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The sharp increase in flexible and externalised work patterns over recent decades has caused 
concern on the part of trade unions and national and international organisations promoting labour 
interests. Industrial and employment relations academics have sought to measure and document 
the changes and consider the space for alternative approaches and outcomes that are more 
favourable to workers and their unions. While the literature is dominated by pessimistic 
perspectives regarding the negative consequences of global trends of flexibilisation and 
employment degradation, research on the potential for the state and other actors to exercise 
agency and regulate the use of labour market flexibility is of the utmost importance. Against this 
background, this thesis makes a notable contribution. It provides in-depth, contextual case study 
analysis from South Africa of both current strategies of temporary employment services (TES) 
firms and of experts’ views regarding the current and likely impact of legislative interventions 
aimed at regulating temporary agency work. 
In South Africa the comparatively privileged political and institutional position of trade unions 
combined with prevailing societal views regarding the necessity to protect workers against 
abuse, has underpinned a radical intervention by government in the form of legislation 
mandating parity in treatment between temporary agency and permanent employees, and 
including a provision whereby temporary employment service workers are ‘deemed’ to be 
employees of the client firm after a period of three months.  
This thesis presents empirical evidence on trends and drivers in temporary agency work in South 
Africa, uniquely drawing on in-depth interviews with industry experts addressing the experience 
and perspectives of the primary players, namely temporary employment firms, clients, workers 
and trade unions. This data is supplemented by interviews with various legal experts regarding 
the likely consequences of the regulatory changes and other secondary evidence.    
The findings highlight the quantitative scale of temporary employment services in South Africa. 
The need for some qualification of dualisation theories is suggested in that many workers remain 
on the books of TES firms and can therefore be seen as ‘partial insiders.’ While experts reported 
a reduction in prevalence of the most unscrupulous and unregulated TES firms as a consequence 
of the new legal framework, increasing use of ‘master vendor’ contracts seeking to avoid 
regulatory scrutiny was also identified. The legislation, as interpreted in recent court decisions, 
has the potential to effect very significant change in employer responsibilities towards TES 
workers. However, the potential for this to materialise in practice was seen to be limited due to 
the weakness of labour market enforcement mechanisms. For their part, South African trade 
unions are faced with multiple internal and operational challenges that impede their effectiveness 
in representing TES workers.  
The findings highlight the value of in-depth case study research of temporary employment 
practices within national institutional and regulatory frameworks and contribute to debates 
around actor agency and social movement responses to dominant economic trends. Limitations 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction and context 
The academic literature on labour markets and employment highlights dramatic changes in 
employment patterns. Although precise data about the scale and nature of changes is elusive, 
‘atypical’ employment practices and the use of flexible and externalised labour have expanded 
dramatically over the last thirty years (Eurofound, 2008; Cotton, 2015). The standard 
employment model is becoming less dominant in advanced economies (ILO, 2015a) and starting 
in the 1990’s, earnest attention has been given to the development of this trend (Prosser, 2015). 
The ILO (2015a) has indicated that wage and salaried employment accounts for about half of 
global employment and covers as few as 20 per cent of workers in regions such as sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Moreover, nearly six out of ten wage and salaried workers worldwide are 
in either part-time or temporary forms of employment (ILO, 2015a).   
 
Academics identify these developments as being underpinned by powerful economic, political 
and social pressures and trends (Blossfeld et al, 2005; Deutschmann, 2011). International 
economic organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have promoted 
a strongly neoliberal vision of economic growth and management, which has come to dominate 
thinking and policy implementation at regional and national levels (Deutschmann, 2011). 
Multinational companies have taken advantage of the increasingly liberal institutional framework 
for international trade and developments in communication and technology, to pursue 
globalisation strategies maximising flexibility and economic benefits (Blossfeld et al, 2005; 
Deutschmann, 2011). Financial measures and the interests of financial institutions are 
increasingly prioritised, dominating social and employment considerations (Thompson, 2003; 
Blossfeld et al, 2005; Deutschmann, 2011).  
 
The decline in prevalence of standard employment models and parallel rise in flexible and 
externalised work patterns has caused great alarm and concern on the part of trade unions and 
national and international organisations promoting labour interests such as the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). For their part, industrial and employment relations academics and 
work sociologists have sought to measure and document the changes and, crucially, consider the 
space for alternative approaches and outcomes that are more favourable to workers and their 
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trade unions (Vosko, 1997; Summers, 1997; Pfeffer and Baron, 1998; Kalleberg, 2000; Roux, 
2010; Le Roux, 2009; Cotton, 2013; Cotton, 2015).     
 
In this regard, recent literature has highlighted the importance of the careful study of national 
contexts (Coe et al, 2009; Knox, 2010; Mitlacher et al, 2014) and a variety of studies have 
considered the extent to which there are national variations in temporary staffing markets (Forde, 
2001; Ward, 2003; Peck and Theodore, 1998; Mitlacher, 2007a; Coe et al, 2009; Vosko, 2000; 
Mitlacher et al, 2015; Kalleberg et al, 2015; Knox, 2018). The significance of national settings is 
often related to the inimitable regulatory frameworks and the complex set of employment 
relations that exist on a country by country basis (Knox, 2010). Regulation therefore being an 
important context for temporary employment agency workers as different institutional 
frameworks and regulatory approaches will influence the deployment and use of these workers in 
particular ways (Knox, 2010; Mitlacher, 2007).   
 While the necessity for and potential of close contextual case studies is emphasised, these are 
few and far between (Knox, 2010, Knox, 2018). A primary reason for this lies in the complex 
and resource intensive nature of research designs aimed at undertaking a contextually rooted 
examination of the drivers and regulation of flexible employment practices. In this regard, a PhD 
thesis provides an opportunity to undertake such a study and the aim of this thesis is to attempt to 
do so with regard to the South African case.    
 
In line with the above trends, there has been considerable growth in the number of temporary 
employment services (TES) workers in South Africa since 2000. Temporary agency working, or 
‘labour broking’ as it is known in South Africa, is the placement of workers by a TES in a client 
company. Despite the importance of TES work, the official labour market statistics in South 
Africa do not record the number of workers who are placed by temporary employment agencies 
(Benjamin, 2013). However, Bhorat et al. (2016) estimated that there were just under one million 
temporary jobs in 2014. The TES industry is worth 44 billion rand, employs around 19 500 
internal staff and just over one million TES workers, which constitutes 7.5 percent of total 
employment in the South Africa market and is likely to grow further (Aletter and van Eck, 2016). 
Yet the use of temporary employment agencies in South Africa is plagued by controversy as it is 
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perceived as a cheaper alternative to permanent employment with the accompanying labour-
related obligations (ILO, 2011; Senne and Nkomo, 2015).  
Despite there being a genuine need for TESs to provide short-term placements for workers, a 
system of ‘permanent casuals’ developed where workers were kept on temporary contracts that 
‘rolled over’ for years and provided cheap labour for South African companies (Dickson, 2015, 
p.5). For most of South Africa’s recent past, TES workers did not have the same employment 
security or pay afforded to other workers and there has been heated debate about how these 
abuses should be resolved (Theron, 2005). As a nation in search of jobs (Bhorat, 2012), few 
debates are more important in South Africa than the nature and regulation of work. This research 
is motivated by these controversies, concerns and debates. 
1.2. Prior research and rationale  
During the 2000s when the growth in temporary agency work was an international trend, 
numerous academics and authors provided insight into the legalities and realities of the TES 
relationship in South Africa. For example, Theron (2005) looked at how the notion of the 
temporary employment service was adopted both in South Africa and internationally, and how 
the South African TES relationship was constructed with reference to the ILO. A few years later, 
Theron, (2008) dealt with the impact of labour legislation on the South African economy and the 
capacity of law to respond to social change. In this context, he addressed the question of how 
labour regulation should respond to the growth of services and the triangulation of employment 
from a global and local level. Whereas Benjamin (2009), focused on decent work and non-
standard employees, looking specifically at the options for legislative reform in South Africa. 
Benjamin (2009) provided an understanding of the legal relationship that underlies the operation 
of temporary employment services and an overview of the regulation of labour broking in South 
Africa at that time. He called for an appropriate regulatory framework to prevent the widespread 
abuse that resulted from the exploitative use of TESs in South Africa.  
 
In this ‘pre-amendment period’, referring to the period prior to the promulgation of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No.6) (LRAA) which sees to further regulate temporary agency 
employment in South Africa, the struggles of the South African precarious, casual and informal 
workers were well documented and located within a number of specific sectors. Examples of 
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these studies include those in retail (Kenny and Webster, 1999; Kenny 2007); metal engineering, 
glass, and paper industries (Barchiesi, 2010); mining (Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009, Forrest, 
2015), forestry and agriculture (Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009); and cleaning (Bezuidenhout 
and Fakier, 2006).  
 
In addition, the role and struggles of organised labour in representing an increasingly casualised, 
externalised and precarious South African labour force was scrutinised. For example, Barchiesi 
and Kenny, (2008) found that due to high unemployment, the proliferation of contingent 
occupations, and growing labour market fragmentation, unions were at risk of being 
marginalised unless they rebuilt alliances with activists and social movements articulating the 
struggles of non-union workers, the unemployed, and marginalised communities. They found a 
contingency of localised labour-community collaborations and reported growing precariousness 
and social vulnerability in wage employment. Similarly, Kenny (2011) examined the ‘mall 
committee’, a new organisational form introduced by the South African Commercial Catering 
and Allied Workers Union to facilitate accessing and representing precarious women workers in 
the retail sector. Kenny (2011) found an enduring movement by worker activists to confront 
conditions within their broader context but claimed that the way in which these networks 
emerged in practice, indicated the reproduction of hierarchies which marginalised precarious 
workers.  
 
During 2009/2010 proposed amendments to labour laws were being debated and the TES 
industry came under intense scrutiny as it awaited legislative reform. At this time, the social 
partners engaged in negotiations about this issue at the National Economic Development Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) and were unable to reach consensus on future reforms. Importantly, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU) were in favour of a legislative ban on labour broking. Although it was relatively 
certain that South Africa’s labour legislation would be amended, it was not clear what form the 
amendments would take. Whilst the African National Congress (ANC) preferred a regulatory 
solution, COSATU maintained its call for a complete ban of labour broking. Persuasive research 
was conducted about the legal situation that prevailed, and the debate around whether prohibition 
or regulation was the most suitable option for curbing abusive practices in the TES industry 
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(Brand, 2010). For example, Harvey (2011) considered the long-standing debate as to whether 
labour broker and workers’ rights could co-exist in South Africa. Labour activists had called for 
the industry to be banned outright, complaining of exploitation in the workplace. Conversely, 
economists and researchers warned that this would impact negatively on the economy as 
statistics revealed a growth in the TES sector which they argued showed that the industry created 
jobs. Harvey (2011) believed that it was not the existence of labour brokers, but rather the 
legislative fiction that the broker was the employer, that resulted in the rights violations and the 
calls to ban the industry. It was this legislative fiction that needed to be removed through 
statutory amendment.  
 
Moreover, during this transition period before the amendments, a slew of research was 
conducted comparing the South African TES industry, and more specifically its legal framework, 
to that of Namibia (Botes, 2015). The reason being that since the implementation of amendments 
to the Namibian Labour Act 11 of 2007 (NLA) in 2007, attempts had been made to ban 'labour 
hire' in Namibia. Policymakers in both Namibia and South Africa were grappling with the 
regulation of agency work. Namibia had taken the lead and adopted legislation that strictly 
regulated agency work, whereas at that time South Africa draft bills had been published that 
sought to strike a balance between recognising TES work and providing security for agency 
workers (Van Eck, 2010). This all in the context of the ILO and the European Union (EU) 
having recognised triangular agency work arrangements. Despite these international trends, 
Namibia had introduced measures that established barriers against such work, which some 
academics believed would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
 
Van Eck (2012) compared the regulation of employment agencies in South Africa and Namibia, 
and the role played by the Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (No.181). The 
argument was that a prohibition of employment agencies would contravene international 
standards even though the ILO convention dealing with employment agencies had not been 
adopted. He believed that it had already had an influence on developments in Southern Africa 
where arguments in favour of the banning of employment agencies had been placed on hold. 
However, trade unionists and politicians in both South Africa and Namibia had articulated calls 
for a total prohibition of temporary employment services. Benjamin (2013) traced the evolution 
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of the interwoven debates on the regulation of temporary employment services in these two 
countries. Before doing so, he also located the issue within an international and comparative 
context. Similarly, van Eck (2014) considered the regulation of employment agencies in Namibia 
and South Africa, focusing on the lessons that could be learnt from the decent work and 
flexicurity approaches. Botes’ (2015) research warned that the South African Government should 
take note of the history of labour hire in Namibia and the risks involved when there was a lack of 
regulation for labour brokers. Botes’ recommendation was that the South African Government 
should follow the Namibian Government’s example by passing the new amended legislation as 
soon as possible to prevent any further disadvantageous treatment of employees associated with 
labour brokers. 
 
During this period of uncertainty prior to the amendments, researchers also focused on the cost 
of the changes and the anticipated effect on the South African labour market. For example, 
Bhorat and van der Westhuizen (2010) conducted a cost-benefit analysis associated with the 
LRA Amendment Bill 20101. One of their findings suggested a significant number of workers 
appeared to have been working for the same employer for between three and five years in non-
permanent employment positions and that the proposed amendments would improve job security 
for these workers. Bhorat, Cassim and Yu, (2014, p.1) observed that surprisingly little academic 
research had been undertaken concerning the TES sector, ‘be it simple ‘bean-counting’ exercises 
or more serious modelling work’. To close this gap in the literature, they researched the demand-
side incentive to employers who opted for hiring TES workers. Their general focus was on the 
assessment of the role played by the TES sector in contributing to employment and output 
growth in post-apartheid South Africa. Broadly stated, they found that TES earnings had kept 
between three and seven percent of households above the poverty line and constituted over 
300 000 households in the economy. Households with TES earnings were found to be better off 
than households without TES earnings, which suggested the pro-poor impact of TES 
employment. Furthermore, the TES sector contributed about nine percent to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 2013, which was significant in the context of South Africa’s low levels of 
economic growth. The TES industry, through offering flexible employment arrangements, had 
become an important driver of employment and output growth.  
 




Shortly before the implementation of the amendments in 2015, broader, more holistic research 
was conducted by Benjamin, (2012); Benjamin, (2013) and Budlender (2013) as part of several 
research studies prepared in 2013 for the ILO on the impact of the Private Employment Agencies 
Convention, 1997 (No. 181). These studies focused on laws, regulations and practices relating to 
the work of private employment agencies. Empirical and statistical aspects of private 
employment agencies in South Africa were considered.  
 
Just prior to, and shortly after the implementation of the 2015 amendments, a scattering of 
studies looked at different aspects of South African temporary agency or precarious work. 
Theron (2014b) considered the legal reforms from a wider, non-standard workers’ perspective. 
He concludes that the amendments to the LRA 1995 were a first step to the inclusion of non-
standard workers in the system. He however emphasised the importance of effective organisation 
of workers in non-standard employment, which he believed would not be achieved without a 
comprehensive strategy that addressed these workers’ needs. Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) 
defined the notion of South African labour broking, examining its trends and legal reforms. 
Senne and Nkomo’s (2015) case study at two higher education institutions, highlighted the 
influence of labour broking on employment practices. They focused on the Employment Equity 
Act 1998 (No. 55) provisions in the light of the LRAA of 2014. They found that employment 
equity policies and practices did not include employees in the cleaning and gardening job 
categories who were recruited through labour brokers. Dickinson (2015) outlined how casual 
workers ended labour broking in the South African Post Office (SAPO). He analysed how this 
took place, the challenges that the SAPO casual workers faced in organising, and the strategies 
and tactics that led to their eventual victory. SAPO had hoped that this victory would be a source 
of guidance for other precarious workers.  
 
From a union perspective, Paret (2015) was concerned with the growing precariousness of the 
working class. He believed that the declining significance of unions had given rise to precarious 
politics: non-union struggles by insecurely employed and low-income groups. The research 
looked at the conditions under which unions incorporate these struggles as part of a broader 
labour movement in communities in California, USA and Gauteng, South Africa. It was found 
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that unions became fused with precarious politics in California but were separated from them in 
Gauteng. Whereas unions in California understood that non-citizen workers were central to their 
own revitalisation, the close relationship between unions and the state in Gauteng created 
distance from community struggles. Aletter and van Eck (2016) considered the compliance of the 
2015 amendments with the ILO standards, with shortfalls being identified and suggestions made 
for future changes to the regulatory framework. Whereas, Bhorat et al. (2016) uncovered the 
growth traps and opportunities for the South African economy, with a focus on underlying labour 
market dynamics. Bhorat et al. (2016) reveal inter alia the skills-biased labour demand path of 
the South African economy and a rising trend in the use of labour brokers to source temporary 
workers.  
 
Cassim and Casale (2018) examined whether there was a wage penalty for labour broker 
employees and, if so, its magnitude. They confirmed that temporary employment services could 
not be accurately identified in recent labour force surveys. However, during 2015 the South 
African Revenue Services and the National Treasury made company and employee income tax 
data available which explicitly captured labour brokers and employee wages. Their study used 
this data to examine whether there was a wage penalty for labour broker employees and, if so, its 
magnitude. They believed that this empirical evidence was important in debates on the sector’s 
role in the South African labour market. They found that there was a large penalty of around 30 
percent associated with TES employment in South Africa, when using total earnings. 
 
For more than two decades researchers have emphasised the growth and importance of the TES 
industry in South Africa. While there has been a good deal of research, much of this has been 
narrow in focus and there is a need for more recent evidence regarding trends in TES work and 
the impact of the 2015 regulations. This research fills this gap as it considers the newly amended 
legislation post 2015, within the historical, political, social and economic context. It is based on 
34 in-depth interviews with manager and director-level experts in the TES industry in South 
Africa. Many of these participants are experienced legal professionals and acting labour court 
judges who were required to assess and interpret the new legislation. Their influence on and 
knowledge of the industry is critical, however their input is neglected in previous research. Many 
large TES firms and clients that were interviewed expressed their reliance on their legal teams to 
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assist them in navigating what they believed to be technical and complex legal provisions, during 
a time of uncertainty. This research includes their contributions and considers TES work in 
South Africa from the TES worker, client, firm and the union perspective. 
 
1.3. Contribution of this thesis 
The South African case is of particular interest at present because recent developments in the 
country constitute something of a natural experiment regarding the potential to regulate flexible 
employment practices so as to better protect workers. Following the end of apartheid and the first 
free and fair elections, the elected ANC government set out an institutional framework for labour 
relations promoting collective regulation of employment. In addition, South African trade 
unions, who were so central to the civil rights movement to end apartheid, occupy a privileged 
position under the new regime. The unions’ position combined with prevailing societal views 
regarding the necessity to protect workers against abuse, has provided for a radical intervention 
by the government in the form of legislation mandating parity in treatment between temporary 
agency and permanent employees, including a provision whereby temporary employment service 
workers are ‘deemed’ to be employees of the client firm after a period of three months (Section 
(3)(b)(i) of the LRA 1995).  
 
By assessing empirical evidence on temporary employment agency working in South Africa, this 
thesis provides new insights into the views, responses, roles and functions of temporary 
employment firms, clients, workers and unions and how these key groups operate within the TES 
industry. In so doing, it addresses South African temporary agency work holistically, 
incorporating empirical data from the legal profession in South Africa, including senior 
employment law solicitors / attorneys, barristers / advocates, and judges of the Labour Court. 
These individuals shape the opinions and perspectives of the key groups involved and are 
relevant given the recent and important regulatory changes in South Africa. In addition, it sets 
the context for South African agency working by reference to both historical regulation and 
recent trends in the South African temporary employment agency labour market. It outlines 
measures to regulate TES work against the framework of current and proposed institutional 
structures and discusses the views and likely impact of these within the context of the literature 
on flexibility and atypical employment. 
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 In conducting this research, the famous words by the Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci 
(1891-1937; 1971) are most apt: 
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; 
in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.  
These words have been applied to many varied situations in history and are an interesting insight, 
referring to a transition period of social, political or legal change where rules and conventions 
seem to bounce around without logic (Business Day Editorial, 2017). In many respects, these 
sentiments relate to this research as the interviews were conducted primarily during 2017, when 
the legal framework for TES workers was newly amended. There was uncertainty about the 
meaning of the sections pertaining to TES workers and their long-term consequences. The ‘old’ 
regulatory system affecting TES work was dying, but the ‘new’ could not be born. During 2015, 
Assign Service (Pty) Ltd v Krost Services & Racking (Pty) Ltd and NUMSA (the ‘Assign matter’) 
was heard before the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and was 
one of the most controversial and eagerly anticipated post amendment cases to unfold. The 
controversy in the Assign matter concerned the interpretation and effect of Section 198A(3)(b)(i) 
of the Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995). This section is important for 
TES work as it concerns the identity of the employer party within the TES relationship. A 
lengthy court process culminated in an appeal being filed with the Constitutional Court (CC) on 
31 July 2017. On 26 July 2018, the Constitutional Court (CC)2 provided clarity in terms of the 
‘sole employer’ or ‘concurrent employer’ debate within the TES employment relationship and 
found that the TES client is the sole employer of the TES worker after three months. The time 
period within which this research took place was a transition period between the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’ and prior to the clarity provided by the CC in the Assign matter. It was a turbulent and 
interesting time for the TES industry, which was evident in some of the participants’ responses, 
many of which were speculative about the future of the industry and revealing in terms of their 
hopes and anxieties. 
Through semi-structured interviews conducted with participants representing a cross-section of 






all three aspects of the triangular employment relationship (client, firm and employee) from a 
national rather than a sector-related perspective. In addition, the views and responses of 
organised labour to the TES industry are assessed, all within the framework of the recent 
legislation amendments. All participants were at the equivalent of director or management level 
and provided expertise and knowledge that revealed a more complex and varied reality of the 
TES industry post the recent legislative amendments. The thesis therefore addresses the broader 
question of the regulation of temporary agency work for the better through the lens of a case 
study of agency working in South Africa, looking at trends, perspectives of key groups and the 
prospects for legal regulation. 
 
1.4. Disciplinary background and focus  
This thesis is intellectually and theoretically located within industrial and employment relations 
and sociology of work literatures. As the research is problem focused it is, like much 
management research, cross-disciplinary in orientation. Insights are gleaned from a number of 
social science subject areas or disciplines which include law and economics in addition to the 
above.  
1.5. Intended contribution  
A primary contribution envisaged for the thesis is a substantive one, namely to conduct an in- 
depth investigation that will facilitate the collection of substantial, high quality empirical data on 
temporary agency work in South Africa; which will feed into the debates regarding the 
precariousness literature by exploring how some temporary agency worker disadvantages can be 
attributed to specific institutional settings. A further contribution of the thesis is the focus on the 
regulation of temporary agency work, and on trade union responses to temporary agency work.   
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
The next chapter, chapter two, will outline the academic context of the thesis by firstly exploring 
the essential characteristics of temporary agency work, its growth, recent trends and challenges, 
and secondly reviewing recent empirical research and theory development on the departure of 
the standard employment relationship, human capital formation, segmentation and dualisation, 
and job quality. Following this, after examining the regulation of temporary agency work from 
an international and state-based perspective, the chapter will discuss union efforts and responses 
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to temporary agency work, with a brief comparison between the global North and global South 
perspectives on temporary agency work. Thereafter the chapter will deal with South Africa as a 
useful case study for temporary agency work, focusing on the difficult economic and social 
conditions, the trade union movement and the specific regulatory environment. The chapter 
concludes with the research questions.  
The following chapter, chapters three, will consist of a review of the South African historical and 
political context for temporary agency work, focusing on the legal framework, the rise and fall of 
the apartheid regime, and the regulatory framework. Following this, chapter four will outline the 
philosophical approach or 'paradigm' (Burrell and Morgan 1979) supporting the research in terms 
of the assumptions made in relation to issues of ontology and epistemology (Smith 1998; 
Bryman 2004). It will then outline the research approach and data collection techniques adopted. 
In addition, how the data was collected, recorded and analysed will be outlined, together with the 
ethical issues and limitations of the study.  
Chapters five to nine will consist of the four main data chapters in which the information 
collected during the empirical research will be presented. Chapter five will provide an overview 
of the South African legal framework pertaining to TES work, chapter six will then set out the 
views of the TES employee, chapter seven discusses the TES firm and eight the TES client. 
Chapter nine outlines union responses to TES work.  
The penultimate chapter, chapter ten, will draw out and discuss the findings in relation to the 
research questions, and how these findings relate to the main concepts and debates in the 
literature review. The final chapter, chapter eleven, will outline the main conclusions arising 





CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The general growth of agency work internationally has generated a wide body of literature 
addressing different aspects of temporary agency work. This chapter reviews this literature and 
builds upon and contributes to current perspectives on agency work. The chapter is divided into 
three main sections, with the first introducing the concepts and key issues surrounding temporary 
agency work more generally, including a review of recent empirical research and theory 
development.  The second section deals specifically with the temporary employment agency 
industry in South Africa, focusing on the difficult economic and social conditions, the specific 
regulatory and collective bargaining environment, and the trade union movement. However, the 
clear distinction between the general literature on temporary agency work and that pertaining to 
the South African context is not always possible. For example, in section 2.14 (that deals with 
the comparative capitalism approach) the general and South African literature is combined in 
order to describe South African varieties of capitalism. The third section concludes with the 
research questions. 
 
Section 1: Temporary employment agency work  
2.1. Essential characteristics of temporary agency work 
Temporary agency work is defined by a relationship between a worker, an agency, and a client 
firm. It involves an employment agreement between an agency and a worker stipulating terms 
and conditions of employment and a commercial agreement that controls the sale of employment 
services between the agency and a client firm (Vosko, 2010, p633). The worker is engaged by 
the agency and there is no direct employment relationship between the client firm and the 
temporary agency worker (Forsyth, 2017), creating a triangular relationship (Vosko, 1997; 
Davidov, 2004; Vosko 2010; Knox, 2018). This work relationship creates a form of externalised 
labour that is known for its impermanence, as neither job assignments nor the employment 
agreement with the agency is ongoing (Knox, 2018). The non-standard nature of this work is a 
departure from the traditional, standard employment relationship (characterised by job security, 
career advancement, wage increases and social benefits) and facilitates greater flexibility in the 
way that firms organise work, enabling them to minimise their risks and responsibilities and 
maximise profits (Knox, 2018).  
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These changes to the traditional employment relationship, which can be seen in the triangular 
relationship, affect the legal, social and psychological constitution of the employment contract 
(Rubery et al, 2002; Mitlacher, 2007b). The precarious nature of this relationship relates to its 
temporary nature but also to the fact that it is indeed triadic (Vosko, 2009; Purcell 2014). The 
reason being that the traditional bilateral employment relationship defines the obligations and 
responsibilities between the employee and employer, whereas this triangular employment 
relationship is characterised by ambiguity with regards to responsibility (Purcell, 2014).  
The ILO (2009c, p.1) has defined temporary agency employment as:  
Employment where the worker is employed by the temporary work agency, and then 
hired out to perform his/her work at (and under the supervision of) the user company. 
There is no employment relationship between the temporary agency worker and the user 
company, although there could be legal obligations of the user company towards the 
temporary agency worker, especially with respect to health and safety. A labour contract 
may be of limited or unspecified duration with no guarantee of continuation. The 
employment is often called ‘temporary work’, ‘temping’ or ‘agency work’. The hiring 
firm pays fees to the agency, and the agency pays the wages (even if the hiring company 
has not yet paid the agency). Flexibility for both worker and employer is a key feature of 
agency work.  
The worker is recognised as being in an employment relationship but because of the multiple 
parties involved, there may be limitations imposed on the rights of the worker or confusion 
regarding rights, particularly if the worker has provided services at the user firm for an extended 
period of time (ILO, 2015). 
Theron (2005) argues that the difficulties with the temporary employment agency relationship 
are evident in the way that the ILO definition is constructed. The client or user company is 
designated as the third party which suggests that the primary relationship is between the party 
providing the service (the agency) and the worker. Yet the user company or client is the party 
that determines what labour or services are required and the parameters of the relationship. The 
user company is the dominant party in the relationship. It is therefore peculiar that the agent or 
provider of the service is identified as the employer because other than remunerating the worker, 
the temporary employment agency does not perform other employer functions (Theron 2005; Le 
Roux, 2009). A further peculiarity of temporary agency work is that the worker works at the site 
of the client and not that of the agency (Mitlacher, 2007b). Rubery et al (2002) point out several 
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difficulties that may be experienced by the temporary agency worker, primarily because the 
worker works at the premises of a client who has no contractual relationship with that worker. 
These include difficulties with supervision and control; initiating disciplinary processes; 
verifying information; grievance procedures; health and safety; equal pay concerns; duties of 
loyalty and confidentiality; and trade union rights (Rubery et al, 2002).   
2.2. The growth of temporary agency work 
The International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT, 2015) reports that 
60.9 million people gained access to work through the recruitment and employment industry 
during 2013, 40.2 million of these via temporary agency work. The biggest market for agency 
work is still the USA, with 11 million people engaged in this type of work. China is close behind 
with 10.8 million people, although the nature of agency work in China is not fully comparable to 
that in other countries (CIETT, 2015). Based on 2012 data, Japan is the third biggest market with 
2.4 million individuals (CIETT, 2015). For the same period, South Africa is reported to have had 
784,434 people in agency work and in the UK 1,155,900 people (CIETT, 2015). Agency work 
delivered the largest part of the sales revenue of the employment and recruitment industry, with 
CIETT reporting that it comprises 68 percent of its global sales revenue (CIETT, 2015). The 
penetration rate is the amount of agency workers as a share of the total working population 
(CIETT, 2015).  During 2013, the USA, Japan and Europe all saw an increase in their 
penetration rates, bringing them closer together: 1.7 percent, 2.0 percent and 2.1 percent for 
Europe, Japan and the USA respectively (CIETT, 2015). In 2013, around the world 12 million 
people were employed daily as agency workers. 
2.3. Trends in temporary agency working 
Earlier research focused on agency workers being used by organisations as a means of providing 
numerical flexibility in response to fluctuating product demand or for short term specialist tasks. 
This created human resource and people management challenges, primarily because of the 
triangular employment relationship created between worker, agency and user firm (Grimshaw et 
al, 2001; Forde and Slater, 2016). More recently, developments in the temporary employment 
agency industry include inter alia, four important trends:   
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• The increasingly complex set of contractual arrangements between agencies and user 
firms. These may include more managed, collaborative arrangements (Forde and Slater, 
2016); 
• A change in the regulatory environment surrounding the supply of temporary workers, in 
that agency temps are treated equally compared to directly employed workers (Forde and 
Slater, 2016);  
• An increase in regulatory avoidance in the temporary agency worker sector (Knox, 
2018); and 
• The express or formal, statutory allocation of employer responsibilities between the 
agency and the client within the triangular employment relationship (Davidov, 2004). 
Related to this trend, is the debate around joint and several liability between the agency 
and the client. 
Growing international price competition and fluid capital markets pressurise firms to maximise 
profitability and respond to rapidly changing consumer tastes and preferences (Eichhorst et al, 
2019). As a result, corporations are increasingly outsourcing many of their functions, leading to 
the ‘fissuring’ of the workplace and the proliferation of subcontracting relationships (Weil, 
2014). In addition, the expansion of the service sector necessitates that employers engage staff 
for their organisations on a 24-hour, seven day a week basis (Eichhorst et al, 2019). Together, 
these changes have made fixed costs and overhead obligations less bearable for employers and 
have led to the rise of non-standard work arrangements (Eichhorst et al, 2019).  
In the past, these non-standard contractual arrangements were based on what Forde and Slater 
(2016) term ‘spot’ contracting where the client firm chooses between many different suppliers of 
agency services. These contractual relationships were usually short term and for easily replaced 
skills, similar to the ‘flexible firm’ model (Pollert, 1988). From the 1990’s onwards, the 
contractual arrangements between the client and the agency firm no longer resembled the ‘spot’ 
contracts of the past. Agencies developed long-term contracts with firms to supply large numbers 
of temps to firms on ‘quasi-continuous’ basis (Peck and Theodore, 1998; Coe et al., 2010; Forde 
and Slater, 2016, p.314). The characteristics of these relationships included ‘permatemps’, 




The latter half of the 1990s saw the negotiation of ‘block contracts’ in some sectors such as 
financial services (Hoque et al, 2008, p.390). These contracts frequently involve a hands-on role 
for the employment agency often including a manager from the employment business working 
on site at the client firm (Forde and Slater, 2016, p.314). Other additional services are often 
provided by the agency firm, such as HR activities, payroll management, training and appraisals. 
An example of this type of relationship is the ‘preferred supplier’ approach where the client firm 
utilises multiple agencies but develops a close relationship with one agency and may receive 
discounted rates for buying in bulk (Kirkpatrick et al, 2011; Forde and Slater, 2016). There are 
also ‘sole supplier’ arrangements, where the client firm contracts with only one agency (Forde 
and Slater, 2016, p.315), and ‘preferred, high volume supply relationships’ (Druker and 
Stanworth 2004, p.58) offering special prices and discounts for volume purchases. ‘Master 
vendor’ contracts are where the client organisation engages a sole agency as ‘master vendor’ to 
meet all the client’s needs at a reduced cost (Hoque et al, 2008, p.391).  
Hoque et al (2008) itemises some potential benefits for employers as a result of the increase in 
collaboration between clients and agencies. It may result in a more engaged model with a 
broader range of attributes than price and result in reduced purchase costs. There is also the 
potential to improve the quality of placement matching especially where agencies are used to fill 
core professional roles. As agencies and clients work more collaboratively, there may be an 
increase in information-sharing, with joint learning and problem solving (Grimshaw et al, 2004). 
High frequency of contact between agency and client means agencies acquire ‘substantial tacit 
knowledge’ of client needs (Hoque et al, 2008). However, increasing the interdependency 
between agencies and employers may play a role in ‘co-producing’ HR services, possibly 
inflating the demand for temporary workers beyond what might otherwise have been required 
(Hoque et al, 2008, p. 114). 
Although temporary agency work may yield benefits, it has been associated with substandard, 
insecure and often highly intensive work, inferior pay and a range of detrimental mental and 
physical outcomes for workers (Forde et al., 2015). These problems are often associated with the 
fact that temporary agency work inhabits a legal ‘grey zone’ (Stanford, 2017, p.385). 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the requirement that agency temps are treated equally comparable to 
directly employed workers in user firms has been introduced in various contexts (Forde and 
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Slater, 2016). However, in the UK for example, there remains a difference between day one 
rights and those that apply during a continuous assignment of twelve weeks or more (Forde and 
Slater, 2016). Section 2.6 below considers attempts to regulate temporary agency work in more 
detail.  
Related to changes in the regulatory environment of the temporary agency work sector, is the 
recent trend of regulatory avoidance (Knox, 2018). Regulatory avoidance has intensified and 
expanded, normalising exploitation and further exacerbating precarious work and its detrimental 
outcomes (Knox, 2018). Temporary agencies are being used to avoid workplace laws and other 
statutory obligations, undermining the coverage and effectiveness of regulation established to 
maintain minimum labour standards and to protect against the immediate and broader social 
effects of precarious employment (Quinlan, 2012; Knox, 2018). Regulatory avoidance produces 
a range of problems, including increasing level of casualisation, leading to increased job 
insecurity and systemic work insecurity (Knox, 2018). The temporary employment sector has 
further been accused of developing elaborate strategies to avoid regulation, circumvent collective 
bargaining, bypass formally binding collective agreements, and undercut pay and conditions 
(Knox, 2018; Doellgast and Greer, 2007). These strategies illustrate the importance of examining 
how regulatory avoidance is constructed and played out within specific national contexts within 
the temporary agency industry. 
An additional, central problem relating to the triangular employment relationship concerns the 
identity of the legal employer of the worker - the agency or the user firm (Davidov, 2004). 
Usually, the user firm assumes that the employer is the agency and the agencies rely on this 
assumption when offering services, but this is not always the reality (Davidov, 2004). The 
concept of ‘exercise of control’ is often central to the analysis of determining employment status 
(Glynn, 2011). This aspect of the analysis is important as a firm is not legally accountable unless 
it exercises sufficient control over workers' activities to be deemed an employer (Fudge, 2006; 
Glynn, 2011). If a firm can avoid exercising control by externalising production, it avoids the 
employment-related regulatory costs it would bear if it produced goods and services internally 
(Glynn, 2011). Consequently, identifying employees and their employer is important for 
attributing responsibility for costs and risks of utilising labour (Fudge, 2006).  
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Allocating employer responsibilities between the agency and the client within the triangular 
employment relationship is tricky because the recruitment, dismissal and employment functions 
usually undertaken by the employer are outsourced to an intermediary, while the ‘task’ side of 
the relationship is not outsourced (Davies and Friedland, 2004, p.141; Benjamin, 2016b). The 
intermediary administers the employment relationship, while the client exercises control over the 
worker’s daily activities (Benjamin, 2016b). In addition, ascertaining the organisation 
responsible for complying with governmental regulations, the liability for work related accidents 
and other aspects of the employment relationship is also problematic (Kalleberg, 2000). Debates 
regarding these issues are often framed around principles of joint employer or co-employment 
(Kalleberg, 2000; ILO, 2016), as assigning liability to multiple firms helps mitigate the cost 
advantages employers may gain from outsourcing or subcontracting (Deakin 2003; Adams and 
Deakin, 2014).  
Joint and several liability is a common labour law technique for ascribing employment related 
responsibilities to organisations involved in a common enterprise (Fudge, 2006; ILO, 2016). This 
measure is often found in the regulation of temporary agency work in both the developed and 
developing countries, particularly in relation to wages and social security entitlements (ILO, 
2016). For example, in the United States of America, joint employment may be found when 
control and supervision over a worker’s activity is shared by different entities (ILO, 2016). The 
joint employers are severally or collectively responsible for the obligations arising from the 
employment relationship under a given act (ILO, 2016). In the United Kingdom (UK), joint and 
several liability is an accepted method in tort law for ascribing responsibility to separate entities 
engaged in a common enterprise (Fudge, 2006). Similarly, joint liability rules between the TES 
client and the TES firm are found in Argentina, France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Namibia, 
Ontario (Canada) and South Africa (ILO, 2016). 
2.4. Issues and challenges arising from temporary agency work 
The triangular employment working relationship and the commercial exchange between the 
client firm and the agency over the sale of the workers’ labour power, shapes the quality and 
character of temporary agency work (Vosko, 2010). As a result of this unique contractual 
arrangement, temporary agency workers are often susceptible to practices constraining their 
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politico-legal freedoms. For example, they often waive their right to choose their worksite, their 
direct employer, and their preferred type of work as they may be assigned to work locations 
without regard for their skills set (Vosko 2010). This disjuncture of responsibility and control 
over their physical surroundings, coupled with a lack of training can lead to problems in the area 
of occupational health and safety (Trebilcock, 1997).  
In addition, the high mobility of labour supplied affects the quality of the work performed (Coe 
et al., 2009). In this regard, temporary employment agency workers typically bear a heightened 
risk of performing substandard work, have reduced career opportunities, along with higher injury 
rates, and a lack of income security that affects living standards and financial independence 
(Knox, 2010; Knox, 2018). They have also reported difficulties obtaining bank loans, finding 
accommodation in the private rental market and maintaining relationships because of this lack of 
financial or employment security (Knox, 2018). 
Wages and working conditions are key competitive factors for agencies, particularly where client 
firms operate in internationally exposed product markets (Alsos and Evans, 2018). These 
competitive factors may hamper collective action among temporary agency employees, which in 
turn exerts pressure on labour standards and collective wage regulation institutions (Arrowsmith, 
2008). Further problems arise as a result of low levels of unionisation and/or coverage under 
collective agreements, such as relatively low wages (which may be a product of the mark-up on 
the ‘invisible fee’ that agencies charge the client), limited access to social benefits and 
entitlements (Vosko, 2010, p.634). Due to the temporary nature of the work, they establish 
occupational connections with multiple entities rather than one and are often dismissed with little 
or no notice (Vosko, 2010). A recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (2019) noted that non-standard workers are 50 percent less likely to 
be unionised than standard employees and, in some countries, 40-50 percent less likely to receive 
income support when out of work. Addressing these problems may differ depending both on a 
country's labour relations institutions and the legislation governing liability and compensation in 
case of accident or injury (Trebilcock, 1997). 
2.5. Understanding temporary agency work 
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Recent empirical research and theory development that allows for a better understanding of 
temporary agency work is considered under four sub-sections. The first discusses the move from 
the standard employment model towards increased externalisation, and the second deals with the 
importance of human capital formation. Thereafter, the third looks at the importance of the 
segmentation and dualisation theories, and finally the concept of job quality is considered. 
 
2.5.1. From the standard employment model to increased externalisation 
The standard employment model, defined by the ILO (2015a, p.13) as a ‘model, in which 
workers earn wages and salaries in a dependent employment relationship vis-à-vis their 
employers, have stable jobs and work full time’, was the norm for industrialised nations of the 
twentieth century and formed the basis of the framework within which labour law, collective 
bargaining and social security systems developed (Summers, 1997; Kalleberg, 2000). There has 
been a decline in long-term employment and job stability in industrialised countries. However, 
the standard employment relationship remains the dominant form of work relationship in 
European economies (Adams and Deakin, 2014). The cause of this decline has been attributed to 
rising skills levels, growing competition, growth in technology and the free movement of capital, 
goods and services across national borders (Supiot, 1999; Fudge, 2012). One of the 
consequences of the decline in the standard employment relationship, is that millions of workers 
are finding themselves outside the ambit and protection of labour laws (Davidov and Langille, 
2006). In the context of these changes, the future role of labour law as a tool for worker 
protection, is a recurrent theme and has often been termed a ‘crisis’ (Tekle, 2010).  
There is voluminous literature about non-standard forms of work and an ongoing debate 
concerning their classification (Mitlacher, 2007b; Kalleberg, 2015). Different terms are used in 
the literature: flexible labour or flexible forms of employment (Cotton, 2015; Jahn, Riphahn and 
Schnabel, 2012), contingent work (Summers, 1997; Kalleberg, 2000; Mitlacher, 2007b), non-
traditional (Kalleberg 2000) or atypical work (Peers, 2013).  The ILO considers the following 
employment arrangements to be non-standard: temporary employment; contractual arrangements 
involving multiple parties, including temporary agency work; ambiguous employment 
relationships, including dependent self-employment and disguised employment relationships; 
and part-time employment (ILO, 2015). What these categories have in common, is that they 
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depart from the standard employment relationship, which is based on full time employment, an 
indefinite contract, performed at the employer’s site and direction (Summers, 1997; Kalleberg, 
2000; Mitlacher, 2007b; Theron, 2014). Adams and Deakin (2014, p. 787) define non-standard 
work as ‘any working arrangement that lacks one or more of the key temporal or physical 
dimensions of the SER [standard employment relationship]’. Common characteristics of 
different types of non-standard work are that they do not fit within traditional economic and legal 
boundaries and are usually associated with poor working conditions and low labour standards 
(Fudge, 2012).  
One of the ways that non-standard employment can be examined is by focusing on the broad 
concept of externalisation (Le Roux, 2009). Organisational theory takes for granted the existence 
of a workforce that is subjected to hierarchical and bureaucratic control and who are ‘attached’ to 
the organisation, with a clear boundary between those who are inside the organisation and those 
that are not (Pfeffer and Baron, 1998). As the employment relationship changed over time, many 
labour norms associated with the standard employment contract were diluted (Deakin, 2002; 
Hayter and Ebisui, 2013). A continuum of employment relationships has developed, ranging 
from long-term attachments between workers and organisations, under bureaucratic control, to 
relationships where workers have weak attachments to the organisation with regard to physical 
location, administrative control or duration of employment (Pfeffer and Baron, 1998). 
This trend towards diminished attachments or increased externalisation can be found in three 
dimensions: externalisation of place; externalisation through diminishing the duration of the 
employment; and externalisation of the administrative control or who has responsibility for the 
worker. Each of these is a distinct form of externalisation (Pfeffer and Baron, 1998). 
Externalisation of place is where the workers are taken out of the workplace, not because the job 
requires it, but for other reasons. An example of this is working from home. Externalisation 
through diminishing the duration of the employment occurs when workers are hired for a limited 
duration or, if they are ‘continuous but part time’, which diminishes their attachment with the 
organisation (Pfeffer and Baron, 1998,p. 264).With regard to externalisation in terms of 
administrative control, firms are removing their task activities from their own administrative 
control, either by hiring temporary or contract workers who remain on another’s payroll, while 
under the direction of the firm (Pfeffer and Baron, 1998).  The externalisation of administrative 
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control may create a detached or triangular employment relationship, where a worker establishes 
a connection with more than one employer (Vosko, 1997; Kalleberg, 2000; Summers, 1997). It is 
in line with this thinking that externalisation is described by Cotton (2015, p. 139.) as obtaining 
labour from outside of a corporation’s boundaries, linked to outsourcing and contracting out, 
motioning a change in the employment relationship with the introduction of a third party.  
2.5.2. Human capital formation 
‘Human capital formation’ is understood as the process of investment and accumulation of a set 
of skills, abilities and productivity characteristics acquired by an individual along their life cycle 
(Eichhorst et al, 2017). The human capital theory predicts that individuals with higher human 
capital have higher earnings. Global evidence confirms that generally the higher the level of 
educational attainment, the higher the probability of finding employment (World Development 
Report, 2007). Since the works of Schultz (1964) and Becker (1962), the role of human capital 
formation has become central to discussions about the development of individual potentials and 
their performance in the labour market, and the success of societies to improve the overall 
wellbeing of their citizens (Eichhorst et al, 2019).  
The International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT, 2000),3 
acknowledged that the lack of investment in human capital was one of the main concerns with 
temporary agency work. The lack of training offered to temporary agency workers can be framed 
in terms of the human capital theory (Storrie, 2015). Problems arise because temporary agency 
workers are only at the user firm for a limited period and are usually employed by the agency. 
Training would therefore not take place at the user firm and would be provided mostly by the 
agency (Storrie, 2015). As a result, difficulties arise in finding appropriate means of financing 
investment in human capital. The skills required for agency work are not firm-specific and 
according to human capital theory, firms will not be prepared to fully finance non-firm specific 
human capital as they may not be able to reap the return on their investment if the worker leaves 
their employment (Storrie, 2003). In addition, the inclination to resign may be high as the agency 
worker may be poached on assignment at the user firm. This affects both the client and 
temporary work agency. On the one hand, the client may be reluctant to invest in an individual 
 
3 The international organisation for the temporary work agency sector. 
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who is not officially an employee and whose attachment to their organisation is almost by 
definition limited. On the other hand, the TES firm bears the risk that a client may poach a 
worker it has trained up, also acting as a disincentive to invest in training agency workers. 
Supporting Storrie’s conclusions, the ILO (2016) informed that once workers were employed in 
firms that provided firm-specific training, holding a fixed term contract reduced the probability 
of being chosen to participate in training activities, even once other worker, job and employer 
characteristics were accounted for. Similarly, the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey 
reported that only 26 per cent of temporary agency workers received training, compared with 39 
per cent of workers on an indefinite contract (ILO, 2016, p.207). 
There are however agency workers who are highly skilled and sought after, and in these cases, 
the agency-worker-employer relationship is nurtured (Parkin, 2000). This may reflect a wider 
privilege of those with the capacity and power to be flexible, or to exploit flexibility, such as for 
example the highly skilled software developer. It also reinforces the widening socio-economic 
gap and opportunities for work (Parkin, 2000). There are some that have the skills and careers to 
meet ‘consumerist expectations of late urban modernity’ but for most workers, such as the 
general operative in manufacturing or the cleaner, temporary agency work simply meets basic 
needs (Parkin, 2000, p. xviii).  
2.5.3. Segmentation and dualisation  
Following on from the arguments raised in terms of the human capital perspectives discussed 
above, labour market theory considers the effects of the development of internal labour markets 
on those included within them, and on those excluded from and confined to the residual 
competitive secondary sector (Rubery, 1978). According to this theory, internal labour markets 
develop because skills become more firm-specific and a worker's productivity, a function of on-
the-job training and experience, ties into length of service within a firm (Rubery, 1978). To 
develop a stable labour force, an employer will pay their workers more than their opportunity 
wage in the external labour market, thus reducing the incentive for mobility among the workers. 
With mobility restricted or eliminated, there will be little market influence on the internal wage 
structure of the firm, which will come to be determined by custom and by rules. As a result, the 
labour market will thus be divided up into independent sections (Rubery, 1978). This argument is 
41 
 
compatible with human capital theory, which had earlier predicted that long-term employment 
relationships and seniority-based wages would be found in contexts where firms and workers 
made mutual investments in firm-specific training (Becker, 1964; Deakin, 2013). In a similar 
vein, transaction cost economics identified stable employment with the presence of ‘asset-
specific’ capabilities, in contrast to low-skill and low-discretion jobs which were associated with 
‘spot contracting’ and ‘market governance’ (Williamson, Wachter and Harris, 1975). 
Theories of dualism emerged in the field of labour economics to explain the existence of low 
paid, insecure, dead-end employment in mature industrial societies (Bertolini, 2018). During the 
1970s and early 1980s, a group of economists and political scientists identified trends toward 
labour market segmentation. Some saw these developments as a response on the part of capital to 
changes in technology and product markets, while others emphasised political motives and the 
effort to control the labour process by cultivating divisions within the working class (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010). According to Pulignano et al (2015), dualisation has many faces: it can be seen as 
a globally emerging divide between classes (Standing, 2011); it is linked to employment status 
such as non-standard employment; socio-demographics as there is an over-representation of 
migrants and women in non-standard work (Vosko, 2010); and it is linked to specific welfare 
regimes (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). Reich et al (1973) defined labour market 
segmentation as the historical process whereby political-economic forces encourage the division 
of the labour market into separate submarkets, or segments, distinguished by different labour 
market characteristics and behavioural rules.  
In line with this thinking, segmentation theory suggests that there is a ‘two-tiered’ labour market: 
one primary segment offering well paid positions with good working conditions and structured 
career ladders, and one secondary segment offering short term, low paid work and providing no 
career prospects (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). As ‘insiders’, permanent workers are expected to 
be located in the primary segment, whereas less favoured peripheral workers with temporary 
contracts such as temporary agency workers, are usually found as ‘outsiders’ in the secondary 
segment, with almost no chance of entering the primary segment (Eichhorst et al, 2017). 
Continued career disadvantages for outsiders exist, such as lower wages as a result of reduced 
bargaining in the wage negotiation process (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). Temporary workers 
therefore exhibit overall secondary labour market characteristics (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).  
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The terminology of the ‘insider-outsider divide’ comes originally from the standard insider-
outsider model, which explains how persistent unemployment can arise when working 
conditions, and wages in particular, are determined by taking into account only the interests of 
employed insiders, thus disregarding the interests of unemployed outsiders (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1984, 1988; Bentolila, 2012). Yet, in the specific context of dual/segmented labour 
markets, this conventional interpretation was slightly modified. In line with the literature on this 
topic, not all employed workers were considered as being insiders but only those who held open-
ended or permanent labour contracts subject to high employment protection (Bentolila, 2012). 
Conversely, employees under very flexible contracts were thought of as being part of the 
outsiders because, given that their role was precisely to bear the brunt of employment 
adjustments, their attachment to the job was fragile (Bentolila, 2012). The insider-outsider theory 
was often connected to the conflict of interest between the insiders and outsiders in the labour 
market. ‘Insiders’ were workers whose positions were protected by labour turnover costs4 and 
‘outsiders’ did not enjoy this protection (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). There are many degrees 
of being an insider or an outsider and the distinction between them is made along a variety of 
divides, such as good jobs and bad jobs, unionised and non-unionised. These differences also 
translate into social differences (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). 
The entrapment hypothesis is also based on ideas from segmentation theory. The ‘two-tiered’ 
labour market offering a primary segment with well-paid positions and structured career ladders, 
and the other offering short term work with no career prospects (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Gebel (2010) argues that there are continued career disadvantages for the temporarily employed 
labour market entrants. Education is the main source of human capital accumulation before 
labour market entry and permanent jobs typically require high levels of skills (Kahn, 2018). 
Secondary segment jobs offer poorer skill acquisition since temporary jobs have a shorter 
duration (Booth et al., 2000). Lower skill investments may hinder upward mobility into stable 
primary sector jobs and hinder compensating wage growth (Gebel, 2010). Individuals are 
therefore unwillingly caught in the temporary job trap: the less-educated are more likely to 
become temporary workers, and then most of them are caught in the temporary job trap due to 
the lack of opportunities to invest in their human capital through training (Choi, 2019, p.3). 
 
4 The costs associated with the dismissal of incumbent employees, and with the hiring and training of new recruits 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). 
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More recently, Rubery and Piasna (2016) suggest that reform agendas should move beyond the 
insider-outsider debate to avoid over emphasising the division of interests between labour force 
groups. They believe that a more inclusive labour market policy should recognise that the 
interests of these groups may not be conflicting (Emmenegger 2009; Rubery and Piasna, 2016).  
2.5.4. Job quality and employment degradation 
Similar to theories of segmentation and dualisation, sociologists have long been interested in job 
quality. While recognising the complexity and debates surrounding the definition of job quality, 
the following aspects are central in considering job quality: compensation, diversity in the 
substance of work, control, stress and work intensification, and the employment contract 
especially with regard to involuntary non-standard aspects (Osterman 2013; Simms, 2017). Job 
quality is therefore a contextual phenomenon, differing among persons, occupations and labour 
market segments, societies and historical periods (Findlay et al, 2013). 
Parallel to labour market economists highlighting increasing dualisation, employment 
researchers have noted a steady decline in aspects of job quality alongside a growth in the 
number of so called ‘bad jobs’ (Marx, [1867] 1967; Kalleberg et al, 2000). In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s economists drew attention to the notion of ‘bad jobs’ by suggesting that the labour 
market was divided into a primary segment of ‘good jobs’ and a secondary segment of ‘bad jobs’ 
(Kalleberg, 2000). The recent growth in non-standard jobs highlighted the concern that these 
jobs were worse for workers than regular full-time jobs, as workers were portrayed as peripheral 
workers in organisations (Kalleberg, 2000; Bosmans, 2015).  
To the extent that non-standard jobs are poorly paid, lack health insurance and pension benefits, 
are of uncertain duration, and lack the protections that unions and labour laws afford, they are 
problematic for workers (Kalleberg, 2000; Webster, 2007). In particular, temporary employment 
agency workers are associated with higher job insecurity and irregular schedules (Håkansson and 
Isidorsson, 2012; Bosmans et al.2015); low wages and benefits (Elcioglu, 2010; Bosmans et al, 
2015); poor training and employability (Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2012; Bosmans et al, 2015; 
Knox, 2010); poor health and safety (Bosmans et al, 2015) and experience unfair treatment from 
their supervisors (Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2006).  
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A central concern for sociologists has been the ‘degradation of work’. More specifically, how 
jobs that used to be ‘good’ quality become ‘bad’ and the variety of factors, conditions and 
processes that lead to such deterioration (Adamson and Roper, 2019). In this light, recent studies 
have highlighted the economic, social, political, industry-specific and organisational issues that 
contribute to the degradation of work (Hannon, 2010; Cunningham, 2016; Curley and Royle, 
2013; Gale, 2012). Some researchers have considered the impact of individual choices and 
opportunities on job quality, as workers have different expectations and needs. For example, 
Kalleberg and Dunn (2016) researched aspects of the gig economy5 and conclude that what 
makes a job ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depends on the characteristics of the individual as well as the job. 
For example, they explain that in some instances gig jobs may be good for immigrants who may 
not otherwise be able to secure employment and may be less likely to be subjected to 
discrimination since they don’t come face-to-face with employers. These jobs may also be good 
for workers in remote areas where local labour markets do not offer them better job 
opportunities. Therefore, differences in geography may also affect job quality as countries or 
regions advance or develop differently (Ghai, 2003). For example, those with a higher level of 
education who live in urban areas are likely to have greater opportunities to choose among 
alternative jobs (Findlay et al, 2013). They are likely to have higher standards for what 
constitutes a good job, as compared to people with less education, or those who live in rural 
areas and as a result have fewer alternative job opportunities (Findlay et al, 2013).   
Some researchers have focused on collective decisions and actions rather than individual choices 
that determine and improve job quality (Adamson and Roper, 2019). The role of unions and the 
collective pressure and engagement they may bring, have recently been considered by both 
Rothstein (2016) and Simms (2017).  Firstly, Rothstein’s ethnographic observations show that 
workers and unions who consent to management demands add to the degradation of jobs 
(Burawoy, 1979; Spangler, 2017). For example, Rothstein explains ‘whip-sawing’ as a process 
used by management to make workers feel continuously threatened by the possibility of them 
losing their employment, with these tensions affecting the union relationship. Unions are caught 
in a contradictory situation where they wish to represent their constituencies but are aware of 
 
5 Also referred to as the sharing economy, collaborating economy, crowd working, access economy, on-demand 




management demands. Another example of management ‘discipline’ is the idea of ‘teamwork’ 
that requires job rotation within a working group. Rather than allowing workers to diversify their 
skills and move up a job ladder, companies operate with a minimum number of workers and 
cross-train them to make them interchangeable. The theoretical point made by Rothstein (2016) 
is that the degradation of work is not as a result of neoliberalism (conceived as the market 
working purely from its own logic or hand in hand with new technologies). Rather, globalisation, 
which is a process in which markets, states, and supra-state entities like the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) act as one, often against the public interest, is the driving force that makes 
‘good jobs go bad’ (Spangler, 2017, p.472). 6 
Whereas Rothstein (2016) explained how job quality is affected if unions consent to 
management demands, Simms (2017) considered how unions attempt to expand their 
representational scope to improve aspects of job quality. Simms focused on how unions represent 
workers’ job quality interests within institutional mechanisms such as collective bargaining, 
minimum wage regulation, and legal regulation. The argument is that collective actors such as 
unions have a central role in resisting threats of downward pressure on job quality and can even 
extend representative institutions in an effort to attempt to re-regulate job quality. It concludes 
with the idea that new interests can be promoted within institutions to improve job quality, 
despite internal resistance (Simms, 2017, p. 63). 
Challenges remain in conceptualising job quality and how it should be measured (Kalleberg, 
2016). In addition, further research is needed to explore why jobs vary in quality and the 
different conditions that facilitate their deterioration or improvement. Adamson and Roper 
(2019) believe that there is a clear gap in exploring how these issues play out differently in the 
countries of the global south, as most studies, with a few exceptions, remain focused on the 
European and North American context. 
2.6. Regulation of Temporary Agency Work 
2.6.1. Broader, global economic and political processes 
 
6 While technological developments and free trade agreements are often associated with the term globalisation, it is 
increasing levels of foreign investment and the growth in the power of multinational corporations that lie at the heart 
of contemporary globalisation (McNally, 2006). Developments like free trade agreements are part of a deeper 
process of reducing the constraints on the ability of corporate interests to ensure the free movement of capital 
(Thomas, 2009).  
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Employment standards are regulated through national and sub-national legislation. However, the 
development of employment standards and the social forces that influence their regulation are 
connected to broader global economic and political processes (Thomas, 2009). Global economic 
integration alters the environment in which labour, management and government interact, 
forcing each to respond and change the rules (Rothstein, 2016). This reconfiguration of the rules 
within countries makes changes to labour relations appear to be domestic change but may be 
attributable to, or influenced by, globalisation. Wherever a value chain ‘touches down’ firms 
encounter and shape local labour relations as actors within these national industrial relations 
systems (Rothstein, 2016, p. 125).  
 
 ‘Flexibility’ in the global context refers to the capacity for capital to alter the geographical 
organisation of production through increased levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). This 
increased ‘geographic flexibility’ has developed as a result of the increased relocation of 
manufacturing production to the southern economies because of the lower labour costs in the 
south (Lipietz, 1987). Thomas (2009) believes that the mobility afforded to capital through these 
vertical disintegration strategies is one of the defining characteristics of economic globalisation 
(Thomas, 2009). The contemporary global political economy has shifted capitalist production to 
new spaces within the world economy - sites where means of production, labour and credit can 
increase profitability (McNally, 1999). These changes have led to the expansion of inter alia, 
subcontracting relationships and the prevalence of sweatshop labour within many nations of the 
south. (Thomas, 2009).  
 
Employment conditions and labour practices in these production relationships have been 
associated with unregulated, low-wage labour-intensive production, gendered inequality, and 
violent resistance to workers’ efforts to organise (Thomas, 2009). The patterns of global 
economic competition, intense labour exploitation in the south, and the increased insecurity in 
industrialised labour markets have led to concerns about a ‘race to the bottom’, of labour 
standards and working conditions (Wells, 2005).  Competitive pressure lowers labour standards 
as jurisdictions compete to attract investment (Thomas, 2009). The challenge to regulate labour 
standards takes place against this backdrop and there have been several attempts to construct 
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mechanisms for improving labour standards in the global economy. These include efforts by the 
ILO for core labour standards and the EU Social chapter, discussed below (Thomas, 2009). 
2.6.2. International regulation: The ILO  
The Treaty of Versailles established the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It was created 
in 1919 to promote social progress and to overcome social and economic conflicts of interest, 
through dialogue and cooperation (Rodgers et al, 2009; Mitchell, 2010). The aim was to find 
common rules, policies and behaviour for all to benefit (Rodgers et al, 2009). It was unique in 
that it allowed for equal power of decision between the actors and introduced a new form of 
international treaty that was concerned with social aims and new ways to apply them (Rodgers et 
al, 2009). Mitchell (2010) and Langille (2009) suggest that the intention of the ILO was to 
promote the adoption of labour standards to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ among industrial 
nations.  
The results of the work of the ILO appear in its formal instruments that it adopts, namely, 
conventions, recommendations, resolutions, declarations and codes of practice. Conventions and 
recommendations both develop standards and ensure a stimulus component for national 
legislation (Laci et al, 2017). One of the more controversial aspects of ILO conventions, are the 
concerns surrounding their application and enforcement (Berg and Kucera, 2008; Laci et al, 
2017). Member states are not obliged to ratify ILO Conventions as ratification is voluntary. 
Ratification does however entail certain obligations, such as adopting national legislation that 
meets standards set out in the conventions, the enforcement of these laws, and reporting on their 
application to the ILO (Berg and Kucera, 2008).  However, the ILO is limited in its ability to 
sanction those countries that are in breach of their obligations. There is no strong enforcement 
mechanism however a supervisory system exists that is unique at the international level and that 
helps to ensure that countries implement the conventions they ratify (Berg and Kucera, 2008). 
The ILO regularly examines the application of standards in member states and points out areas 
where they could be better applied. If there are any problems in the application of standards, the 
ILO seeks to assist countries through social dialogue and technical assistance.  
The history of agency work and ILO instruments show that as early as 1919, agency work was 
mentioned in both the ILO Convention on Unemployment 1919 (No.2) and the ILO 
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Recommendation on Unemployment 1919 (No.1). Table 1 below sets out some of the ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations from 1919 to 2007 that have relevance in relation to 
temporary agency working. 
Table 1: ILO Conventions, Recommendations and the status of agency working 
Date ILO Convention & 
Recommendation 
 
Details regarding agency working 
1919 ILO Convention on 
Unemployment 1919 (No.2)   
 
 
ILO Recommendation on 
Unemployment 1919 (No.1) 
 
Non-profit employment agencies were allowed to 
exist as long as they were strictly controlled by a 
central state authority.  
 
The Recommendation stated that fee-charging 
agencies for profit should be prohibited. 
 
1933  Fee-Charging Agencies 
Convention 1933 (No. 34) 
 
The banning of agency work was formalised and 
fee-charging employment agencies were to be 
abolished. Fee charging agencies were defined as 
‘employment agencies conducted with a view to 
profit, that is to say, any person, company, 
institution, agency or other organisation which acts 
as an intermediary for the purpose of procuring 
employment for a worker or supplying a worker for 
an employer with a view to deriving either directly 
or indirectly any pecuniary or other material 
advantage from either employer or worker’ (Art 
1a).  
 
1949 Convention on Fee-Charging 
Agencies Convention 1949 (No. 
96) 
The banning of agencies was relaxed in so far as it 
provided that member states could either abolish 
such agencies or regulate them.  Most member 
states chose the option of prohibiting fee-charging 
agencies (Valticos, 1973). 
 




The framework provided by the ILO Convention on 
Part-Time Work, only applied fully to permanent 










The Decent Work Agenda liberated the approach 
towards agency work and legitimised the industry. 
Agency workers were protected with the adoption 
of Convention No. 181. The ILO introduced 
conventions and recommendations relating to 




Private Employment Agencies 














Private Employment Agencies 




In terms of Convention 181, the ILO confirmed its 
awareness of the importance of flexibility in the 
functioning of labour markets. It sought to allow 
and regulate the industry rather than banning it.  It 
acknowledged the need to protect workers against 
abuses and recognised the need to guarantee the 
right to freedom of association. Article 11 states 
that members shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure adequate protection for the workers 
employed by private employment agencies. Article 
12 states that a member shall determine and allocate 
the respective responsibilities of private 
employment agencies and of user enterprises in 
relation to the protections and benefits mentioned in 
Article 11. 
 
The main purpose of Recommendation No. 188 is 
the protection of agency workers and the prevention 
of unethical practices. One of the key principles is 
the transferring of agency workers to become 
employees of clients (Article 15). 
 
2006 The Employment Relationship 
Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) 
(Recommendation 198) 
Addressed the temporary employment agency 
relationship through a non-binding 
recommendation. It recommends that countries 
should adopt a national policy to ensure that 
employed workers, including those that are part of a 
multi-party relationship, should have the same 
standards applicable to all forms of contractual 
arrangements. 
 
2007 The ILO’s Guide to Private 
Employment Agencies, 2007 
(ILO, 2007) 
Provides guidance to national legislators in drafting 
employment agency legal frameworks. The Guide 
confirms that Convention No. 181 was 
implemented to replace earlier standards that 
abolished employment agencies.  
 
Source: Adapted from Aletter and van Eck, (2016, pp.301-302) and the researchers own summary 
As set out above, Convention No. 1817 stressed the importance of flexibility and the role which 
private employment agencies played in the labour market. It furthermore seeks to ensure that 
workers placed at the client by the agency, receive protection under the labour laws as well as 
 
7 C181 - Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181). 
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protection against discrimination and violation of their privacy rights (Benjamin, 2013). Article 
12 requires legislation to be enacted by ratifying countries that sets out the responsibilities of 
agencies and the client (user enterprise) to ensure worker protection (Benjamin, 2013). More 
specifically, Article 11 states that members shall, in accordance with national law and practice, 
take the necessary measures to ensure adequate protection for the workers employed by private 
employment agencies, in relation to: freedom of association; collective bargaining; minimum 
wages; working time and other working conditions; statutory social security benefits; access to 
training; occupational safety and health; compensation in case of occupational accidents or 
diseases; compensation in case of insolvency and protection of workers claims; and maternity 
protection and benefits, and parental protection and benefits. Article 12 states that a member 
shall determine and allocate, in accordance with national law and practice, the respective 
responsibilities of private employment agencies and of user enterprises in relation to the 
protections and benefits mentioned in Article 11. 
Article 4 of Convention No.181 states that measures should be taken to ensure the right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining (Aletter and van Eck, 2016). However, 
Convention No. 181 does not set out how responsibilities should be allocated amongst the 
entities in the triangular relationship, and does not provide any guidelines (Vosko, 1997).  
Neither does Convention No. 181 deal with the circumstances that countries must consider when 
deciding whether to permit agencies being classified as employers, nor does it deal with the 
security of employment of agency workers hired by private employment agencies (Benjamin, 
2013). Benjamin (2013b) states that at the time that the Convention No. 181 was adopted, it was 
not anticipated that workers of temporary employment agencies would be deprived of labour law 
protection to the extent that they have been. The Employment Relationship Recommendation, 
2006 (No. 198) (Recommendation 198) is the only international standard that addresses the issue 
of the temporary employment agency relationship through a non-binding recommendation. 
Recommendation 198 recommends that countries should adopt a national policy to ensure that 
employed workers, including those that are part of a multi-party relationship, should have the 
same standards applicable to all forms of contractual arrangements (Benjamin, 2013b).  
More specifically, Recommendation 198 4(b)-(g) stipulates that national policy should: 
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4 (b) combat disguised employment relationships in the context of, for example, other 
relationships that may include the use of other forms of contractual arrangements that 
hide the true legal status, noting that a disguised employment relationship occurs when 
the employer treats an individual as other than an employee in a manner that hides his or 
her true legal status as an employee, and that situations can arise where contractual 
arrangements have the effect of depriving workers of the protection they are due; 
(c) ensure standards applicable to all forms of contractual arrangements, including those 
involving multiple parties, so that employed workers have the protection they are due; 
(d) ensure that standards applicable to all forms of contractual arrangements establish 
who is responsible for the protection contained therein; 
(e) provide effective access of those concerned, in particular employers and workers, to 
appropriate, speedy, inexpensive, fair and efficient procedures and mechanisms for 
settling disputes regarding the existence and terms of an employment relationship; 
(f) ensure compliance with, and effective application of, laws and regulations 
concerning the employment relationship; and 
(g) provide for appropriate and adequate training in relevant international labour 
standards, comparative and case law for the judiciary, arbitrators, mediators, labour 
inspectors, and other persons responsible for dealing with the resolution of disputes and 
enforcement of national employment laws and standards. 
Recommendation 198 on the employment relationship is an important articulation of the changes 
taking place in employment relations and the duties of states to establish the legal responsibilities 
of employers (Cotton, 2015). 
A further important development for temporary agency work was the launching of the ILO’s 
concept of ‘Decent Work’ in 1999. Decent Work is encapsulated in four pillars, namely, the 
promotion of fundamental principles and rights at work, the promotion of employment and 
income opportunities, the expansion and improvement of social protection coverage, and the 
promotion of social dialogue and tripartism (ILO, 2010). The Decent Work Agenda radically 
broadens the ILO’s traditional constituencies to focus on people on the periphery of a formal 
system of labour and social protection (Fudge, 2012). According to the ILO (1999), ‘decent 
work’ has the following characteristics: it should be sufficient and allow for full access to 
income-earning opportunities, generate an adequate income, protect workers’ rights, be 
productive, and provide adequate social protection (ILO, 1999; Tipple, 2006).  
What is regarded as ‘decent’ varies across societies and cultures, although there may be some 
elements common to all (Rodgers, 2008). Several case studies report that those in triangular 
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employment, such as temporary agency workers, have poor protection from termination of 
employment and suffer decent work deficits (Ebisui 2012; ILO 2014, ILO 2015; Serrano 2015). 
These include low or stagnant wages, with no access to the social protection and benefits usually 
associated with full-time standard employment. They experience more occupational accidents 
and workplace hazards than regular workers and are often in low-skill jobs, with no opportunities 
for career advancement. In addition, they often lack access to the fundamental workers’ rights of 
organising and bargaining collectively (Serrano and Xhafa, 2016). 
The Decent Work Agenda is not however without problems. The ILO has largely moved to a 
‘soft’ law technique and away from the traditional convention-based system. Although the 
Decent Work Agenda has expanded the ILO’s focus beyond the four fundamental principles and 
rights at work, it has continued with the soft law approach (Fudge, 2012. p. 18). As a result, one 
of the major difficulties in relying on the ILO’s international standards as a way of improving 
living conditions and standards of work, is that the nation states simply do not ratify or enforce 
international standards, which are often seen as mere ‘window dressing’ (Fudge, 2012, p. 21).  
A further dilemma that the Decent Work Agenda faces is how to measure the concept of ‘decent 
work’. The ILO has attempted a systematic definition of the quality of work through its ‘Decent 
Work’ concept. However, Burchell et al (2014) conclude that one of the main problems with 
measuring the quality of employment, is the fact that it is difficult to reach universal agreement 
on what constitutes a good job. In addition, the measurement of decent work is constrained by 
the availability of internationally comparable data on employment conditions across both 
developed and developing countries. Without comparable data, methodologies for the 
measurement of decent work make little sense (Burchell et al, 2014). During 2008, the 
International Organisation of Employers (IOE) stated that ‘decent work’ does not set clear 
parameters and does not take into account the particular conditions of each labour market. The 
ILO has still not produced a universally applicable methodology for the measurement of decent 
work (Burchell et al 2014). 
2.6.3. The European Union 
2.6.3.1. The EU Social Chapter 
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The Social Chapter provides for the development of EU-wide labour standards and a 
comprehensive approach to regionally based regulation (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2003). It is 
different to the ILO which promotes but does not require member states to adopt or implement 
its standards (Thomas, 2009). Once the European Council of Ministers has passed a labour 
standard directive, members of the European Union are bound by the directive and must 
incorporate it into national labour law (Thomas, 2009). In addition, it provides for a process of 
negotiation of new labour standards through social dialogue between employer and union 
representatives (Thomas, 2009).  
Despite the EU’s regional approach to labour standards, the Social Chapter displays a tendency 
to rely on the regulation of labour standards at the level of individual nation-states (Rubery and 
Grimshaw, 2003). Member states have therefore retained their decision-making sovereignty over 
certain employment related issues such as minimum wages, termination of employment and 
trade union rights. In these areas the European Union is prohibited from regulating. In the areas 
where it does regulate it is necessary for agreement on new regulatory instruments to be reached 
between the member states.  There is also no intention to harmonise labour standards across the 
EU. Instead, they are designed to form a minimum base upon which individual states may build 
(Thomas, 2009).  
2.6.3.2. The European Council Directive on Temporary Agency Work 2008  
Similar to the developments at the ILO during the 1990s, EU Directives were adopted to address 
precarious employment. The need to allow workers in non-standard employment access to 
benefits and entitlements associated with the standard employment relationship (SER) was 
recognised. Although EU directives addressing atypical work preceding the 2008 EU Directive 
on Temporary Agency Work (the Directive) specifically subscribed to equal treatment, there 
were weaknesses to their approach (Vosko, 2009). For example, equal treatment based on a form 
of employment did not provide for minimum standards for all forms of employment (Fudge and 
Vosko, 2001). In addition, because of the requirement for a comparator, it only applied to 
restricted categories of workers and excluded temporary agency workers (Vosko, 2011, p.63). 
The purpose of the 2008 EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work was to ensure: 
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The protection of temporary agency workers and to improve the quality of temporary 
agency work by ensuring that the principle of equal treatment, as set out in Article 5, is 
applied to temporary agency workers, and by recognising temporary work agencies as 
employers, while taking into account the need to establish a suitable framework for the 
use of temporary agency work with a view to contributing effectively to the creation of 
jobs and to the development of flexible forms of working (Article 2). 
The 2008 Directive applied strictly to employees and their equivalents ‘who are assigned to user 
undertakings to work temporarily under their supervision and direction’ (Council of the EU, 
2008, Article 1.1). It departed from its precursors on part-time and fixed-term work, as it 
advanced a qualified version of equal treatment for temporary agency workers and extended 
further legitimacy to temporary work agencies (Vosko, 2009). The Directive aimed to protect 
temporary agency workers against abuse by affirming the employment relationship as a basis for 
labour protection. It constructed an employment relationship between a worker and an agency 
though not between the worker and the user firm (Council of the EU, 2008, Articles 1 & 2). The 
defining feature of the employment relationship was therefore postings of limited duration to 
user firms (Vosko, 2009). The concept of the ‘comparable permanent worker’ was set aside in 
favour of providing to temporary agency workers conditions, ‘for the duration of their 
assignment at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply if the worker had been recruited 
directly by the user firm to occupy the same job’ (Council of the EU, 2008, Article 5.1). With the 
new phrase ‘recruited directly by that user firm’, the Directive created the possibility for 
comparing temporary agency workers with not only permanent but other workers, such as fixed-
term workers, employed by the user firm (Vosko, 2009). In other words, if a temporary agency 
worker was hired, it was to be on the same terms and conditions as if they were directly recruited 
on a fixed-term or permanent contract (Vosko, 2009). 
The overall promotional tenor of the Directive is illustrated by Article 4 (Wynn, 2013). 
Article 4 (1) provides: 
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of temporary agency work shall be justified only on 
grounds of general interest relating in particular to the protection of temporary agency 
workers, the requirements of health and safety at work or the need to ensure that the 
labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented. 
Article 4 concerning the review of restrictions or prohibitions was redrafted and no longer 
included an obligation upon the member states to discontinue all restrictions or prohibitions on 
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the use of temporary agency work (Eklund, 2009). Article 4 refers to a ‘review of restrictions and 
prohibitions’ but according to Article 4(1) such restrictions and prohibitions are justified ‘only 
on grounds of general interest, the requirement of health and safety at work and the need to 
ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented’ (Eklund, 2009). The 
Article called upon member states to review, by 5 December 2011, the restrictions and 
prohibitions, after consulting the social partners, in order to verify whether they were justified 
according to the terms of paragraph 4(1) (Sartori, 2016). 
Deregulated environments such as the UK had little to review but more highly regulated 
environments such as France, Italy and Germany needed to deregulate in order to comply 
(Countouris and Horton 2009; Wynn, 2013). Article 4 did not seem to affect the Swedish 
legislative framework as no restrictions of any kind were laid down by law or collective 
agreements on ‘the use of temporary agency workers’, in particular (Eklund, 2009).8 A number 
of EU member states had signed and ratified the ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention 
C-181 of 1997, which did not contain a similar provision and permitted states to 'prohibit […] 
private employment agencies from operating in respect of certain categories of workers or 
branches of economic activity' (Article 2(4)(a) of the C-181). However, Wynn (2013) believed 
that the improvement of general levels of protection under the directive would obviate the need 
for former restrictions on the use of temporary agency work. 
Eight years after the EU Directive on temporary agency work was enacted, Sartori (2016, p.109) 
conducted comparative research to investigate the process of implementation and the impact on 
the relevant national legislations. Sartori (2016) specifically investigated the outcome of the 
Article 4 process and concluded that it did not move towards a liberalisation of temporary 
agency work.  The reasons being that most member states although aware of the existence of 
prohibitions and restrictions, did not take steps to remove them. However, countries such as 
Belgium, Spain and Sweden took advantage of the Directive’s provisions and eliminated a few. 
In some cases, as in Bulgaria, the Directive was used to introduce conditions of use and other 
limitations which did not exist before. Sartori (2016) argues that this paradoxical situation is due 
to the different interpretations of what constitutes a prohibition or restriction, as well as a 
 
8 Article 4 of the Directive limits any restriction or prohibition on the use of agency workers to 'grounds of general 
interest relating in particular'  to 'the protection of agency workers', 'health and safety' 'or the need to ensure that the 
labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented' (Countouris and Horton 2009). 
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justification on the grounds of general interest. Member states such as Luxembourg, perceived 
the former in much less inclusive terms compared to the Commission. Almost all countries 
considered that their own provisions limiting temporary agency work were justified, without 
however providing the explanations required by the Commission (Sartori, 2016, p. 117). 
The key protection for temporary agency workers in the EU Agency Directive, was Article 5(1) 
that contained the principle of equal treatment. The comparison of ‘basic working and 
employment conditions’ with workers ‘recruited directly by the user undertaking to occupy the 
same job’ allowed the user firm to compare the temporary agency worker with other temporary 
workers rather than permanent workers (Wynn, 2013, p. 61). 
Article 5(1) reads: 
The basic working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers shall be, for 
the duration of their assignment at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply if 
they had been recruited directly by that undertaking to occupy the same job.  
The principle of equal treatment existed in some form in some member states before the 
implementation of the Directive (Sartori, 2016). Equality could be adjusted by national or 
sectoral social partners to suit different social models, by way of these derogations (Wynn, 
2013). The Directive provided for three types of derogations: firstly as regards pay, and secondly 
when temporary agency workers who have a permanent contract of employment with a 
temporary work agency continue to be paid in the periods between assignments (the so-called 
Swedish derogation) (Article 5(2)). Thirdly, in terms of employment conditions generally, when 
different arrangements are provided for in collective agreements (Article  5(3)) or when such 
arrangements are established by the member states, after consulting the social partners, and 
provide, in particular, a qualifying period for equal treatment (Article  5(4)). Article 5(5) called 
upon member states to take appropriate measures to prevent the misuse of derogations as well as 
any attempt to circumvent the provisions of the Directive (Sartori, 2016, p.113). 
Article 5 of the Directive therefore did not cover all temporary agency workers and contained the 
possibility for excluding (from provisions governing basic working and employment conditions) 
workers with permanent employment contracts with a temporary work agency who are paid 
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between postings (Council of the EU, 2008, Article 5.2).9 For the workers that were covered, the 
principle of equal treatment was extended to ‘basic working and employment conditions’, 
encompassing, exclusively, working time and pay (Council of the EU, 2008, Article 3.1f). There 
were also measures to prevent misuse such as ‘successive assignments designed to circumvent 
the provisions of the Directive’, by which they mean the misuse of the qualifying period 
(Council of the EU, 2008, Article 5.5) (Vosko, 2009). Clauses that prevented the conclusion of a 
contract of employment between the user firm and the worker after the assignment (no-hiring 
clauses), were prohibited. However, a reasonable level of recompense for the agency services 
rendered were allowed. Unlike the Directive on Fixed-Term Work’s instruction to member states 
to establish conditions under which fixed-term contracts or relationships may be changed into 
permanent employment relationships, there was no mention of circumstances requiring the 
conversion into a bilateral employment relationship (Vosko,2009). 
In addition to what was outlined above, Sartori (2016) also investigated the principle of equal 
treatment and the review of the restrictions and prohibitions laid down in the law of member 
states. The research pointed out that the convergence brought about by the Directive was still 
very limited, owing to the several derogations permitted to EU Countries. Sartori (2016, p.109) 
concluded that the future degree of harmonisation of temporary agency work regulation was in 
the hands of the European Court of Justice, called to strike the right balance between the 
cornerstones of the Directive and the scope for derogation left to member states. 
2.6.4. The UK: The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 
The Agency Working Directive proposed by the EU as early as 2002 failed to progress past the 
Council of Ministers in 2003 (Eurofound, 2009). The UK supported the notion of equal treatment 
for temporary workers but expressed concerns over balancing the needs of the UK’s flexible 
labour market, with the provisions of the Directive (Forde and Slater, 2011). In May 2008, a 
compromise was reached between the UK business and trade union social partners providing for 
equal treatment for temporary workers in the UK to be effective after a period of 12 weeks into 
assignments. The revised Directive was accepted by the EU Council in June 2008. In January 
 
9 Council of the EU. (2008) Directive on Temporary Agency Work 08/104/EC. 
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2010 the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 (AWR or Regulations)10 were laid before 
Parliament (Forde and Slater, 2011). These Regulations were implemented virtually in an 
unchanged form in October 2011 (Forde and Slater, 2016).  
A week after the UK declaration was signed, agreement was reached between Eurociett/Uni-
Europa, the European social partners for the temporary work sector (McKay, 2010). This 
agreement confirmed the parties’ support for a directive guaranteeing equal treatment to 
temporary agency workers but went further than the UK declaration in stating that the non-
discrimination principle applied from day one of an assignment, unless a qualifying period was 
agreed on at a national level by the social partners and/or tripartite bodies (McKay, 2010). The 
UK social partners therefore negotiated a deal that fell short of that being pursued by most other 
social partner organisations in member states (McKay, 2010). 
Nevertheless, for the management of agency workers in the client firm, the requirements of the 
AWR provided a significant change in responsibilities. Some rights for agency temps were 
available from day one of an assignment, such as access to staff canteens, childcare, transport 
and client-firm job vacancies equal to that enjoyed by a comparable employee of the hirer. After 
a 12-week qualifying period, agency workers were also entitled to the same basic conditions of 
employment as if they had been directly employed by the hirer on day one of the assignment 
(Forde and Slater, 2016). This specifically covered pay, including any fee, bonus, commission, 
or holiday pay relating to the assignment. It did not include redundancy pay, contractual sick 
pay, and maternity, paternity or adoption pay; nor working time rights, for example, any annual 
leave above what is required by law (Forde and Slater, 2014). 
Essentially, the AWR gave effect to the purpose of the European Council Directive on 
Temporary Agency Work 2008 (the Directive).11 As discussed above, the purpose of the 
Directive was to ensure that temporary agency workers were afforded protection and to improve 
the quality of their work by ensuring that the principle of equal treatment in Article 5 was 
applied to them (Ebrahim, 2017). Regulation 5(1)(a) of the AWR provided that an agency 
worker was entitled to the same basic employment conditions as they would have been entitled 
 
10 Agency Workers Regulations Statutory Instrument No 93 of 2010 (AWR). 




to for doing the same work had they been recruited by the client without the intervention of a 
temporary work agency. Regulation 5(3) of the AWR stated that regulation 5(1)(a) shall be 
complied with if the agency worker is working under the same relevant terms and conditions as 
an employee who is a comparable employee. In order for an employee to qualify as a comparable 
employee both the agency worker and the employee must work under the supervision and 
direction of the client, and both must be engaged in work that is the same or broadly similar 
having regard to, where relevant, whether they have a similar level of qualification and skills. 
Relevant terms and conditions of employment are terms that are ordinarily included in the 
contracts of employees of the client (Ebrahim, 2017).  
Therefore, after a twelve-week qualifying period12, agency workers are entitled to the same 
relevant terms and conditions as if they had been directly employed by the hirer on day one of 
the assignment (Forde and Slater, 2014). An agency worker can qualify for this equal treatment 
after 12 weeks in the same role with the same hirer, regardless of whether they have been 
supplied by more than one TWA over the course of that period of time (Agency Workers 
regulations 2010 guidance). The AWR regulation 6(1) sets out the following list of terms and 
conditions that will fall within the meaning of ‘relevant terms and conditions’: (a) pay; (b) 
duration of working time; (c) night work; (d) rest periods; (e) rest breaks; and (f) annual leave.13 
Pay is further defined as any sum payable to an employee of the client in connection with the 
employee's employment and this includes any fee, bonus, commission, holiday pay or other 
emolument referable to the employment, whether payable under contract or otherwise (Ebrahim, 
2017).14 The following, inter alia, are specifically excluded from the definition of pay: (a) 
occupational sick pay; (b) pension payments or compensation for loss of office; (c) maternity, 
paternity or adoption leave payments; (d) worker's redundancy payments; (e) any payment made 
pursuant to a financial participation scheme; (f) bonus payments for an employee's loyalty or 
 
12 According to the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, an agency worker can accumulate these weeks even if they 
only work a few hours a week. The temporary work agency may ask for a work history from the agency worker to 
help establish when they are entitled to equal treatment 
13 Regulation 6(1)(a)-(f) of the Agency Regulations. 
14 Regulation 6(2) of the Agency Regulations. 
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long-term service; (g) payment for time off for carrying out trade union activities (Davies, 2010; 
Ebrahim, 2017).15  
There has been much debate about which workers are in and out of scope of the AWR, with 
particular attention focusing on the Swedish Derogation or ‘Pay Between Assignments’ (PBA) 
model.  The PBA was an additional type of contractual arrangement included in the Regulations 
after negotiations by the Swedish government (Forde and Slater, 2014). The Swedish Derogation 
occurs when a temporary work agency (TWA) offers an agency worker an ongoing contract of 
employment and pays the agency worker between assignments (Forde and Slater, 2014). In terms 
of a PBA, agencies take on temporary agency workers as employees, guaranteeing them some 
pay between assignments if no work is available, but under which the worker waives their right 
to comparability and equal pay with workers within client firms (Forde and Slater, 2014). 
Although, workers need to be informed that concluding this type of contract means giving up the 
entitlement to equal pay (Forde and Slater, 2014). During 2013, the Trade Union Congress’ 
(TUC)16 expressed grave concerns about the use of the Swedish derogation in the UK and took 
the unprecedented step of formally complaining to the European Commission. They believed 
that the UK government had failed to properly implement its obligations under the Directive 
(TUC, 2018a).  
During January to August 2013, Forde and Slater (2014) studied the effects of the AWR on 
employer and agency practice. They conducted 28 interviews across 11 agencies, four user firms, 
union and industry representatives, and a small number of agency temps. They concluded that 
the AWR did not have the expected effect of reducing the demand for temporary agency work. 
In fact, just prior to the AWR in autumn 2011, there were 285,000 agency temps in work in the 
UK. This number rose to 321,165 by winter 2012 after the AWR came into effect (Forde and 
Slater, 2014). In cases where larger numbers of temps were being used, or where temps were 
being used on a longer-term basis, firms looked to alternative contracting strategies to transfer 
some of the risks associated with the regulations. Some client firms had looked at utilising 
alternative contract forms, such as casual workers. It appeared that the smaller agencies bore the 
 
15 Regulation 6(3)(a)-(g) of the Agency Regulations. 
16 The Trades Union Congress (TUC) represents more than 5.5 million working people in 48 unions across the 
economy (TUC, 2018b). 
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brunt of the changes. Firms weighed up the cost of providing equal treatment and made a 
judgment close to the 12-week period as to whether or not to offer their temporary employees 
permanent contracts. However, one agency reported an increase in temp to permanent contracts. 
Although there had been a perception of high bureaucratic costs of complying with the 
regulations, many agencies reported that the systems had been relatively straightforward to adopt 
as processes had been put in place prior to the regulations. Derogation contracts were most likely 
to be present where large numbers of temps were being supplied on a long-term basis. However, 
they stated that derogation contracts were not as commonplace as had been reported, and were 
unlikely to take hold significantly, given the risks associated with them for agencies. Long-term 
partnerships between agencies and firms played a role in shaping responses to the regulations. 
Conversely, the regulations had provided the opportunity to develop closer working relationships 
with client firms (Forde and Slater, 2014). 
Research was also conducted by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) on 
the impact of the AWR (ACAS, 2015). This research found that agency workers were often 
unaware of their rights especially regarding holiday pay, notice periods and the twelve-week 
threshold. In addition, these workers were afraid of asserting their statutory rights due to the 
perceived imbalance of power in the employment relationship. The ACAS research found that 
many agencies and hirers had developed stronger bonds after the AWR came into effect (Forde 
and Slater, 2014). It was also found that employers that regularly used agency workers changed 
their working practices to avoid using agency workers for more than twelve weeks in order to 
avoid offering agency workers paid annual leave or equal pay (ACAS, 2015). An ambivalence 
on the part of some agencies to share information and promote good practice with other agencies 
with whom they were competing, was reported.  
When the AWR were being prepared, the TUC lobbied hard for anti-avoidance rules to prevent 
hirers from avoiding equal treatment by hiring agency workers on a succession of assignments. 
Whilst such measures were included, hirers often avoided equal treatment rights by dismissing 
agency workers after eleven weeks - only to rehire them shortly after (TUC, 2018a). As pointed 
out in the ACAS research, agencies and hirers used these strategies to ensure that agency 
workers never accrued the twelve weeks of continuous employment and therefore did not secure 
the right to equal treatment. The Directive anticipated this problem, stating in Article 5(5) that 
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member states opting for a qualifying period should take steps to prevent circumvention (Davies, 
2010). In order to avoid employers abusing the twelve-week qualifying period, The AWR 
contains anti avoidance provisions designed to prevent the structuring of assignments to 
intentionally circumvent the AWR. In all circumstances, the agency worker must have completed 
at least two assignments or two roles (in substantively different roles which break the qualifying 
period) with the same hirer or connected hirers within the same group, in order for the anti-
avoidance provisions to become relevant (The Agency Workers Regulations: Guidance, 2010). 
These provisions could be utilised if the agency moves a worker to a new assignment every 
eleven weeks in order to avoid the equality provisions that become effective after twelve weeks 
of employment. However, certain specified factors must be present that would indicate that a 
pattern of assignments was structured with the intention to deprive the worker of equal treatment 
rights. These factors include the length of the assignments; the number of role changes; whether 
the role changes were substantively different; and the length of the break periods (The Agency 
Workers Regulations: Guidance, 2010). 
Agency workers could therefore bring a claim in the Employment Tribunal if they believed they 
were not receiving equal treatment under the AWR.  All agency workers were also protected 
from detrimental treatment by the agency or hirer because they asserted their rights under the 
AWR.  A Tribunal could make a declaration, order payment of compensation and make 
recommendations for action to be taken (Ince, 2011). However, the most obvious problem was 
that the provisions set up to avoid the abuse of the twelve-week period did not address the 
possibility that a single assignment may be structured to avoid the application of the Regulations 
(Davies, 2010). The Agency Workers Regulations: Guidance provisions only apply to agency 
workers who have completed two or more assignments, or who have worked in more than two 
roles. A hirer is therefore at liberty to use a succession of different agency workers for eleven-
week assignments even though this would mean that none of the workers in question ever 
acquired the right to equal treatment (Davies, 2010). In addition, if agency workers qualified for 
equal treatment from day one, there would have been no need for elaborate anti-avoidance 
provisions (Davies, 2010). The very presence of the qualifying period deprived a high proportion 
of agency workers of equal treatment rights but was nevertheless agreed to by the social partners 
(Davies, 2010). Davies (2010) argues that given the history of the Directive, workers’ 
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representatives may have felt that it was important to secure agreement to the Directive, even if it 
meant some undesirable compromises.  
In October 2016, the UK Prime Minister commissioned Matthew Taylor (Chief Executive of the 
Royal Society of the Arts) to conduct an independent review into modern working practices, 
focused on assessing how employment practices might need to change in order to keep pace with 
modern business models (BEIS, 2018). In July 2017, the Review of Modern Working Practices 
(the Review) was published. The Review made a number of recommendations in relation to 
agency workers and enforcement of employment rights, which were considered in a consultation 
document entitled ‘Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices. Consultation 
on agency worker recommendations’ (the Consultation Document) (BEIS, 2018). The 
Consultation Document set out the details of a consultation process to seek views on the 
recommendations made by the Review. Importantly, included in the scope for consultations was 
the possibility of extending the provisions that policed umbrella companies and other 
intermediaries in a supply chain, and the possibility of the repeal of the legislation that allowed 
the Swedish Derogation (BEIS, 2018). The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) invited trade unions, employer associations and other interested organisations 
and individuals to submit their views for consideration for the consultation on the 
recommendations made by the Review.  
The TUC responded to the BEIS’ invitation to submit views for consideration. The TUC 
recommendations included a call for the UK government to introduce wide-ranging reforms to 
protect agency workers. Their call for reform included, inter alia, the repeal of the Swedish 
derogation, to ensure all agency workers had the same rights to equal pay. In addition, they 
recommended that after twelve weeks of doing the same job for the same hirer, hirers should be 
required to assess whether the work done by the agency worker was required on an on-going 
basis.  If so, the agency worker should be offered a permanent contract with the hirer (TUC, 
2018).  
Simultaneously with the BEIS consultations and recommendations by TUC, Alsos and Evans 
(2018) compared the evolution of industrial relations and collective wage regulation 
arrangements in the temporary agency industries of Sweden, Germany, Norway and the UK. 
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Within a framework of institutionalisation and institutional change, they examined how the 
strategic choices made by key actors, principally employers, confronted by market deregulation, 
EU enlargement and EU-level regulation, have affected the form and strength of collective 
regulation. With regard to the UK, these authors report that there was much debate about which 
workers were in and out of the scope of the AWR. Furthermore, UK agency workers on direct 
pay between assignments (PBA) contracts with their agency had no equal pay rights with 
comparable hiring company workers, if payment was guaranteed for at least 4 weeks when no 
assignments could be found. There was evidence of agency staff being paid up to £135 a week 
less than such comparators (TUC, 2013). In addition, PBA contract numbers had grown rapidly 
in the UK since 2011, typically in industries where high-volume agency supply minimises the 
risks to agencies and justifies cost reductions for the client (Alsos and Evans, 2018).  
As a result of the recommendation of the Taylor Review that the Swedish derogation should be 
removed, Regulations 10 and 11 of the AWR (which allowed for PBA instead of equal pay after 
twelve weeks) no longer apply from 6 April 2020. Minor changes to regulations 5, 7 and 18 also 
apply from the same date in order to repeal the Swedish derogation. These amendments have no 
effect on the rest of the Agency Workers Regulations (Agency Workers Regulations 2010: 
Guidance, p. 40). From 6 April 2020, a permanent contract giving pay between assignments no 
longer allows a worker to opt out of equal pay entitlements. All agency workers are entitled to 
the same pay as a permanent employee of the hirer after twelve weeks in the same role with the 
same hirer (Agency Workers Regulations 2010: Guidance, p. 40). Where a Swedish derogation 
contract’s duration extends beyond 6 April 2020, TWAs are likely to move PBA agency workers 
onto a suitably amended or new contract that gives them their right to equal pay (Agency 
Workers Regulations 2010: Guidance). The repeal of regulations 10 and 11 will not 
automatically result in the termination of any contracts of employment that agency workers may 
already be engaged under prior to 6 April 2020. These contracts may continue, subject to their 
terms, but all agency workers will be entitled to equal pay after twelve weeks (Agency Workers 
Regulations 2010: Guidance). 
2.6.5. Localised and state-based focus on legislation 
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As can be seen from the UK example above, temporary employment agency work can only be 
understood within the complex set of employment relations and regulations that exists on a 
country by country basis (Knox, 2010). Regulation is an important context for temporary 
employment agency workers, as different levels of regulation will influence the deployment and 
use of these workers (Knox, 2010; Mitlacher, 2007). There is no one universal model of 
temporary staffing industry regulation or of its relationship to the wider employment relationship 
(Coe et al, 2009). The internal composition of the non-standard workforce - the mix of agency, 
part-time and fixed-term employment - differs from one country to another (Coe et al, 2009). 
Employment regulation can range from the full spectrum of lightly regulated to unregulated in 
the USA, to closely regulated in Germany and to the prohibited such as in Italy, Spain and 
Sweden until recently (Burgess and Connell, 2004; Strauss and Fudge, 2013).  
On a national basis, there are a multitude of reasons for the regulation of temporary agency work.  
These include inter alia, to standardise employment status for taxation, equity, safety, 
immigration and social security reasons (Burgess and Connell, 2004).  Regulation of temporary 
agency work is also pivotal to preventing the exploitation of workers and to ensure the 
application of labour codes and rights across the workforce regardless of the nature of the 
employment contract (Burgess and Connell, 2004). The nature of employment status associated 
with temporary agency work also differs from country to country and these variations include the 
identification of the employer, whether the employee or worker has a contract of employment, 
and the regulation of the employment contract. In addition, there are also differences in terms of 
what is allowed in areas such as long-term temporary hires, the ongoing renewals of temporary 
contracts, and the provision of benefits to temporary agency workers (Burgess and Connell, 
2004).  
The regulation of temporary employment arrangements also applies at different levels such as 
the agency business, the contract of employment of the agency workers, and employment 
conditions associated with agency employment (Burgess and Connell, 2004). The business is 
primarily regulated by means of licensing and monitoring procedures, and some countries curtail 
the scope of the agency’s activities, by for example, prohibiting recruitment services (Storrie, 
2003). For agencies, regulation may also include the posting of financial guarantees to protect 
employment benefits, the involvement of social partners, annual reporting obligations and 
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limitations on the scope and activities and sectors of operation (Burgess and Connell, 2004; 
Strauss and Fudge, 2013).  Collective agreements also play a role in the regulation of 
assignments and contracts, for example in the Netherlands and Sweden, and to a lesser extent in 
Belgium and France (Storrie, 2003).  
One measure of fostering accountability in multi-party arrangements, is to distribute the 
liabilities for labour and employment obligations among the different parties involved (ILO, 
2016). This may be achieved by regulations providing for joint and several liability between the 
parties. If a joint and several liability rule applies, a worker could claim the labour entitlements 
from both the agency and the user firm and could recover the full entitlements (for which the 
shared liability exists) from either of them (ILO, 2016). This measure is found in the regulations 
governing temporary agency work in both developing and industrialised countries, and usually 
relates to wages and social security entitlements (ILO, 2016). Joint liability rules are provided for 
example in Argentina, France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Namibia, Ontario (Canada) and 
South Africa (ILO, 2016). The joint liability rule may assist in ensuring compliance with labour 
obligations in temporary agency work. The user firm being exposed to potential claims by the 
agency workers creates a strong incentive for the selection of reliable private employment 
agencies (ILO, 2016). In addition, coupling the joint liability rule with a non-discrimination 
principle17 for agency workers employed by the user firm, may prevent temporary agency work 
from being used solely as a tool for shedding labour responsibilities and gaining access to 
cheaper workers (ILO, 2016).  
Although different countries have different levels of protection for employment, Storrie (2003) 
argues that as a general requirement, agency workers should have the same employment 
protection as workers with a contract of employment. The presumption should be that 
employment is in terms of an open-ended contract unless there are objective grounds to contract 
otherwise (Storrie, 2003). Temporary work agencies should be allowed to pursue profitable 
 
17 Article 5 of the ILO’s Private Employment Agencies Convention No.181, 1997 discusses the principle of non-
discrimination in relation to temporary agency workers: ‘In order to promote equality of opportunity and treatment 
in access to employment and to particular occupations, a Member shall ensure that private employment agencies 
treat workers without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction, 




business activities, while maintaining the integrity of collective bargaining at the user firm. This 
is essential to ensure a degree of job security for agency workers, with the ideal being equal 
treatment for all (Storrie, 2003).  
From a broader perspective, Cotton (2013) warns that at a national level there are some 
fundamental problems with taking a regulatory approach to externalised labour. The reason 
being that the ‘raw material’ of labour law is the employment contract, as this changes so does 
the scope of labour law. Changes to the employment relationship result in regulation being left 
without an object (Tsogas, 2009). A further problem is that externalised work forms are often set 
up with the purpose of avoiding legislation. In many cases the gains for contract and agency 
workers come through collective bargaining and dialogue with employers (Cotton, 2013). As a 
result of this national regulatory weakness, international standards and mechanisms are 
disproportionately important in the regulation of externalised labour (Cotton, 2013). 
2.7. Union efforts and responses to temporary agency work 
One of the primary issues surrounding temporary employment agency work is the ability of 
traditional class actors, such as trade unions, to represent temporary agency workers (Benassi 
and Doriatti, 2014). The literature points to several factors that make union representation of 
atypical workers difficult, such as their heterogeneity, vulnerability, their dispersion along the 
value chain and the unwillingness of unions to represent them (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014). In 
the main, trade unions regard the growth of externalised labour as directly responsible for the 
erosion of permanent jobs and decent work (Forde and Slater, 2005; ILO, 2009a).  
Predictably, the position adopted by many trade unions is that externalised labour undermines 
fundamental rights and should be opposed (Cotton, 2013). The search for leverage or bargaining 
power leads to trade unions being regarded as the cause of insider-outsider divisions (Rubery and 
Piasna, 2016). The ‘insider-outsider’ literature proposes that unions act as obstacles to 
employment opportunities available to the outsiders resulting in labour market dualisation with 
only the insiders enjoying representation and protection (Pulignano et al, 2015). As a result of 
increasing economic pressure, unions have been found to support the use of atypical workers as a 
buffer in order to protect their core constituencies from market fluctuations and cost cutting 
pressure (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014). However, Palier and Thelen (2010) argue, and Pulignano 
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et al (2015) agree, that dualisation is as a result of the weakening of trade unions, rather than 
their intentional protection of insiders. This argument suggests that trade unions’ preferred route 
would be increased protection for all and only resort to reduced outsider protection as a second-
best solution (Pulignano et al 2015; Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
Pulignano et al (2015) compared Belgian and German plants of multinationals and reveal that 
there are important country differences in regard to the treatment and protection of agency 
workers, with a particular emphasis on unionisation. They conclude that dualisation is not an 
inevitable outcome for coordinated market economies as unions in some countries are able to 
reduce the inequalities between insiders and outsiders. Their overall argument is that unions do 
have space for strategic choice, but they need to pay attention to the institutional setting as 
unfavourable legal and political contexts lead to the failure to prevent dualism (Pulignano et al 
2015).  
Theories of union revitalisation argue that unions seek to recruit atypical workers and bargain on 
their behalf. This they do as a result of an increasingly hostile environment for labour and to 
regain their bargaining power (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014). These contrasting perspectives, 
whether to exclude or include atypical workers, outline the dilemma that unions face in dual 
labour markets (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014). Goldthorpe (1984) believes that both inclusion and 
exclusion are viable strategies for unions to maintain their labour market power. In short, trade 
unions have had multiple responses to the introduction of agency workers including exclusion, 
engagement and regulation and their responses are often influenced by different country contexts 
(Heery, 2004; Cotton, 2013). However, little research exists on the conditions under which 
unions choose one or the other of these options and that their decision ultimately depends on how 
they define their boundaries and constituencies. (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014).  
As the working and employment conditions of temporary agency labour differ from country to 
country, so do the possibilities of obtaining union representation for temporary agency workers 
(Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2014). In France and the Netherlands, for instance, temporary 
agency workers can be represented by the trade union at both the user firm and at the temporary 
work agency, whereas the legislation and the trade union organisational structure in Sweden 
requires union representation to be linked to the employer, that is the temporary work agency 
(Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2014). The possibility of temporary agency workers obtaining 
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representation is also dependent on the unions’ attitudes towards agency workers. In other words, 
it is a matter of whether the union can represent temporary agency workers and whether it wishes 
to (Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2014).  
The desire for unions to include non-standard workers was looked at in a study by Berntsen 
(2016), albeit in the context of migrant workers. Berntsen considered the nuanced processes of 
non-unionisation of migrant construction workers in the Netherlands. This study shed light on 
the ways migrant workers negotiate and navigate an increasingly flexible and pan-European 
labour market. It suggests that although some trade unions may have been reluctant in the past to 
represent migrant workers, migrants do join trade unions when unions make strategic and 
resourceful efforts to include them. Both the Berntsen (2016) and Håkansson and Isidorsson 
(2014) studies point to the desire and effort made by unions to include those in precarious 
employment such as migrant workers and temporary agency workers. Bearing in mind however, 
that the insecurity of these workers, as well as making union organisation a challenge, might also 
encourage worker demand for protection (Heery and Abbott, 2000; Dean, 2012). 
A good example of strategies to include temporary agency workers may be found in the German 
case. Until the late 2000’s trade unions in Germany made little effort to unionise temporary 
agency workers (Ferreira, 2016). This even though these workers were often working under 
worse conditions and had lower pay than their permanent counterparts. Ferreira (2016) explains 
several reasons for the low unionisation of these workers. Unions often had difficulties engaging 
these workers due to the short term (less than 3 months) work placements. Workers therefore felt 
they did not have the same attachment to their industry as permanent workers. The traditional 
methods of attracting members such as strikes, would be unlikely to attract temporary agency 
workers as they would simply be sent back to the agency and likely made redundant. During 
2007, unions realised that the temporary agency industry was supported by labour regulation and 
embarked on new strategies, while remaining critical of temporary agency work. For example, 
they created information portals, developed petitions, established collective agreements, 
provided guidance and practical assistance and campaigned for change (Ferreira, 2016). These 
campaigns aimed to realise the principle of equal treatment and equal pay, reduce the use of 
temporary agency workers and focus on their recruitment. The hope was that by ensuring equal 
pay, employers would reduce their use of temporary agency workers. Ferreira (2016) however 
70 
 
concludes that despite these efforts to include temporary agency workers, the underlying 
message from unions remained negative. The unions stressed that temporary agency work should 
be used as a tool for short term flexibility and not as a viable employment option (Ferreira, 
2016). 
The UK union response to the AWR reflects a long-standing approach towards agency temps, 
ranging from ‘opposition’, to acceptance, to positive engagement (Heery, 2004; Forde and Slater, 
2014). The dominant view is that the AWR do not provide enough protection for temporary 
agency workers. Unions perceived the equality rights (after twelve weeks) as a step in the right 
direction, but workers were still left relatively unprotected as it provided scope for employers to 
adjust their strategies, as discussed in the previous section (Forde and Slater, 2014). Unions 
realised that the AWR only provided some degree of protection and that new organising 
strategies were necessary to improve conditions for these workers. Unions continued to 
campaign for day one equal treatment rights and against PBA contracts18 which were perceived 
as exploitative (Forde and Slater, 2014). Unions informed workers of their rights through emails, 
leaflets, media campaigns and union agency representatives as many workers were unaware of 
what the regulations meant (Forde and Slater, 2014). As outlined in section 2.6.4. above, the UK 
government has responded to such concerns. As from 6 April 2020, a permanent contract giving 
pay between assignments no longer allows a worker to opt out of equal pay entitlements. All 
agency workers are entitled to the same pay as a permanent employee of the hirer after twelve 
weeks in the same role with the same hirer (Agency Workers Regulations 2010: Guidance, p. 
40). 
2.8. A global north v global south perspective 
Due to peculiar histories, legacies, boundaries, legal frameworks, and the nature of collective 
action, precarious work has different characteristics in different national settings. Nevertheless, 
there has been a tendency to consider the economic development of the west as a defining pattern 
where economic growth eventually produces a more affluent worker (Kalleberg and Hewison, 
2012). In line with this thinking, growth leads to a mass consumption society where workers are 
 
18 PBA contracts no longer apply from 6 April 2020. 
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the consumers necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist economy. The informal sector19 
assumes a transition to formal employment as ‘surplus labour’ is absorbed and wages rise 
(Kalleberg and Hewison, 2012, p.398). There are however challenges to conceptualising 
precarious work in this manner because of its variations in the global south (Mosoetsa et al, 
2016). Labour historians and labour studies scholars have often conceptualised workers as 
employees of specific firm concentrated locations such as factories, mines and other large 
organisations. However, this is a view of labour in a post-war era in developed economies 
(Mosoetsa et al, 2016).   
For most of human history, and especially in the global south, work has occurred under unstable 
conditions, with little legal regulation and little expectation of long-term continuity (Mosoetsa et 
al, 2016). Externalisation, casualisation, mass unemployment and workers that fall outside the 
ambit of labour law as a result of economic, political and ideological globalisation, have long 
been a reality in the developing world and in particular in the Southern African region (Teklè, 
2010; NALEDI, 2006). A great part of the active population has never performed work that 
corresponds with the ‘conventional’ or ‘standard’ employment model around which labour law is 
shaped (Tekle, 2010). These non-standard groups of workers usually escape the legal categories 
that determine the applicability of labour law and are explicitly excluded from labour law 
coverage, in whole or in part (Tekle, 2010). However, former colonies in Francophone and 
Anglophone Africa still retain some of the labour laws that were imposed on them during 
colonial times and ‘borrow and bend’ laws from other countries (Kalula, 2004, Tekle, 2010; 
Fenwick, Kalula and Landau, 2010). This has important implications. Labour laws are moulded 
on a model that does not reflect African realities as wage and salaried workers account for as few 
as 20 percent of workers in sub-Saharan Africa (Tekle, 2010; ILO, 2015).  
 
19 In Africa, during the 1970’s, another term arose, namely that of ‘informality’ or the informal sector to describe 
workers outside the formal capitalist system. Hart (1973) popularised the notion of informality and believed that the 
distinction between formal and informal income opportunities was based on the difference between wage-earning 
and self-employment. Significantly the concept of ‘informality’ was used and developed around the same time by 
the ILO (ILO, 1972). The informal sector, or informal economy as it became known, embraces a whole range of 
occupations, from small-scale manufacturing and retail to domestic service and various illegal activities, united only 
in terms of being beyond the reach of labour law, labour contracts, licensing and taxation laws (Munck, 2013). 
According to the ILO the percentage of persons in informal employment in sub-Saharan Africa ranges from 33 per 




In addition, the socio-political underpinnings of labour laws imported from Europe were not 
present in some African countries, such as a strong trade union movement, a functioning state 
administration, the rule of law and respect for civil and political liberties (Tekle, 2010). There are 
different reasons behind the retention of the European-originated model of labour law, one of 
them is that there was adherence to a set of values and rights widely shared by the international 
community and encapsulated by the international labour standards and human rights norms 
(Tekle, 2010; Meknassi, 2010). Another is that these ‘transplanted’ labour laws corresponded to 
the industrialisation and development strategies that the developing countries pursued, as they 
believed that this would trigger growth and they would ‘develop’ and resemble northern societies 
(Sankaran, 2010; Tekle, 2010). 
Whether in the global north or the global south, Lee and Kofman (2012) agree with Kalleberg 
(2011) and Standing (2011) that precarity is a global challenge. However, the concept of 
precarious work developed from intellectuals and social movements battling work insecurity and 
welfare state retrenchments in the global north. For this reason, the concept of precarious labour 
seems to assume that Europe and the United States represent the norm of labour relations. Some 
scholars argue that the current rise of precarious work in the global north in some way emulates 
patterns already present in the global south (Mosoetsa et al, 2016). Others such as Munck (2013), 
suggest that the focus on the standard employment relation as something that must be recovered 
through political action originates from the European experience but may not be applicable to 
post-colonial societies where ‘standard’ employment was not the norm in the post-war era. In the 
global south, it may be historically inaccurate to call for a ‘return’ to standard employment 
relations that did not prevail in the past (Mosoetsa et al, 2016). The development of labour 
markets in the global south was different to that of the global north. Light industry and mining 
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the largest increase in 
industrialisation happened during and after World War Two and involved a much smaller 
segment of the population than in the global North. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, but 
only a partial absorption of the adult work force, led to low levels of employment (Mosoetsa et 
al, 2016). 
In the context of developing countries, precarious employment is not just a pendulum swing 
from security to flexibility but a core part of the state’s strategy of development. Lee and 
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Kofman (2012) argue that the state, in collaboration with international institutions, deliberately 
creates a precarious workforce without full-citizen protection, in order to keep a competitive 
export niche in the global economy. Therefore, in many developing countries, precarious 
employment reinforces state legitimacy and labour politics becomes national politics, and class 
struggle becomes a citizenship struggle. Precarious employment in the global south has different 
roots and different consequences - it is not just a job issue. The history and legacy of 
colonialism, authoritarianism and late industrialisation and the neoliberal, structural adjustment 
by international financial institutions affected class relationships, labour movements, and state 
capacity (Lee and Kofman, 2012, p.405). 
In line with the idea that precarious workforces are deliberately created, are Mezzadri’s (2017) 
arguments which concern the comparative advantage of certain regions. The idea is that cheap 
labour is used as a ‘natural’ category for poor and developing countries (Mezzadri, 2017; Dutta, 
2019). However, cheap labour is not naturally available and has to be ‘manufactured’. The 
manufacturing of cheap labour occurs as a result of multiple ‘capital-labour relations, labour 
practices and outcomes’ that create ‘typologies of vulnerability’ in places of work and beyond 
(Mezzadri, 2017, p 18; Dutta, 2019). In contexts where there are existing socio-economic 
divides, inequalities and regional disparities, the manufacturing of cheap labour is created by 
utilising these pre-existing conditions. Framed within the neo-liberal development context, cheap 
labour and poor working conditions are reconceptualised as ‘strategic assets’ to be exploited 
(Mezzadri, 2017, p. 25). The informalisation of labour relations being a key feature of the 
neoliberal era and a key characteristic of global commodity chains that produce global 
sweatshops driven by labour intensity, frequent relocation, low capital investments and complex 
commercial agreements (Mezzadri, 2017, p. 26). 
Section 2: South Africa as a useful case study of temporary agency work 
2.9. South African temporary agency work 
Lee and Kofman (2012) believe that one of the best country studies for precarious employment 
as a ‘crisis of social reproduction’ is South Africa. This was largely because of the colonial 
legacy of social underdevelopment, a despotic racial order using cheap labour, and ruthless 
suppression of political dissent in the 1980s that produced a national liberation movement in 
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which class and citizenship struggles were fused (Lee and Kofman, 2012, p. 390). The largest 
trade union federation, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), recognised the link 
between class and citizenship struggles and has stated that sub-contracting, casualisation and 
division of workers, denies workers their citizenship and is the rise of a new form of apartheid 
(Barchiesi, 2011; Lee and Kofman, 2012).Webster and Omar (2003) similarly believe that the 
effects of the apartheid regime on the workplace included low trust, low levels of skill, a 
reluctance to identify with the goals of the enterprise, and above all, the persistence of the racial 
division of labour that characterised apartheid.   
Parallel observations were made in a study conducted by Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw (2009), 
fifteen years after the start of democracy in South Africa. The study draws on empirical research 
in three sectors of the South African economy - mining, forestry and agriculture. The authors 
argue that the post-apartheid era witnessed a marked increase in the precariousness of workers’ 
status and situations. Regardless of formal labour market regulation, externalisation turned 
previously oppressed wage labourers into poor, casualised workers, trying to make ends meet in 
a liberalised economy. Their study concludes that although South Africa’s transition profoundly 
changed the lives of workers, it had not improved their situation due to the casualisation of their 
status and conditions. While there had been a desire to change the exploitative labour regime in 
law, little had been done by the government to transform the reality in the workplace. Employers 
adapted to the political change by shifting to economic coercion and casualisation because of 
high unemployment.  
In the same light, Gericke’s (2010) perspective is that under the previous apartheid regime, 
labour relations were regulated by labour legislation which excluded black workers from the 
definition of an employee. The definition of an employee therefore constitutes the important 
starting point whereby a worker would be afforded protection under labour legislation.20 The 
exclusion of migrant African workers, forming the majority of temporary workers in most 
sectors at the time, was of significant importance as they were employed in terms of fixed-term 
contracts. Historically, labour brokers used the same legal mechanism to control the employment 
 
20 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (the  LRA 1995) states that an ‘employee means - 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying 
on or conducting the business of an employer.’ 
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of temporary workers (employees of the broker) who were placed with a client (Theron, 2005; 
Gericke,2010). The idea was that the LRA 1995 prior to the latest 2014/15 amendments, 
facilitated externalisation21 by creating loopholes for employers who wanted to avoid 
employment risks and the high costs of unfair dismissal proceedings (Theron, 2005; Gericke, 
2010).  
Due to ongoing abuse of temporary agency workers and the negativity surrounding the 
temporary agency industry, trade unions and politicians called for a total ban on temporary 
employment services (or labour brokers). The issue became one of the most high-profile political 
issues in the country. Legislation that sought to prevent all triangular employment was published 
by the government in 2010 but was subsequently withdrawn because of the problems that arose 
with this approach. Instead, legislation seeking to regulate temporary employment agency work 
and address the abuses associated with the sector was introduced in 2012, and promulgated in 
2014/15 (Benjamin, 2013b).  
Despite the growth in temporary agency work, the use of labour brokers as they are commonly 
known, remains plagued by controversy as it is perceived as a cheaper alternative to permanent 
employment and the accompanying labour-related obligations (ILO, 2011; Senne and Nkomo, 
2015). Furthermore, the complex historical context and the development of the regulatory 
framework within this context provides a valuable setting for research. Yet as discussed in the 
introduction to the thesis, there is a paucity of research examining temporary agency work in 
South Africa adopting a holistic perspective and taking account of contextual aspects (Senne and 
Nkomo, 2015).  
2.10. The difficult economic and social conditions that exist in South Africa 
The vulnerability and precariousness of employment in South Africa is not confined to the lack 
of formal jobs. It is common for those who enjoy the protection of unionisation to earn wages 
that often barely cover necessities (Barchiesi, 2011). Wage labour in South Africa does not 
experience a stable social experience, inclusion and ‘full social citizenship’ (Barchiesi, 2008, 
p.123). Instead, it carries the mark of ‘precariousness of subsistence’ (Barchiesi, 2008, p. 123) 
 
21  In the context of this comment, ‘externalisation’ is defined by Gericke (2010) as ‘a process used by employers to 
transform and delegate work formerly done by permanent employees, to temporary workers at the workplace who 
are engaged in a tripartite relationship between the worker(s), the client and the labour broker’. 
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defined by ‘shakiness and harmful unpredictability, as well as the lack of social recognition and 
appreciation’ (Offe, 1997, p. 82; Barchiesi, 2008).  
In addition, the South African labour market remains racially biased, with one race at the bottom 
of the stratum and the other at the top22. The South African socio-economic context remains 
characterised by poverty, high unemployment and a history of racial segregation (Senne and 
Nkomo, 2015). As a result, temporary and casual labour have been ‘endemic features’ of the 
South African labour market for many decades and government policy in relation to the 
regulation of these arrangements is argued to be, or is seen as, incoherent, inadequate and 
inefficient despite more than two decades of democracy (Van Eck, 2010; Senne and Nkomo, 
2015).  
In order to place the South African labour market and economic environment in context, it is 
useful to look at the country within an emerging economy perspective. The five emerging 
economies, Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey together comprise 41 per cent of the 
world’s population and 42 per cent of the world’s labour force. Each country liberalised its 
product markets to accelerate the country’s growth and development. In some, such as South 
Africa, this was coupled with democratic transition, with organised labour playing a key role in 
the process of political change. High degrees of informality and late or limited industrial 
development produced patterns of industrial relations that differ from those in advanced 






22  Large proportions of black Africans are employed in ‘Elementary and Domestic worker occupations’ (low-skilled 
occupations) compared to the other population groups. Among Indians/Asians and white populations large 
proportions are employed in Managerial, Professional, Technician and Clerical occupations. For every one black 
African in a Managerial occupation, there were five Indians/Asians in Managerial occupations and six white people 
in that occupation. In contrast, for every one Indian/Asian in Elementary occupation there were seven black Africans 
in that occupation. The ratio for white to black Africans in Elementary occupations is 1:10 (Stats SA, 2016, p.ix). 
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Table 2: Emerging economies including South Africa: population, income, growth and labour markets 























(% of total) 
Brazil    207 653 14023 51.48 -3.6 24.6 62.0  43.0 
China 1 378665 14339 42.16 6.7 37.1 70.9  51.9 
India 1 324171   6092 35.15 7.1 39.8 53.9  90.6 
South 
Africa 
     55908 12260 63.40 0.3 60.4 54.7  34.0 
Turkey    79512 23756 40.04 3.2 46.8 52.0  31.7 
Source: Hayter, 2018 p.11 
Table 2 above shows the proportion of those in informal employment remains significant in 
many of emerging economy countries. Income inequality is high, and there has been a rise in 
insecure forms of employment, whether ‘labour brokering’ in South Africa, ‘dispatched labour’ 
in China or ‘outsourced’ labour in Brazil (Hayter, 2018).  
South Africa is classified as an upper middle-income economy, yet gross domestic product 
(GDP)23 growth rates over the last ten years have been sluggish.  Between 1994 and 2007 real 
GDP growth averaged 3.6 percent per annum, but after the 2008 financial crisis this slowed to 
1.9 percent, and growth has since fallen below one percent (Bhorat, Cassim and Hirsch, 2014; 
Bhorat and Stanwix, 2018). South Africa’s labour market remains one of the most unequal in the 
world, with a wage Gini coefficient24 of 0.62 in 2014. Bhorat and Stanwix (2018) explain this as 
a function of the difference in earnings between the rich and the poor, but it is also due to the 
vast number of unemployed in the labour market.  
 
23 The market value of goods and services produced within a country. 
24 The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of statistical dispersion that represents the income or 
wealth distribution of a nation’s residents. It is portrayed as a number between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect 
equality and 1 perfect inequality. It is derived from the Lorenz curve, a graphical depiction of societal inequality. A 
Lorenz curve is generated by plotting the cumulative population income on a vertical axis and population percentile 
on the horizontal axis; a straight 45-degree line represents total equality. 
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The South African TES sector has expanded at a growth rate of 8.7 percent in the last two 
decades (Bhorat and Stanwix, 2018).  Bhorat and Stanwix (2018) point out that the TES growth 
rate was more than five times the tertiary sector growth that grew at an overall 1.6 percent 
between 2000 and 2016. In general, employment growth in the TES sector exceeded the national 
employment growth rate of most sectors, including the financial sector (Bhorat and Stanwix, 
2018). TES employment as a proportion of financial employment increased from 27 percent in 
1996 to 47 percent in 2014 (Bhorat, Naidoo, Oosthuizen, Pillay, 2015). TES employment as a 
proportion of total employment went from 2.2 percent to 6.44 percent from 1996 to 2014 (Bhorat 
and Stanwix, 2018). 
The legacy of apartheid remains visible in all areas of the labour market, with education perhaps 
the most obvious case. Poor schooling for the majority of South Africans persists; leaving most 
individuals ill prepared to enter the job market, with very few low-skilled employment 
opportunities (Bhorat and Stanwix, 2018). The lack of opportunities is evident in the fact that the 
unemployment rate for South African youth aged 15-34 years was 37 percent in the first quarter 
of 2015 (Ingle and Mlatsheni, 2017). Youth unemployment rates are important for job search 
prospects because having current employment is highly correlated with having previous work 
experience (Banerjee, et al, 2008). 
Another important legacy of apartheid was the geographic distance between where many of the 
unemployed reside and where most businesses are located, resulting in low levels of labour 
market participation and employment in rural areas (Banerjee et al, 2008). Turok et al (2011) 
believe that in rural areas the failure of the market is particularly stark, with obvious private 
sector neglect ‘there is not enough demand for goods, so there is not enough money, there is no 
industry and there is no development in the rural areas and former homelands. There is market 
failure’ (p. 183). 
High levels of unemployment, coupled with rural areas that lack development, result in young 
people struggling to find jobs. Many of those who do find jobs, are employed only briefly before 
becoming unemployed again (Branson et al 2019). Due to their youth and disadvantaged 
backgrounds, they do not know where to look for employment, or how to apply for positions and 
have no access to the media or internet. In addition, they have no information about job 
vacancies or how the application procedures work, with no networks to introduce them to 
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potential employers (Dieltiens, 2015). Furthermore, having previously had a job is correlated 
with currently having a job (Branson et al, 2019). TES firms may therefore act as a key 
intermediary between new entrants into the labour market and labour market opportunities (Lam 
et al, 2008; Bernstein, 2012).  
In addition, South African employment is mainly accessed through informal networks of friends 
or family who are aware of job openings, or who put people in touch with employers (Lekana 
2006; Schoer and Leibbrandt 2006; Graham et al. 2016). Branson et al (2019) found that more 
than half (53 percent) of young people who were unemployed and who had found a job, 
indicated that they found work because friends, family or household members told them about 
the employment opportunity.  
Bernstein (2012) conducted research on how TES firms affect people’s chances of finding work. 
This research assessed the characteristics of over 10 000 people who registered with a branch of 
the largest TES firm in South Africa, Adcorp. The research compared the profile and 
employment prospects of TES beneficiaries against data from StatsSA.25 Comparisons were also 
drawn between the TES data and data from the Jobs and Opportunities Seekers (JOBS) 
programme at the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) (Bernstein, 2012). The 
research found that TES operate at a significantly larger scale than comparable government 
programmes; that in terms of salaries, there seemed to be little difference between TES workers 
placed by the Adcorp branch and those in other types of jobs. Moreover, TES firms may have 
important advantages as routes into employment. They are of use to unskilled, inexperienced 
workers whose connection to the labour market is particularly tenuous. Bernstein (2012) 
cautioned however that these findings apply only to the TES employees from a single data set, 
taken from one large corporate TES firm, and it could not be claimed that the findings applied to 
all workers placed by all TES firms. An important aspect of this research was that employment 
agencies may be a route into employment for people who do not have friends and family 
employed in firms that are looking to recruit staff and who could vouch for them. In other words, 
those who do not have access to informal networks. 
Similar findings were obtained in the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), which began in 2002 and 
followed the lives of a large and representative sample of adolescents in Cape Town as they 
 
25 Statistics South Africa is the national statistical service of South Africa. 
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become adults (Lam et al 2008). CAPS data revealed that those who found jobs through 
employment agencies have amongst the lowest number of earners within the household, perhaps 
indicating that they had much less access to networks of people who would be able to assist them 
to find work. These data may mean that employment agencies are of assistance to people with 
limited attachment to the labour market and limited access to employed individuals who can help 
them find a job (Lam et al 2008; Bernstein, 2012). Employers seem to prefer people who come 
through a referral system and rely on social networks to find employees (Bernstein 2014, De 
Lannoy et al, 2018). Intermediary interventions26 such as TES firms aim to minimise the barriers, 
costs and risks faced by youth whilst looking for work. Common methods employed by a TES to 
address unemployment include managing the process of recruiting, screening, assessing, 
selecting and placement of suitably qualified candidates on behalf of their clients (De Lannoy et 
al, 2018).  
2.11. South Africa’s regulatory environment 
The modern-day South Africa is a Constitutional state that entrenches a Bill of Rights. Section 
23(1) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices, which means that the labour policy choices are constrained and the justification for any 
limitation of these rights is not simply a matter of economics (ILO, 2010). Although social 
inequalities remain (Barchiesi, 2008), labour enjoys rights and safeguards empowered by the 
Constitution and employment legislation. However, this empowerment has not counterbalanced 
the trends of joblessness, externalisation and casualisation of employment (Theron, 2004; 
Barchiesi, 2008).  
According to Clarke et al (2004), the ANC's adoption of neo-liberal, macroeconomic trade and 
industrial policies after 1994 undermined the new regulatory regime and impeded the overall 
transformation of the labour market. The result was that formal employment shrunk, various 
forms of non-standard such as temporary agency work grew and ‘old’ forms of casual and 
contractual employment continued as holdovers from the apartheid labour market (Clarke et al, 
2004). However, Betcherman et al (2001) explain that the labour market is often a controversial 
aspect of public policy and approaches are dominated by opposing views. One view favoured the 
 
26 Intermediary interventions are those that bridge the gap between young work seekers (18-35 years) and employers 
(De Lannoy et al, 2018). 
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protection of workers through labour legislation and collective bargaining, and the other 
emphasised the advantages of encouraging market processes. Freeman (1992) points out that 
there is wide disagreement between economists such as those from the World Bank, who see 
government regulation of wages, mandated contributions to social funds, job security, and 
collective bargaining as 'distortions' in an otherwise ideal world; and economists such as those 
from the ILO who stress the benefits of interventions. These latter economists argue that 
regulated markets adjust better than unregulated markets and recommend tripartite consultations 
and collective bargaining as the best way to determine labour outcomes (Freeman, 1992).  
Initially in the late 1990s, South African policies and legislation encompassed the spirit of ‘give-
and-take’ between business and labour and resulted in what has been described as ‘well-crafted, 
carefully balanced legislation that had one eye on the ‘decent work agenda’, but which also gave 
employers a reasonable amount of flexibility in managing employees’ (Altbeker and 
Masiangoako, 2019, p. 2). Shortly after democratisation in 1994, the Cheadle Task Team was 
briefed to prepare South Africa's first set of post Constitutional labour legislation and in its 
ensuing Explanatory Memorandum it mentioned that the draft Bills sought to ‘avoid the 
imposition of rigidities in the labour market’ as they aimed to ‘balance the demands of 
international competitiveness and the protection of fundamental rights of workers’ (Cheadle 
Commission,1995; Van Eck, 2013 However, since 1996 amendments to legislation have tended 
to strengthen worker protection and reduce flexibility (Altbeker and Masiangoako, 2019).27 
Bhorat and Stanwix (2018) contend that South Africa is not overly restrictive or inflexible. Their 
reasoning is based on the standard Doing Business Survey measures that rank South Africa’s 
labour codes as being close to the world average - slightly higher for the difficulty of hiring and 
firing, but significantly below average for both the costs of firing and non-wage labour costs. 
However, they point out that the extent to which employers comply with the labour codes is not 
captured by these measures. Their research suggests that many employers do not comply with 
basic aspects of the labour code. For example, sub-minimum wages, having no access to paid 
leave, not being registered for the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), and not having a 
 
27 In contrast to the general trend in Europe, the South African collective bargaining system has not moved towards 
a more neo-liberal approach, whereas the trade regime and macroeconomic and monetary policies have (Maree, 
2011). Maree (2011) believes that this lack of coordination in policy between different departments of the state has 
had negative consequences for the South African economy and its ability to create employment.  
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written contract. Institutions that deal with labour disputes such as the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the Labour Courts are not without their 
problems. The CCMA provides an accessible avenue for dispute resolution but can be costly for 
employers and the Labour Court’s backlog make it an unattractive avenue for recourse (Bhorat 
and Stanwix, 2018).  
Furthermore, Bhorat and Stanwix (2018) believe that the rapid growth in the TES sector is 
representative of firms implicitly viewing the labour regulatory regime as too restrictive for 
direct hiring. The suggestion is that employers wish to reduce their non-wage labour costs, 
including HR processes and management of employees, by hiring TES workers (Bhorat and 
Stanwix, 2018). The growth of TES work remains a controversial development in South Africa 
as although jobs are being created as a result of the industry, these jobs are usually more 
precarious (lower paid, less secure, and having limited recourse to the legal system for workers) 
(Bhorat and Stanwix, 2018).  
During 2015 the South African Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66) (the LRA1995) was 
amended to provide additional protection to vulnerable TES employees. The additional 
protections have resulted in the client and the TES being jointly and severally liable if the TES 
contravenes the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 (BCEA) or sectoral 
determinations under the BCEA, as well as collective agreements or arbitration awards which 
apply in respect of these employees. If the TES employee works for a client for a period 
exceeding three months and is paid less than the annual earnings threshold (currently 
R205 433.4328per annum) (the Threshold Amount), the client becomes the ‘deemed employer’ of 
the TES employee. Once the TES employee is deemed to be the employee of the client, he or she 
must be treated on the whole no less favourably than an employee of a client performing the 
same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment29(Workman-
Davies and Vatalidis, 2015). These LRA amendments were introduced following the growth of 
the TES sector and were aimed to secure permanent positions for temporary workers after a 
period of three months in the same job (Bhorat and Stanwix, 2018).  
 
 
28 £10 887 per annum as at 20 January 2020. 
29 Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995. 
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2.12. South Africa’s collective bargaining system 
South Africa conforms to the international labour standards of the ILO by promoting collective 
bargaining. It has ratified C087 -Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to Organise 
Convention 1948, C098 - Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 
98), and C154 - Collective Bargaining Convention 1981 (No. 154). All these conventions 
embrace the right of an employee to engage in collective bargaining with a view to improving 
working conditions (Matete, 2014). The post-apartheid evolution of the South African collective 
bargaining institutions did not however follow international trends. There was an international 
increase in decentralised bargaining, whereas in South Africa the negotiations at the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)30 resulted in an acceptance of sectoral 
or industry-level bargaining (OECD, 2010).31 Centralised and sectoral bargaining were favoured 
by the larger and more organised unions, and Section 1(d)(ii) of the LRA 1995 expressly states 
that it is the preferred level (Grogan, 2017). 
The LRA’s 1995 overall approach to collective bargaining has been described as leaning towards 
centralised bargaining, while retaining voluntarism (Baskin, 1996; Benjamin, 2016), with 
collective bargaining widely regarded as a labour right (Holtzhausen, 2012). There is no legally 
enforceable duty to bargain. The LRA 1995 secures only the means of collective bargaining, 
without prescribing, or empowering the courts to prescribe how these means should be exercised 
or concluded (Grogan, 2017).32 The courts have accepted that the absence of a legally 
enforceable ‘duty to bargain’ does not violate the constitutional right to engage in collective 
bargaining (Benjamin, 2016). The rationale is that imposing a duty to bargain at sectoral level 
would violate the right of employers to elect not to bargain with other employers at sector level, 
 
30 NEDLAC is a representative and consensus-seeking statutory body established in law through the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council Act of 1994. It aims to facilitate sustainable economic growth, greater 
social equity at the workplace and in the communities, and to increase participation by all major stakeholders in 
economic decision-making at national, company and shop floor level. 
31 The term ‘bargaining level’ describes whether bargaining takes place between unions and individual employers 
(plant-level bargaining), or the holding company of a group (centralised bargaining), or between one or more unions 
and a group of employers from an industry or occupation (sectoral bargaining) (Grogan, 2017, p. 390). 
32 One reason for this approach was that the previous system that contained a duty to bargain, became a basis for 
attacks on majoritarian trade unionism as the courts carved out bargaining units for minority and craft trade unions 
(Benjamin, 2016). Another reason was that the drafters argued that a legally enforceable duty to bargain would 




which is generally seen as protecting the constitutional principle of freedom of association 
(Benjamin, 2016).  
One of the more interesting developments in the LRA 1995, is the establishment of workplace 
forums in terms of Sections 78-94. Workplace forums are a form of works councils and are plant 
level consultative bodies (Wood and Mahabir, 2001). Workplace forums in South Africa, unlike 
in Germany,33 must co-exist with formalised plant level bargaining (Wood and Mahabir, 2001). 
Section 23 of the LRA 1995 makes provision for collective agreements that deal with wages and 
conditions of employment to be concluded outside bargaining councils at workplace (plant) 
level, however workplace forums do not deal with wages and conditions of employment, 
allowing both of these systems to co-exist. The success of the system depends on unions taking 
the initiative and making a formal application to the CCMA for their establishment as employers 
cannot initiate the process. Unions have been reluctant to promote workplace forums because of 
fears of demarcation disputes and the general erosion of their traditional role. Workplace forums 
have therefore had limited success in South Africa, with only a very small number of forums 
operative (Wood and Mahabir, 2001). 
Broadly speaking, South Africa’ bargaining framework exists on two levels, as set out in table 3 
below. The first is more centralised at industry level in bargaining councils, and the second is 
decentralised to individual firms or plants. In addition to bargaining councils, wages may also be 
negotiated in other ways, either through a statutory system of wage determination or outside the 
statutory system (Bhorat et al, 2009; OECD,2010).   




Functions and powers Registration 
Bargaining 
Councils 
• Make and enforce collective 
agreements  
• Prevent and resolve labour 
disputes  
• Establish and manage a dispute 
resolution fund 
• Promote and establish training 
May be formed by one or more 
registered trade unions and one or 
more registered employers’ 
organisations, given that these 
parties are ‘sufficiently 
representative’. NEDLAC is 
assigned the task of determining 
 
33 German works councils constitute a part of what is in most respects a centralised system, with limited room for 
shop floor participation (Wood and Mahabir, 2001). 
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and education schemes  
• Establish and manage schemes 
or funds to benefit its parties or 
members  
• Make and submit proposals on 
policies and laws that affect a 
sector or area 
 
their scope and area of justification 
Statutory 
Councils34 
• Resolve labour disputes  
• Promote and manage education 
and training schemes  
• Form and manage schemes or 
funds for the benefit of its 
parties and members  
• Make collective agreements  
• May perform any other 
bargaining council functions 
 
May be formed by a registered 
trade union or employers’ 
organisation that does not have 
sufficient membership to meet the 
representivity requirement to form 
a bargaining council. Thus, 
registration is unilateral. 
Outside of statute 
 
Functions and powers Description 
Plant or firm 
level bargaining 
Bargain over issues otherwise 
covered by Bargaining or Statutory 
Councils. 
Collective bargaining between an 
individual employer and the trade 
unions(s) representing the 





They promote the workers’ 
interests by consulting and making 
joint decisions. A workplace forum 
has the right to be consulted by the 
employer on: restructuring and new 
work methods; partial or total plant 
closure; mergers and ownership 
transfers; retrenching workers; job 
grading; criteria for merits and 
bonuses; education and training; 
product development plans; export 
Workplace forums may be formed 
when there are more than 100 
employees by applying to the 
Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA). 
 
34 The rationale for the establishment of statutory councils was as a compromise between the voluntarist bargaining 
councils and statutory councils that had an element of ‘compulsion’. This compromise was apparently in response to 
labour’s demand for mandatory centralised bargaining. In establishing statutory councils, the LRA 1995 stipulates 
that one party, providing it is at least representative of 30 percent of the sector, can trigger statutory councils. 
Statutory Councils were never a success and have only been established in about 3 areas. In theory they can be used 
to compel employers to engage in sectoral bargaining, but they are limited to non-wage issues unless the employers 





promotions; and health and safety 
measures. They do not deal with 
wages and conditions of 
employment 
 
Source: Coleman (2013, p. 71); Leibbrandt, et al (2010, p.30) and OECD (2010, pp.236-237) 
Together with bargaining councils, sectoral determinations fell under the statutory system of 
bargaining and wage determination (Bhorat et al, 2009). The Minister of Labour could establish 
a sectoral determination that set out basic conditions of employment for employees in a specific 
sector and area (Bhorat et al, 2009).35 Sectoral determinations needed to be concluded in 
accordance with Chapter 8 of the BCEA and published in the Government Gazette. In general, 
sectoral determinations were in sectors where no bargaining councils existed and set minimum 
terms and conditions of employment, minimum wages, adjustment in minimum wages and 
regulated the payment of remuneration (Bhorat et al, 2009; OECD, 2010). The National 
Minimum Wage Act 2018 (No. 9) (NMWA) repeals chapters 8 and 9 of the BCEA, dealing with 
the publication of sectoral determinations. However, existing sectoral determinations will remain 
in force except where they prescribe a wage less than the NMWA (Moodley, 2017). 
 
Outside the statutory system of bargaining councils and sectoral determinations, non-statutory 
collective bargaining takes place and can be both centralised or at company plant-level (Godfrey 
et al, 2007). Two major industries are covered in full or in part by non-statutory, centralised 
bargaining arrangements, namely mining and automobile manufacturing (Godfrey et al, 2007). 
Within retail, bargaining takes place at either the national company-level, regional level or store 
level, and unorganised firms are bound only by the retail sectoral determination (Godfrey et al, 
2007). Wage regulations have therefore developed in a fragmented fashion, with minimum wage 
levels exhibiting large variations between and within sectors, as well as regionally. The result is 
that a myriad of specific minimum wages exists, making it one of the most complex systems in 
the world (Oxford Analytica, 2017).  
 
 
35 Eleven sectoral determinations governing vulnerable workers in different sectors of the economy have been 
established. These are Forestry, Agriculture, Contract Cleaning, Taxi Operators, Civil Engineering, Learnerships; 
Private Security, Domestic Workers, Wholesale and Retail, the small business sector, children in the performance of 
advertising, artistic and cultural activities, and Hospitality.  
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Table 3 below sets out the trend in bargaining council numbers and registered employees 
covered from 1983 to 2010. Holtzhausen (2012) records that councils were on the decline and 
that new councils formed have been established with great difficulty and long periods of 
struggle. Four of the nine major sectors of the South African economy have no council, or the 
councils cover an insignificant proportion of the workers (Holtzhausen, 2012). Benjamin (2016) 
observed that in the period since the LRA (1995) came into effect, relatively few bargaining 
councils have been formed and fewer than ten per cent of workers in the private sector are 
covered by bargaining councils. This he argues, is proof of employers taking advantage of the 
voluntarism to resist sectoral bargaining Benjamin (2016). In 2014 there were 44 registered 
bargaining councils covering some 2,5 million workers (Du Toit et al 2015, p. 51).  Over 60 per 
cent of these workers fall within the five public service bargaining councils (Benjamin, 2016). 
Coleman (2013 p.75) confirms that the number of Bargaining Councils has declined steeply in 
recent years as can be seen from table 4, but the number of workers covered by bargaining 
councils increased until 2004 but declined thereafter. Much of the increase is made up of the 
addition of the five public service councils after the new Labour Relations Act incorporated 
coverage of the public service (Bhorat et al, 2009). Those covered by Bargaining Councils 
declined by about 70 000 between 2004 and 2010 (Coleman, 2013). 
Table 4: Bargaining Council trends as displayed in number of councils and coverage of employees 
Year Number of councils Total registered employees covered 
1983 104 1171 724 
1992 87 735 533 
1995 80 823 823 
1996 77 810 589 
2000 78 - 
2004 57 2 358 012 (1 075 969 in the public sector) 
2008 48 2 315 297 
2009 46* - 
2010 47 2 290 600 
Source: Holtzhausen (2012, p. 12); Coleman (2013, p. 81). 
*This figure excludes two councils that were in the process of de-registration 
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The decline in the number of councils has been attributed to the amalgamation of regional 
councils and sub-sectoral councils into national councils, but also to some being de-registered or 
ceasing to function (Holtzhausen, 2012; Coleman, 2013). However, Benjamin (2016) states that 
while there has been some consolidation of regional councils into national institutions in some 
sectors, there has been no substantial growth in the number of bargaining councils. As far back 
as 2006, Godfrey et al (2006) stated that the bargaining council system might be teetering on the 
brink of a crisis. Coleman (2013) explains that once formed, new councils appear to struggle to 
get up to a reasonable level of representivity.  
On 1 January 2019, the long awaited The National Minimum Wage Act 2018 (No. 9) (NMWA) 
came into effect. The national minimum wage (NMW) is R2036 per hour or R3,90037 a month for 
a 45-hour work week (Isaacs, 2018).38 The same mechanisms utilised to enforce the provisions 
of the BCEA will be used to enforce the NMW (Moodley, 2017). The NMWA repeals chapters 8 
and 9 of the BCEA, dealing with the publication of sectoral determinations (Moodley, 2017). 
However, as stated above, existing sectoral determinations will remain in force except where 
they prescribe a wage less than the NMW (Moodley, 2017). If a sectoral determination already 
prescribes wages that are higher than the NMW, the wages in that sectoral determination, and the 
remuneration and associated benefits based on those wages, must be increased proportionally to 
any adjustment of the NMW for three years from when the NMW Act is enacted (Moodley, 
2017). Based on household survey data, Patel et al (2016) estimate that many workers in South 
Africa report earning wages that are low, even relative to the current sectoral determinations. 
Approximately 30 percent of workers report earning less than R1 813 per month39 (the lowest 
sectoral determination), while around 70 percent of workers earn below the highest sectoral 
determination of R6 506 per month40 (Patel, 2016). 
2.13. The strong trade union movement in South Africa 
During the 1950s, the South African Nationalist government enacted laws to promote work 
committees for black workers to weaken trade unions (Benjamin, 2012). Those who organised 
 
36 Equivalent to £1.07 (based on exchange rates for 14 January 2020). 
37 £207.87 (on 14 January 2020). 
38 Domestic workers are entitled to R15 per hour, farmworkers R18 per hour and Public Works Programme workers 





black workers risked imprisonment for undermining the internal security of the apartheid state 
and for promoting communism (Benjamin, 2012). The aim of labour law in apartheid South 
Africa was political marginalisation and exploitation (Benjamin, 2012). The re-emergence of 
black independent trade unionism in the 1970s, and its focus on community and political 
struggles in the 1980s, resulted in the mobilisation and solidarity that played a decisive role in 
pre and post-apartheid democratisation and the rise to power of the African National Congress 
(ANC) in 1994 (Barchiesi, 2008). It was during this period, when the increase in atypical 
employment became a global phenomenon, that an emergent union movement in South Africa 
fought bitter and violent battles to secure its members’ basic rights (Vettori, 2005). 
Historically, the South African trade union strategies were highly innovative and ranged from 
establishing worker advice centres, building strong workplace structures, mobilising the support 
of community organisations for consumer boycotts, and participating in broad political alliances 
for liberation (Von Holdt and Webster, 2005). Trade union discourse and action was 
overwhelmingly shaped by the struggle against racial and colonial oppression. In democratic 
South Africa, the COSATU unions kept the broader discourse of social justice that focuses on 
the poor, the jobless, and the communities, but have arguably failed to develop innovative 
organisational strategies (Von Holdt and Webster,2005). 
After the attainment of democracy in 1994, the South African union movement was cited as one 
of the few union movements in the world to be increasing in membership (Silver, 2003; 
Chinguno, 2010). However, the reorganisation of production and fragmentation of work caused 
the trade union density to decline from 57 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 2007 (Pillay, 2008; 
Chinguno, 2010). During 2015/16 South Africa had a trade union density of 28.2 percent and 
collective bargaining coverage of 30 percent (Hayter, 2018). Chinguno (2010) argues that as 
mass-based organisations, trade unions can only sustain their credibility, legitimacy, 
representativeness as a social force if they engage workers in new forms of employment.  
The South African union movement’s fight against state repression contextualises the debates 
regarding atypical employment and there remains a fierce desire by the labour movement to 
avoid any trend that may attempt to reinstate the abusive situation experienced by workers under 
the apartheid government (Omomowo, 2010). In this regard, the debate in terms of the atypically 
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employed in South Africa is often perceived as a class battle because of the unique 
circumstances imposed by apartheid, which had a far-reaching effect on the development of the 
country’s labour market policy (Bronstein, 2009). Various stakeholders in the debate for and 
against atypical employment differ on key issues, especially as to whether some forms of 
atypical employment should be banned. Importantly, these debates are set against a background 
of high unemployment in South Africa. COSATU advocates for the banning of temporary 
employment services and contends that it is against the African National Party’s (ANC) Freedom 
Charter41 and the ILO’s notion of decent work (Mazanhi, 2012). Generally, South African trade 
unions have campaigned actively against temporary agency work (Cotton, 2013). Given the 
weakness of industry regulation and international standards, South African trade unions have had 
a preference for legislative responses which has been a successful strategy securing important 
gains for workers (Cotton, 2013).  
In order to allow trade unions to engage temporary agency workers, regulatory gaps in the 
protection of collective rights and the right of these workers to establish and join trade unions, 
must first be established (ILO, 2016). An interesting development in this respect is contained in 
the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No. 6 2014) (LRAA). The LRAA now allows trade 
unions representing the employees of temporary employment agencies to exercise their 
organisational rights not only at the workplace of the agency, but also at the user firm’s 
workplace (Benjamin, 2013, pp.12-15; ILO, 2016). In addition, an arbitration award establishing 
organisational rights may be made binding on the TES agency and the TES client (Benjamin, 
2013).42 Moreover, workers employed by agencies who participate in a legally protected strike 
action are entitled to picket at the user firm’s premises (ILO, 2016).  
The South African Department of Labour (DoL) has provided some insight into the effect of 
these new organisational rights regarding non-standard forms of employment. The DoL produces 
 
41 Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, 26 June 1995. 
42 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is independent and governed by a tripartite 
Governing Body. The CCMA’s functions include dispute resolution, dispute management, and institution-building 
within the labour arena and the provision of education, training and information to employers and employees and 
their organisations. The CCMA is funded by the national government and there are no charges for referring disputes 
to it. All disputes about unfair dismissals, trade union organisational rights, the interpretation of collective 
agreements and certain individual unfair labour practices, as well as interest disputes arising from collective 
bargaining, must be referred to conciliation. Arbitration is the route for adjudicating disputes about dismissals for a 
reason related to the employee’s conduct or capacity, as well as disputes concerning trade union organisational 
rights, the interpretation of collective agreements and certain individual unfair labour practices (Benjamin, 2013b). 
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an Annual Industrial Action Report that reviews developments in industrial action for a 
particular year and highlights key trends (ILO, 2016). Since 2005, the report has provided 
chronological information on strike incidents which includes information reported by employers, 
the media, and industrial actions outside of working hours. An analysis of these reports show that 
non-standard employment represented an important element in strike action, including wildcat 
strikes (ILO, 2016). Close to eight percent of incidents were reported to have some relation to 
non-standard work in 2006, peaking at nearly 17 per cent in 2010. The demands included 
demands to regularise the contracts of casual or temporary workers and to align their terms and 
conditions with those of permanent workers. In addition, there were demands to end the use of 
‘labour brokers’ or temporary agency work (ILO, 2016). The sectors in which most of the strikes 
took place were wholesale and retail trade, community, social and personal services, financial 
services, and manufacturing, representing almost 92 per cent of workdays lost. These sectors had 
a high proportion of their workers in flexible employment relations that were outside the reach of 
institutional safeguards (ILO, 2016). The report concluded that both the vulnerability of these 
workers and the fact that unions had begun to organise and represent them, were the main 
reasons for these developments. Some of these actions took place within the context of COSATU 
calling for a ban on the use of labour brokers. This received some support from the South 
African government, who, following lengthy tripartite dialogue on labour law reforms, 
introduced amendments over the course of 2010 to 2014, which sought to improve regulation of 
the use of temporary employment services, fixed term contracts and part-time employment (ILO, 
2016). 
Moreover, Webster and Englert (2019) looked at whether the role played under apartheid by 
labour in the transition to democracy can be revived in the struggle against inequality of the post-
apartheid period. They argue that the transition to a neoliberal state in the post-apartheid period 
has fragmented workers and weakened their capacity to build sustainable workplace 
organisation. However, they identify the emergence of collective action and organisation 
amongst precarious workers in South Africa. They found that in response to the degeneration of 
their traditional organisations, these workers have rebuilt worker organisation in line with 
organising traditions built in South Africa 40 years ago. Webster (2019) argues that there is a 
general distrust of existing trade unions among many precarious workers. As a result, they were 
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forming worker committees or councils on a plant by plant basis instead of establishing trade 
unions. This illustrates that precarious workers are actively organising, and they remain very 
rooted in historical organisational traditions. These workers focus on accountability, participation 
and transparency thereby challenging the practices of the established unions. As a result, they 
have challenged the unequal neoliberal workplace and the pessimistic ‘end of labour’ thesis. 
Webster (2019) argues that there is danger that established unions will not be open to 
experimentation and the protection of vulnerable workers. Instead, they will defend the interests 
of permanent workers becoming dependent on the new post-apartheid labour institutions, rather 
than rebuilding power in the workplace (Webster, 2019). 
 
2.14 The comparative capitalism approach 
2.14.1. Varieties of capitalism 
The comparative capitalism literature seeks to explain firm behaviour within a designated 
country context. There are two approaches considered in this section of the thesis: the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) theory, that  is concerned with how the nature of relationships between a 
firm and the institutional context in which it operates leads to competitiveness, and business 
systems theory that prioritises the importance of relationships between a firm and its internal 
(e.g. employees) and external (e.g. the state) stakeholders (Dibben et al, 2013, p.8). 
The publication ‘Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage’ by Peter Hall and David Soskice in 2001 examined systematic similarities and 
differences in economic policy, firm behaviour, institutional arrangements, and ‘strategic 
interactions’ among economic actors in order to explain variation in growth, unemployment, or 
inflation across high-income economies (Pitcher, 2017). They categorised and described these 
economies based on the comparison of Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) characterised by 
arm’s length interaction among market actors, and Coordinated Market Economies (CME) where 
informal networks and collaborative arrangements accompany market relations (Kiran, 2018). In 
the original Hall and Soskice (2001) study, six of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries are categorised as LMEs (the United States, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), while ten as CMEs (Japan, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Finland and Norway). They 
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later suggested the possible existence of a third type, called ‘Mixed Market Economies’ 
(MMEs), combining features of CMEs and LMEs (Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Witt et al, 2018).  
Comparative capitalism literature’s central line of thought is that at any point in time, there are 
discrete aspects of the institutional and business framework that combine, facilitate or promote 
particular ways of organising economic activity with implications for firm, sector and national 
performance (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Firms in all capitalist economies face co-ordination 
problems which require them to develop relationships with various actors, such as the state and 
organised labour, but also banking and financial institutions (Witt and Jackson, 2016). Key co-
ordination problems include: setting wage and working conditions (which have implications not 
only for firm profitability, but also for unemployment, inflation and aggregate demand); securing 
skilled labour (which affects both firm profitability and the general level of competitiveness in 
the economy); forging relationships with suppliers (which may involve vertical integration) and 
developing forms of corporate governance that overcome transactions costs and ensure access to 
finance (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 6-7). The overall objective of comparative capitalisms 
literature has been to shed light on how different economies navigate co-ordination problems, 
create complete complementarities, and how their institutional diversity shapes business 
outcomes (Witt and Jackson, 2016). 
Although the VoC literature focuses on advanced capitalist economies, there have been attempts 
to apply it to developing countries (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). These and other studies 
considerably expand the theoretical and empirical scope of Hall and Soskice’s original study 
(Pitcher, 2017). For example, Schneider (2008) distinguishes two further varieties:  ‘Network 
Market Economies’ in which co-ordination is achieved predominantly through trust (for example 
Japan, Taiwan); and ‘Hierarchical Market Economies’ characterised by strong degrees of vertical 
integration,  a high degree of labour market segmentation, few (albeit diversified) large firms and 
decentralised labour relations (for example Latin America and South Africa) (Schneider 2009). 
Schneider (2010) classifies South Africa as a ‘hierarchical’ variety of capitalism on the grounds 
that firms in the leading sectors of the economy are predominantly large and concentrated 
(Schneider, 2008, p15). 
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Over the last decade, researchers have debated the presence of two to five models, if not more 
(Lallement, 2011).  Some of this research, aimed at defining forms of capitalism, is summarised 
in table 5 below. 




Schneider (2009) Latin American 
countries 
Coined the term ‘Hierarchical Market Economies’ 
(HMEs) for these countries given the patronage 
relationship between the state and businesspeople 










They have defined these countries as ‘Dependent 
Market Economies’ (DMEs) since the Central and 
Eastern European countries are highly reliant on 
foreign direct investments and transnational 
corporations. 
 
Schmidt (2007) Italy, France and 
Spain 
Schmidt claimed that she brought the role of the state 
into the VoC framework by defining Italy, France 
and Spain as State-Influenced Market Economies 
(SMEs) given the distinctive influence of the state 
over labour and business. 
 






Focused on the welfare regimes and production 
systems of these two countries and concluded that 
they can be defined as Mixed Market Economies 
(MME) in which the state has an extensive role to 
compensate the deficiencies of the institutional 
structure in these countries. 
 
Witt & Redding, 
(2013) 
13 major Asian 
countries with 
one another and 
Germany, the 




They concluded that the Varieties of Capitalism 
framework is not applicable to Asia given the 
heterogeneity and differing characteristics of 
business systems in different Asian countries. 
Kiran (2018) Turkey Based on a qualitative comparison with the DMEs, 
MMEs and HMEs, Kiran claims that Turkey is a 
HME with four characteristic features found in Latin 
American economies: the dominance of the family-
owned diversified business groups, state-regimented 
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and weak industrial relations, low skills and the 
influence of MNCs. 
 
Source: adapted from Kiran. (2018, pp.42-43) 
Despite the abundant VoC literature available, little agreement has been reached about how 
many models should be discerned within capitalist economic spaces (Pitcher, 2017). 
Considerable agreement exists that national diversity occurs across several core institutional 
domains such as education and skills formation, employment relations, financial systems, 
interfirm networks, internal dynamics of the firm, ownership and corporate governance, and the 
institutions of the state itself (Witt & Redding, 2013; Witt and Jackson, 2016). Despite the lack 
of agreement on the number of models, most empirical studies focus on three fixed categories of 
capitalism, namely Liberal Market Economies (LME), Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 
and Mixed Market Economies (MME) (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Akkermans et al, 2009). These 
three models and their key characteristics are set out in table 6 below. 
Table 6: Varieties of capitalism: key characteristics of LMEs, CMEs and MMEs 
LMEs CMEs MMEs 
United States, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, 
Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand are 
identified by this approach 
 
Large equity markets 
marked by high levels of 
transparency and dispersed 
shareholding. 
 
Access to external finance 
depends on publicly 
assessable criteria such as 
market valuation. 
 
Japan, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Switzerland, 
Austria, Finland and Norway 
are identified by this approach 
 
Firms are connected by dense 
networks of cross-shareholding 
and membership in influential 
employers’ associations. 
 
These networks provide for 
exchanges of private 
information, allowing firms to 
access capital as a consequence 
of their reputation rather than 
share value. 
Southern Europe, 
particularly in France, 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain are identified by this 
approach. 
 
MMEs are hybrids and seen 
as an inconsistent and 
inefficient form of capitalism. 
They are unlikely to attain the 
same levels of economic 
performance as the two pure 
forms.  
 
Characterised by the central 




Regulatory regimes allow 
hostile takeovers that 
depend on share price, 
rendering managers 
sensitive to current 
profitability. 
 
Trade unions are weak. 
Wage-setting is usually a 
contract between workers 
and individual employers. 
Labour markets are fluid, 
so workers invest in 
general, transferable skills. 
Industry associations are 
weak, and firms lack the 
capacity for collaborative 
training that confers 
industry-specific skills. 
 
Technology transfer is 
accomplished by licensing 
or hiring experts, and 
standards are set by market 
races. 
 
Top managers have 
substantial authority over 
all aspects of firm strategy, 
including layoffs. 
 
The relationships firms 
form with other actors are 






Managers are less sensitive to 
current profitability. 
 
Strong trade unions, powerful 
works councils, and high levels 
of employment protection, 
result in less fluid labour 
markets and longer job tenures. 
 
Wage setting is coordinated by 
trade unions and employers’ 
associations that also supervise 
training schemes.  
 
Workers acquire industry-
specific skills and assurances 
of available positions if they 
invest in them. 
 
Industry associations are 
pivotal to standard setting, with 
legal endorsement and 
technology transfer taking 
place through collaboration 
between workforce 
representatives and business 
networks. 
 
Top managers have less scope 
for unilateral action, and firms 
adhere to more consensual 
styles of decision making. 
Labour market characteristics 
include intermediate level of 
The private sector is often 
subservient to the public 
sector. Private exchange can 
only take place where the 
government has not forbidden 
it or already assumed that 
role. 
 
Government intervention is 
key and includes subsidies, 
tariffs, prohibitions, and 
redistributive policies, legal 
tender laws, monetary control 
by a central bank, public road 
and infrastructure 
projects, tariffs on foreign 
products and entitlement 
programs. 
 
There are strong relations 
between political parties and 
organisations such as trade 
unions. 
 
Trade unions and business 
organisations often hold 
monopolies, or quasi 
monopolies over membership 
domains and have privileged 
access to state resources and 
often demand compensation 
from the state. 
 
Government activities often 
offer benefits directly to a 
concentrated, organised group 
at the expense of the tax base. 
 




The preferred instrument 
of employment adjustment 




employment protection and 
mobility facilitated by high 
levels of generic qualifications 
and skills. 
The preferred instrument of 
employment adjustment is 
internal flexibility (working 
time, functional flexibility). 
 
include dual flexibility that 
allows protection for the core 
labour force and precarity. 
 
 
Source: Hall & Gingerich, 2005, pp. 8-9 (adapted by: Molina and Rhodes, 2007; Lallement, 2011, p.638; 
Hassel, 2014; Malik, 2017; Ross, 2019)  
As can be seen from table 6, at one end of the spectrum are LMEs where relations between firms 
and other actors are coordinated primarily by competitive markets. At the other end are CMEs 
where firms typically engage in more strategic interaction with trade unions, suppliers of finance, 
and other actors (Hall & Gingerich). Somewhere between them are the hybrid MMEs, 
characterised by the central role of the state, where government activities often offer benefits 
directly to a small group at the expense of the wider tax base,  resulting in an inefficient form of 
capitalism and precarity. 
 
While as outlined in table 5 the varieties of capitalism approach continues to be adopted and 
refined, there have been numerous criticisms levelled against this approach. For example, 
Crouch (2005) argues that analytically, it tends towards description rather than analysis and there 
is the temptation to fit the empirical evidence to the model. Molina and Rhodes (2007) are 
critical of its neglect of the state, its divorce of the firm from national contexts, an over-concern 
with institutional equilibrium rather than dynamics of change, and its incapacity for dealing with 
non- Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Co-ordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Witt et 
al (2018) argue that Hall and Soskice’s (2001) VoC theory would probably classify most 
economies in the world as MMEs. For example, Witt and Jackson (2016) examined 22 OECD 
countries, including those Hall and Soskice (2001) had originally classified as CMEs and LMEs. 
They found coherently complementary institutions across the five spheres of the political 
economy defined by Hall and Soskice only in six cases. These include five LMEs namely, 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK and the USA, and one CME, Austria. The remaining 16 
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economies are MMEs, including Germany, which Hall and Soskice saw as an ideal CME (Witt 
et al, 2018). While the framework seems to work well on the LME side of the spectrum, Witt 
and Jackson (2016) suggest insufficient discriminatory power for understanding institutional 
variations outside that category. In line with Molina and Rhodes (2007), Witt et al (2018) believe 
that the VoC approach does not provide a theoretical foundation for the existence of MMEs, nor 
a basis for distinguishing possible types within this category (Witt and Jackson, 2016; Witt et al 
2018). Importantly, the relevance of VoC outside of developed, industrialised countries has also 
been questioned (Padayachee, 2013). Critics have charged that the VoC literature ignores 
diversity and that the two models of LME and CME are too restrictive for analytical purposes 
(Bosch et al. 2010, p. 26; Dibben et al, 2013). 
 
2.14.2. Varieties of capitalism: South Africa 
2.14.2.1. South Africa in the apartheid era  
The task of categorising pre-apartheid South Africa is particularly difficult as aspects of the 
HME and MME models can be identified when analysing this period. In addition, South Africa’s 
peculiar historical trajectory does not fit neatly into any archetypal ‘variety’ of capitalism 
(Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). This is because the state intervened in ways which were often 
ideologically inspired and because the institutions which were created served a limited section of 
the population and discouraged job creation for the majority while still facilitating redistribution 
through the fiscus, reflective of the  MME model (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010).  
However, Schneider (2010) classifies South Africa as a ‘hierarchical’ variety of capitalism or as 
a ‘Hierarchical Market Economy’ (HMEs). The reason for his HME classification, is that the 
South African financial sector is by African standards large and well-developed as a 
consequence of the historical role played by British imperial capital and then Afrikaner financial 
capital which produced a unique corporate structure whereby a small group of conglomerates 
came to own and control both the major corporations and finance houses (Ashman and Fine, 
2013). By 1994, the gold-mining giant Anglo American controlled 43 percent of the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) capitalisation, and the top five groups (Anglo 
American, Rembrandt, and life assurers: Sanlam, Old Mutual, and Liberty Life) controlled 84 
percent through complex cross-holdings and preferential shares (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010).  
99 
 
Apartheid therefore produced an almost entirely white business elite that was highly 
concentrated in terms of corporate ownership and control (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). In this 
‘hierarchical market economy’, key co-ordination problems for business were solved through 
vertical relations within large conglomerates or hierarchical relationships between firms rather 
than through either the market or corporatist institutions (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). This was 
compounded by sanctions against the apartheid regime which saw considerable withdrawal of 
international capital and the ‘trapping’ of large amounts of domestic capital, accompanied by 
illegal capital flight (Ashman and Fine, 2013).  
A further characteristic of the apartheid variety of capitalism was the way that the state 
intervened aggressively in the economy to protect white employment through labour-market and 
trade and industrial policy, and to foster capital-intensive growth, thereby limiting the capacity of 
the economy to create unskilled jobs (Seeking and Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). 
At the end of apartheid, the state owned the TV stations, all the major radio stations, it controlled 
electricity generation and supply (through the parastatal Eskom), had a monopoly on 
telecommunications (through its control of Telkom) and the parastatal Transnet owned and ran 
the rail network and the national airline (Rumney, 2004, p. 402).  
As such, the apartheid state shaped the business environment directly through parastatals 
(Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). Similarly, the apartheid state used its extensive powers of 
regulation to promote Afrikaner capital, to protect the living standards of white voters, and to 
promote domestic industry (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). Both during and after apartheid, 
government policies provided strong incentives to capital to employ more capital and skill 
intensive production technologies, thereby contributing to South Africa’s ongoing structural 
unemployment crisis (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). 
2.14.2.2. South Africa in the post-apartheid era  
After the abolition of apartheid, attempts were made to nurture a more social-democratic and co-
ordinated variety of capitalism, with the adoption of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) that reflected the ideas of a social democratic welfare state (Padayachee, 
2013; Nattrass, 2014). Labour’s struggles during apartheid reinforced the emergence of a new 
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industrial relations system influenced by key features of a CME, including collective bargaining, 
employee rights and representation, and the establishment of social accords bringing together 
organised labour, business and the state (Webster, 2013). However, the implementation of this 
vision proved problematic as the patterns of conflict, coercion and dispossession - characteristics 
of South African capitalism in its formative years - were perpetuated through market forces that 
underpinned problematic trends such as the fragmentation and flexibilisation work (Webster, 
2013; Padayachee, 2013). 
The African National Congress (ANC) soon replaced popular mobilisation (the RDP) for 
neoliberal macroeconomics (the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme or GEAR) 
(Hart and Padayachee, 2013, p.61). Throughout GEAR, many LME model aspects were adopted, 
characterised by weak employment protection and external flexibility. These neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies were adopted against the wishes of organised labour, driven by global 
financialisation, competitiveness and a ‘cozy corporatist culture’ (Bond, 2013; Padayachee, 
2013, p.23).  
 
During this time, what was particularly concerning to trade unions was the highly flexible labour 
market that had emerged through the rapid growth of the temporary employment agency sector 
(Webster and Sikwebu, 2010). This led to the differentiation of the South African labour market 
into three zones - a core of formal sector employees with more or less stable employment 
relations, a zone made up of workers with less stable employment relations, and a peripheral 
zone made up of workers whose main source of livelihood is through informal sector activities 
(Webster and von Holdt, 2005, p. 27). ‘Liberalisation’ had therefore polarised the labour market 
by increasing the resources of the core, while reducing the resources for those who were in the 
non-core categories such as TES workers and those working for outsourced functions. During 
2006, research from National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) 
confirmed that trade liberalisation had exposed the local economy to competition resulting in 
increased casualisation. This they said had occurred because foreign capital demanded lower 
wages and the relaxation of regulations to increase profits. Companies therefore resorted to 
casual and flexible labour to reduce labour costs, extend working hours, and achieve easy 
deployment of labour (Bodibe, 2006) 
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Unemployment and poverty remained normal for the black majority and the white minority still 
controlled most major businesses (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). In addition, the big mining 
companies took advantage of an international regime favourable to free capital flows to move 
their headquarters and much of their money out of the country (Hart and Padayachee, 2013).  
According to Ashman, Fine and Newman (2011), 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
left the country after 1994 and the easing of exchange controls made this outflow increasingly 
legal. The unwillingness of South African firms to invest within the country meant that corporate 
savings were high and by the end of 2010, reached nearly 18 percent of GDP (R480 billion) 
(Hart and Padayachee, 2013).  
Although considerable privatisation took place after 1994, by privatising what had become 
natural monopolies, the economic structure remained highly uncompetitive (Competition 
Commission, 2008; Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). The ANC’s initial approach was encouraging 
the white conglomerates to unbundle and sell off parts of their business empires to aspirant black 
capital (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). When the pace was too slow, they then shifted to a more 
assertive regulatory stance, brokering with the main sectors (including agriculture, transport, 
autos and information technology) ‘voluntary’ mid- to long-term targets for change in 
ownership, participation and training (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). However, the beneficiaries of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) were a small elite, many with close links to the ruling 
party, some of them party officials, plus a few prominent ex-trade unionists (Hart and 
Padayachee, 2013). These elites mostly became wealthy through boardroom deals and self-
enrichment rather than empowerment. The reluctance of these elites to invest some effort into a 
common national development strategy is one reason why South Africa misses an important 
ingredient of Schmidt’s state meditated model (Nölke and Claar, 2013). 
In terms of the post-apartheid era, South Africa shares with the SME model the ‘comparative 
advantage’ of abundant, cheap, unskilled labour - a lasting element of apartheid (Nölke and 
Claar, 2013). It also shares some characteristics with CMEs such as its labour regulation and 
welfare system. In 1994 the post-apartheid government inherited a system of social grants which 
reaches 14 million people (28 per cent of the population) at a cost of 3.3 percent of GDP 
(Nattrass, 2014). But unlike the ideal-type CME, no significant or sustained support is provided 




In terms of the future, Nattrass (2014) suggests that one option is to move more towards 
becoming more CME-like by providing social welfare for the unemployed. This route is resisted 
by business and organised labour because of South Africa’s relatively narrow tax base, which 
will necessitate that all income earners would pay higher taxes. Another option is to move more 
in the direction of an LME regarding labour laws whilst retaining statist components (for 
example, industrial policy) where they are effective (Nattrass, 2014). This, however, is not an 
option for organised labour. Those who propose labour-market reforms are labelled ‘neo-liberal’ 
and ‘sell-outs.’ Productive discourse about how to build an inclusive political economy in South 
Africa, remains difficult (Nattrass, 2014). 
 
2.14.3. Business Systems Theory (BST) 
Although often combined with the VoC approach, Business Systems Theory (BST) precedes it. 
Originally developed by Whitley (1999), the main theme of BST, in its approach to the 
comparative analysis of market economies, is that differences in societal institutions encourage 
or discourage kinds of economic organisation (Dibben et al, 2013). It is different to the VoC 
approach as BST focuses primarily on the firm as the centre of a broader web of embedded social 
relations and pays more attention to the role of the state (Morgan, 2007; Hancke et al, 2007).  
Whitley (1999, p. 33) defines business systems as: 
Distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and mode of 
authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and 
interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees. 
Whitley originally identified six archetypes (or clusters of countries) associated with certain 
practices, involving economies of the developed world (1999). These six national archetypes are 
primarily drawn on the East Asian, European and North American experiences and encompass 
such diverse cases as Scandinavia, the United States, Hong Kong, South Korea, Italy and Japan, 
and  can be considered economically successful (Wood and Frynas, 2006). Using BST, a further 
archetype has been developed by Wood and Frynas (2006), the ‘segmented business system’, 
based on the experiences of East Africa (Brewster et al, 2018). 
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Whitley (1999) argues that the nature of the firm will vary according to the relative importance 
of a range of stakeholders, consisting not only of owners, managers, and business partners, but 
also including different categories of employees (Whitley 1999). For example, in 
‘compartmentalised business systems’ such as the UK, employer-employee interdependence will 
be low, reflecting competitive labour markets and relatively weak unions (Whitley 1999). In 
more ‘collaborative and coordinated business systems’, such as Germany, firms will be more 
dependent on the firm and industry skills of existing employees, which is associated with 
stronger unions and co-ordinated decision making (Whitley 2000). There would also be a strong 
emphasis on diversified quality production, formalised wage determination, industry specific 
training, high levels of commitment and problem solving and collaboration (Whitley 2010: 379).  
As with VoC, BST is criticised for its focus on stylised ideal types and for paying too much 
attention to rules and formal process, rather than exploring how they are acted out on a day-to-
day basis. A strength of the approach is that it does not assume that heterogeneity is pathological 
or a sign of systemic disintegration (Wood et al, 2011). It has therefore been recently used to 
explore the complexities within emerging economies (Wood and Frynas 2006; Wood et al., 
2011). For example, Wood and Frynas’ (2006) in east Africa, by Wood et al (2011) in 
Mozambique, and Witt and Redding (2013) in China and India.  
Despite many differences across the African continent, researchers have identified certain 
common themes (Wood and Brewster; Kamoche, 2011). Firstly, in many sub-Saharan countries, 
labour rights lost during the one-party era were recovered after democratisation. This led to a 
return to freedom of union organising and the increase in individual employee rights (Brewster et 
al, 2018). Simultaneously, structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) led to job losses, and the weakening of employee bargaining power and state 
capacity to enforce laws. Many existing practices have translated into poor outcomes (Kamoche, 
2011; Kamoche, 2002; Wood and Frynas, 2006; Brewster et al, 2018).  
Poor outcomes also represent the product of embeddedness of authoritarianism and patriarchy 
both within and beyond the workplace. This would make it difficult to maintain and introduce 
advanced HRM paradigms (Hyden, 1983; Kamoche, 2002). Harvey (2002) states that critical to 
understanding HRM in Africa is that not only laws but formal rules are often ignored or bent. 
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This may in part allow firms greater room to manoeuvre but also causes lower levels of systemic 
trust, given the greater difficulties of enforcement. This in turn raises transaction costs relating to 
operationalisation of the employment contract and the overall organisational effectiveness 
(Marsden, 1999).  
2.14.4. Business Systems Theory: South Africa 
Bischoff and Wood (2018) believe that South Africa represents an ‘exceptional case’. It has one 
of the largest economies in Africa, a large industrial sector and excellent infrastructure. Unions 
mostly organise under the umbrella of COSATU and are the strongest on the continent. This is 
supported by a generally labour-friendly body of labour law (Bischoff and Wood, 2018). 
However, the bargaining position of labour has been undercut by high levels of unemployment, 
as much as 45 percent in some estimates. Mass immigration has provided new skills and 
entrepreneurial capabilities, however, intense competition for jobs has led to periodic outbreaks 
of xenophobic riots. COSATU has historically been aligned to South Africa’s ruling party, the 
ANC, although in recent years the relationship has soured (Bischoff and Wood, 2018).  
The South African government tends to play an important role in the formal sector as it performs 
a coordinating function, involves intermediaries, provides education and training, and ensures 
that laws are applied (Fransen and Bert, 2016). Education and training are generally of a high 
quality, although education and training for workers is not (Fransen and Bert, 2016). Formal 
sector firms mainly operate within the rules set by the state and benefit from a sophisticated 
support and financial system (Ashman and Fine, 2013; Bischoff and Wood, 2013; Fransen and 
Bert, 2016). As a result, formal sector firms tend to be larger, operate internationally, have a 
traditional departmental structure with transparent reporting lines, and are likely to take risks 
(Fransen and Bert, 2016). In contrast informal sector firms are casually organised and obtain 
almost no support from the financial system or from policies aimed at small and medium 
enterprises (Bischoff and Wood, 2013; Padayachee, 2013; Fransen and Bert, 2016). They 
therefore tend to be smaller, operate in the local market and their income levels are close to the 
poverty line (Ashman & Fine, 2013; Fransen and Bert, 2016).  
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Since the end of apartheid, major policy efforts have aimed at reducing the segmentation of 
business systems. Municipalities promote pro-poor growth, small and medium-sized firms have 
received some support, and black entrepreneurship and employment were promoted through 
black economic empowerment (BEE) initiatives (Fransen and Bert, 2016). However, the impact 
of these policies has been questioned and government’s response to the challenge of 
segmentation has been described as weak and late in coming (Padayachee, 2013; Fransen and 
Bert, 2016). This weak response can possibly be explained by the ongoing relationship between 
organised labour and government. Historically, this relationship was complicated by the fact that 
the South African Treasury promoted orthodox fiscal policies without negotiating these with 
labour or taking them to the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). 
Treasury therefore promoted a business-friendly set of policies, whilst the Ministry of Labour 
promoted pro (organised labour) policies; a policy incoherence which exacerbated the post-
apartheid unemployment crisis (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010). In addition, collective action by 
business was undermined by established corporations and the emerging ‘empowered’ black 
business elite who pursued their own agendas through direct engagement with government. 
Tension remains between the objectives of BEE and forging business unity.  
In considering the varieties of capitalism literature, certain key characteristics of present day 
South African capitalism become apparent: the corporate concentration, recent ‘unbundling’ and 
continuing forms of anti-competitive behaviour and BEE, which is introducing new forms of 
concentration, economic power and patronage into the economic system. In addition, the 
fragmented character of business organisation in South Africa is still an important consideration 
(Nattrass and Seeking, 2010).  In terms of the future, until labour, business and the state agree on 
what needs to be done, and on what sacrifices and deals should be struck, there is little chance of 
a co-ordinated, egalitarian growth path in South Africa (Nattrass and Seeking, 2010, p.4). 
Section 3: Conclusion and research questions  
This chapter reviewed a wide body of literature addressing different aspects of temporary agency 
work. The first section introduced the concepts and key issues surrounding temporary agency 
work more generally, including a review of recent empirical research and theory development. 
The second section dealt with the TES industry in South Africa, focusing on the difficult 
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economic and social conditions, the specific regulatory and collective bargaining environment, 
and the trade union movement. The third section concludes with the research questions. 
Flexibilisation and dualisation of employment are recurring themes in the literature. However, 
there is an absence of empirical research regarding the latest trends in temporary agency work, 
particularly in countries from the global south. The first of these trends is the increasingly 
complex set of contractual arrangements between agencies and user firms identified in wealth 
nations of the west, and that require closer attention in countries of the south. South Africa’s 
sophisticated legal regime coexisting alongside a weak economy provides an interesting context 
for these arrangements.  
 
Secondly, internationally there have been recent changes in the regulatory environment 
surrounding the supply of temporary workers. Certain aspects have received special focus, 
namely the equal treatment of TES workers, and the statutory allocation of employer 
responsibilities between the agency and the client within the triangular employment relationship. 
Debates around joint and several liability between the agency and the client have also come to 
the fore. These changes are of interest in South Africa given the more radical amendments to 
legislation in this regard. In addition, the important consideration of regulatory avoidance and 
how it is constructed and played out in the South African national context would be significant.  
 
Finally, internationally unions face acute resource, logistical and operational challenges in 
attempting to organise the temporary employment agency sector. Given that South African trade 
unions have been particularly successful in promoting the regulation of TES work, how South 
African unions fare when facing the many challenges brought about by the flexibilisation and 
fragmentation of employment would be of interest. 
 
In order to investigate the above themes from the literature, a holistic approach that provides the 
ability to look at different sub-units (the TES client, worker, firm and unions) situated within a 
larger case (South African TES working) and that considers the interrelationship between the 
phenomenon of TES work within the South African context,  would be appropriate. The 
extensive literature review undertaken did not identify similar holistic case study research 
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drawing on interview data with experts from a cross section of the TES industry, post the 2015 
amendments to the legislation framework.  
This thesis therefore addresses the question of the regulation of temporary agency work for the 
better through the lens of a case study of agency working in South Africa, looking at trends, 
perspectives of key groups and the prospects for legal regulation. In this regard, the objective of 
the proposed research is to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the current position and perspectives of the temporary agency worker, firm and 
client in South Africa? 
2. What is the regulatory framework for temporary agency work in South Africa and the 
response of key groups to this framework? and  
3. How is temporary agency work influenced by trade union responses?  
 
The next chapter, chapter three ‘The South African political and historical context’, aims to 
provide historical context, including that of the legal framework for TES work up to 2010. It 
does not contain any empirical evidence and is therefore deliberately placed before the 
methodology or findings chapters.  It is different to chapter five ‘The legal framework’, as 













CHAPTER 3: THE SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT  
3.1. Introduction 
It is important to outline the far-reaching effects of apartheid’s repressive legacy, to understand 
what had to be undone and to contextualise the current debates surrounding TES work. What 
follows is a summary of the historical, political and legal processes that supported TES workers, 
clients and firms in the South African context. 
To this end, the chapter firstly considers the historical development of the legal framework from 
the rise of the apartheid labour regime, to the changing views between 1970 and the early 1990s. 
It secondly examines the transition to democracy and the post-apartheid context after 1994. 
Lastly, the chapter focuses specifically on South African temporary agency work from 1956 to 
2010. 
3.2. The historical development of the legal framework  
Initially, South Africa was an agrarian community and agricultural workers constituted most the 
labour force (Nel, 1997). As the economy developed, laws regulating bilateral individual 
relations were inadequate and The Masters and Servants 1856 (No.15 of 1856) was promulgated, 
which had a negative effect on employer-worker relations from the outset. Minor offences by a 
‘servant’ or apprentice, for example a refusal to obey a command, warranted imprisonment, with 
or without hard labour (Nel, 1997). Even at this early stage, racial issues played a major role in 
the South African labour relations environment.  
The discovery of diamonds and gold during the mid-19th century catapulted South Africa into the 
era of industrial revolution. Britain had a major influence on the country after gold and diamonds 
were discovered and the legal system remained static for almost two decades (Nel, 1997). A 
characteristic of all South African legislation during this early time was that it was based on 
racial discrimination. This approach was evident when the Nationalist Party came into power in 
1948. The labour legislation was substantially updated, thereby locking South Africa into a 





3.2.1. The rise of the apartheid labour regime  
Officially, apartheid began with the National Party’s election in 1948, although elements of 
apartheid existed long before this time. The root of apartheid was the legal segregation of the 
country by race, with the sole goal being white supremacy. This was achieved by depriving the 
majority of the South African people from basic democratic freedoms and instituting labour 
market regulation that ensured that white employment rights were not shared by the rest of the 
population (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006).  
Compared to other southern African countries, the apartheid system in South Africa was not 
unique but extreme in its racial ordering of society (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). However, 
the colonisation of South Africa was peculiar for two reasons: its incredible mineral wealth and 
its ‘white settler population of some size and cultural cohesion who were determined to maintain 
and enhance their group power and status’ (Wallerstein, Martin and Vieira, 1992, p.4). 
Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006) state that this caused a dilemma for the mining industry: they 
required cheap labour and the settler population regarded the urbanisation of the African 
population as a social and political threat. To resolve this ‘dilemma’ the migrant labour system 
was developed. Labour was secured through the deliberate destabilisation of rural economies, the 
‘legal’ dispossession of land and the introduction of taxes that were required to be paid in cash 
(Ibid, 2006, p. 465).  
As a form of control, African men who migrated to the urban areas and mines were typically 
housed in single-sex hostels and their wives and families remained in the rural areas and 
survived through the engagement of subsistence farming and money sent home to them by the 
working men in the family. Mineworkers were mostly employed on fixed-term contracts and had 
to return to rural areas when the contracts expired or they became unable to work (Ibid, 2006). 
Apartheid policies ensured that the mining industry could subsidise its profits by externalising a 
large part of the burden of social reproduction to rural subsistence economies. Johannesburg, 
founded in 1886, associated with the influx of labour and the Witwatersrand gold rush, soon 
became South Africa’s most densely populated metropolis (Ibid, 2006; Wolpe,1972).  
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (Act No. 11 of 1924), enshrined one of the pillars of the 
apartheid regime - the politics of boundary drawing. Labour was controlled through the concept 
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of the ‘pass’, a document that dictated where the bearer could and could not be at any time. 
Importantly, the 1924 Act, excluded ‘pass-bearing natives’ from the definition of ‘employee’. 
Initially this only applied to African men and African women were included during the 1950s 
(Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). This 1924 Act excluded black people from membership of 
registered trade unions and prohibited the registration of black trade unions. Later, the state 
would enforce the racial segregation of trade unions and anti-communist laws were used to 
neutralise labour activities (Baskin, 1991; Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006).  
There were three central characteristics of apartheid’s labour regime:  
• The racial division of labour: colour bars were enforced in jobs and wages, which created 
a racially segmented labour market (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). 
• The urban geographies and the migrant labour system: cities were divided into ‘white’ 
suburbs and ‘black’ townships, with industrial areas as ‘buffer zones’. Black workers 
were only allowed in white areas to work if they possessed a ‘passbook’ signed by their 
employers. Rural labour reserves (called ‘homelands’) became ‘self-governing states’ 
where African people were granted pseudo-citizenship rights. To stem the urbanisation of 
African people, subsidies were granted to firms who set up businesses in the homelands. 
The idea was to declare the homelands independent states with their black ‘citizens’ 
being ‘foreigners’ in a ‘white South Africa’. If hostel-dwellers lost their job, it meant 
losing their accommodation and they were forced return to the rural areas (Von Holdt 
2003; Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006, pp. 466-467). 
• Legislation segregated the facilities in the workplace: employers had to provide separate 
canteens, change houses and toilets for white and black workers. This legislation was 
only repealed in 1983, but as Von Holdt (2003, pp. 29-30) points out, many firms 
nevertheless continued with their previous practices well after the law’s abolition. 
Black workers were effectively denied the opportunity ‘to seek work of their choice, to live 
where there was work and to have their families with them’ (Kraak, 1993, p.3). Regulating this 
segmented labour market was a dualistic system of labour control: collective bargaining rights 
for non-African workers, and a system of despotic control and the denial of de facto trade union 
rights for black workers (Kenny and Webster, 1999). The use of the strike weapon was severely 
restricted by the existence of tough industrial legislation, the pass laws, and the mine compound 
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system. South Africa accustomed itself to a regime of very tough security laws, which resistance 
movements found very difficult to circumvent (Davenport, 1987). 
Fine and Davies (1990) provide an interesting assessment of the 1930s and 1940s in South 
Africa and the growth of the industrial labour force. The appearance of a ‘new class of black 
proletariat’ was a powerful motor for democratic change in South Africa. This growth provided 
the foundation for the trade union organisation and the dramatic escalation of black militancy 
during the 1940s that fought against the racial capitalist system (Fine and Davies, 1990, p.4). The 
militancy of the African proletariat stimulated a steady growth of political opposition by the 
black middle classes, with the revival of the African National Congress (ANC), the formation of 
the ANC Youth League and the waging of joint campaigns by the ANC and the Communist 
Party (Fine and Davies, 1990). The state was thrown into a profound crisis by these 
developments that was ‘resolved’ through the rise in Afrikaner nationalism. This nationalism 
functioned to suppress the threat posed by the working-class movement, primarily through the 
repression of the working class (Fine and Davies, 1990).  
At the heart of the apartheid political regime was racially segregated and highly unequal labour 
rights (Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). There was a range of rights, beyond employment 
rights, that white workers benefitted from: union rights, social security, medical insurance, 
unemployment benefits and access to labour courts. These were in strong contrast to the state’s 
efforts to weaken African workers by subverting their organisations and repression of their rights 
(Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). Black workers were relegated to the least qualified, most 
poorly remunerated jobs and they were prevented from contesting unfair practices or dismissal. 
In addition, they were deprived of indirect wages, such as pension or insurance, and professional 
advancement. Only the minority of black workers who were in formal employment (all 
temporary workers were excluded) had the capacity to bargain for improved working conditions 
and only if the employers’ practices allowed for such capacity to bargain (Von Holdt, 2003, 
Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009).  
The blurring of racial and technical hierarchies played a prominent role in the emergence of 
unions in South Africa. An increasingly structured union contestation eventually pushed the 
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government to adopt the Industrial Conciliation Act 1979 (No. 94 of 1979)43 and to recognise 
black workers’ unions, which in turn modified the status of wage labour and eventually brought 
about the end of apartheid (Von Holdt, 2003, Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). The result of 
the apartheid regime was profound inequality. Most obviously, real wages for black people were 
calculated to be a fifth of those of white people by the early 1970s, and still only a third by the 
early 1990s when apartheid laws were being abandoned (Wood and Harcourt, 1998p. 77-8; 
Donnelly and Dunn, 2006, p.5).  
3.2.2. The changing views during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s 
The struggle against apartheid led to democracy in South Africa in 1994 but labour reforms were 
being implemented from the late 1970s onwards (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). The apartheid 
system of labour control was being challenged through the emergence of shop floor based 
industrial unions for black workers in key sectors such as manufacturing (Baskin, 1991; Kenny 
and Webster, 1999). During 1979, racial dualism was abandoned, and black trade unions were 
recognised for the first time. By the mid-1980s these unions fought and won rights on the shop 
floor in companies that limited managements’ unilateral power to dismiss and gave workers a 
voice in the workplace. Membership in trade unions grew dramatically from 700,000 in 1979, to 
nearly 3 million members by the late 1990’s (Kenny and Webster, 1999). 
During 1979 the government appointed a commission of inquiry into labour legislation, namely 
the Wiehahn Commission to investigate and advise on existing labour legislation. The 
recommendations by the Wiehahn Commission were the first crack in the wall of apartheid 
(Wiehahn Commission, 1979; Parsons, 2007). This commission enabled government to 
formulate a new labour policy and promulgate new legislation, which was mainly embodied in 
the Industrial Conciliation Act 1979 (No. 94 of 1979), and other amendments thereafter. The 
acceptance of most of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission by the National Party 
Government of the day, was significant as it paved the way for the legitimising of black and 
 
43 Following the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission during 1979, this act set up an Industrial Court 
which interpreted labour laws and heard cases of irregular employment practices such as dismissals, wage disputes 




multiracial trade unions in South Africa and their recognition by commerce and industry 
(Parsons, 2007).  
Despite these initial changes, there were still severe tensions between parties in the post 1980s 
period. The apartheid system had created a political vacuum and the South African trade union 
movement attempted to fill this vacuum (Parsons, 2007). For a short time, and partly because of 
employer disquiet, the state’s response to the continued turmoil was to backtrack on the Wiehahn 
policy. The Labour Relations Amendment Act 1988 (No. 83 of 1988), sought to curb union power 
by introducing the concept of unfair industrial practices, outlawing certain categories of strike 
and secondary action and making unions liable for unlawful striking by their members (Baskin, 
1991, p.261-5; Donnelly and Dunn, 2006). The 1988 Act merely provided a focus for intensified 
dissent, including three national strikes in 1989, led by COSATU (Baskin 1991; Donnelly and 
Dunn, 2006). 44 
Throughout the 1980s, the labour movement played a significant role in the anti-apartheid 
struggle (Adler and Webster, 2000; Makino, 2010). COSATU’s activism during the 1980s 
concerned issues of political liberation (Makino, 2010) and its role extended far beyond a general 
framework of an inclusive collective bargaining system (Parsons, 2007). The union movement’s 
activities led leaders in organised business to realise that commerce and industry would continue 
to bear the brunt of these pressures unless there was meaningful political reform (Parsons, 2007). 
Consequently, calls for a political settlement from the organised business community grew more 
insistent and there were increased attempts to promote a broad-based commitment to 
fundamental human rights in South Africa (Parsons, 2007). 
The economic crisis of the apartheid system during the 1980s contributed to the gradual decline 
in sectors such as manufacturing, which culminated in approximately eighty thousand jobs being 
lost in just one area of Johannesburg, called the East Rand, between 1988-1999. Throughout the 
1990s, downsizing mirrored the outsourcing of production in sectors like metal, engineering, 
chemical, glass and paper. Small companies, largely non-unionised, proliferated especially in 
production segments that did not require substantial capital investment and overheads. The use of 
temporary employment services played a significant role in the casualisation of employment 
 
44 In 1983, black union movements were consolidated into a powerful union confederation consisting of more than 
half a million supporters and 34 unions, namely COSATU. 
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during these difficult economic times (Barchiesie, 2010). Employers used the decentralisation of 
labour recruitment across the local urban economy, as a powerful weapon to stratify the labour 
force and generalise its vulnerability (Barchiesie, 2010). The combination of temporary contracts 
and temporary employment services ensured workers’ compliance and flexibility, while limiting 
companies’ obligations towards their employees. The use of temporary employment agencies or 
‘labour brokers’ ensured that long-term career orientations were impossible and workplace 
identities weakened (Barchiesie, 2010). Meanwhile, South Africa’s unemployment rate increased 
from almost 16 percent in 1990 to more than 30 percent in 2002. Jobs classified as being in the 
informal sector grew as a proportion of all employment, from 1.7 million in 1990 to 3.5 million 
in 2002 (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006, p. 468).  
3.2.3. The position after 1994: the post-apartheid labour regime 
Democratic elections were held in 1994 and Nelson Mandela was elected as President.  
The truly remarkable nature of South Africa’s transition was captured in the election and 
the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the new president during the last week of May 
1994. … For South Africans, it became a deeply emotional experience, with the 
overwhelming majority of eligible voters participating in the first-ever democratic 
election. The atmosphere of euphoria carried through into the following week of national 
celebrations … However, the ambiguous character of this astonishing climax to South 
Africa’s transition to democracy was clearest when Mandela stepped from his automobile 
to be ushered to the inaugural platform by none other than the white general officers of 
the security forces, the same men who had prosecuted the regime’s brutal war against its 
opponents, especially the African National Congress (ANC) … As the commander-in-
chief, Mandela took his place at the head of a Government of National Unity. (Adler and 
Webster, 1995, pp. 75-76). 
 
3.2.3.1. ‘Triple transition’ and ‘normalisation’   
During 1990 the government began to negotiate with its opponents, a process that resulted in the 
interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1993 (No. 200 of 1993). In 1997 the 
final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (No. 108 of 1996) (the Constitution) 
came into effect. South Africa became a constitutional state with a supreme Constitution and a 
Bill of Rights. 
With the transition to democracy in 1994, the ANC-led government had to resolve the economic 
contradictions that apartheid had created. To achieve this required enormous economic and 
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social change (Feinstein, 2005; Parsons, 2007). South Africa was undergoing a ‘triple transition’ 
which included a transition to a globally competitive economy, attempting to consolidate 
democracy and removing the legacy of apartheid (Webster and Omar, 2003, p. 3). Some writers 
described this triple transition as often involving contradictory processes, resulting in a tension 
between political, economic and social forces (Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006); Von Holdt 
2003; Webster and Omar 2003). Post-apartheid South African commentators used the word 
‘normalisation’ to describe the intended reform of the employment relations system (Donnelly 
and Dunn, 2006, p.9).  
So, normality implied a blurring of the demarcation between employment relations and 
politics, between industry and society. Fragmented, decentralized, market-oriented 
arrangements along Anglo-Saxon lines would not do. A multi-layered, articulated system 
following the European pattern was preferred as a complement to political emancipation, 
one that upheld the independence of unions and employers, maintained some power 
equilibrium between them, yet gave them formal access to the state and involvement in 
broader social and economic policy making (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006, p.9). 
 
The concept of ‘normalisation’ also included some ambiguity and tension, as political and 
employment relations would overlap. However, simultaneously, employment relations needed to 
become less ‘political’, in terms of being part of a national power struggle; more economically 
sensitive, in terms of national prosperity, towards a more enduring, integrative engagement 
(Donnelly and Dunn, 2006, p.9). This was the best way for ‘redistributive justice’ and ‘dynamic 
efficiency’ to co-exist (Standing et al, 1996, p.1-16).  
Attempts were made to nurture a more social-democratic and co-ordinated response with the 
adoption of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that reflected the ideas of a 
social democratic welfare state (Padayachee, 2013; Nattrass, 2014). As Naidoo (2003)45 would 
later argue, the RDP was a class compromise, however, differences continued to bubble under 
the surface of this compromise. Nonetheless, the RDP was a highly consultative and collective 
process, that represented the consensus of the liberation movement (Naidoo, 2003). The RDP 
proposed a state-led, market assisted transformation process that promised to accommodate 
capital, but not be subordinate to it. Such an accommodation strategy required a strong 
developmental state mobilising people for transformation and regulating capital (Naidoo, 2003). 
 
45 Naidoo was the Director of National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) at that time. 
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During and after 1994, there was a systematic removal of apartheid legislation and the 
introduction of legislation designed to create equal opportunity throughout society (Webster and 
Omar, 2003). A drafting committee that consisted of government, labour and business and 
international experts provided by the ILO, prepared legislation (Webster and Omar, 2003). This 
involved the introduction of a new labour relations regime, made up of five core statutes: 
• The National Economic Development and Labour Council Act 1994 (No. 35 of 1994). 
• The Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995) 
• The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 of 1997) (BCEA) 
• The Skills Development Act 1998 (No. 97 of 1998) 
• The Employment Equity Act 1998 (No 55 of 1998) (EEA) 
For the first time, all workers were brought under the ambit of one industrial relations system. 
This included public service workers, farm workers and domestic workers (Kenny and Webster, 
1999). The new Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995) promoted collective 
bargaining by providing for organisational rights of unions in the workplace. The law entrenched 
what many unions had struggled to achieve through private agreement: access to employer 
premises, meeting rights, and union subscription facilities. This new labour regime gave workers 
an institutionalised voice not only at the workplace but also at the sectoral and national levels 
through industry-wide bargaining councils and the multi-partite National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) (Kenny and Webster, 1999). 
This legislation was designed to position South Africa on the ‘high road’, emphasising skills 
through training, effective collective bargaining, rewards and incentives schemes (Webster and 
Omar, 2003, p.4). The approach adopted under the new legislation rested on the assumption that 
institutionalised collective bargaining would usher in new, less adversarial workplace relations. 
The 1995 LRA maintained and strengthened the system of workplace collective bargaining. 
Industrial Councils were renamed Bargaining Councils and could be established in industries 
with sufficient union and employer representation (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). 
In addition to drafting legislation that attempted to reconstruct the judicial architecture for 
collective bargaining on a non-racial basis, legislation was drafted to put in place minimum 
standards (Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006). During 1997, the BCEA provided an inclusive 
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definition of an employee, which covered all workers (except the self-employed) and strictly 
regulated working conditions, such as 45 working hours per week, 21 days of leave per year and 
sick leave entitlement (Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). Some of the regulations in the BCEA 
concerned all sectors, for example, unemployment insurance and retrenchment (redundancy) 
funds. Some social protection measures, such as pension funds and different types of insurance, 
depended on negotiated agreements within each business or branch. It was for this reason that the 
BCEA provided a mechanism called ‘sectoral determination’ which allowed the Minister of 
Labour to intervene in defining the minimum remuneration and working conditions for a sector if 
workers were insufficiently unionised to negotiate with their employers (Pons-Vignon and 
Anseeuw, 2009). 
During 1995, NEDLAC was established in South Africa as a platform for social dialogue 
between the representatives of government, business, labour and community. NEDLAC is 
unique in that, in addition to the conventional tripartite partners, it includes the community 
constituency, which is represented by inter alia national organisations of civics, youth, women 
and disabled people (Makino, 2010). NEDLAC considers and seeks to reach consensuses about 
‘all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy before it is introduced in 
Parliament’ as well as ‘all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is 
implemented or introduced in Parliament’ (NEDLAC Act No. 35, of 1994, Section 5). The fact 
that NEDLAC is a statutory body means that it has power and stability (Gostner and Joffe, 
1998).  
The legal design of the post-apartheid labour regime showed its intended collaborative nature 
and bears striking similarities to the northern European model of industrial relations (Donnelly 
and Dunn, 2006; Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). The appeal to COSATU and to the 
liberation movement at large reflected the rejection of the apartheid workplace regime (Von 
Holdt, 2003; Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). There was a desire to give credence to the social 
gains obtained by the liberation movement during the 20 years that preceded 1994. This was at 
odds with the market-oriented model encouraged by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund who followed the South African transition closely and attempted to exert 




3.2.3.2. A shift to market liberalism and the informalisation of work 
The African National Congress’ (ANC) political roots are somewhat heterogenous, involving 
Christian and liberal socialist themes, pan-Africanism and elements of Marxism (Donnelly and 
Dunn, 2006). During the anti-apartheid struggle it was a coalition of several groups, with a 
predominantly Marxist ideology (Weeks, 1999). 
The decisions initially made in relation to the entire employment relations system by the 
Government of National Unity after 1994, endorsed by the ruling ANC and its South African 
Communist Party ally after 1999, flew in the face of conventional wisdom (Donnelly and Dunn, 
2006). During the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation orthodoxy was that transforming economies should ‘free up’ their labour markets. 
Instead, South Africa looked to Europe for inspiration. It legislated for social dialogue at national 
level, encouraged industry-wide bargaining and promoted workplace bodies (workplace forums) 
which were like works councils (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006). Reforms were introduced while 
international sanctions were lifted, and its economy was exposed to free trade. On the one hand, 
new institutions such as bargaining councils and workplace forums were established, while on 
the other hand economic liberalisation became more dominant. 
With South Africa rapidly integrating into the global economy, there was pressure on the South 
African labour market in support of flexibilisation and deregulation (Makino, 2010). The ANC 
wanted the international financial community to see its economic policies as conventional in 
terms of fiscal and monetary discipline, tariff removal, public spending restraint and privatisation 
(Bhorat et al 2002, p.4; Donnely and Dunn, 2006). As apartheid began to disintegrate, economic 
policy shifted towards market liberalism. The ANC government began to implement a typically 
orthodox macroeconomic policy: fiscal deficit reduction through expenditure restraint and tight 
monetary policy, with rapid trade liberalisation (Weeks, 1999). The Department of Finance 
promoted a market orientated programme called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (GEAR) (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006). The stated purpose of GEAR was to increase 
economic growth, with a 4.2 percent rate programmed for 1996 to 2000 (Weeks, 1999). GEAR 
encouraged labour flexibility as an avenue to job creation and left the expansion of formal 
employment to the operation of market forces (Barchiesie, 2010). At that time, analysts and 
politicians argued that most unemployed individuals lacked the skills required for globally 
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competitive productions. They believed that the only option for most job seekers in South Africa 
were low-paid positions with limited security and bargaining protections (Barchiesie, 2010). 
COSATU rejected GEAR as ‘neoliberal’ but the informalisation of work nonetheless became a 
policy response to the country’s employment crisis. As low-skilled workers found it exceedingly 
difficult to find regular employment, corporate outsourcing and subcontracting provided 
alternatives in multitudes of non-union small and micro enterprises (Barchiesie, 2010). Research 
on poverty conducted by National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), 
would later describe the effects of GEAR on the poorest South Africans: 
With the adoption of government’s Growth, Employment and Reconstruction programme 
(GEAR) from 1996, this focus on the poor and the inclusion of their stories and their 
contribution to the dilemma of solving poverty, grew silent. The development emphasis 
shifted from the previous rights-based focus grounded in the highly progressive South 
African Constitution1, to technocratic questions of economics, numbers and targets. 
Within government a prevailing sentiment developed that poverty would inevitably be 
addressed through the attainment economic growth. The classical neoliberal trickledown 
approach to poverty eradication became the dominant policy approach under GEAR, and 
the RDP office and ministry were closed (Frye, 2008, p. 9) 
On the one hand, new institutions such as the industrial councils were set up, while on the other 
hand economic liberalisation became more dominant. As can be seen from the above quotation, the 
outcome of this era was that low-skill African workers found it exceedingly difficult to find 
regular employment. Corporate outsourcing and subcontracting provided alternatives in myriads 
of non-union small and micro enterprises that operated along the boundary between formal and 
informal (Barchiesie, 2010). Equally important in the decentralisation of production was the shift 
of labour recruitment towards temporary employment agencies (Barchiesie, 2010). The South 
African case seems to indicate that changing corporate strategies, a business-friendly policy 
environment, and growing working-class poverty are decisive features in the expansion of the 
informal economy (Barchiesie, 2010). 
3.3. The South African regulatory framework: temporary agency workers  
3.3.1. Historical developments and background: from 1956-2000 
Flexible and insecure employment has been the norm in South Africa for a considerable time as 
evidenced by the way many mineworkers were employed, which was usually on a contract basis 
(Makino, 2010). For this reason, the issue of who should receive the protection of labour law 
remains an important question for the direction of labour market regulation. As set out in table 4 
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below, although TESs have been used in South Africa since the 1950s, they were not regulated 
by the Labour Relations Act of 1956 (No. 28 of 1956) (1956 LRA). This Act did not contain a 
definition for these services and did not acknowledging their existence (Botes, 2014). However, 
TESs became popular in the 1980s and were introduced into South African law as part of the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 1983 (No. 2 of 1983) (the 1983 Amendment Act)46. The 
amendment deemed the broker to be the employer of the labour broker employee, creating a 
triangular employment relationship (Budlender, 2013). Section 198 of the 1995 amendment to 
the LRA47 retained the statement that the labour broker, now referred to in the amended act as 
‘temporary employment services’, was the employer (Budlender, 2013). 
Table 7: Key events from 1956 to 2002 that impacted on the TES relationship in South Africa: 
Year Event and its impact on the TES relationship 
 
1956 Although temporary employment agencies were used in South Africa since the 
1950s, they were not regulated by the Labour Relations Act of 1956 (No. 28 
of 1956). This Act did not contain a definition for these services and did not 
acknowledge their existence (Botes, 2014). 
 
1983 ‘Labour brokers’48 were introduced into South African law as part of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act 1983 (No. 2 of 1983). The broker was deemed to be the 
employer of the workers they supplied (Budlender, 2013).  
 
1994 During and shortly after 1994, core employment statutes were introduced: The 
Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995); The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 of 1997) (BCEA); and The Employment Equity Act 
1998 (No 55 of 1998) (EEA). For the first time, all workers including TES workers 
were brought under the ambit of one industrial relations system. The BCEA 
provided an inclusive definition of an employee, which covered all workers except 
the self-employed (Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). 
 
1995 In the 1995 LRA the ‘labour broker’ was renamed a ‘temporary employment 
service’ (TES). The TES is the employer of the TES employees that they place 
with clients, if they assume responsibility for remunerating these employees.  The 
TES client was made jointly and severally liable for breaches of the BCEA, 
 
46 Section 1 of the 1983 Amendment Act states: ‘Labour broker’s office’ means any business whereby a labour 
broker for reward provides a client with persons to render service to or perform work for the client or procures such 
persons for him, for which service or work such persons are remunerated by the labour broker.’ 
47 Section198(1) of the 1995 LRA states: ‘In this section, “temporary employment service” means any person who, 
for reward, procures for or provides to a client other persons– (a) who render services to, or perform work for, the 
client; and (b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment service.’ 
48 See par 7.2.1. for further discussion on the concept of ‘labour broker’. 
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sectoral determinations, collective agreements and arbitration awards. The concept 
of joint and several liability did not extend to unfair dismissal protection and other 
matters dealt with in the LRA 1995 (Benjamin, 2009b). 
  
Source: researchers own summary 
TESs were ‘deemed’ to be the employers of individuals that they placed with their clients, 
provided they were responsible for paying their remuneration (Benjamin, 2009). The TES 
employee had no recourse against the client as the client was not the employer and the risk of 
non-compliance rested on the TES employee and not the client (Benjamin, 2009). The client was 
made jointly and severally liable for the breach of the BCEA, sectoral determinations, collective 
agreements and arbitration awards (Benjamin, 2009). If the TES failed to pay its employee, the 
client was liable to make these payments. However, the client’s liability was a default liability; 
the client could not be sued directly at the CCMA or the Labour Court as it was not the employer 
(Benjamin, 2009). The TES employee could only act against the client if it had obtained a 
judgment against the TES, which the TES did not pay (Benjamin, 2009). TESs marketed their 
services as a means of avoiding the risks of adverse findings at the CCMA, as it designated the 
temporary employment agency as the employer (Theron, 2008).  The risk was further reduced as 
it was difficult for the TES employees to prove dismissal in a triangular employment 
relationship. Consequently, the TES sector grew prolifically during the 1990s (Cohen, 2008; 
Theron, 2008).  
Many negatives persisted for these TES employees and section 198 of the 1995 LRA simply did 
not address all the elements in the triangular employment relationship (Botes, 2014). They were 
often engaged under a TES arrangement for long periods of time and had no security of 
employment. They could be ‘withdrawn’ from the client by means of a commercial arrangement 
with no fair reason provided and often did not know that the TES was the employer. In addition, 
they were deprived of Constitutional and other labour rights and were often paid significantly 
less for the same work as regular employees. In short, TESs were recognised under section 198 
of the LRA without regulation (Benjamin, 2009). Furthermore, collective bargaining was 
undermined as organisational rights were almost impossible to enforce. The terms in the 
commercial agreement that governed the TES relationship usually provided for the ‘automatic 
termination’ of these workers on termination of the agreement by the client, resulting in an unfair 
redundancy process. These commercial agreements also made it impossible for the client to 
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employ the worker for six months after the termination of the assignment. Clients therefore had 
no obligation to find alternate work for these workers and the worker was left with no income 
(Benjamin, 2013). From a worker perspective, divisions were created on the shop floor between 
workers in different categories which affected the ways workers view themselves as workers in 
their workplace.  Atypical employees felt detached from their jobs and the same time full time 
workers lost enthusiasm for improving their lot (Kenny, 1997; Bodibe, 2006). The 1995 LRA 
maintained a fiction that the temporary employment agency (TES) was the employer, when in 
fact it was just an intermediary (Cohen, 2008). 
By 1996, the gains by labour triggered a major debate regarding labour market reforms (Kenny 
and Webster, 1999). Employers argued that the new labour relations regime was contrary to the 
global trend of labour market flexibility and raised the cost of labour (Kenny and Webster, 
1999). Those not in favour of this argument pointed out that this drive by employers was an 
attempt to reduce labour costs and undermine the core rights won by the labour movement. They 
argued that flexibility was simply a re-segmentation of the South African labour market as it 
created greater insecurity and unemployment for both core and flexi-workers (Kenny and 
Webster, 1999).  
During 1996 the South African Foundation (SAF)49 released a document that advocated neo-
liberal economic policies were the most realistic strategy for improving productivity and 
competitiveness by reducing wage costs (Kenny and Webster, 1999). It proposed a two-tier 
labour market, with two sets of rules: ‘the existing high-wage capital-intensive low-employment 
sector, and a burgeoning free-entry labour-intensive sector with strong new investment’ (South 
African Foundation 1996, p.102). The second tier would allow workers to be made redundant 
without severance pay or procedure and there would be no statutory rights to non-wage benefits. 
In addition, employers would be exempt from all minimum standards legislation (SAF, 1996; 
Kenny and Webster, 1999, p.218). At that time, Standing et al (1996, p. 12) wrote: 
It would be strange to promote ‘two-tier’ labour markets when the country has struggled 
so long to overthrow a two-tier society and a two-tier labour system, when the vestiges of 
that system were still being dismantled. 
 
49 The SAF was a powerful lobby group and think tank for big business. Fifty-three of South Africa’s top 
companies, certain foreign companies, and some South African state-owned companies were members of the SAF 
(Baskin 1996, pp. 7-8) 
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COSATU argued that this approach would erode labour standards and rejected a two-tier labour 
market strategy. COSATU stressed that the flexibility trend was simply a re-emergence of the 
apartheid strategy to divide workers into those with and without rights, as was the case with 
migrant workers in the past and would be a ‘recipe for perpetual instability in the labour market 
and the economy’ (COSATU, 1997, paragraph 5.75) 
At this time, the South African Department of Labour’s Green Paper that was a spring board for 
the development of the new 1997 BCEA, was released. The 1996 Green Paper dealt explicitly 
with the rise of non-standard employment and its consequence for labour protection:  
The current labour market has many forms of employment relationships that differ from 
full-time employment. […] They are usually described as non-standard or atypical. Most 
of these employees are particularly vulnerable to exploitation because they are unskilled 
or work in sectors with little or no trade union organisation or little or no coverage by 
collective bargaining. A high proportion are women. Frequently, they have less 
favourable terms of employment than other employees performing the same work and 
have less security of employment. Often, they do not receive ‘social wage’ benefits such 
as medical aid or pension or provident funds. These employees therefore depend upon 
statutory employment standards for basic working conditions. Most have, in theory, the 
protection of current legislation, but in practice the circumstances of their employment 
make the enforcement of rights extremely difficult (Department of Labour, 1996; 
Benjamin, 2005, p. 31).  
The BCEA introduced a regulatory framework for casual workers, but it also allowed individual 
contract and collective bargaining to change those minimum standards (Kenny and Webster, 
1999). South African firms were moving in the same direction as the global trend towards 
flexibility, in increasing their use of casual and contract workers and through outsourcing 
(Standing et al, 1996; Kenny and Webster, 1999). This trend occurred simultaneously with the 
move to extend basic labour rights and standards to large sectors of the workforce that had in the 
past been excluded from the core labour regulation regime (Kenny and Webster, 1999). 
Meanwhile, unemployment continued to increase and by 2000 the official unemployment rate, 
which excludes discouraged work seekers, was at 26 percent (Paret, 2016). These figures 
increased informalisation from both above and below. In other words, from above as employers 
exploited the labour surplus by hollowing out the core of stable workers and replacing them with 
flexible, cheap labour through casualisation and subcontracting. From below, as poor 
communities were forced to rely on informal income generating activities and ‘casual servitude’ 
(Paret, 2016, p.90). 
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3.3.2. The period from 2000 to 2010 
A strike in October 2002 by 4000 workers at the century old ERPM gold mine east of 
Johannesburg proved to be the pivotal event in the debate over temporary agency working in 
South Africa (Benjamin, 2005). Almost all the mine’s workforce was employed by a temporary 
employment agency (or labour broker) rather than by the mine owners.  The striking workers 
demanded that the temporary employment agency pay them money it had received from the 
mine, which they believed to be part of their wages. Prior to the strike, most of the workers 
believed that they were employed by the mine (Benjamin, 2005; Bezuidenhout 2008). A research 
project was commissioned by the South African Labour Department after this incident and this 
project concluded that strategies of externalising work through temporary employment agencies 
and outsourcing, were the major drivers of informalisation of work in South Africa 
(Bezuidenhout et al 2004; Benjamin, 2005). In addition, this report stated that employers’ desire 
to avoid legislation had increased the use of TESs and the legislative provisions had provided the 
opportunity (Benjamin, 2013). The absence of specific rules dealing with atypical employment 
gave employers the freedom to manage the relevant relationship as they saw fit, leaving these 
workers vulnerable (Botes, 2015).  
Significantly, as at September 2007, National Labour and Economic Development Institute 
(NALEDI) research records that: 
It would thus be expected that the problem of labour brokers would compel unions to put 
in place aggressive measures to ensure that they are strictly regulated and where 
necessary, used at the absolute minimum. The reality however is more disquieting. A 
number of unions may have concluded agreements previously on this issue but in the 
collective agreements considered by NALEDI, only NUMSA, NUM and CEPPWAWU 
address the problem in any significant way. NUMSA and employers in the retail motor 
sector state that they will regulate and better enforce the main agreement relating to 
labour brokers, while in the agreement with New Tyre Manufacturers, there is acceptance 
that where applicable, in-plant agreements will apply regarding the use of labour brokers 
(Ndungu, 2008, p.11).50 
 
50 ‘NUM’s agreement with Exarro stated contractors must be registered under the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act as well as under the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act. Such contractors 
must also pay the applicable levies and employers should not make use of contractors to fill vacant permanent 
positions. Similar provisions are found in NUM’s agreement with the Chamber of Mines (collieries-Kangra and 
Springlake) which requires the companies to introduce guidelines to deal with contractors. Furthermore, while 
labour contracting is to be monitored at mine level, there is agreement that the conditions of employment of 
contractors “should be in line with generally acceptable conditions of employment”. CEPPWAWU’s agreement 
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Towards the end of 2008 the ANC launched its election manifesto, which included a call for 
‘decent work’ (Harvey, 2011). The ANC manifesto promised to: 
Avoid the exploitation of workers and ensure decent work for all workers, as well as to 
protect the employment relationship, introduce laws to regulate contract work, 
subcontracting and outsourcing, address the problem of labour broking and prohibit 
certain abusive practices (ANC Election Manifesto, 2008, p.8). 
During 2008, the South African Labour Department commissioned a report on labour brokers, 
proposing to outlaw labour brokers except in circumstances where they are to provide labour 
with specialist skills (Benjamin, 2013, Webster et al, 2008). The call to ban labour brokers was 
adopted as a campaign by the labour movement, especially COSATU, but the official policy of 
the ruling party was to retain labour brokers and further regulate the industry to avoid abuse 
(Benjamin, 2013). However, it became clear that more was required in terms of statutory 
regulation to prevent exploitation and infringement of parties’ rights in the triangular 
employment relationship and the South African Minister of Labour proposed general 
amendments to the 1995 LRA in 2010 (Botes, 2014).  
During 2010, the Minister of Labour changed the provisions regarding TESs and drafted 
proposed amendments that banned TESs, by declaring that all temporary employment should be 
deemed permanent unless the employer can provide a valid reason why the employment should 
be for a fixed term (Botes, 2014). Heated debates and arguments as to whether the TES industry 
should be further regulated or banned, ensued in South Africa. Those not in favour of a ban 
argued that the use of TESs provides some relief to the unemployment crisis in the country and 
allowed a measure of flexibility (Botes, A). A Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) of inter alia 
the proposed Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 2010, was requested by Cabinet. This 
assessment would indicate the impact of the proposed amendments on the South African labour 
market and a grave picture was painted of the adverse effects of a total ban of temporary agency 
 
with employers in the metal industry states that the main agreement will apply to all labour brokers but it also goes 
on to add that where an employer intends to use labour broker workers, then such employer must give seven days 
notice to the union of his/her intention to do so. For the petroleum sector, the question of contractors and non-
permanent staff is termed “a company/plant level issue”. In the agreement signed by public sector unions in the 
Public Sector Coordinating Bargaining Council, its terms require that the salary and benefits of casual workers 
should comply with the requirements of the BCEA in an attempt, it seems, to avoid undercutting and a race for the 




working (Botes, 2014). The Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2010 was widely rejected, 
especially by employer organisations and was withdrawn and redrafted.  
A new proposal was submitted to NEDLAC in March 2012. These amendments proposed an 
increase in the regulation of the TES industry rather than a total ban (Botes, 2014). These 
proposals were open to public debate, creating animosity between employer organisations and 
trade unions. COSATU organised a countrywide protest action during March 2012 in support of 
their demand to ban TESs (Botes, 2014). However, during 2012, a collection of labour law 
amendments were published and implemented in a staggered manner throughout 2013/2014: The 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No. 6 2014) (LRAA) is to be read together with the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment 2013 (No. 20 of 2013) (BCEAA), the Employment 
Equity Amendment Act 2013 (No.47 of 2013) (EEAA), as well as a new statute, the Employment 
Services Act 2014 (No.4 of 2014) (ESA).  
In general, the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No. 6 2014) (LRAA) places additional 
duties on temporary employment agencies as employers, with the aim of protecting these 
workers from possible exploitation. In addition, the relationship between the TES, the worker 
and the client were substantially amended by the LRAA with the introduction of section 198A. 
This new amended legislation will be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief description of the historical, political and legal context of South 
African TES work. What was highlighted was that TES work has a contentious history 
exacerbated by the inequalities of the apartheid era. The dramatic changes in the South African 
political economy that coincided with the transition to democracy led to the rapid expansion and 
growth of the newly emergent black unions (Paret, 2016). However, this period also saw a 
simultaneous rise in urbanisation, unemployment and declining wages that fuelled the 
informalisation of employment (Paret, 2016). TES workers for most of South Africa’s recent 
past, have not had the same employment security or pay afforded to other workers (Theron, 
2005; Dickson, 2015). There has been heated debate about how this problem should be resolved 
and after years of delay, new legislation aims to curb these abuses. The chapter focused on the 
development of the legal framework affecting TES workers at different points in South Africa’s 
history, including the new legislation that promised reform to the industry. 
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As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this chapter is different to chapter five (The 
legal framework) in two respects. Firstly, it only contained background and contextual 
information, with no empirical evidence. Secondly, although the chapter dealt with the South 
African TES legal framework, it does so from a purely historical point of view up to 2010.  
Chapter five deals with the current legal framework. Although chapter five includes some 
background information to assist in the fluid reading of the text, it is essentially a ‘findings’ 
chapter. Chapter five contains empirical evidence in the form of participants’ quotes, together 
with tables and explanations for the TES specific legislation that was introduced during 2014/15. 
Chapter five is therefore placed after the literature review and methodology sections, alongside 


















CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the choice of research design and 
methodology for the doctoral thesis. This is a qualitative study with the primary data obtained 
from interviews and secondary documentation. The research aimed to combine these data from 
different sources, with the main unit of analysis being temporary agency or temporary 
employment services (TES) work in South Africa. More specifically, the research aimed to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the current position and perspectives of the temporary agency worker, firm and client 
in South Africa? 
2. What is the regulatory framework for temporary agency work in South Africa and the 
response of key groups to this framework? and  
3. How is temporary agency work influenced by trade union responses?  
The chapter sets out the choice of the methods used and details the practical difficulties 
encountered in researching this area.  Included is an outline of the chosen research design, tools 
and fieldwork employed for the thesis. The chapter first discusses philosophical issues, 
specifically questions of ontology and epistemology regarding the research topic. Next, the key 
components, advantages and disadvantages of a case study design are detailed, together with an 
alternate research design that was considered. Other relevant research projects that utilised a case 
study design are tabled and compared to this research. The techniques used for data collection 
and data analysis were discussed thereafter. Finally, the chapter sets out considerations of ethics 
and limitations, and concludes with a summary of the research design choices made. 
4.2. Ontological and epistemological standpoint 
Philosophical ideas influence the practice of research and need to be identified by the researcher 
(Creswell, 2009) as they help explain why certain strategies of inquiry and research methods are 
chosen. The philosophical world view, the strategies of enquiry and research methods, are 
therefore all interconnected and inform the research design (Creswell, 2009).  
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The methodological framework of the research will be informed by ‘critical realism’ (Robson, 
2002; Bhaskar, 1978), a philosophical approach that recognises reality as something that exists 
independently of those who observe it but that is only accessible through the perceptions and 
interpretations of individuals (Ritchie et al, 2014). Critical realism recognises the fundamental 
importance of participants’ own interpretations of the issues researched and highlights that their 
different vantage points will result in different types of understanding. The belief is that external 
reality is diverse and multifaceted, and it is the aim of the researcher to capture that reality in all 
its complexity and depth (Ritchie et al, 2014). 
Critical realism has a stratified rather than a flat ontology and the strata are: the empirical, the 
actual and the real. The empirical domain is where observations are made and experienced by 
observers. However, events occur in the actual domain that may not be observed or may be 
observed differently by different observers (Easton, 2010). A process of interpretation between 
the domains is needed since establishing the ‘truth’ about a situation may often be challenging 
and complex. Since there is no way of judging the ‘truth’, critical realism relies on the researcher 
to collect further data that help distinguish among alternative explanations and contributes to 
debate in the community of researchers. Criticality becomes essential as only by the same data 
being seen through different theoretical lenses, employed by different researchers, can 
understanding of some of the real world occur (Easton, 2010). 
The fundamental tenet of critical realism is that the researcher can use causal language to 
describe the world (Easton, 2010). With regard to the nature of the research question, critical 
realism stipulates that the question must be in the form of ‘what caused the events associated 
with the phenomenon to occur?’ (Bolin et al, 2013). A critical realist approach is well suited to 
the study of clearly bounded, complex phenomena such as organisations, inter-organisational 
relationships or nets of organisations and is therefore appropriate for case study research. It 
justifies the study of any situation, regardless of the research units involved, but only if the 
process involves thoughtful, in-depth research where the objective is to understand ‘why things 





4.3. The central features of a case study 
Case studies are best suited for questions that ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Stake, 1995; Yin 2014; 
Boblin et al, 2013). 
A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in its real-world 
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context may not 
be clearly evident (Yin, 2014, p. 2).  
However, Haunschild and Eikhof (2009) state that a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context can also be studied by, or be the result of, other qualitative research approaches that 
do not follow a case-study approach. They suggest that a more convincing characterisation of 
case study research is that it investigates  
A unique and defined social entity as unit of analysis, e.g. an individual, an organization, 
an industry or an event…A case study is then defined by what is studied and not by how 
a phenomenon is studied (Haunschild and Eikhof, 2009, p110) 
Helen Simons (2009, p. 21) defines a case study as:  
An in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of 
a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context. It is 
research-based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence led. The primary purpose 
is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, 
policy, institution or system to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, 
professional practice and civil or community action. 
Stake (1995, p.xi) states that a case study is  
The study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its 
activity within important circumstances. 
What unites both the Simons (2009) and Stake (1995) definitions, is the commitment to studying 
complexity in a real-life situation and that they do not define the case study in terms of the 
methods used (Simons, 2009; Thomas, 2016). One of the main features of a case study inquiry is 
that it relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data converging in a triangulating fashion 
(Yin, 2014). A further distinguishing feature of the case study approach is the prominence placed 
on the what is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of ‘the case’, in other words, the boundaries are kept in focus (Stake, 
2000).  
Case studies do not emphasise a method or a set of procedures, it is rather a focus (Thomas, 
2016). Within the design frame, a variety of methods may be used to answer the questions. As 
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Thomas (2016, p. 38) states, the case study is ‘generous in its affection for methods - 
observation, diaries, questionnaires, tests, statistics, interviews, whatever… the options are 
limitless’. With different elements of the case study, the researcher may use other design frames 
under the umbrella of the case study (frames within frames) (Ibid, 2016).  
4.4. Case study approach and its suitability for the research 
4.4.1. The alternate research designs considered  
In deciding on the appropriate research design for the research, two options were considered, the 
social survey and the case study design.  
Most social surveys gather only a relatively small amount of detail from each case, whereas 
during a case study, large amounts of data are collected about one case, across a wide range of 
dimensions (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000). The kind of data collected in a case study are 
frequently, but not always, unstructured data and the case study involves qualitative analysis of 
those data. This has implications for the purpose of the research as it is argued that the case 
study’s aim is to capture cases in their uniqueness, rather than to use them as a basis for wider 
generalisations or for theoretical inference of some kind (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000).  This 
aim often requires a narrative approach rather than one framed in terms of variable analysis 
(Hammersley and Gomm, 2000, p. 3).  Table 8 sets out a comparison of the case study and the 
survey research approach as outlined by Hammersley and Gomm (2000). These differences were 
taken into account when deciding on the design for the research. 
Table 8: A comparison of the case study approach with the survey approach 
 Case study Survey 
Investigates: One case or a small number of 
cases 
 
A relatively large number of cases 
Data collected and 
analysed about: 
A large number of features of 
each case 
 
A small number of features of each 
case 
Study of: Naturally occurring cases 
where the aim is not to control 
variables 
Naturally occurring cases selected to 
maximise the sample’s 
representativeness of a wider 
population is a priority 
Quantification of 
data: 
Is not a priority 
 








Aiming to: Look at relationships and 
processes 
 
Look at generalisation 
Source: Hammersley and Gomm, (2000) as adapted by Thomas, (2016) 
The survey design was considered as an option for the research as it has been used in other 
temporary agency work research (Forde, 2001; Forde and Slater, 2005; Hoque and Kirtkpatrick, 
2003; Lui, Wu and Hu, 2010; Kalleberg, 2010). While surveys can describe institutions and 
structures, it is challenging to investigate social processes using surveys (Gamwell, 2008; Kelly, 
1998). This thesis aimed to describe and explain the complexity of TES work in South Africa as 
experienced by trade unions, TES firms, TES workers and TES clients, and influenced by the 
driving economic trends, the historical and political context, and the legal framework. Social 
phenomena were investigated, which made qualitative methods, within a case study research 
design, ideally suited (Gamwell, 2008). The research questions required an in-depth, qualitative 
approach as they are explorative in nature (Yin, 1994; Gamwell, 2008). In addition, the research 
themes needed to be understood within a wider context, making the case study the perfect 
approach (Kitay and Callus, 1998). The case study represents the most appropriate means of 
examining how events unfold; exploring causal relationships; researching motives; power 
relations; processes that involve understanding complex social interactions; strategies; dynamics 
and the realities of the case, all of which were important for the current research (Perrett, 2007; 
Kitay and Callus, 1998).  
4.4.2. Other relevant research projects that utilised a case study design 
A case study research design has been used in research projects concerning aspects of temporary 
agency working in different country settings. A selection of these research projects and their 






Table 9: Examples of research projects that used a case study design, and their relevance  







agency work. Case 
study evidence 
collected in Germany 
and the USA. 
Explorative, qualitative study 
intended to identify the factors 
influencing the utilisation of 
agency work. Five German and 
five American companies were 
studied.  
• Temporary agency 
workers in a country 
context. 
• Regulatory framework 






Analysis of the 
reaction of British 
unions to agency 







A case study of the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union’s 
policies was developed. In 
addition, a second pair of case 
studies was developed in 
further education and another in 
the healthcare sector. 
 
• The evolution of union 
policy on agency work 
overtime. 
• Union responses to 
agency work. 












work in four Belgian 
and German 
workplaces. 
A comparative case study 
analysis of four workplaces: 
American multinational 
companies operating in the 
automotive sector, located in 
Belgium and Germany.  
• The role of trade 
unions with regard to 
temporary agency 
work. 
• Temporary agency 
work in a country 
context. 
• Regulatory framework 








work in the 
Australian hotel 
industry. 
A case study involving 
qualitative methods, at four 
hotel sites in Sydney Australia.  
• Temporary agency 
work in a country 
context. 
• Regulatory framework 













Multiple case study 
methodology based on ten 
Swedish cases. Eight of the 
cases were in the private sector 
and two in the public sector.  
• Temporary agency 
work in a country 
context. 
• Labour market trends 
and theories assessed. 
• Regulatory framework 
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of the country settings 
assessed 
 









Germany and Singapore were 
selected as case studies. The 
institutional foundations and 
forces that shape the position of 
agency workers in Singaporean 
and German systems of 
employment relations were 
compared. 
 
• Temporary agency 
work in a country 
context. 
• The development and 
characteristics of 
agency work in both 
countries were 
discussed. 
• Union representation 
of temporary agency 
workers. 




Source: studies identified from social science research databases 
 
4.4.3. The advantages of a case study design 
Certain advantages of case study designs are relevant to this research. These are that case studies 
allow for: 
• Small scale research through concentrating efforts on one or a few research sites 
(Denscombe, 2014); 
• A focus on a particular instance, which allows the researcher to adopt a holistic view and 
to look in depth at the subtleties and intricacies of a phenomenon (Denscombe, 2014); 
• The use of a variety of research methods and multiple sources of data are encouraged 
(Denscombe, 2014). Yin (2014) states that this is a unique strength of the case study 
approach, the ability to deal with a variety of evidence, such as, documents, artifacts and 
interviews. Multiple sources of data enable the most accurate understanding or 
interpretation to be developed. Data such as documents and other evidence provided by 
the participants also have the advantage of not being created as a result of the research 
and may broaden the coverage of the research in terms of their detail, time span and 
setting (Yin, 1994, p. 80). 
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• Studies that are concerned with investigating phenomenon as they naturally occur and 
where there is no need for the researcher to impose controls or implement changes to key 
factors or variables (Denscombe, 2014); 
• The researcher to tease out and disentangle a complex set of factors and relationships, 
even though it is done in a single or a small set of circumstances (Easton, 2010). This is 
an iterative process of data collection and analysis that ‘…implies a continuous moving 
back and forth between the diverse stages of the research project’ (Verschuren, 2003). 
The flexibility that case study research provides is not shared by the survey-based 
methods (Easton, 2010). 
 
4.4.4. The disadvantages and limitations of a case study design 
One of the concerns is the apparent inability to generalise from case study findings.51 Yin (2014) 
states that case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes. In this sense, the case study does not represent a ‘sample’ and in doing a case study, 
the goal is not to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalisations) (Yin, 2014). Stake’s (2000) 
view is that case studies are epistemologically in harmony with the reader’s experience and 
therefore, to that person, a natural basis for generalisation.  He argues that knowledge from case 
study research is a form of generalisation, not scientific induction but ‘naturalistic generalisation’ 
(Stake, 2000, p.22).52 Naturalistic generalisations are not predictions, but expectations; 
particularisation more than generalisation and the power of attention to the local situation, not in 
how it represents other cases in general (Stake, 2005).53 
A frequent concern about case study research is that it potentially takes too long and can produce 
massive, unreadable documents (Yin, 2014). Case studies are often incorrectly confused with 
ethnography or participant-observation; both methods require lengthy periods of time to 
complete.  However, the case study need not rely solely on these two forms of data collection, 
 
51 See paragraph 4.9 for a further discussion on generalising from case study research. 
52 A naturalistic case study constitutes the science of the particular. The aim of naturalistic case study is to 
understand with minimum intervention the particularity of a case in its ordinary situation from multiple perspectives 
(Tineke and Stake, 2014). 
53 Tineke and Stake (2014, p.1152) explain this generalisation as: ‘issues at the case level sometimes lead to the 
improvement of generalizations, particularly when rooted in a situation of stress, teasing out more of the 
complexity’. They speak of the ‘vicarious experience’ when those reading the case translate the experience from the 
case studied to their own context. 
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depending on the topic that is chosen (Yin, 2014). This research did not adopt either of these data 
collection strategies. 
The boundaries of the case study may be difficult to define in an absolute and clear-cut fashion. 
This may cause difficulties when deciding what sources of data to incorporate and which to 
exclude (Denscombe, 2014). The boundaries of this case study are further discussed in section 
4.4.5.1. below. 
Denscombe (2014) warns that gaining access to case study settings can be a demanding aspect of 
the case study process and that the research may flounder if permission is withheld or withdrawn. 
In addition, access to documents, people and settings can generate ethical problems in terms of 
confidentiality (Denscombe, 2014).  The difficulties experienced in this research with regard to 
accessing TES employees are detailed in section 4.9 below. 
4.4.5. Type of case study  
4.4.5.1. The case study unit of analysis and focus 
Unlike other research methods, a comprehensive and standard catalogue of research designs for 
case study research has yet to emerge and case study designs have not been codified (Yin, 2014). 
Yin (1994) suggests that there are five main components of a case study design. These are the 
study's questions, its propositions, its unit of analysis, the logic linking the data to the 
propositions and the criteria for interpreting findings.  
The boundaries that define the case include the unit of analysis on which the case will be based. 
Gerring (2004) supports the idea that a ‘nation state’ can be the unit of analysis for a case study:  
A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon, for example, a nation-state, revolution, 
political party, election, or person - observed at a single point in time or over some 
delimited period of time (Gerring, 2004, p. 342).  
Taking Gerring’s views into account, TES work within the boundaries of South Africa formed 
the unit of analysis of this study, with the beginning and the end of the case defined as the eight-
month period during which the data collection took place.54 However, defining the boundaries of 
the unit of analysis does not artificially limit the study as one of the key features of case study 
 
54 Fieldwork was undertaken from 13 June 2017 (the first interview) to 15 February 2018 (the final interview). 
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research is the ability to explore the relationship between the unit and the wider environment 
(Kitay and Lansbury 1997). 
4.4.5.2. The case study subject, purpose and approach  
Writers on case studies explain that there are many different types of case studies, with important 
distinctions arising from the particular subject and purpose of the research in question, namely 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin, 1994). The type of case study affects the focus of 
the research questions and the degree to which the aim of the case study was to analyse 
particular, unique circumstances or to focus on generalisation (Cassell and Symon, 2004). 
Thomas (2016, pp. 98-99) sets out different types of case studies as depicted in Table 10 below.  
Table 10: The different kinds of case studies 
Subject Purpose Approach Process 
Special or outlier case 
Key case 







Testing a theory 
Building a theory 













Source: Thomas, 2016, p. 114  
 
Having regard to Table 10 above, the subject of this research is a local knowledge case, which 
Thomas (2016) states is an example of something in the researcher’s personal experience. The 
purpose and approach of the research will be to conduct an exploratory/descriptive case as more 
needs to be known about agency work in South Africa, i.e. ‘what is happening and why?’ 
(Thomas, 2016, p. 126). The principal purpose of the exploratory case study is to establish the 
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‘shape’ of the problem or issue (Thomas, 2016, p. 132). In this regard, Gerring (2004, p. 345) 
states that case studies often ‘tackle subjects about which little is previously known or about 
which existing knowledge is fundamentally flawed’. The exploratory case explores the key 
issues affecting those in the case study setting, for example, problems and opportunities 
(Denscombe, 2014). The descriptive approach may ‘help to identify the appropriate explanation 
to be analyzed’ (Yin, 2014, p.140). Gerring (2004, p. 347) states that ‘there is a methodological 
affinity between descriptive inference and case study work’. When a phenomenon is described, it 
is usually being compared to an ideal type definition (Gering, 2004). To describe it is to 
categorise, and to categorise is to rely on language to divide up the world into identifiable 
entities (Gerring, 2004). The research design used was therefore an explorative qualitative study, 
intended to identify the current views (client, firm, worker and union) of agency work in South 
Africa, within the historical and political context, regulatory framework and current economic 
trends.  
4.4.5.3. The case study design: single or multiple cases 
Rose et al (2014), suggest that case selection involves two linked decisions: what cases and how 
many cases to study. A choice should be made between the two primary case study designs, 
namely, the single and the multiple case study design. Yin (2014) sets out a basic set of research 
principles for doing single and multiple case studies and provides four types of designs: the 
single-case holistic design; the single-case embedded design; the multiple-case holistic design 
and the multiple-case embedded design.  
One of the more controversial decisions is whether a single case is sufficient. There are various 
objections that have been raised regarding a single case, such as, the representativeness of the 
chosen case; the vulnerability to confirmation bias; the difficulty in carrying out a comparative 
analysis (Rose et al, 2014); and the difficulty in achieving the level of understanding required by 
examiners for a doctorate degree (Remenyi, 2012). However, Remenyi, (2012) advises that if the 
production of an answer to the research question is only obtainable by means of a single case 
design, it may be acceptable. Similarly, Yin (2014, p.51), states that the single case study design 
is appropriate under certain circumstances and provides ‘five single-case rationales’ which are 
having a critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal case.  
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Having considered the possibility of the single-case holistic design; the single-case embedded 
design; the multiple-case holistic design and the multiple-case embedded design for the research, 
the single-case holistic design seemed the most appropriate. The reason for single-case holistic 
design being selected, was that there was a desire to understand one wholistic case being TES 
work in South Africa as a nation state. In addition, taking Yin’s (2014) guidelines into account, 
the researcher knows of no research that has focused on TES work in South Africa from four 
different perspectives, namely the TES worker, firm, client and union, under the newly amended 
regulatory framework. In addition, senior legal, union and business professionals were 
interviewed as participants in order to ascertain the impact of the historical and political context, 
regulatory framework and economic trends on South African TES work.  The case study is 
therefore the first of its kind, and thereby revelatory (Yin, 2014). Yin (2014) stated that a 
rationale for selecting a single case is that the researcher has access to a ‘situation previously 
inaccessible to empirical study. The case study is therefore worth conducting because the 
descriptive information alone will be revelatory’ (Yin 2014, p. 52).  
4.5. Access and location 
When considering the case study design, an important consideration is the adequate access to 
useful data through relevant and significant case study sites and participants, and this is often a 
major challenge (Remenyi, 2012). The researcher worked at the Parliament of South Africa in 
Cape Town for approximately three years and worked as an employment attorney in 
Johannesburg for approximately 15 years. This experience provided important access to a range 
of members of the South African legal profession and business environment for the purpose of 
the interviews.  
This was a small-scale study and two primary locations in South Africa were initially identified 
for the research, Johannesburg and Cape Town. The researcher had lived in Johannesburg for 28 
years and in Cape Town six years and was familiar with the surroundings, people and culture. 
Although most of the participants were located in these two areas, some of participants were 
from Pretoria in the Gauteng province (an approximate 40-minute drive from Johannesburg) and 
one was from the Eastern Cape. 
These four locations were also informed by the researcher’s access to participants who were 
willing to participate in the study. The decision to draw participants for the study from these 
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locations within South Africa was not motivated by the need for comparison and all data were 
treated as relating to the South African context as a whole. The locations of the participants are 
found on Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Map of South Africa showing the four primary locations of the research  
 
 
4.6. Data collection techniques 
4.6.1. Overview of data collected  
The preparatory review of theory in the literature review provided an initial indication of the type 
of data to be collected (Ryan et al. 2002). In addition to exploratory research conducted from 
June 2017 to February 2018, the research draws upon secondary documents and the limited 
statistical data provided mostly by the participants.55 In total, 34 in-depth telephonic interviews 
were conducted with 33 participants, representing a cross-section of participants in the TES 
industry. Interviews were primarily undertaken with participants at director level, and in some 
instances, management level. Some of the participants had represented either their union or 
 
55 See paragraph 6.2.1. for more details regarding the limited information available. 
141 
 
business at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).56 These 
participants included human resources (HR) professionals, union officials, business executives, 
legal professionals, government officials, a non-profit organisation director, senior employees at 
employer organisations, an international organisation director and a bargaining council manager. 
Participants all held positions that provided expertise and knowledge about the TES industry in 
South Africa.57 English is widely spoken in South Africa and the interviews were all conducted 
in English. 
In addition, secondary data were gathered that included corporate information published on 
websites, internal company documents, annual reports, statistical reports and information 
furnished by trade unions, and employers’ associations. Informal records disclosed by the 
participants, data drawn from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country notes, were also viewed. South 
African Quarterly Labour Force Surveys from Statistics South Africa, South African news 
reports, and articles written by leading academics and attorneys were taken into consideration.  
This study necessitated that the participants should have knowledge and experience of the study 
subject. Participants needed to be able to reflect on and discuss their experiences clearly and be 
willing to share them (Mollitt, 2006). The first two interviews were conducted with participants 
that the researcher knew from previous work experience and who had knowledge of the TES 
industry. These participants agreed to provide further names of individuals that they believed 
would be helpful and knowledgeable. In addition, the researcher telephonically contacted 
participants who she did not know personally, but knew were knowledgeable about TES matters, 
had written articles in the press, or who were named in articles relating to TES work, and/or who 
had specialised in employment related matters. Participants were therefore selected through a 
combination of purposive sampling as a result of their specific knowledge of the TES industry, 
and snowball sampling. Purposive or purposeful sampling selects participants on the basis of 
how useful they are for the pursuit of the inquiry and is a common sampling strategy in 
qualitative research (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). The idea is to select cases that will provide a 
 
56 NEDLAC is a representative and consensus-seeking statutory body established in law through the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council Act of 1994. It aims to facilitate sustainable economic growth, greater 
social equity at the workplace and in the communities, and to increase participation by all major stakeholders in 
economic decision-making at national, company and shop floor level. 
57 See appendix 1 for the generic details of the interview participants. 
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rich source of information relevant to the research (Patton, 1990). Snowball sampling uses 
connections between people that both includes and excludes individuals (Browne, 2005). It 
involves using contacts and informants to identify appropriate cases and is also referred to as a 
‘opportunistic’ sampling, in that researchers take advantage of situations as they arise during the 
data collection phase of the research (Kemper et al., 2003, p. 283).  
Some writers believe that the validity, understanding and insights gained from the data will 
depend more on data collection and analysis skills than with the size of the sample (Patton 2002; 
Saunders et al 2009). In addressing the issue of an appropriate sample size or ‘sufficient’ 
interviews, many research textbooks recommend continuing to collect qualitative data, such as 
by conducting additional interviews, until data saturation is reached. In other words, until the 
additional data collected provides few, if any, new insights (Saunders et al 2009, pp. 234-235). It 
was initially anticipated that there would be more than 34 interviews, but it became clear during 
the interview process that the same individuals were recommended for research by the 
participants and that a point of data saturation may have been reached within the professional 
TES community in South Africa. The sample size was also determined by the requirement to test 
understanding and add to the categories emerging from data analysis (Mollitt, 2006). After 34 
interviews, there appeared to be no new categories emerging. 
While not all participants approached agreed to participate, those that did participate provided 
information on the four areas of TES work, namely unions, TES firms, TES workers and TES 
clients.  Initially, the participants were seen as key informers or gate keepers who may also have 
insight into the wider social, national and political context (Purcell, 2014). Whereas individual 
participants were seen as those that describe their personal feelings and opinions, key informants 
are more likely to provide information (Ibid, 2014). However, very early on during the interview 
process it became clear that the line between key informers and participants became blurred and 
that the ‘key informers’ possessed in-depth knowledge of the TES industry and were able to 
assist in providing information that informed the research. All interviews lasted approximately 
45 minutes. Each participant was informed verbally and in writing prior to the interview that the 
interview would be recorded, and all participants consented to the recording. Data was recorded 




The transcribed interviews formed two volumes, with page and paragraph numbers for reference 
purposes. In total, the two volumes consist of 585 pages of transcribed interviews. The 
transcribed interviews were not sent to the participants to verify as this had not been the 
agreement with the participants prior to the interview. The researcher was mindful of the 
participants’ time, especially since many of the legal participants ‘sell’ time and may have been 
reluctant to participate if they thought their involvement would be a protracted affair where they 
were required to check transcripts. Although presenting the transcribed interviews back to the 
participants to confirm their content can avoid some misinterpretation and is useful as a form of 
triangulation, it was not possible in this study. However, case study interview data can be 
rigorously triangulated with information obtained from other sources, which was the case here 
(Mollitt, 2006). 
4.6.2. Interviews  
The research questions were suited to in depth, qualitative study as they were detailed and 
exploratory in nature (Yin, 1994). Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were therefore 
considered suitable for the research. The reason for this choice was that the semi-structured 
interview allows for predetermined questions but allows the interviewer the discretion of adding 
or omitting questions and probing interesting responses (Robson, 2002). The advantages of the 
interview are numerous: they provide opportunities to clarify misunderstandings, allow probing 
questions, and create a rapport and trust between the researcher and research subject (Robson, 
2002; Gamwell, 2008). 
 Although a persistent line of enquiry was followed, the actual stream of questions was fluid 
rather than rigid (Rubin and Rubin, 2011; Yin, 2014). More specifically, the interviews followed 
a guided conversation approach, facilitated by a checklist of topics and questions to be covered. 
This broad checklist of topics was sent to each participant prior to the interview as part of the 
invitation letter.58 This letter reflected the purpose of the interviews by providing relevant 
contextual information and provided an outline for the interviews. This approach acknowledged 
the need to explore the participants’ specialised knowledge, while focusing on specific aspects of 
that knowledge. The specific application of this approach differed slightly according to the type 
 
58 Appendix 2 contains an example of the invitation letter sent to the participants. Two versions of the letter are 
attached as they were slightly different for union participants. 
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and purpose of the interview and the specific expertise of the participant. For example, the focus 
was slightly different for lawyers, union officials or industry specialists. It was expected that 
unanticipated themes would emerge from the interviews, so the questions were initially relatively 
broad so as not to restrict interviews by ascribing too many predetermined categories to the 
interview schedule (Patton, 1990). The aim was to draw out a range of relevant themes, including 
unexpected ones (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). 
All the participants were invited to participate in the interview process in writing, through email. 
Some of them were contacted telephonically before the interview invitation was sent and others 
were sent invitations without a prior telephone conversation. Some participants had no contact 
details other than email addresses and could therefore not be contacted telephonically prior to the 
written invitation. Where possible, telephonic contact was made prior to the written invitation to 
explain the research and to ensure that the contact information was correct. On occasion, 
discussions with the participants’ administrative staff would precede the written invitation. The 
idea was to ensure the best possible means of communication for the participant and the logistics 
of the telephone call. Appendix 1 sets out the generic details of the 33 interview participants. 
4.6.3. Documentation 
Documentary evidence is likely to be relevant for every case study and should be the object of 
explicit data collection plans (Yin, 2014). Documents may also be used for contextual 
information about events that cannot be directly observed, or to question information from other 
sources (Stake, 1995; Boblin et al 2013). News clippings and other articles appearing in mass 
media or in community newspapers may provide a source of information for the case study (Yin, 
2014). These add value to the case study making it more ‘readable’ and ‘well documented’ (Yin, 
2014, p.108). It would however be important not to over rely on documentary evidence in a case 
study (Yin, 2014). Similarly, to take cognisence of the fact that documents were created for a 
purpose other than for a case study and the case study researcher is therefore a ‘vicarious 
observer’ (Yin, 2014, p. 108). 
A variety of documents were collected to supplement the interview data, these included 
unpublished information such as court documents that were drafted by the participants but the 
matter never proceeded to trial; presentations, for example some participants had conducted 
training sessions and had provided their power point presentation slides; a report of a NEDLAC 
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meeting that a participant had attended; and examples of two TES worker agreements. Some 
documents were provided for background purposes with the agreement that they would not be 
made publicly available, other data were simply unpublished. Many of the documents were sent 
to the researcher after the interview was conducted. The process typically involved the researcher 
making a list of the documents or material referred to during the interview, a verbal request made 
for the documents at the end of the interview and a follow-up letter to the participant listing and 
requesting the required documents. On most occasions the participants were reluctant to provide 
details or documentation regarding the size of their organisations. Participants were also not able 
to provide confidential legal documents or employment / HR related documentation. The legal 
participants were bound by legal confidentiality rules and were unable to provide details 
concerning their clients. Throughout the thesis, the researcher was careful not to reveal 
information that could lead to the disclosure of the organisation or participant’s identity. 
4.6.4. Legal aspects of the research 
It was essential for this thesis for the researcher to engage with legal aspects of temporary 
employment work. This took the form of detailed analysis of the constitutional and legislative 
frameworks around temporary employment in South Africa as well as the various amendments 
and case law developments regarding the latter. South African sources and provisions were also 
considered against the context of relevant International Labour Organisation Conventions and 
resolutions. In addition, a comparative perspective was provided by means of an outline and 
analysis of European Union and United Kingdom regulations on temporary agency work. 
Conventional literature review sources and techniques were adopted to this end. It was necessary 
to obtain and analyse the primary text and subsequent amendments of legislative instruments 
which was possible using official government sources and legal databases. The latter were also 
used to search for case law updates and commentaries. Desk based research also enabled the 
views of leading South African constitutional and labour law scholars to be drawn on.  
Uniquely and importantly this research adds to applied knowledge in terms of the legal aspects 
as attorneys and other legally trained individuals such as acting labour court judges and union 
officials were interviewed. These participants added depth of understanding in that they spoke of 
their personal views and the problems experienced in practically applying and understanding the 
legal framework.  
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As stated in the Introduction, Chapter 1 of this thesis, the research was conducted during a period 
of legal uncertainty, shortly after the introduction of new legislative amendments to the legal 
framework pertaining to TES work. During the research, the Assign matter was heard by the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), Labour Court and Labour 
Appeal Court and finally the Constitutional Court in South Africa. The outcome of this matter 
impacted upon the rights and responsibilities TES workers, firms, clients, and unions. The 
researcher was required to keep abreast of the outcome of this matter and subsequent court 
matters relating to TES work. Two of the participants, employment attorneys, provided the 
researcher with updates and alerts regarding the matter. In addition, the researcher created her 
own alerts in the South African online press to receive any news relating to the changes to the 
TES industry. As a supplement to any academic articles and textbooks that dealt with the 
changes to the TES industry, the researcher searched the online resources provided by legal firms 
with a reputation for providing excellent labour law advice. These legal firms often publish 
newsletters and information brochures for their clients that alert them to changes in legislation. It 
was important to keep abreast of the changes in ‘real time’ which is not always possible with 
academic articles and textbooks. These resources described in this paragraph were all collated, 
and where possible, the researcher drafted tables to explain the new legal position pertaining to 
TES work in South Africa.  
In summary, it was necessary to adopt multiple data collection methods in parallel, with the fact 
that many high level legal practitioners were recruited as research participants being of great 
benefit to understanding the legal aspects of temporary employment in South Africa.    
4.6.5.  Data triangulation 
A major strength in case study research is the opportunity to use many different resources or 
sources of evidence (Yin, 2014). Using multiple sources of information is often described as 
‘triangulation’ (Boblin et al, 2013).  The use of multiple sources of evidence allows for a broader 
range of historical and behavioural issues to be considered, however its most important 
advantage is the development of ‘converging lines of inquiry’ (Yin, 2014, p. 120). If the data is 
truly triangulated, the case study’s findings will have been supported by more than a single 
source of evidence. In developing divergent evidence, data triangulation helps to strengthen the 
construct validity of the case. Multiple sources of evidence in effect provide multiple measures 
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of the same phenomenon and will increase confidence that the case study rendered the event 
accurately (Yin, 2014).  
Multiple sources of evidence were used within the broad case study approach. The 
documentation provided by the participants, secondary data such as media articles, industry 
studies and reports, were all used as an additional source of information and as a benchmark for 
the findings from the participant interviews. Another frequently used method for triangulation is 
referred to as informant triangulation. The researcher obtains evidence from a number of 
different participants and in this way obtains the views of different people, who all have their 
individual perceptions of what has taken place (Remenyi, 2012). The 34 in-depth telephonic 
interviews were conducted in order to grasp the different perspectives of TES work in South 
Africa (union, firm, worker and client) and provided important information about the historical, 
social and legal context of TES work. The perspectives of these four different groups of 
participants were all taken into account to report or describe a topic or theme.  
4.7. Data analysis 
From an epistemological perspective, critical realism can be viewed as a philosophy of social 
science that informs the theory and method of social science rather than prescribing methods for 
analysing the social world (Yeung, 1997; Purcell, 2014). Although directing the researcher to 
seek out underlying structures and mechanisms that give rise to phenomena, as well as 
describing those phenomena, critical realism does not provide a methodological blueprint for 
research (Yeung, 1997; Purcell, 2014). For critical realism, methodological choices and strategy 
are determined by the nature of the research problem or issue to be addressed (McEvoy and 
Richards, 2006). The research strategy employed in this research was based upon the search for 
explanation through a deep understanding of the dimensions that constitute the phenomenon of 
agency work in South Africa (Purcell, 2014).   
To this end, semi-structured or in-depth interviews were used to gather data, which was analysed 
qualitatively and used to understand the ‘what’, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of temporary agency 
working in South Africa (Saunders et al 2009). Three ‘concurrent flows of activity’ were 
adopted for the qualitative data analysis: data reduction, data display and conclusion-
drawing/verification (Miles and Huberman,1984, p.23). Data reduction refers to the process of 
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selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming raw data throughout the process of 
a qualitative project (Miles and Huberman,1984). Methods of data collection and data analysis 
were not mutually exclusive as the two processes overlapped and occurred simultaneously, in a 
process of ‘explanation building’ (Yin 1994). This simultaneous process occurred early on, for 
instance at the point where the questions for the participants were developed for the interviews. 
Questions were examined and modified based on subsequent findings (Mollitt, 2006). For 
example, the answers provided by one participant would be analysed and modified for 
subsequent participants. The reason being that participants would mention information that the 
researcher had not considered and that would then become part of the questions for following 
interviews.  
During the interview process, ideas and impressions were recorded as soon as they occurred 
(Voss et al, 2002). Handwritten notes were made in a notebook during and directly after the 
interviews. The note taking consisted of writing down the main points of interest and possible 
documents that could be requested, while the participant was speaking. In addition, the 
researcher made notes of questions that could be asked at the end of the interview to clarify 
certain points. Once the fieldwork was conducted during 2017 and 201859, the interviews were 
transcribed in full and placed in chronological order and each page was numbered. There were 
two volumes of interview material (collectively 586 pages referred to as the ‘Interview 
Volumes’), making data reduction imperative.  
The first stage of the analysis involved the identification of relevant themes. Possible themes 
were considered early in the research process, even prior to formal data analysis, as the 
researcher was sensitive to the emergence of patterns observed during the fieldwork (Voss et al, 
2002). In addition, the engagement with relevant literature allowed for the development of initial 
themes on South African temporary agency work. These initial themes developed during the 
fieldwork and the literature, were further developed through a first reading of the transcribed 
data before the data were coded (Prosser, 2016). Themes were therefore identified in three ways, 
firstly through intuitively deciding what may be important for the thesis (in the initial stages 
during the interviews), themes that emerged from the literature review and themes that emerged 
from reading the interview transcripts. All these themes had to be relevant to the research 
 
59 See appendix 1 for a list and identifiers of interviewees. 
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questions and all the research questions had to be dealt with. The overall aim was to draw out a 
range of relevant themes, including unexpected ones (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).  To allow 
unanticipated themes to emerge from the interviews, the researcher did not restrict interviews by 
ascribing too many predetermined categories to the interview schedule (Patton, 1990). 
The second stage of the analysis process was to construct a visual format that presented 
information systematically so that the researcher could draw valid conclusions (Voss et al, 
2002). Broadly speaking, the ‘framework’ analytical method was used to provide a data 
summary or visual display and provide a data management process. The framework method’s 
distinctive feature is that it forms thematic matrices, as every participant is allocated a row and 
each column denotes a theme. Data are then summarised by case and theme/subtheme and the 
summary entered in the appropriate cell (Ritchie et al, 2013). Many researchers have stressed the 
importance of coding to reduce data into categories and bring structure into the data (Vos et al, 
2002, Miles and Huberman, 1984; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Haunschild and Eikhof, 2009). To populate the matrix, codes or labels were developed from the 
themes identified (Miles and Huberman 1994, 55-69; Bryman, 2004). The finalised list of codes 
that were developed from the themes/subthemes are set out in Table 10 below. 
Table 11: Final coding used for the framework Document 




• Tax rules 
• Flexibility 
• Unemployment 
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• Consolidate 
• High earners  
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• organising 
Responses 
• Prior 2015 



















• LRA s197 
• LRA s189 
• Dismissals 
 




• Decent work 
 
 
The third stage of the analysis process involved the manual coding of the interview transcripts. 
All the transcripts were read and coded using an initial list of codes. Codes were often combined, 
changed, or divided into sub-codes during this stage until the final codes as set out in table 10 
were developed. Thereafter, the coded information was extracted by a manual system of cut and 
paste into the framework chart or matrix. Each column of the framework chart contained the data 
relevant to a certain code or theme, each row contained a summary of the data relevant to an 
interview participant, for example interview 1, interview 2 and so on. The aim was to create a 
useful resource to use for the analysis process, while retaining the integrity of what each person 
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said. However, early in the process of creating this tabular framework chart, it became 
unmanageable due to the sheer volume of relevant data and the many themes that emerged from 
the data. 
The fourth stage in the analysis process involved changing the format of the visual presentation 
(the tabular framework chart/matrix) to a more user-friendly Word document (called the 
Framework Document60 for purposes of this thesis). It was decided to take each theme (column) 
and place it in a Word document with a heading for that theme. The rows were replaced by 
inserting an exact reference after the quotation for example, ‘Int. 1. Par. 2 pp.63-64’ (the row). In 
other words, the identity of each person could still be traced back to the interview transcript so 
that the words could be located in context, or a simple word search could be conducted for ‘Int.1’ 
to show what that participant had stated within the theme. So, the reference replaced the row and 
the headings and sub-headings replaced the columns, but the information remined the same. The 
result was a user-friendly Word document with headings and sub-headings that depicted the 
themes and sub-themes that came from the framework columns. The net result of this change of 
format, was a document consisting of a summary of all the data relevant to the themes or sub-
themes, and ultimately to the research questions, that could be tied back to the relevant person or 
interview. This Word document (reconfigured from the traditional framework document) 
effectively ‘displayed’ the important themes of the 586 pages of data in a manageable format. 
The Framework Document and the contents page of this document (that sets out the final themes 
and subthemes) is attached as appendix 4.  
The fifth stage of the analysis process involved the population of the Framework Document by 
meticulously going through all the interviews and copying and pasting the relevant coded 
interview material and placing each quotation under a heading in the Framework Document. 
Some of this work had been completed in the third stage before the framework chart became 
unmanageable. Stage five therefore involved transferring the information from the chart to the 
Framework Document and continuing to populate the Framework Document with material that 
had not been covered in stage three. A quotation from a participant was often placed under more 
 
60 The term ‘Framework Document’ is not an official term and is a name used in this thesis to describe the visual aid 
developed using the framework method. It is a name given to distinguish the Word formatted document from the 
tabular framework chart that was originally created but became unmanageable. The name ‘Framework Document’ 
was chosen as it was created with the framework method in mind. 
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than one heading in the Framework Document. While populating the Framework Document the 
researcher remained reflective, considered the broader context of the interviews, and looked for 
new themes that would adequately answer the research questions. In addition, the researcher 
underlined and highlighted important sentences in the Framework Document. A 413-page 
Framework Document with headings, relevant quotations placed under the headings, together 
with related references to the interview. This visual format (Voss et al, 2002) or Framework 
Document was used throughout the drafting of the findings. Please see appendix 5 for an extract 
of the Framework Document, that provides an example of a theme (or column in the traditional 
framework system).  
Once the visual format was complete, the researcher began looking for causality and patterns as 
the sixth stage of the process (Voss et al, 2002). This involved looking for both patterns and 
exceptions to patterns in the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Voss et al, 2002). Essentially, interview data 
were analysed using an inductive, thematic approach, in which key themes were identified from 
the data. These primary data were supplemented with background data, gathered from publicly 
available sources, and from documentary evidence provided by the participants. In addition, the 
researcher looked at how themes could be grouped and combined to facilitate the coding process. 
Finding patterns in the data was achieved by comparing each incident with previous incidents in 
the same theme (the columns) and across different interviews (rows). It also involved word 
searches in the Framework Document. This is referred to as the ‘constant comparative method’: 
The simple principle of going through data again and again (this is the constant bit), 
comparing each element - phrase, sentence or paragraph - with all other elements (this is the 
comparative bit) (Thomas, 2016, p.204).  
 
By continually comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher refined the concepts, 
identified properties, and explored the relationships between them, formulating a coherent 
explanatory model (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Yin (2014) suggests that the analysis should 
show that all the evidence has been attended to; all plausible rival interpretations should be 
addressed; the most significant aspect of the case study should be considered; and the researcher 
should use their own prior expert knowledge in the case study to demonstrate awareness of 
current thinking about the topic (Yin, 2014). 
153 
 
The analysis process included close attention to the actual words spoken by the participants. 
Sense had to be made of any contradictions in the data, and any opposing views needed to be 
portrayed. For example, views from union participants and TES firm participants relating to TES 
work and especially in relation to how they viewed TES worker experiences, were often 
contradictory. Special attention was paid not only to what participants said, but what they were 
reluctant to speak about. For example, TES firm participants were hesitant to provide statistics 
relating to TES work, they were also unwilling to provide contact with TES workers for the 
purpose of the study. How participants defined certain terms was of interest, for example their 
definitions of ‘decent work’ depended on whether they were from a TES firm or a union and 
these varied considerable. The researcher was careful to pay attention to the actual words of the 
participants to ensure that the research was empirically derived. As far as possible, the researcher 
attempted to portray different views of TES work, from a worker, firm, client, and union 
perspective for each theme. Similarly, it was important to relate these views to both theory and 
the research questions.   
To ensure that all the data was included the researcher read the transcripts three times. When the 
Framework Document was compiled, the transcripts were considered on a line by line basis, each 
sentence considered to ascertain whether that sentence or paragraph could be relevant for a 
theme identified, or if it may be relevant for more than one theme. As the Framework Document 
and the Interview Volumes were both Word documents, they could be crossed referenced using 
word searches. For example, one of the legal themes related to the parity provisions contained in 
Section 198A(5) of the LRA, which deals with the equality of treatment between TES workers 
and other workers. Firstly, the researcher manually added (cut and paste) every sentence relating 
to this theme contained in the Interview Volumes to the Framework Document under the theme 
entitled, section F ‘The national legal framework for temporary agency workers’ sub-theme 6. 
‘Equal treatment’ provisions’ (refer to the contents page for the Framework Document, 
Appendix 4). To double check that all possible information had been extracted from the 
Interview Volumes into the Framework document, a word search was done on the original 
Interview Volumes. So for this theme, words such as ‘parity’, ‘equality’, ‘equal’, ‘the same’, 
‘198A(5)’, ‘fairness’ were searched for in the Interview Volumes to ensure that oblique 
references to this theme were not missed in the original reading of the transcripts.  
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In terms of secondary documentation provided by the participants, such as employment 
agreements, case law and minutes of meetings, these were added to the thesis in a systematic 
way. All secondary documentation provided by the participants were sent electronically as there 
were no face-to-face meetings and participants were all in South Africa. This information was 
stored in an electronic file. Each interview participant (e.g. interview 1) had a separate electronic 
file with sub-files that contained secondary documentation pertaining to that participant. The 
transcribed information and the secondary information were read, re-read, and included for a 
certain theme. The researcher was familiar with all the material as the interviews were all 
conducted personally and most of the secondary documents was requested during the interviews. 
This actual verbal request for documentation was transcribed along with the other material for 
the interview and acted as a reminder and contained information important for a word search. A 
similar word search, as explained above, was conducted for the files that contained the secondary 
information to ensure that all information was included in the thesis.  
4.7. Research ethics 
Ethical issues were taken into consideration within the process of gaining access to individuals 
and no pressure was applied on intended participants to grant access. Full respect was given to 
the decision of intended participants not to take part in the research. All intended participants 
were provided with a date and time in writing as to when they would participate in the data 
collection process and the researcher contacted them telephonically at that time. The right of the 
participants not to answer any question was also respected. The right to anonymity and 
confidentiality were agreed between researcher and participant in a written document entitled 
‘Written consent to participate in a research study’.61  This document contained all the 
confidentiality provisions and was sent to each participant prior to the commencement of the 
interview. Informed consent was therefore obtained from all participants.  
Most of the participants agreed to participate in the study on the conditions of confidentiality and 
anonymity. This promise was kept as the participants’ names, gender and the names of the 
organisations they work for were not mentioned this thesis. Each participant was assigned an 
interview number and was described in terms of their profession, for example, ‘a legal 
participant’ and the organisation as ‘a large TES firm’. The institutional ethical requirements of 
 
61 Please see appendix 3 for the details of the confidentiality agreement. 
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Kingston University were observed in this study. Please see appendix 6 for the ‘Kingston 
University application form for ethical review (RE4) for research involving human participants.   
4.8. Limitations  
A common complaint about case study research is that it is difficult to generalise from one case 
to another. Yin (1994) argues that the problem lies with the very notion of genralising to other 
case studies. He suggests that researchers should generalise to theory the way a scientist 
generalises from experimental results to theory. In other words, the scientist does not attempt to 
find a ‘representative’ experiment, therefore a case study researcher should not attempt to find a 
‘representative’ case study. What Yin (1994) is suggesting is that instead of reflecting the single 
experience of for example, the TES employee in Johannesburg, the study should incorporate 
broader theoretical issues such as the role of the TES worker, the role of decent work, the 
‘insider -outsider’ concept in relation to TES work. Case study research can also extend existing 
theory by applying it to new situations or groups and investigating whether existing explanations 
provide an adequate account of the research findings (Gamwell, 2008). 
The researcher planned to travel to South Africa during 2017 to interview participants. However, 
this was not possible as there were problems with renewing her South African passport. Due to 
time pressures and lack of resources, the researcher could not delay the research schedule for 
four months (this is the minimum time period required to renew a South African passport from 
the UK) and decided to conduct telephonic interviews with participants while waiting to travel. 
After conducting the first few telephonic interviews, the researcher realised that the participants 
preferred telephonic interviews as they were easier to schedule and could be fitted around their 
busy lives. For example, one participant was interviewed while travelling to the airport, another 
travelling to appear in court and another as he travelled to a client appointment. One participant 
was recuperating from an illness and was able to conduct the interview while at home. Similarly, 
another participant was only able to schedule a telephone call at home over the weekend due to 
their busy schedule. It was therefore decided to conduct all the interviews telephonically as the 
participants all had the necessary technology to conduct the interviews in this way, and due to 
their seniority in the business environment, were well versed with this approach. Due to this 
choice of interview style, direct observation was not possible. However, it was still possible to 
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sense emotions such as hesitation, reluctance, uncomfortable pauses, or nervousness from the 
sound of their voices and how they answered their questions. 
Gaining access to agency workers to participate in the research was an important goal throughout 
the research. However, no TES workers were interviewed, despite many attempts to do so. 
Where relevant, all participants were asked to assist in accessing TES workers but none of them 
were able to provide this access. A union participant pointed out the reasons why TES workers 
were reluctant to participate. This was the response when the union participant was asked to 
assist in providing access to workers: 
There is a lot of suspicion in this environment, specifically of people that work for a 
labour broker because they are afraid they will lose their job and that is a major fear for 
them. So, this is why I'm saying I would rather prefer that you ask that question to one of 
the labour brokering employers and this will be at director level. So, they will be entitled 
to say okay no we will arrange that, and they will give that assurance to that person that 
he can feel free to speak and I'm quite sure that you will get the value out of the interview 
that you are looking for (Int12.p181-182. Par.160-162). 
Following the advice from this participant, almost all the TES firm (labour broker) participants 
were asked to provide access to their workers, but none of them were successful in securing 
interviews with TES workers. However, a chief executive officer and a managing director of 
different TES firms, a TES client who is a senior human resources manager of a large retail 
company, employment lawyers, senior union officials, government department employees and 
acting labour court judges, who have all had extensive dealings with TES worker matters, were 
interviewed. The union participants and a non-profit organisation participant had worked 
extensively with TES workers and their views were invaluable in understanding the role, rights, 
problems and abuses experienced by TES workers. The legal participants’ information was 
especially interesting as some had acted for TES firms, clients and employees and included all 
parties’ perspectives in their responses. Three of the legal participants were acting labour court 
judges and had a wealth of experience from all sides of the triangular employment relationship 
because of their position. The participants that were spoken to had strong insight into the TES 
worker experience and secondary data shed light on these participants’ views and supported their 
contentions. 
While the original intention was to obtain direct temporary agency worker perspective, this 
proved impossible and consequently the worker perspective could only be obtained indirectly. 
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As mentioned above, these indirect perspectives were obtained through five of the 33 
participants who could be classed as direct employee representatives (trade union reps, ILO 
official, NGO director) and many of the legal attorneys who were interviewed who specialised in 
employee cases. These interviews resulted in data relating to the concerns faced by the TES 
employees. However, there clearly is an important difference between first and second-hand 
perspectives on people's experiences. In addition, it is acknowledged that even union members 
do not accept that the union leaders speak for them, and neither union leaders nor lawyers can 
experience the working conditions of the employees. The research would have clearly benefitted 
from interviews from agency workers, since a key aim of the research was to understand the 
dynamics between agency worker, employment agency and user firm. Since some of the 
attorneys, union participants, the NGO director and ILO official had previous experience of 
agency work in the sector, it was possible to gain some direct insight into this dimension of the 
study. The implications of having to rely on these sources for the employee perspective was that 
the data obtained from these interviews lacked the depth that was required to adequately reflect 
the experiences of agency workers. These were retrospective accounts, and filtered through the 
lens of their current positions, such as a union official or attorney. The inclusion of first-hand 
agency worker views would have gone some way towards making the case study more holistic 
and contributed to applied knowledge.  
Other researchers have recorded similar difficulties accessing temporary agency workers, as they 
tend not to exist in large numbers in single organisations and are often fearful of victimisation. 
They are thus difficult to access and studies of temporary workers often have small sample sizes 
(Alan and Sienko, 1997; Gardner and Jackson, 1996; McDonald and Makin, 2000; Purcell, 
2014). Underhill and Michael Quinlan (2011) state that explanations for agency worker’s greater 
vulnerability have been constrained by the problems researchers face in accessing these workers. 
In this research, these difficulties guided the researcher to place more emphasis on the legal 
aspects of temporary agency work. With this focus in mind, the TES worker representatives 
interviewed (union officials, attorneys and a non-profit organisation employee) were in a perfect 
position to comment on weaknesses in the legal and collective bargaining framework relating to 
TES workers. Despite the limitations and difficulties faced, the researcher is confident that those 





The first section of this paper dealt with the philosophical world view. It was decided that critical 
realism would inform the methodological framework as it recognises that reality exists 
independently of those who observe it, while at the same time it values the interpretations of 
individuals. It is well suited to case studies that involve complex phenomenon, especially if the 
objective is to establish ‘why things are as they are’ (Easton, 2010, p.119). 
Having concluded that critical realism is the appropriate world view, the following two sections 
dealt with the central features of a case study and why a case study would be the best design for 
the research. This section tabulated previous studies, in reputable journals, that used the case 
study design to investigate phenomena involving temporary agency working in different country 
settings. The disadvantages and limitations of the case study approach were considered but were 
outweighed by the advantages. The case study design permits for a holistic view, whilst allowing 
for an in depth look at the subtleties and intricacies of complex phenomena such as agency 
working. One of the deciding factors for the design was that the case study uniquely allows for 
and encourages multiple sources of data to be collected. This aspect was pivotal to a study that 
would involve insight into TES work in South Africa. 
After the decision was made to conduct a case study, a decision needed to be made about what 
case study design would be most appropriate. The single-case holistic design was chosen as there 
was a desire to understand one wholistic case, namely TES work in South Africa as a nation 
state. The research focused on TES work in South Africa from four different perspectives 
(employee, firm, client and union) and within the context of history, politics, the regulatory 
framework and economic trends. The case study is the first of its kind, and thereby revelatory, 
which according to Yin (2014), is a rationale for selecting a single case design.  
Next, the data collection techniques and analysis were outlined. In this regard details were 
provided about the transcription of the interviews and the creation of the Interview Volumes, and 
the subsequent coding process. A Framework Document was created from themes that were 
initially developed from the literature review and later supplemented by the interview data. This 
Framework Document formed a visual presentation of the interview data, under theme headings, 
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together with a reference for each quotation that allowed the researcher to refer to the Interview 
Volume and the actual interview in context.  
Thereafter, the chapter outlined some of the ethical considerations and attached the university 
ethical approval form as a schedule.  Finally, the limitations of the study were pointed out, and 
these included the fact that no direct interviews with TES workers were conducted, the use of 
telephone interviews and the question of genralising from case studies. The justification for the 



























CHAPTER 5: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
5.1. Introduction 
Whereas chapter three discussed historical legal aspects of South African TES work, this chapter 
concentrates on the current legal framework. The chapter firstly provides an overview of the 
relevant international laws and norms, together with a brief synopsis of the constitutional 
framework. After that, the chapter considers the two most important employment statutes for 
TES work, namely, The Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995), and The Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 of 1997) (BCEA). Next, the chapter outlines what is 
termed the ‘deeming provision’ in this thesis, Section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA 1995. The 
deeming provision concerns the identity of the employer party within the TES relationship. This 
section also includes the participants’ views on the deeming provision. Thereafter, a discussion 
on the triangular employment relationship’s principles of non-discrimination follows. The ‘parity 
provision’ as it is termed in this thesis, is contained in Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995 and 
deals with issues of non-discrimination against TES workers. The participants’ views on the 
parity provisions are provided.  The final section of this chapter deals with regulatory avoidance 
and the lack of enforcement of legislation in the South African TES industry. 
5.2. International law and the South African Constitution 
South Africa left the ILO in 1966, in response to international pressure against apartheid. During 
1994, the First democratic elections were held in South Africa and the country re-joined the ILO 
the following month. During 1995, South Africa adopted a new Labour Relations Act and in 
1996, ratified Conventions No 87 and 98, implementing most of the recommendations made by 
the ILO (Rogers et al, 2009). South Africa is a current member of the ILO and international 
labour standards have a direct influence on South Africa’s formulation of its labour policies 
(Aletter and van Eck, 2016).  
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (No. 108 of 1996) 
(the Constitution) states that there is a constitutional obligation to consider international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights (Aletter and van Eck, 2016).  The South African Bill of 
Rights provides for labour rights in section 23, inter alia the right to fair labour practice, to form 
and join a union, to strike, to form and join an employers’ organisation, to organise and to 
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engage in collective bargaining (Ibid, 2016). The relevance and importance of international 
standards is reinforced in the 1995 LRA. This makes it obligatory, when applying the 1995 LRA, 
to interpret the Act’s provisions in compliance with public international law obligations of the 
Republic (Ibid, 2016). 
Section 233 of the Constitution provides that ‘Customary international law is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’ Section 39 of the 
Constitution, which deals with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, further draws a distinction 
between international law and foreign law. It directs that international law must be considered, 
and that foreign law may be considered (Ibid, 2016). The Constitution does not define 
‘international law’ nor ‘foreign law’. This is especially relevant to whether international law 
refers to international standards that South Africa has assented to, or whether it also refers to 
relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations that South Africa has not ratified (Aletter and 
van Eck, 2016). In terms of temporary agency workers, this is an important question as South 
Africa has not assented to the relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations which regulate 
employment agencies (Ibid, 2016). In a decision by the Constitutional Court, S v Makwanyane 
and another62 the court decided that both binding and non-binding international instruments must 
be used when interpreting South African law (Ibid, 2016). In Murray v Minister of Defence63 the 
court stated that Section 39(1) of the Constitution obliged the Court to consider international law, 
such as the ILO Conventions and Recommendations, when interpreting any right to fair labour 
practice. The courts have therefore confirmed that in terms of the meaning of international law, 
ILO Conventions and Recommendations constitute international law (Ibid, 2016). In addition, 
the 1995 LRA also confirms the commitment to the ILO in that it states that one of its objectives 
is to give effect to the obligations that the country incurs as a member state of the ILO (Aletter 
and van Eck, 2016).64 South African legislation on agency work was enacted before the adoption 
of the Convention No. 181 (Benjamin, 2013). Table 8 below sets out South Africa’s legislative 
changes that have affected TES workers and the role that the ILO played at different historical 
points during this process. 
 
 
62 1995 (3) SA 391. 
63 2006 11 BCLR 1357 (C) at 1358. 
64 Section 1(b) of the LRA. 
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Table 12: South Africa’s Legislative changes in respect of TES workers and the role of the ILO  
Phase Legislation  Effect on employment agencies 
 




The LRA 28 
of 195665 was 
amended by 
the LRA 51 
of 198266, 
which came 
into effect on 
6 August 
1982 
• Triangular employment 
relationships were regulated 
for the first time in 1982. 
• The concept of ‘labour broker’ 
was introduced.67 
• Employment agencies were 
‘deemed’ the employers of the 
agency workers, if they were 
responsible for paying their 
remuneration. 
 
• South Africa was not a member of 
the ILO. 
• South African employment 
agencies were employers of 
agency workers more than a 
decade prior to these arrangements 
being regulated by the ILO’s 
Private Employment Agencies 









• The TES was responsible for 
remuneration of the agency 
worker, the TES is the 
employer of that worker. 
• The agency and the client 
were jointly and severally 
liable for transgressions of 
collective agreements and the 
BCEA. Only the employment 
agency was liable for unfair 
labour practices or unfair 
dismissals.  
 
• South Africa re-joined the ILO. 
• There was no indication that the 
ILO instruments in effect at that 
time played any role in drafting the 












• Policy makers attempted to 
improve the plight of 
temporary agency workers. 
• Protection for higher earning 
TES employees remained 
largely unchanged. 
• Lower earning agency 
Compared to the provisions of the 
Private Employment Agencies 
Convention 1997 (No. 181) and the 
Private Employment Agencies 
Recommendation, 1997 (No. 188): 
• Most of the amendments are in 
line with international norms. 
• In line with international norms, 
 
65 The Labour Relations Act of 1956 (No. 28 of 1956). 
66 The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1982 (No. 51 of 1982). 
67 The term ‘labour broker’ is used in South Africa to refer to what are more commonly referred to as labour hire 
firms or temporary employment agencies.  Although the statutory terminology was changed to ‘temporary 
employment services’ in 1995, the term ‘labour broker’ has remained and is often used with a scornful meaning in 
public discourse.  The broader category of labour market intermediaries is referred to as private employment 
agencies, and temporary employment services are therefore a sub-category of private employment agencies. The 
enterprise with whom the employees are placed is referred to in ILO terminology as the ‘user enterprise’ and are 
often referred to as the client, user or host enterprise (Benjamin, 2013). 
68 Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No. 6 2014). 
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workers, under the Threshold 
Amount69 received wide 
ranging new protections.  
• The right to equality for lower 
income earners protected. 
 
employment agencies are not be 
prohibited and allowed to operate 
in a flexible labour market.  
• ‘Equal treatment’ provisions went 
further than the international norm.  
• It is questionable if international 
norms were met for high earning 
group.  
• The amendments do not address 
fees being charged to agency 
workers. 
• The norm that requires that 
workers should not be prohibited 
from being employed directly by 
the client was not included. 
 
Source: adapted from Aletter and van Eck, (2016, pp. 287-297). 
5.3. The national legal framework for TES work 
During and shortly after 1994, core employment statutes were introduced, amongst these were 
The Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995), The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 of 1997) (BCEA), and The Employment Equity Act 1998 (No 55 
of 1998) (EEA). Employment protection legislation applies to all employees who ordinarily work 
in South Africa.  It also applies regardless of the stated governing law of any employment 
contract or the nationalities of either the employee or the employer (Bhoola, 2002). The 
employee may not contract out of statutory employment protection unless the legislation 
specifically permits it and then, only to the extent permissible in terms of the legislation (ibid).  
The legislation is supported by codes of practice which may be statutory codes of practice drawn 
up by NEDLAC or non-statutory codes of practice issued by the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).  These codes of practice often provide only guidelines and 
do not always have direct legal effect. They are however taken into account by the Labour 
Courts in deciding whether or not an employer has breached statutory employment regulations.  
Additionally, there are numerous laws implementing health and safety regulations (ibid). Table 
13 provides a brief outline of the three most important Acts that govern TES work in South 
Africa. 
 




Table 13: An outline of the three most important employment Acts 
Name of Act 
 
Key aims Coverage 
Labour Relations Act 
(1995) 
• Orderly collective 
bargaining 
• Workplace democracy 
• Collective labour dispute 
resolution (provisions for 
the CCMA) 
 
• All workers except the 
Defense Force, Secret 
Services and essential 
services 
Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (1997) 
• Improve minimum rights 
for all workers 
• Improve enforcement 
mechanisms 
 
• All workers except 
Defense Force and Secret 
Services 
• Incudes part time and 
casual labour and TES 
employees 
 
Employment Equity Act 
(1998)  
• Eliminates unfair 
discrimination  




• Employees in 
‘designated’ companies 
Source: Adapted from Bhorat et al (2001), Leibbrandt et al (2010, p.28); OECD (2010, p.234) 
The LRAA came into effect on 1 January 2015, but the provisions took effect on 1 April 2015 
after the expiry of a three months’ grace period (Strydom, 2017). Section 198 of the LRA 1995 
was adjusted by the insertion of the changes and not merely amended (Strydom, 2017). The 
LRAA is to be read together with the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 2013 
(No. 20 of 2013) (BCEAA), the Employment Equity Amendment Act 2013 (No.47 of 2013) 
(EEAA), as well as a new statute, the Employment Services Act 2014 (No.4 of 2014) (ESA). 
One of the most significant changes to the legislation pertaining to the TES industry, was the 
changes to section 198 of the LRA 1995. These changes add further protection to lower earning 
employees70 against possible abuse of temporary appointments by employers. Essentially, the 
amendments to this section restrict the employment of TES workers to employment for a period 
 




not exceeding three months; or as a substitute for a temporarily absent employee; or in a category 
of work which is considered to be a temporary service as determined by a collective agreement 
of a bargaining council or a sectoral determination, for a period of time. In any other situation the 
TES worker would be considered an employee of the client and not the temporary employment 
service. Table 14 sets out a summary of Section 198 of the LRA 1995, as amended by the 
LRAA. Importantly, the provisions of the LRAA apply to employees who earn below the 
Threshold Amount71, who are historically vulnerable to abusive practices (Venter, 2015).  
Table 14: Summary of some of the important provisions of Section 198 of the LRA  
Section of the LRA Details 
Section 198(1) Defines a ‘temporary employment service’ (TES) as any person 
who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client, other persons who 
perform work for the client and who are remunerated by the TES.   
 
Section 198(2) Provides that for the duration of the employment relationship the TES 
firm remains the employer of the TES employee. Often referred to as 
the ‘first deeming’ provision, which has been in the LRA since it was 
first promulgated and applies to all TES employees. 
 
Section 198A Defines a 'temporary service' (TS) as work for a client by an 
employee for a period not exceeding three months; or as a substitute 
for an employee of the client who is temporarily absent72; or as a 
category of work or any period of time determined to be a temporary 
service by a bargaining council agreement, sectoral determination or 
ministerial notice. TES employees falling into these categories remain 
employees of the TES in terms of Section 198(2) and are immune from 
the application of the Section 198A(3)(b)(i) deeming provision.  
 
198A(3)(b)(i) The ‘deeming’ provision states that if a TES employee is not 
performing a ‘temporary service’, the employee is ‘deemed to be the 
employee of the client’ and to be ‘employed on an indefinite basis’ by 
the client.  
 
Section 198A(5) The ‘parity’ provision stipulates that a TES employee deemed to be an 
employee of the TES client, is to be treated on the whole not less 
favourably than a permanent employee of the client performing the 
same or similar work provided that there is a justifiable reason for 
different treatment. 73 
 
71 R205 433.80 gross pay per annum (£10 867.41 on 22 January 2020). 
72 No time limit is mentioned in the Act. 




Section 198D The justifiable reasons for differentiation include seniority, 
experience, length of service, merit, quantity or quality of work 
performed, or other similar considerations that are not discriminatory. 
 
Section 198A(4) The termination by the temporary employment services of an 
employee‘s service with a client, whether at the instance of the 
temporary employment service or the client, for the purpose of 
avoiding the operation of subsection (3)(b) (the deeming provisions) or 
because the employee exercised a right in terms of this Act, is a 
dismissal. 
 
Section 198(4) The temporary employment service and the client are jointly and 
severally liable if the temporary employment service, in respect of any 
of its employees74, contravenes -  (a) a collective agreement concluded 
in a bargaining council that regulates terms and conditions of 
employment; (b) a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; (c) the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act; or (d) a sectoral determination made in terms of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act. 
 
Section 198 (4A) If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly and severally 
liable in terms of section 198(4) or is deemed to be the employer of an 
employee in terms of section 198A(3)(b)— (a)  the employee may 
institute proceedings against either the temporary employment 
service or the client or both the temporary employment service and the 
client; (b)  a labour inspector acting in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act may secure and enforce compliance against the 
temporary employment service or the client as if it were the employer, 
or both; and (c)  any order or award made against a temporary 
employment service or client in terms of this subsection may be 
enforced against either’. 
 
Sections 198 (4C) & 
(4D) 
A TES must comply with employment conditions in a sectorial 
determination or collective agreement concluded at a bargaining 
council that is applicable to a client for whom the employee works. 
The Labour Court (LC) or an arbitrator may rule on whether a contract 
between a TES and a client complies with the LRA, a sectorial 
determination or bargaining-council agreement.  
 
Section 198 (4F) Provides that TES’s must register with the Department of Labour and 
cannot raise non-registration as a defense.75  
 
Source: Adapted from Cohen (2014); Strydom (2017); the LRA 1995 
 
74 See table 12 for an explanation of liability. 
75 Note that the date of commencement of section 198(4F) is still to be proclaimed. 
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In explanation of the above table 14, section 198A(3)(b) becomes the operative clause 
determining the identity of the employer for employees earning below the Threshold. Then, once 
an employee becomes employed by the client by operation of section 198A(3)(b), the employee 
must, in terms of section 5, ‘be treated not less favourably than an employee of the client 
performing the same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment’. 
This would obviously only apply in the event that the terms and conditions of the employment 
applicable to the placed worker are less favourable than those applicable to the employee of the 
client. Last, to prevent the client from attempting to avoid the operation of section 198A(3)(b), 
the legislature added subsection (4). This states that if a TES or client terminates an employee’s 
assignment to avoid the operation of section 198(3)(b), that termination will be considered a 
dismissal and the usual remedies available through the LRA will apply (Assign Services (Pty) Ltd 
v NUMSA & Others, paragraph 53). 
5.4. The ‘deeming provision’ Section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA   
5.4.1. Who is the employer of the TES worker? 
The amendments contained in the LRAA were designed to discourage the use of TES workers on 
a long-term basis to avoid the costs of the employment of permanent employees (Le Roux, 
2015). The obligation imposed if clients make use of these workers in circumstances that fall 
outside the definition of a temporary service, consists of two parts. Firstly, that the TES worker 
assigned to the client is ‘deemed’ to be the indefinite employee of the client for the purposes of 
the LRA 1995 (van Eck, 2013). Secondly, the client must treat the ‘deemed’ employee ‘on the 
whole not less favourably’ than an ordinary employee who performs the same or similar work, 
unless there is a justifiable reason for not doing so (Le Roux, 2015).  
However, on a practical level the ‘deemed employer’ provision created confusion. To apply and 
interpret the provision two mutually exclusive interpretations became popular with the legal 
profession, writers and academics after the promulgation of the amendments. The first being that 
once the deemed employer provision applied, the TES employees automatically transferred to 
the client and their employment with the TES came to an end.  The second position was that the 
TES employees remained employed by the TES and that a dual employment relationship arose in 
respect of the client (Workman-Davies and Vatalidis, 2015). During 2015, Assign Service (Pty) 
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Ltd76 v Krost Services & Racking (Pty) Ltd and NUMSA (the ‘Assign matter’) was heard before 
the CCMA77 and dealt with these conflicting interpretations. 
The Assign matter was one of the most controversial and eagerly anticipated post amendment 
cases to unfold. The controversy concerned the interpretation and effect of Section 198A(3)(b)(i) 
of the LRA 1995. The relevant s198A(3) provides as follows:  
For the purpose of this Act, an employee-   
(a) performing a temporary service as contemplated in subsection (1) for the client is the 
employee of the temporary employment services in terms of section 198(2); or  
(b) not performing such temporary service for the client is—  
(i) deemed to be the employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the employer; 
and  
(ii) subject to the provisions of section 198B, employed on an indefinite basis by the 
client. 
 
Table 15 sets out a summary of the progression of Assign matter focusing on the employer party 
in the TES relationship. At the CCMA the National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA) argued 
that the employees, who fell below the Threshold Amount78, had come to be exclusively 
employed by the client, Krost Shelving and Racking (Pty) Ltd, after the three-month period. The 
TES company Assign Services (Pty) Ltd argued that the employees in question remained its 
employees but for the purposes of the LRA 1995, there was a dual employment relationship with 
the client. 
Table 15: Summary of the Assign Service (Pty) Ltd matter: The employer party 














Assign Service (Pty) Ltd v Krost Services & 
Racking (Pty) Ltd and NUMSA79: 
 
The Commissioner interpreted Section 
189A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA 1995 to mean that after 
the elapse of the three-month period, it gives rise 
to the client becoming the exclusive employer of 
the TES employees, as opposed to the client and 
the TES being dual employers.  
 
76 Assign is a TES as defined in s198(1) of the LRA1995 and is a member of the Confederation of Associations in 
the Private Employment Sector (CAPES). 
77 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. 
78 R205 433.80 gross pay per annum (£10 867 on 22 January 2020). 









Brassey AJ Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others80: 
  
Despite the deemed employer provisions in the 
LRA, the court found that the client is a 
concurrent employer rather than the sole 
employer. The TES is not substituted for the client 









Tlaletsi DJP,  
Phatshoane 
AJA 
NUMSA v Assign Services & others81: 
 
The LAC overturned the Labour Court’s judgment 
and concluded that the plain language of Section 
198A(3)(b) of the LRA supports the sole 
employer interpretation. The court ruled that the 
purpose of the deeming provision ‘is not to 
transfer the contract of employment between the 
TES and the placed worker to the client, but to 
create a statutory employment relationship 















Petse AJ and 
Theron J. 
 
Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others: 
 
The first respondent in the LAC matter, Assign 
Services (Pty) Ltd (Assign) filed an appeal with 
the CC on 31 July 2017. On 26 July 2018, the CC 
upheld the LAC ruling of a sole employer 
interpretation. 
 
Source: The researcher’s own summary 
The CC decision has provided clarity in terms of the ‘sole employer’ or ‘concurrent employer’ 
debate, in that the TES client is the sole employer after three months. The CC ruled that the 
language in section 198A of the LRA was clear enough (Mahlakoana, 2018). This means the 
TES will not have any legal standing in the employment terms of TES employees‚ nor be 
involved any further in the equation with regards to the LRA 1995, after the three-month period 
has elapsed (Mahlakoana, 2018). How the TES employees are to be treated in terms of principles 
 
80 [2015] 11 BLLR 1160 (LC). 
81 [2017] ZALAC 44 (10 July 2017). 
82 Paragraph 43. 
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of non-discrimination, once they are deemed to be the employees of the TES client, is dealt with 
in section 5.5.1. below.   
5.4.2. The deeming provision and the issue of joint and several liability 
In the past, South African legislation tended towards express allocations of employment law 
obligations to a single employer in both the 1956 and the 1995 LRA.83 This is no longer the case 
as the new section 200B(2)84 of the amended LRA1995 now explicitly recognises that there may 
be more than one employer for the purposes of liability. Historically, the temporary employment 
agency (or TES) was legislatively determined to be the true employer of the placed employee 
through the 1993 amendment to the old Labour Relations Act of 1956. The legislature at that 
time created a legal fiction by which the placed employees were ‘deemed’ to be employed by the 
TES firm. 85 This provision, though with a different construction, was carried through to section 
198(2) of the LRA 1995.86 Section 198(2) of the amended LRA 1995 provides that  
For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or provided 
to a client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary 
employment service, and the temporary employment service is that person’s employer. 
In addition, section 198A(3)(a)-(b) now explicitly provides a further deeming provision: 
For the purposes of this Act, an employee - (a) performing a temporary service as 
contemplated in subsection (1) for the client is the employee of the temporary 
employment services in terms of section 198(2); or (b) not performing such temporary 
service for the client is - (i) deemed to be the employee of that client and the client is 
deemed to be the employer; and (ii) subject to the provisions of section 198B, employed 
on an indefinite basis by the client.  
   
 
 
83 See Dlodlo AJ judgment at p. 15 paragraph 46 of the Assign Services CC matter. 
84 Section 200B(1)-(2) reads: ‘(1)  For the purposes of this Act and any other employment law, ‘employer‘ includes 
one or more persons who carry on associated or related activity or business by or through an employer if the intent 
or effect of their doing so is or has been to directly or indirectly defeat the purposes of this Act or any other 
employment law. (2) If more than one person is held to be the employer of an employee in terms of subsection (1), 
those persons are jointly and severally liable for any failure to comply with the obligations of an employer in terms 
of this Act or any other employment law’. 
85 See Dlodlo AJ judgment at p. 5 paragraph 10 of the Assign Services CC matter. 
86 Labour Relations Act (66 of 1995). 
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In other words, an employee not performing a temporary service for a client is deemed to be an 
indefinite employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the employer.87 The intention of 
the legislature in the January 2015 amendments to the LRA 1995 was to provide additional 
protection to TES employees who earned below the Threshold amount of R205 433,30 per 
annum, and who had been placed with the TES client for longer than three months. This was 
essentially done through the introduction of an extended joint and several liability of the client 
and the TES in terms of s198(4A) of the LRA 1995. This provision, inter alia, meant that the 
client was now exposed to claims of unfair dismissal and the like, by employees of the TES 
(Pienaar and Naidoo, 2017).  
When the Assign matter came before the Constitutional Court on 22 February 2018,88 Dlodlo AJ 
acknowledged that section 198(4) of the LRA occasioned some difficulty. Section 198(4) 
stipulates: 
The temporary employment service and the client are jointly and severally liable if the 
temporary employment service, in respect of any of its employees89, contravenes -  (a) a 
collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; (b) a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; (c) the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; or (d) a sectoral 
determination made in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
Dlodlo AJ explained that section 198(4) of the LRA 1995 effectively creates ‘a substantive and 
statutory form of joint and several liability -  which does not equate to joint or dual employment 
but rather creates a statutory accessory liability for the client in the circumstances set out in the 
section - where the TES carries principle liability as employer in terms of the LRA’ (Dlodlo AJ, 
2018, paragraph 58). Section 198(4A) adds to this that- 
If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly and severally liable in terms of 
section 198(4) or is deemed to be the employer of an employee in terms of section 
198A(3)(b)— (a)  the employee may institute proceedings against either the temporary 
employment service or the client or both the temporary employment service and the 
client; (b)  a labour inspector acting in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
may secure and enforce compliance against the temporary employment service or the 
client as if it were the employer, or both; and (c)  any order or award made against a 
temporary employment service or client in terms of this subsection may be enforced 
against either.  
 
87 Assign Services CC matter. 
88 Case CCT 194/17 




Dlodlo AJ explained the perceived difficulties with 198(4) and 198(4A): 
I am persuaded that the sole employer interpretation is not hampered by section 198(4A). 
The section does not purport to determine who an employer may be from time to time. It 
provides that, while the client is the deemed employer, the employee may still claim 
against the TES as long as there is still a contract between the TES and the employee. 
This is eminently sensible considering that the TES may still be remunerating that 
employee. The view is buttressed by section 200B, which provides very broad general 
liability for employers. Section 198(4) and (4A) seems to carve out specific areas of 
liability for the TES pre-and post-deeming as opposed to general liability applicable in 
terms of section 200B (paragraph 61). 
In other words, section 198(4) and (4A) stipulate specific areas of liability for the TES firm pre- 
and post-deeming, as opposed to the general liability applicable in terms of section 200B. 
Subsection 198(4A) was introduced to provide recourse directly against the client for 
contraventions in terms of section 198(4) without first having to institute proceedings against the 
TES (as was the pre-amendment case).  
In order to explain how this thinking ties into the ‘sole employer’ reasoning, the following 
explanation from Dlodlo is helpful: 
A TES’s liability only lasts as long as the relationship with the client and while it (rather 
than the client) continues to remunerate the worker. Nothing in law prevents the client 
and the TES from terminating their contractual relationship upon the triggering of section 
198A(3)(b), with the client opting to remunerate the placed employees directly. If this 
happens, the TES that placed the worker will cease to be a TES in respect of that worker 
because it no longer meets the requirement in section 198(1) of remunerating the worker. 
The TES will then fall out of the relationship entirely. 
Table 16 below sets out the identity of the employer, and the liability for both the TES client and 
TES firm, pre- and post the deeming provision in section198A(3)(b)(i). Liability is affected by 
whether the TES firm and the TES client continue the commercial contract and therefore the 







Table 16: The identity of the employer and the liability of both the TES and the client pre- and post the 
deeming provision 
 The TES 
relationship 
3 MONTH point CONTINUED 
relationship 
Liability  A ‘substantive and 
statutory form of 
joint and several 
liability’ in terms of 
198(4) 
1. The commercial 
contract remains 
between the client and 
the TES, and the TES 
continues to pay the 
worker. 
 
2. The commercial 
contract terminates, 
and the TES no longer 
pays the worker 
 
1. Joint and several 
liability in terms of 





2. Liability rests with the 
TES client as there is 
no longer a TES in 
terms of 198(1) and no 
longer a triangular 
employment 
relationship 
Employment The TES remains 
the employer of the 
worker in terms of 
198(2) for the 
duration of the 
‘TES relationship’. 
1. The commercial 
contract remains 
between the client and 
the TES, and the TES 




2. The commercial 
contract terminates, 
and the TES no longer 
pays the worker. 
 
1. Client is the deemed 
employer of the TES 






2. Client is the deemed 
employer of the TES 
worker in terms of the 
deeming provision 
198A(3)(b)(i). 
Source: researcher’s own summary  
Dlodlo AJ explained that the placed employee retains the right to claim against the TES through 
section 198(4A) to the extent that they are still remunerated by the TES. This liability relates 
only to claims brought by the employee. The protections afforded by the sole employer 




In addition, the LAC90 had recognised that there was a perceived conflict between s198(2) and 
198A(3)(b) referred to in s198(4A). Dlodlo AJ dealt with this conflict and confirmed that the 
deeming provisions in section 198(2) and 198A(3)(b)(i) cannot operate at the same time. When 
employees are not performing a temporary service as defined, then section 198A(3)(b)(i) 
replaces section 198(2) as the operative deeming clause for the purposes of determining the 
identity of the employer (paragraph 83f). 
Dlodlo AJ believed that these restrictions of TES employment to genuine temporary work 
affords the clarity and precision needed to realise the constitutional right to fair labour practices 
and meaningful participation in trade union activity (paragraph 67). He furthermore believed that 
part of these protections entails that ‘placed employees’ are fully integrated into the workplace as 
employees of the client after three months. The contractual relationship between the client and 
the placed employees does not come into existence through a negotiated agreement or a 
recruitment process. The employee automatically becomes employed on the same terms and 
conditions of similar employees, with the same benefits, prospects of internal growth and job 
security. The purpose of section 198A was to fill a gap in accountability between client 
companies and employees who are placed with them (Paragraph 69). 
5.4.3. The participants’ views of the ‘deeming provision’ 
The participant views of the deeming provision were obtained prior to the CC ruling in the 
Assign matter. However, their thoughts and ideas remain interesting, although most were critical 
of the lack of clarity of the deeming provision at the time. One acting Labour Court judge 
believed that instead of a deeming provision there should rather have been an enquiry into bona 
fides (i.e. good faith) because the bona fides enquiry already exists in South African law. This 
participant explained that for over two decades the courts had dealt with similar issues on the 
basis that certain transactions were a sham and declared them as such (Int29.p485. Par.98-100). 
The argument was that if the TES structure was a sham, a device, or subterfuge, then the 
aggrieved party should bring an application to the Labour Court and have it declared as such 
(Int29.p485. Par.102).  
 
90 NUMSA v. Assign Services and others 
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Do not legislate yourself out of a genuine scenario… if you have an artificial creation like 
198A, you have got all the problems associated with the artificial creation, and that is, 
how does it practically work? How do you just move somebody from one employer to 
another?’ (Int29.p485. Par.104).    
One participant who was involved in the NEDLAC consultations prior to the 2014 amendments, 
believed that the law is incorrectly constructed and too complex (Int19.p289. Par.34). This 
participant argued that the interpretation of the law in the LAC decision91 was correct ‘I think the 
interpretation is exactly what the stakeholders and social partners meant, even though the guys at 
the labour brokers don’t agree’ (Int19.p299. Par.152). However, this participant believed the 
negotiated solution incorporated into the legislation by the stakeholders was incorrect 
(Int19.p299. Par.162). Furthermore, this participant thought that if the CC had overturned the 
LAC decision (which we now know it did not), the labour movement would simply have lobbied 
to have the legislation changed (Int19.p299. Par.162). However, an acting Labour Court judge 
participant disagreed with this view and believed that the LAC erred in interpreting the law as it 
simply ignored the clear and unambiguous meaning of the word deemed ‘I think it [the LAC 
decision] is a sensible approach, I think it is probably the right approach, but whether it is correct 
in law is debatable’ (Int23.p384. Par.16). This participant argued that if the correct meaning of 
the word ‘deemed’ was used it would lead to a dual employment relationship as per the LC 
decision handed down by Brassey AJ.  
Participants thought that several unintended consequences flowed from the deeming provision as 
interpreted by the LAC judgement. One of these consequences was that the TES employees may 
not want to be the employees of the TES client and may prefer working for the TES firm. For 
example, working for the TES client may increase their prospects of being made redundant 
(Int23.p384. Par.22). An acting LC judge believed that there should be a provision in Section 
198 of the LRA 1995, similar to Section 19792 of the LRA 1995, that dealt with the transfer of 
 
91 The LAC concluded that the plain language of Section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA supported the sole employer 
interpretation. The court ruled that the purpose of the deeming provision ‘is not to transfer the contract of 
employment between the TES and the placed worker to the client, but to create a statutory employment relationship 
between the client and the placed worker’. 
92 Transfer of contract of employment: (1) In this section and in section 197A - (a) ‘business’ includes the whole or a 
part of any business, trade, undertaking or service; and (b) ‘transfer’ means the transfer of a business by one 
employer (‘the old employer’) to another employer (‘the new employer’) as a going concern. (1) If a transfer of a 
business takes place, unless otherwise agreed in terms of subsection (6) - (a) the new employer is automatically 
substituted in the place of the old employer in respect of all contracts of employment in existence immediately 
before the date of transfer (Section 197 of the LRA 1995). [Emphasis added]. 
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employees when a business is sold as a going concern. Section 197 of the LRA provides that the 
employees transfer to the new entity ‘unless otherwise agreed’ and gives a representative trade 
union and the employer the option of contracting out of a Section 197 transfer. ‘I think it would 
have made sense to give a representative trade union that sort of discretion’ (Int23.pp384-385. 
Par.24). However, another participant was sceptical about this view ‘I think that is probably a 
hopeful view [chuckle] because I haven't yet come across a worker who doesn’t want to be 
transferred’ (Int25.p415. Par.100). However, the LAC specifically stated that no automatic 
transfer of employment similar to that envisaged by section 197 of the LRA (dealing with the 
transfer of a business as a going concern) takes place in section 198 (dealing with TES work) 
(Jones, 2017).  
According to one participant, the primary difference between Section 198 of the LRA and a 
transfer of employees in terms of Section 197 transaction, is that in the latter, the old employer is 
substituted by the new employer as if the old employer never existed. In the context of the 
construction that the LAC in the Assign Services matter gave to Section 198 of the LRA, there is 
a deemed creation of new employment with the TES client, with the effect from the expiry of the 
date of three-month period (Int29.p486. Par.112-116). Another participant believed one of the 
unintended consequences of the LAC judgment was that if the TES employee was made 
redundant soon after becoming an employee of the TES client, their severance pay would be 
negatively affected, especially if they had been in the employ of the TES company for a long 
period of time. Unlike in Section 197 of the LRA, where the employee transfers to the new entity 
and kept their length of service from the old entity to the new entity, there was no such guarantee 
in terms of Section 198 of the LRA (Int24.p401. Par.46).  
The three-month period of the deeming provision was an additional topic of concern for the 
participants and their views varied greatly. A union participant believed there should never have 
been a three month-period at all and that TES employees should have the same rights from day 
one. 
Employees must, as soon as they start working, have the same rights as workers who had 
been there for longer. These three months provides a way in which they can dodge … it 
was put in obviously as a concession to the employers (Int21.p344. Par.32).  
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 One legal participant believed that the three-month period may not be regarded as sufficient in 
some industries and should have been drafted in a flexible manner to cater for different industry 
or sector needs. The argument is that some industries work on six-month contracts rather than 
three months. The example provided was the farming industry that may have a six-month fruit 
picking period and would require TES employees for this period (Int6.p106. Par.96). Another 
employment lawyer participant believed that due to high unemployment and low skills levels, the 
three-month period was simply too short. The participant explained that the three-month period 
resulted in a cost increase for business (Int14.p201. Par.12). 
We warned in the negotiations equal treatment should not be a race to the bottom, 
because you know equal treatment might mean that from now on, we are going to employ 
people at X rate. So, whether they are temps, permanent that becomes the new rate to be 
employed (Int14.p201. Par.14). 
 
A manager at a large bargaining council agreed that the TES period of three months before the 
TES employee become the employee of the TES client, should be extended to a longer period 
given the high unemployment rate in South Africa. The participant’s rationale was that extending 
the three-month period would provide workers with more opportunity for employment or 
movement to permanent job opportunities. TESs may also be used as a catalyst to give young 
people or new entrants to the job market, an opportunity to enter into the job market (Int27.p451. 
Par.34).  
5.5. The ‘parity provisions’ Section 198A(5) of the LRA     
Other jurisdictions provide for principles of non-discrimination between non-standard workers 
and their standard counterparts. For example, for the European Union (EU) the EU Directive 
1999/70/EC on fixed-term work and Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work, both provide for the 
removal of discrimination against fixed-term and part-time workers respectively (ILO, 2016). 
The Republic of Korea prohibits discrimination against fixed-term or part-time workers on the 
grounds of their employment status (Ibid, 2016). Japan prohibits unreasonable working 
conditions that result from the difference in work periods of fixed-term employees as compared 
to an undetermined-term employee (Ibid, 2016). 
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Temporary service employees in the United Kingdom receive statutory protection for equal pay 
in terms of the AWR (Ebrahim, 2017). The AWR protect agency workers from less favourable 
working conditions compared to employees, after they have completed twelve weeks of service 
(Leighton and Wynn, 2011; Elenor, 2017). To qualify as a comparable employee both the agency 
worker and the employee must work under the supervision and direction of the client and both 
must be engaged in work that is the same or broadly similar having regard to where relevant, 
whether they have a similar level of qualification and skills (Ebrahim, 2017). The Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) Guidance on the Agency Workers Regulations (the Agency 
Workers Guide) states that the meaning of equal treatment is usually a matter of common sense 
and what is required is simply to treat agency workers as if they had been employed directly to 
the same job without the intervention of a temporary work agency (Ebrahim, 2017). 
In South Africa, Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995 provides that TES employees employed for 
more than three months must not be treated less favourably than an employee employed on a 
permanent basis who performs the same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for 
different treatment (ILO, 2016).  
5.5.1. The ‘parity’ provision’ and the principles of equality 
Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995 stipulates: 
An employee deemed to be an employee of the client in terms of subsection (3)(b) must 
be treated on the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the 
same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. 
 
An important aspect of Section 198A(5) of the LRA (referred to as the ‘parity provision’) is the 
interpretation of the words ‘must be treated on the whole not less favourably’. Clause 38 of the 
Memorandum of Objects of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 provides the following 
examples of what would constitute treatment that is ‘on the whole not less favourably’ in terms 
of section 198A(5) of the LRA: ‘…the same wages and benefits as the client's other employees 
who are performing the same or similar work’. Section 198D of the LRA 1995 stipulates that the 
following factors may be taken into account in determining whether justifiable reasons exist for 
treating TES employees differently: seniority, experience or length of service; merit; the quality 
or quantity of work performed; and any other criteria of a similar nature.   
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The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) deals with equity in the workplace for all 
employees, including temporary agency or TES workers. The equal pay protection provisions 
in the LRA 1995 are therefore unusual (Ebrahim, 2017). This ‘novel equal pay legal 
framework’ does not require TES workers to prove that they are paid less as a result of the 
employer discriminating against them unfairly. Instead, the employer bears the onus of proving 
that the differential treatment is based on a justifiable reason and such reason is not unfairly 
discriminatory (Ebrahim, 2017, p.9).  
Interpretation issues are no doubt going to arise in relation to the words ‘must be treated on the 
whole not less favourably’ in Section 198A(5) of the LRA.  Interestingly, the same words are 
used in respect of part time employees in Section 198C(3)(a) of the LRA 1995.  In respect of 
fixed-term contracts the words ‘on the whole’ are missing in Section 198B(8)(a) of the LRA 
1995, which simply says ‘must not be treated less favourably. In respect of Section 197 of the 
LRA 1995 (transfers of contracts of employment) the words ‘on the whole not less favourable’ 
are also used in relation to conditions of service on the transfer of employees from one 
employer to the next (Pemberton, undated). The different wording of sections of the LRA 1995 
indicates that the standards regarding equal pay for equal work are different. There appears to 
be two approaches to equal pay claims; the first requires an equalisation of the overall general 
package received by the employees, while the other requires a line by line equalisation of the 
pay and benefits received by employees (Patel, 2014). No reasons for the differentiation have 
been provided by the LRA 1995 and how these words will be interpreted will be left in the 
hands of the judiciary (Patel, 2014).  
5.5.2. Principles of non-discrimination: the participants’ views 
Wage equality in this country is horrendous. I mean we have one of the biggest wage 
differentials in the world. And at the end of the day you've got to look at your temporary 
employment services are very often entry into the workplace. And historically they have 
been your lower income earners and they are your vulnerable workers [TES Executive] 
(Int5. p87. Par284-286). 
As with the above quotation, participants from both the employer and labour movements 
acknowledged that in the past TES employees were likely to experience unequal treatment and 
there was a general need for the legislation to provide further protection against such abuse 
(Int2.p15. Par.32 [legal participant]; Int12.p166. Par.32 [union participant]). One TES 
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executive participant stated that the unequal pay rates between permanent employees and the 
TES employees encouraged the casualisation of employment as it was a stimulus to reduce the 
permanent workforce in favour of engaging TES workers. According to this participant, TES 
clients and companies eroded the permanent component of employment and replaced it with 
the TES component because it was cheaper ‘the primary objective is not strategic in the sense 
of flexibility, it is only in the spirit of cutting down costs’ (Vol 2: Int32.p22. Par.244). An 
advocate (barrister) participant pointed out that TES employees were often paid lower wages 
than their permanent counterparts even in industries where minimum wages were prescribed by 
a bargaining council. In these instances, permanent employees of the TES client may have 
negotiated preferential terms and conditions above the minimum requirements. However, this 
participant warned about the possible consequences for the TES client if the wages and other 
benefits were immediately equalised in terms of Section 198A(5) (Int20.p331. Par.166). This 
participant suggested that parties consider a negotiated solution to phase in the changes, rather 
than an expensive legal solution, to avoid redundancies and job losses (Int20.pp331-132. 
Par.168).  
Participants focused much of their criticism on the lack of clarity of the wording of Section 
198A(5) of the LRA 1995 and the unintended consequences that may flow from the 
implementation of its provisions. How to deal with TES employees’ pension funds in relation 
to the parity provisions, was one such area that lacked clarity. If the TES employee was 
deemed to be the employee of the TES client and that client was part of an industry with a very 
specific industry retirement or pension fund, the question arose as to how the TES client would 
comply with the parity provisions with regard to that fund. One TES company participant 
stated that the wording of Section 198A(5) of the LRA 2015 allowed for a degree of flexibility. 
This participant supported the idea that the TES employee need not join the new TES client 
pension fund but should rather be provided with an increase in remuneration to compensate for 
the fact that they were not part of the fund. The participant believed that this would satisfy the 
requirement of the wording ‘on the whole’ not less favourable than the TES client’s own 
employees (Int3. p57. Par28).  
Some participants believed that the parity provisions would simply be ignored or circumvented 
(Int12.pp166-167. Par.34 [union participant]; Int20.p322. Par.70[legal participant]) and since 
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the TES workers were poorly unionised and earned low wages, it would be difficult to 
challenge (Int33. Vol 2. p37. Par122[legal participant]). One legal participant stated that TES 
employers circumvented the provisions of the LRA 1995 by simply rotating employees from 
one employer to another so that they did not work for more than three months for the same TES 
client (Int33. Vol 2. p37. Par118). Another legal participant pointed out that using the 
outsourcing ‘model’ was a popular way of avoiding the parity provision.93 This participant 
explained that if the TES company could no longer provide a temporary employment service in 
terms of section 198 of the LRA, an outsourced service could be provided, and the parity 
provisions would not apply.  
So, you just shift labour broking into outsourcing, and you get the same result. You 
continue to be able to employ workers on different terms and conditions and now there 
is nobody to compare them to in the main client industry because nobody in the client’s 
operation does that job (Int20.p330. Par.148). 
A legal participant expressed concern that the larger trade unions were not active enough in 
defending the rights of the TES workers in terms of the parity provisions  
You'd expect there to be pushback. What you would have expected is that the big trade 
unions would have taken up these new rights, because they after all were the ones who 
fought for them (Int20.pp322-323. Par.72).  
However, another participant believed that trade unions had simply waited for the CC to 
pronounce on the Assign matter before embarking on litigation to protect TES workers’ rights. 
This participant believed that the bulk of litigation would flow from the parity provision in the 
future and that the courts would adopt a strict approach, requiring compelling reasons for 
paying a lower rate than permanent employees (Int23.pp387-388. Par.54).94  
5.5.3.  The GIWUSA v Swissport matter:  the next case in the TES debate 
During July 2018 the CC in the Assign matter dealt with the identity of the employer party in the 
TES relationship, where the TES employee was deemed to be the employee of the TES client. 
During March 2019, General Industries Workers Union of South Africa obo Mgedezi and Others 
 
93 See par. 7.3.2. for a further discussion relating to the outsource model. 
94 Interestingly, the participants did not highlight the latitude employers seem to potentially have in justifying 
different treatment, for example, different employee qualifications, skills etc. This may be due to the changes to the 
legislation being relatively new when the interviews were conducted. 
182 
 
v Swissport SA (Pty) Ltd and Others95 (the GIWUSA v Swissport matter) was heard before the 
CCMA, which is the next case in the TES debate.  
In terms of the facts of the case, the three applicants were employed by the second respondent, 
the Workforce Group (‘Workforce’). The first respondent, Swissport SA (Pty) Ltd (‘Swissport / 
client’) was the client of Workforce. Two of the applicants were employed as forklift drivers and 
the third as an acceptance clerk. The applicants had rendered their services at the client’s 
premises. The facts indicated that the applicants earned below the Threshold Amount and that 
Swissport was responsible for daily operations and supervision of the applicants. There was a 
commercial relationship between Swissport and Workforce, and the applicants were ‘on the 
books’ of Workforce and received the benefits that Workforce employees received (van Wyk et 
al, 2019). Swissport employees received benefits such as pension fund contributions, medical 
insurance, discretionary bonuses and shift allowances that were not afforded to the applicants. 
The applicants had to demonstrate that they performed the same or similar work to Swissport's 
employees. The difficulty facing the applicants was that there was no comparator, as Swissport 
did not employ any forklift drivers or acceptance clerks as these were all supplied by Workforce. 
The applicants therefore argued that the position of cargo controllers was sufficiently similar to 
the position of forklift drivers for the purposes of section 198A(5) of the LRA.  
Three issues arose in GIWUSA v Swissport in relation to section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA 1995. 
Firstly, were the applicant’s permanent employees of the client? Secondly, if so, were they 
entitled to be ‘on the books’ of the client? In other words, the matter dealt with the demand to be 
employed in terms of permanent employment contracts with the client (in this case Swissport) 
which was not a question directly before the CC (Frahm-Arp and Willem, 2019). Thirdly, 
whether they were entitled to equal benefits as compared to certain employees of the client (van 
Wyk et al, 2019).  
The CCMA held that it was common cause that the applicants had been employed with 
Swissport for a period in excess of three months and no evidence was led that this employment 
was a temporary service. The deeming provision in section 198A(3)(b) therefore applied. 
However, the CCMA found that job functions of the forklift drivers and cargo controllers were 
not the same or sufficiently similar to invoke section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995. Further, there 
was no comparator for the acceptance clerk. As a result, the applicants did not have to be treated 
 
95 General Industries Workers Union of South Africa obo Mgedezi and Others v Swissport SA (Pty) Ltd and 
Another [2019] 9 BALR 954 (CCMA). Case no. WECT 18794 on 18 March 2019. 
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‘on the whole’ not less favourably than cargo controllers and were not entitled to the additional 
benefits available to Swissport's employees (van Wyk et al, 2019; Robins and Olley, 2019).  
Three important principles may be extracted from this case:  
Firstly, that TES employees who are placed at a client in excess of three months and earn under 
the threshold are deemed permanent employees of the client for purposes of the LRA. In this 
matter, it was not disputed that they were deemed to be employed by Swissport in terms of 
section 198A(3) of the Labour Relations Act. 
Secondly, in terms of the requirement for TES employees to be transferred ‘to the books’ of the 
client. The CCMA held that the applicants remained ‘on the books’ of Workforce provided that a 
contractual relationship remained between workforce and the client, maintaining a tripartite 
relationship. This was made clear from Assign matter where the court held that it was not 
required for TES employees to be transferred to a new employment relationship. All that was 
required was for the TES employees to be indefinitely employed by the client for the purposes of 
the LRA 1995. The CCMA held that the deeming provision, as per paragraph 75 of Assign 
judgment, was not a transfer to a new employment relationship, but rather a change in the 
statutory attribution of responsibility as employer within the same triangular employment 
relationship (Ncume, 2019). The triangular relationship then continues for as long as the 
commercial contract between the TES and the client remained in force and required the TES to 
remunerate the workers. This did not imply that the applicants had to be ‘on the books’ of 
Swissport. Swissport was required to take responsibility for the applicants in terms of the 
deeming provision of the LRA 1995 (Ncume, 2019). In other words, just because the applicants 
were deemed to be employees of Swissport, it did not mean that they had to be employed by the 
client. The Commissioner therefore held that the relief sought, namely that the employees be 
employed in terms of permanent employment contracts with Swissport could not be granted 
(Frahm-Arp and Willem, 2019). 
Thirdly, an employee can only claim equal benefits if their employment is of an indefinite 
nature and there is an identifiable comparator who does the same or similar work to that of the 
employee (van Wyk et al, 2019). It is important to remember that the obligation to treat the 
deemed employees no less favourably only arises in respect of employees doing the same or 
similar work. It is not a blanket comparison of the terms and conditions of the entire workforce 
of the client (Frahm-Arp and Willem, 2019). 
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Frahm-Arp and Willem (2019) argue that in terms of this mater, the employees of the TES do 
not become the employees of the client in all circumstances, such that they need to be offered 
employment contracts with the client. Rather, the client, for the purposes of the LRA 1995, is 
deemed to be their employer and is in those instances liable or responsible for the employees. 
These instances are in respect of unfair dismissals, unfair labour practices, collective 
bargaining, and unfair discrimination claims in relation to union membership and union 
activities. 
5.6. Regulatory avoidance and lack of enforcement 
Mitlacher et al (2015) compared experiences of agency work across different national or 
regulatory contexts, including Australia, Germany and Singapore and found that increased 
regulation improved outcomes for temporary agency workers. However, regulatory avoidance 
in the temporary work agency industry has expanded and intensified, normalising exploitation 
and increasing the negative outcomes of precarious work (Knox, 2018). Knox (2018) defines 
regulatory avoidance as overt avoidance or breaches of specific regulations, or the exploitation 
of loopholes and shortcomings.  
In South Africa, the avoidance of protections in labour legislation for TES workers has in the 
past provided the motive for firms to use TESs, and the legislative provisions concerning TESs 
provided the opportunity to achieve this (Benjamin, 2016a). One legal participant perceived the 
entire purpose of the TES industry as a mechanism of avoiding the employment relationship: 
You now have this labour brokering industry which just acts as a subsidiary … entity to 
distance employers from their actual workers. So, the way … around labour brokering 
in South Africa today, is not really about how to regulate labour broker people who are 
… in labour broker companies, it is just to get rid of the mechanisms that employers are 
using through labour brokers to not engage with their own employees (Int7.p111. 
Par.16). 
Tightening the regulations for the TES industry in South Africa has provided more protection 
for the TES employees, but a legal participant believed that more effective enforcement and 
increased resources are still needed.  
There are inspectorates for all of those main agreements, there is a process of 
enforcement through arbitration in terms of the main agreement, you don’t have to run 
to the Department of Labour and rely on each inspectorate.  You have your own 
inspectorate and you do not even have to enforce it at the Labour Court, you have got 
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the Section 33A LRA arbitrations under the bargaining councils, where the bargaining 
councils by way of an arbitrator, can enforce their agreement and issue arbitration 
awards which are binding. So, everything is there, all the mechanisms are there, it is just 
to commit the resources to enforce it and that should solve your problem. And I have 
got a huge issue with trying to legislate yourself out of resource issues because it never 
works (Int29.pp481-482. Par.62). 
A union participant expressed similar concerns regarding the lack of resources:  
Bargaining councils have agents who are supposed to go out, and of course the 
Department of Labour has labour inspectors. But none of these bodies have enough 
people, so you know someone could complain … to the bargaining council and it could 
be weeks, months before someone could actually be able to go out there and see what 
was actually happening (Int26.p438. Par.120-122). 
Another union participant mentioned that as part of the union’s national minimum wage 
negotiations, they were to include the general ‘tightening up’ and improvement of the 
enforcement processes by the Department of Labour and the bargaining councils.96 ‘so that we 
can also try and bring this up to the required standard for fair labour practises’ (Int12. p170. 
Par60-62). However, a legal practitioner participant stated that they were sceptical about the 
enforcement challenges ever improving and believed that the solution rested on self-
compliance: 
The national minimum wage is going to be the same, where the Department of Labour 
has not got the resources to police the national minimum wage, so we have enforcement 
problem in South Africa … And, again, you can understand how much bribery and 
corruption opportunity this induces as well… But I mean, the point is, and again that is 
the problem you got to encourage employers to self-comply, you are not going to have a 
big brother policeman ever in South Africa doing effective enforcement via the 
Department of Labour. That is not going to happen in my or your lifetime, unless we 
develop a private-public type model like in the Netherlands (Int14. Pp. 204-205. Par44-
48). 
 
A key development in South Africa has been a shift from generalist labour inspectors to 
specialist inspectors (Cameron, 2015; Hastings and Heyes, 2016). Since 2012, the policy has 
been to appoint specialist labour inspectors in the provinces who are experts in particular areas 
(such as Electrical, Health and Safety, Construction and Explosives). Specialisation has 
improved the effectiveness of provisional offices (Hastings and Heyes, 2016).  However, the 
 
96 The media reported during April 2019 that the South African Labour Minister, Mildred Oliphant, had stated that 
there would be tough enforcement of the implementation of the National Minimum Wage. Government’s intention 
was to strengthen the inspectorate and the CCMA’s monitoring roles (Africa Daily Voice, 2019) 
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state labour inspectorate (Inspection and Enforcement Services (IES)) has severe resourcing 
challenges such as a lack of sufficient number of inspectors and high turnover (Hastings, 2019; 
Hastings and Heyes, 2016). Labour inspectors may issue compliance orders against employers 
who break statutory obligations, which are enforced as orders of the Labour Court where 
financial penalties may result from noncompliance to obligations. Despite these powers, in a 
recent report Kretzmann (2017) noted the Department of Labour had just one inspector for every 
120,000 economically active citizens, a figure which compares unfavourably to the ILO’s 
recommended rate of one for every 20,000 (Kretzmann, 2017).  
At the time that the amendments to the employment legislation were debated, a self-regulatory 
model rather than formal legislative amendments was proposed by some TES firms 
(Int22.pp367-368. Par.48). An influential self-regulatory body, funded by large South African 
and international staffing firms, had been proposed. A participant who had held different senior 
government department positions and had been involved in the NEDLAC negotiations prior to 
the recent legislation amendments, confirmed that the idea at that time was that those in the TES 
industry who did not operate according to the rules established by the body, could be fined. This 
approach had been successful in the private security industry and certain parallels could be 
drawn between the two industries. The security industry had grown quickly, with a violent 
history and had many ‘fly by night’ operators (Int19.p292. Par.66). The participant believed that 
despite these difficulties, a security industry was formed that provided a provident fund, a 
minimum wage process and managed smaller employers to ensure that workers were not abused. 
‘There is a reporting hotline, together with all the other industry bodies’ (Int19.p292. Par.70).  
Putting the regulatory process into the CCMA and making it a highly complex legal 
process, instead of it being a process that could have been addressed through maybe a 
regulatory body … I think it is going to slow down the CCMA, it is going to slow down 
dispute resolution (Int19.p292. Par.72). 
A legal participant however disagreed with the idea that setting up a regulatory body would have 
been preferable for the TES industry ‘I mean that is still a legal solution isn't it? That's just 
regulating it in terms of a council or a regulatory body rather than in the LRA’ (Int20.p337. 
Par.244). When asked if this would have been a preferable solution for the TES industry, this 
participant argued that what was preferable for the TES employer may not be beneficial for the 
TES worker (Int20.p337. Par.245). ‘It all depends on your perspective you know, if you are a 
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worker you would prefer the LRA as it stands and if you are a manager you won't (Int20.p338. 
Par.246).  
A director at a government department participant explained that although a self-regulatory 
model had not been introduced, it was ‘not mutually exclusive’ with the regulatory framework 
that was implemented. Despite the self-regulatory model being rejected, the participant thought 
that there was still a general commitment to regulation within the industry and its associations 
(Int22.p368. Par.50). 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the legal framework within which the South African TES industry 
operates. The chapter provided an overview of the international laws and norms affecting TES 
work, the constitutional framework and important national statutes. The chapter’s focus rested on 
the ‘deeming provision’97 and the ‘parity provisions’. 98 Participants’ views and criticisms of 
these two important provisions of the LRA 1995, were also discussed. The final section of this 
chapter discussed regulatory avoidance and the lack of enforcement of legislation in the TES 
industry, with a brief discussion on a self-regulatory model that was proposed by some employer 
parties at the time that the 2015 amendments were debated.  
This chapter was the first of the findings chapters. The next four chapters set out the findings of 
the research from four different perspectives: in chapter six from a TES employee perspective, 
chapter seven from a TES firm perspective, and chapter 8 from a TES client perspective. Finally, 








97 Section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA. 
98 Section 198A(5) of the LRA. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE TES EMPLOYEE  
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the principle findings in relation to South African TES employees, in three 
parts. The first part deals with the context within which TES employees work, such as the 
paucity of TES statistical information, their employment status, and the high unemployment rate. 
The next part reflects on TES employees’ access to work and looks at their use of networks, the 
concept of ‘flexicurity’, and whether TES work is a steppingstone to permanent work. The final 
part considers TES employees’ access to social insurance and retirement benefits, and whether 
these compare to the benefits provided to permanent employees.   
6.2. Contextual matters 
6.2.1. Paucity of statistical information relating to TES work  
 
The limited availability of statistics for the TES sector in South Africa must be highlighted. 
Bhorat et al (2014) state for example, that it is not possible to ascertain directly the number of 
workers employed through TES firms in the South African economy as the nationally 
representative household surveys do not probe whether workers are employed through TES 
firms. A participant who is a senior member of staff of a large TES firm, discussed the 
difficulties faced in obtaining proper statistical information.  
It is the developed countries with mature workforces that are actually able to produce decent 
labour market stats. We only get our stats by ourselves through some assumptions, we don’t 
actually have hard-core facts that we use. We also have contribution to an industry levy, and 
it goes by turnover and headcount and based on that, we can work out how many players 
we've got out in the industry. But we do not actually have pure data coming through. 
(Int5.p89. Par.318).  
This participant explained that South African statistics, such as Statistics South Africa (Stats 
SA), do not differentiate between different types of work so it was very difficult to isolate tends 
in TES work (Int5.p89. Par.314). The same difficulties were mentioned by a participant from an 
employers’ federation. This participant added that the industry was not a singular industry and 
falls under the larger grouping of ‘financial and business services’ which makes it difficult to 
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isolate statistically. In addition, there has been no historical legal requirement for the industry to 
report99 to a centralised body which has resulted in a lack of reliable statistic information. 
It is a difficult thing to measure because there isn’t a singular. We are not a singular 
industry that gets reported. So, if we fall under financial and business services, which is 
obviously very big as an industry, and … we know that we are a significant employer in 
that sector. But you know, there is a challenge in trying to actually get data because there 
is no one place to report. But one of the things that with the Employment Services Act, 
which was promulgated last year, we now will have regulation for our industry requiring 
compulsory licensing for companies who operate in the recruitment and staffing sector, 
whether offering permanent or temporary employment services. And through that 
mechanism we anticipate a reporting that will allow us to draw more accurate statistics 
about how many temporary employees are actually out there, and what sort of services 
and sectors they are fulfilling (Int30.p498-499. Par.22).  
Section 198(4F) of the LRA introduced the requirement that ‘no person must perform the 
functions of a temporary employment service unless it is registered in terms of any applicable 
legislation’. This amendment came into effect on 1 January 2015, but the regulations for 
registration of TES have not been finalised100 (Jorge and Adams, 2019). The Employment 
Services Act 4 of 2004 (ESA) came into effect on 9 August 2015 and Section 13(1) reads ‘The 
Minister may, after consulting the Board, prescribe criteria for the registration of private 
employment agencies.’ Section 13 of the ESA has been excluded from coming into operation. 
On 5 December 2018, the Minister of Labour published draft regulations on the registration of 
Private Employment Agencies and TES for public comment and the opportunity for public 
comment closed on 28 February 2019 (Jorge and Adams, 2019). The participant from the 
employers’ federation explained that there had however been a requirement to register a TES 
business with the Department of Labour prior to the ESA.  
We have always had to as an industry since 1998 register your business with the Department 
of Labour. And so, it wasn’t a license, but you were supposed to register, and that continues. 
But with the new Act, we have to, well companies will now have to get a license to operate. 
And without that, they will obviously be breaking the law … the Employment Services 
 
99 This participant is referring to a reporting system to an industry specific body. Employers, including TES firms, 
must still register with the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) through the Department of Labour, or the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS). Registration with UIF: All employers who have employees working 24 or more 
hours a month (based on section 10, of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act). Registration with SARS: 
All employers as soon as they have an employee who earns taxable income must also register with SARS (based on 
section 10, of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act) (Department of Labour, 2014). See paragraph 6.4 for 
further details on the UIF. 




Board was constituted this year and there are draft regulations pending, which obviously 
need to be approved by the Board. … Because the Act was promulgated but Section 13, 
which talks to the licensing requirement, that has not yet been promulgated because it’s a bit 
of a chicken and an egg. You know, we have got to get the Board together, and get the 
regulations, and once those are ready, and then that section of the Act can be promulgated 
(Int30.p499. Par.24).  
In addition to the lack of reliable statistics for the TES industry, Bhorat (2016, p.1) states that 
‘surprisingly little academic research has been undertaken concerning the sector, be it simple 
‘bean-counting’ exercises or more serious modelling work’. 
6.2.2. The concept of ‘worker’ and ‘employee’  
Temporary agency workers are generally considered as employees, except for the UK where they 
are not granted the employee status under tax regulations and employment laws (Fu, 2016). 
However, differences exist in different countries regarding who should be considered the legal 
‘employer’. In East Asia and most European countries it is the agency, in Canada it is usually the 
user firm, in the US it is quite often both, and in the UK it is neither (Davidov, 2004; Fu, 2016).  
In the UK there is a distinction between a ‘worker’ and an ‘employee’.101 An employee has a 
contract of employment whereas, a worker is a wider category which includes someone who has 
a contract of employment or a contract where the individual undertakes to do or perform 
personally any work or services for someone who is not a client or customer (BIS Guidance on 
the Agency Workers, 2011). All employees in the UK are workers, but an employee has extra 
employment rights and responsibilities that don’t apply to workers who aren’t employees. An 
individual is considered an agency worker in the UK if they have a contract with an agency but 
work temporarily for a hirer. An individual is not an agency worker if they find work through an 
agency but work for themselves (self-employed). Neither are they agency workers if they use an 
agency to find permanent or fixed-term employment, or conclude a ‘pay between assignments’ 
contract - in other words, they become an employee of the agency.102 
In South Africa, the first question is whether the parties are indeed ‘employees’ and ‘employers’ 
within the meaning of the applicable statute and/or the common law (Grogan, 2017). If the 
 
101 In the UK a person is considered a ‘worker’ if they have a contract or other arrangement to do work or services 
personally for a reward; their reward is for money or a benefit in kind; they only have a limited right to subcontract 
the work; they have to arrive for work even if they don’t want to; their employer has to have work for them to do as 
long as the contract or arrangement lasts; and they aren’t doing the work as part of their own limited company in an 
arrangement where the ‘employer’ is actually a customer or client.  
102 https://www.gov.uk/agency-workers-your-rights  
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parties are not employees, then the employment statutes do not apply to them, they are not 
entitled to social security benefits and have no access to statutory tribunals for violations of 
employment rights (Ibid, 2017). The critical distinction is whether the parties have concluded a 
contract of employment or a contract for the provision of work. The latter entails the provision of 
work or services but is not a contract of employment.103 (Ibid, 2017). 
The word ‘worker’ is not defined in the Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 of 1995). An 
‘employee’ is defined in section 213 of the LRA 1995: 
Any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for 
the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other 
person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer.104 
However, the Constitutional Court in the Assign matter stated that  
The usual TES employment relationship is not covered by section 213. If it were, there 
would be no need for the employment relationship to be deemed to exist in section 198(2) 
(Dlodlo AJ at paragraph 55). 
In chapter 9 of the LRA 1995 entitled ‘Regulation of non-standard employment and general 
provisions’, section 198(2) states that: 
For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or provided 
to a client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary 
employment service, and the temporary employment service is that person’s employer. 
[emphasis added]. 
In the Assign Constitutional Court matter 105 Dlodlo AJ in his majority judgement stated that:  
It is immaterial, for the purposes of section 198(2), whether an employee and a TES enter 
into an employment contract. Once the employee provides a service to the TES’s client, 
they automatically become the TES’s employee. Under both the 1956 LRA and the 1995 
LRA (before the 2014 Amendments), the TES was expressly designated as the employer 
for purposes of the LRA. Section 198A(3)(b) applies a different regime to employees 
who have provided a service for more than three months if they fall below a specified 
earning threshold. But section 198A(3)(b) does not proclaim that an employee ‘is’ the 
client’s employee. Rather, the employee is ‘deemed to be’ the client’s employee. This 
disjuncture does not in itself mean that ‘deemed to be’ is lesser than ‘is’ and both sections 
are, in their true senses, ‘deeming provisions’ (at paragraph 44-45 of the judgement). 
 
103 For example, independent contractors, partners, and agents. 
104 Section 213 of the LRA 1995. 
105 Case CCT 194/17. 
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Dlodlo AJ further explains that nothing turns on the difference between the word ‘deemed’ and 
‘is’ in section 198(2) and that the difference should not cause controversy in the interpretation of 
section 198A(3). He was of the belief that both sections create a statutory employment 
relationship which does not depend on the way the word ‘deemed’ is interpreted (Paragraph 50 
of the judgment). Dlodlo AJ however clarified at paragraph 56 of the judgment, that ‘sitting on 
the books of a TES does not make you an employee’. Section 198(2) clearly states that the 
individual’s services are to be ‘procured for or provided to a client by a temporary employment 
service’. 
The Constitutional Court in the Assign matter dealt with the question of the relationship between 
the TES worker and the TES firm after the worker is deemed to be the employee of the client. 
Once the deeming provision takes effect, the client becomes the only employer for the purposes 
of enforcing rights granted to employees in terms of the LRA. The court noted that the 
contractual relationship between the client and the placed employee does not come into existence 
through negotiated agreement or through the normal recruitment processes used by the client. 
Instead, the employee automatically becomes employed by the client and he or she must be 
treated on the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the same or 
similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment (Le Roux and Alcock, 
2019). 
6.2.3. High unemployment  
The unemployment rate in South Africa was 27.6 percent in the first quarter of 2019 (Mkentane, 
2019). Job losses were recorded in the formal sector (-65 thousand), private households (-30 
thousand) and in agriculture (-1 thousand), while gains occurred in the informal sector (+188 
thousand). The expanded definition of unemployment, including people who have stopped 
looking for work, was 37.3 percent in the third quarter of 2018 (Trade Economics, 2018). South 
Africa has one of the highest ILO defined106 unemployment rates in the world. In this upper 
 
106 In application of the international definition adopted in 1982 by the ILO, an unemployed person is a person of 
working age (15 or over) who meets three conditions simultaneously: being without employment, meaning having 
not worked for at least one hour during the reference week; being available to take up employment within two 
weeks; having actively looked for a job in the previous month or having found one starting within the next three 




middle-income country, on average over a 20-year period, one out of every four members of the 
labour force was jobless (Bhorat et al, 2016).  
The negative consequences of the unemployment rate in South Africa was highlighted in a report 
on the drivers of youth unemployment (Graham et al, 2018) and two further studies conducted in 
different provinces in South Africa. One a longitudinal, qualitative study in Cape Town showed 
extensive attempts by young people to find work without consideration of the wage (Newman 
and De Lannoy, 2014). The other, a qualitative study conducted with employed and unemployed 
youth in Gauteng, the Western Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Eastern Cape, and the North West107, 
showed that when young people were asked about the lowest wages they would accept, they 
indicated a willingness to work for wages below sectorally determined minimum wages because 
they realised that they needed the work experience (Patel et al, 2016). 
This challenging work environment and the resultant desperation of many to find work, was a 
strong theme that flowed from the interviews. According to a managing director of an 
international TES firm, at the time of the interview, South Africa was experiencing a stagnant 
economy ‘so, it is a challenging environment from a temporary staff worker point of view’ 
(Int10.p141-142. Par.20-26). A union division manager acknowledged that TES firms ‘fill an 
important gap in supplying job opportunities for people’ and did not believe that banning108 TES 
work would be beneficial because of the high unemployment rate (Int12.pp166-167. Par.34). 
This union participant acknowledged that the high unemployment rate affected the unions’ 
approach to TES employee matters. The approach preferred by this participant was to deal with 
each specific case or ‘transgression’ that was reported individually and with care, as employment 
was scarce (Int12.p167. Par.36-38). The participant explained that TES employees feared losing 
their jobs if they reported wrong doings.  
People are scared to complain they would rather earn a few rand per day instead of what 
they are really entitled to earn to get some money. To get some money to pay for their 
daily needs than to be without a job and be on the street for quite some time before they 
find something else (Int12. p170. Par58-60).109 
 
107 These are different geographical areas or provinces in South Africa. See Image 1 in par.6.5. 
108 See paragraph 3.3.2. of the ‘South African historical and political context’ chapter for a further discussion on the 
union movements’ drive to ban TES work. 
109 The same sentiment was expressed by a TES firm participant who stated, ‘rather a job than no job’ (Int5.p88. 
Par.300). In addition, minutes of a NEDLAC National Social Dialogue Institution meeting held during 2017, on the 
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This participant believed that the high unemployment rate in South Africa created the 
circumstances for some unscrupulous TES firms to employ individuals without complying with 
minimum statutory provisions. ‘A few people get rich and they're abusing people that are just so 
glad that they have an opportunity to have some income that they are open for abuse’ 
(Int12.p176. Par.106). This view was supported by another union participant who agreed that the 
high rate of unemployment resulted in millions of individuals desperate to be employed. 
Consequently, they were in no position to negotiate with an employer for decent conditions and 
wages, and simply accepted whatever was offered. Employers were aware of their position of 
power, which made it difficult for the enforcement of laws pertaining to TES workers 
(Int21.p345. Par.38).  
In addition to the high unemployment rate, South Africa has been identified as having a high 
percentage of unskilled workers who have no access to employment, thereby exacerbating the 
plight of TES workers attempting to find employment (Int14.p201. Par.12).  The oversupply of 
unskilled and semiskilled workers in South Africa is well documented (Bell, 2018; Maree,2011). 
For example, Maree (2011, p.11) states that  
A very important feature of the South African economy is the imbalance in the labour 
market. There is a chronic shortage of skilled labour, which co-exists with a very large 
surplus of low-skilled and unskilled workers. This gives rise to massive unemployment, 
which has existed for many decades and goes back to the apartheid era and beyond.  
Bhorat et al (2016) suggests that the TES industry appears to have absorbed a lower skill set of 
workers and is a sector whose employment expansion is explicitly focused on semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers. A union division manager referred to above, itemised a variety of problems 
experienced by unskilled and semi-skilled TES workers (Int12.pp167-168. Par.44). The 
participant maintained that professional TES employees were generally employed in terms of fair 
principles, for specific projects, with proper compensation (Int12. p169. Par52). In contrast, 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers were often employed for extended periods as ‘temporary’ 
TES workers, on very low pay and benefits. If a legal dispute was declared, it took a 
considerable amount of time for a final judgment to be reached and for the employee to be 
employed as a permanent employee as a result of the court’s decision. However, this 
 
future of work, was provided by one participant. This document states ‘a strong argument has been made that the 
immediate goal should be any job rather than a decent job if the high unemployment levels are to be lowered as 
targeted by the National Development Plan (NDP).’  
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‘permanence’ did not last long as the employer usually found a reason to dismiss the employee 
(Int12.pp167-168. Par.44). The participant reasoned that these practices continued because of the 
high unemployment rate in South Africa as individuals who had very little or no skills continued 
to accept potentially exploitative positions to access employment from ‘fly by night labour 
brokers’ as ‘when they get any opportunity of work, they jump for it’ (Int12. p169. Par56). This 
participant believed that the latest amendments to the labour legislation improved the plight of 
the TES employee as new legal mechanisms to deal with abuse now existed (Int12. p170. Par58). 
6.3. Access to TES work  
6.3.1. Access to TES work through networks  
A director of a relevant government department believed that a large and increasing component 
of people in South Africa are those who struggling to get a foot in to the labour market.   
 
From a policy point of view, that is a huge challenge. How does one try and bridge for 
those who don’t even work through temporary employment service companies or other 
intermediaries, how does one assist them into the labour market? Even if it is on a short-
term basis … That’s where the big numbers are… that raises a very important question, 
and that is how the industry operates in relation to that cohort - of those who are 
unemployed, but seeking employment, I mean. … That I think would be a very 
interesting issue with regard to the industry itself (Int22. P379. Par190-195). 
 
The ILO suggests that agency work can be vital for less skilled workers who lack the informal 
networks and contacts that are often necessary to gain permanent employment (ILO, 2011). In 
the South African context of mass unemployment, job search activities are influenced by 
financial constraints, geographical isolation, networks and perceptions of opportunity. One of the 
most important ways of finding a job is through networks (Altman and Potgieter-Gqubule, 2009, 
p.31).  
The director of a government department mentioned above, confirmed that most employment in 
South Africa originated through networks and contacts that individuals may have. It was 
therefore very difficult for the unemployed to access the labour market unless they were linked 
into these networks (Int22.p379. Par.200). The participant explained that the TES industry 
operated within a certain network of people that they have ‘on their books’ and therefore did not 
‘tap into’ the cohort of unemployed people (Int22.p379. Par.198).  
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In South Africa sort of common sense says that most employment comes through 
networks and particular contacts and that access to the labour market is a hugely difficult 
issue for many people. Unless you are linked into networks. And I suppose the question 
is, does the temporary employment sector operate any differently in respect of that issue? 
Or, does it also link into particular networks and not genuinely assist however many five, 
six million unemployed that are seeking employment, as a foot into the formal labour 
market? (Int22.p379. Par.200-202).   
According to a TES firm participant who has been in senior positions in the industry for decades, 
the number of individuals who benefit from these internal networks are significant. This 
participant stated that they have as many as five million people ‘on their database’ who they can 
select for positions that suit their clients. 
I have … probably on record in terms of my database, shoo [chuckle], we can put it 
probably four, five million… Because we send out a sales team to go and hunt down 
these job opportunities, and because you know our operation team … support them so 
well, we can literally handpick the individuals that will suit a particular job function. If it 
is a critical one for example, with specific skill, but where a client is prepared to allow us 
to help upskill someone, they are prepared to give you know one or two people, not a lot 
but one or two people the opportunity to get in there first and to start to earn money and 
to start to get experiences, and that to me is invaluable (Int15.p219. Par.16-18).   
 
The access to employment (whether it be temporary employment or permanent employment) via 
TES firms in South Africa appears to have three different contexts:  
• The ‘fly-by-nights’ that employ those who were desperate and consequently take any 
opportunity of work: As one union participant pointed out ‘So, every person in that 
grouping, and most of them are illiterate or semi-skilled when they get any opportunity of 
work, they jump for it. And this is where the fly-by-night labour brokers then abuse the 
situation by giving the people a lesser salary than the industry pays, or lesser benefits 
than the industry normally supplies’ (Int12. p169. Par56);  
• Expanded networks where reputable TES firms employ the unemployed from a wider 
group of those looking for work: As one senior TES firm participant mentioned stated 
‘There is no other institution in South Africa that is able to take 80 000 most of whom are 
youth and previously unemployed workers and in two years convert that temporary 
employment of 30 percent of them into a permanent job’ (Int3. P44. Par174-176)110; and 
 
110 During 2010, Bhorat and van der Westhuizen (2010, p.61) suggest that more than 3.5 million workers had been 
placed by TES since 2000 and that half of these workers were previously unemployed. 
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• An internal network of workers that were ‘on the books’ of the TES firms therefore not 
extending the employment to those who were unemployed but rather using existing 
people within a contained network: As one senior legal participant explained ‘there are 
labour brokers that have people on their books. I can call them to have someone that is 
available I don’t need to go out into the market and recruit because that takes a month 
you know to get someone in on an urgent well to get someone in as an employee’ (Int2. 
P20. Par90). 
 
The issue surrounding access to TES employment using ‘networks’ is interesting as it appears 
that the TES industry creates employment for some unemployed who then become in a sense, 
partial insiders of an internal network. They dominate TES employment opportunities at the 
expense of other unemployed people who fail to get any foothold in the labour market or are 
forced to join ‘fly-by-night’ operators. As argued by the above participant, ‘if you are working 
with a very specified pool of employees, you know, then it doesn’t really help the problems we 
face in the labour market’ (Int22.p380. Par.206).   
6.3.2.  ‘Flexicurity’ and the transition into employment 
Balancing the security needs of labour market participants with pressures for flexibility has 
driven much of the policy-making in Europe (Russell et al, 2019).111 The concept of ‘flexicurity’ 
originated as a policy framework in Denmark and the Netherlands in the early 1990s (Murphy, 
2018) and is defined as: 
A policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the 
flexibility of labour markets, the work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and 
to enhance security - employment security and social security - notably for weaker groups in 
and outside the labour market (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004, p.4). 
One of the central tenets of the flexicurity approach is that greater flexibility of labour supply 
supports transitions into employment (Russell et al, 2019). However, with increased flexibility 
there is a greater risk of job insecurity, both objective and subjective, with less stable contracts 
and more frequent unemployment spells (Russell et al, 2019).  
 
111 Flexicurity become influential in academic and political discourse when it was placed at the core of the European 
Employment Strategy by the European Commission (Burroni and Keune, 2011). 
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According to Zekic (2016), employment security and employability have become important 
notions in labour market policies and are often used as an alternative to job security. Job 
insecurity has been defined as the subjectively perceived risk of involuntary job loss and is 
generally understood as the security of staying in the same job with the same employer (Klug, 
2019). Job security is believed to be a traditional form of security for workers whereas, 
employment security is a relatively new notion and is seen as a component of the more global 
notion of security of work and explained as the ability to easily find a job (Virtanen et al, 2002; 
Zekic, 2016). Due to the idea that lifetime employment is eroding, many policy makers are 
increasingly claiming that workers’ income security should not depend entirely on their current 
job, but on their ability to find new employment in the labour market (Zekik, 2016). The idea 
that TES employees had greater employment security, especially during volatile economic times, 
was supported by a director of an employers’ confederation participant.  
The employment security rather than job security, we argue is higher for a TES employee 
than somebody who is permanent. Because just because you are permanent, doesn’t mean 
you are not at risk of being retrenched112 at any given time, especially in economic 
volatility… in many cases the TES’s are upskilling their TES workers significantly 
because there’s obviously a benefit for them. Because the higher the skill level of their 
temp workforce, the more easily they are able to put them into clients and obviously their 
rates of pay goes up and so it’s good for everybody (Int30.pp498-499. Par.22).  
A participant from a confederation of business organisations shared a similar view. This 
participant believed that from a security of employment perspective, the TES industry played a 
valuable role. This participant argued that although long-term security could not be guaranteed, 
the reality was that the industry was creating opportunities for short term work and was a major 
labour market facilitator. (Int11.p155. Par.40). 
In line with these participants’ views, Smith and Neuwirth (2009) researched temporary 
agencies’ ability to find new employment for their workers. They studied a temporary help 
agency firm in Silicon Valley in the United States over several years. They were interested in 
how temporary agencies attract the best possible employees and how they negotiate with client 
companies to ensure a good ‘fit’ for the temporary workers they place. They found that 
temporary agencies help applicants to improve their resume’s and refine their job expectations. 
In addition, Smith and Neuwirth (2009) state that they often advocate for better wages, higher-
 
112 Made redundant. 
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level positions, and more humane, safer working conditions for their temporary workers. 
Although they warn against their analysis being construed as an endorsement of temporary help 
service agencies, they argue that the infrastructure of the temporary help industry may provide 
unusual forms of assistance and protections for workers who lack options for better jobs. They 
conclude that while, on average, agency temps receive lower wages and rarely can purchase 
health insurance, they can also be buffered from the worst aspects of new employment relations 
by labour market intermediaries such as temporary placement agencies (Smith and Neuwirth, 
2009, p.56). 
The notion of employment security as opposed to job security was further discussed by the 
participants in the context of decent work, and conflicting views emerged.113 A participant from 
a large TES firm believed that  decent work as a concept in South Africa was moving away from 
the idea that it needed to be a permanent job, with a pension, medical insurance and job security, 
towards the concept of employment security114 (Int3.p46. Par.200). Whereas a senior director of 
a government department believed that although temporary work, by definition, did not provide 
long-term employment security, there was no fundamental conflict between the concept of 
decent work and temporary work if temporary work had access to rights, such as social security 
benefits (Int22.pp366-367. Par.36-40). However, the need for job security as a necessity for 
decent work was stressed by a manager at a national bargaining council. The participant argued 
that even though the TES industry provided work for individuals, these opportunities lacked job 
security and consequently deprived individuals of the ability to make commitments and buy 
assets, such as homes and motor vehicles, or any decision that required long-term financial 
security (Int27.p452. Par.49).  
A few participants raised similar concerns regarding the lack of job security experienced TES 
employees. A union participant believed that TES workers were unable to make long term plans 
as they were uncertain of where they would be working from month to month, weekly or even 
daily (Int21.p342. Par.6). According to this participant, virtually no TES employee felt confident 
that they would be working at the same place after a year. The participant explained that 
 
113 The participants were asked to consider the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) concept of decent work 
in relation to TES industry in South Africa. The interview invitation letter (see appendix 2) asked the following 
question ‘What are your thoughts about labour brokers and the ILO concept of ‘decent work’?’ The question was 
purposefully broad as the idea was to focus on their individual understanding of the concept. 
114 See paragraph 6.3.2. for further discussion on job security and paragraph 6.4. on social security. 
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although this lack of certainty was not problematic for a small minority of very highly skilled 
TES workers, for most semi-skilled manual workers, life was extremely precarious. They may 
have a reasonable job one week and be completely unemployed the next week, as there would be 
no available work for the TES firm they were working for (Int21.p342. Par.8-9). However, in 
line with flexicurity principles discussed above, a participant who worked for a non-profit, 
voluntary organisation argued that it is these very risks that TES employees face, that makes 
employing them attractive to some employers, thereby aiding their transition into employment. 
Our sort of biting joke is to say that the workers who are the most precariously based are 
the permanents, because why would the employer want to have a permanent employee 
worker there, with high wages, with benefits like medical aid and provident fund? Why 
should you want to do that if you can have these labour broker workers that you can, you 
know, bring into your workplace and expel at will? If I were an employer, I would 
probably be doing the same thing it makes perfect sense (Int9.p136. Par.68). 
Wright et al (2019) however caution against the flexicurity model being seen as a purely positive 
solution. They argue that although in Denmark and the Netherlands, flexicurity systems were an 
innovative design to encourage flexible labour markets in a manner mutually beneficial to 
businesses and but its reliance on high levels of public spending and the resilience of unique 
institutional arrangements are likely difficult to replicate in other countries. Additionally, while 
flexicurity may be beneficial for the unemployed, its ability to reduce the harmful effects of job 
insecurity has been seriously questioned. 
6.3.3. TES work as a steppingstone to permanent employment 
Bhorat et al (2016) considered the aggregate and sectoral employment trends relative to the TES 
sector for South Africa over the past nineteen years (1995 to 2014). 115 As part of this study, they 
mentioned that the temporary to permanent placements conversion rate between July 2013 and 
June 2014 was 19.9 percent. This means that 19.9 percent of TES workers who were initially 
employed on a temporary basis were permanently employed as at June 2014. However, Bhorat et 
al (2016) stated that the result is in contrast to their findings using the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (QLFS) data, which show that more than half of TES employees were actually 
permanently employed.  
 
115 Although the TES sector was not listed as a separate sector in the labour force and household survey data, Bhorat 
et al (2016) state that the sector is possible to capture in a ‘more statistically circuitous and complicated manner’. 
The TES sector they claim, manifests itself in respect of the financial and business services sector. 
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In addition, the qualification and occupation data for young people in South Africa shows that 
the TES sector is a vital port of entry for young people, with incomplete schooling or a Matric116, 
who are hoping to enter the labour market (Bhorat, Cassim and Yu (2017). However, on average, 
the conditional wage penalty for being a TES employee is around 17 percent and this penalty is 
greater as one moves up the wage distribution (Bhorat and van Der Westhuizen, 2013).   
Accessing TES work as a means of acquiring permanent work was a strong theme that emerged 
from the interview data.  In other words, TES work as a steppingstone into permanent 
employment and increased skills. A senior member of staff of a large TES firm pointed out that 
after a two-year period, about thirty percent of their temporary workers that were placed with 
TES clients, obtained permanent employment (Int3. p44. Par172). 117 The participant maintained 
that their TES firm was a channel into the formal or permanent labour market.  
There is no other institution in South Africa that is able to take 80 000, most of whom are 
youth and previously unemployed workers, and in two years convert that temporary 
employment of 30 percent of them into a permanent job (Int3. p44. Par176). 
Similarly, a chief executive officer of a prominent TES firm, that had been operating in the South 
African market for many years, supported the idea that TES firms create permanent employment. 
I think I've placed on average about ten odd thousand people every single day throughout 
the country, and different entities, and different job categories. And I've placed probably 
about three million people in permanent employment since I've started. And the stories I 
can tell you are some wonderful heart-warming stories about how people have come in 
with literally nothing (Int15. p218. Par6). 
A human resources specialist of a large retailer who is a TES client, agreed that TES employees 
obtained permanent employment as a result of their placements, especially in the supply chain 
environment. Many of the participant’s permanent employees came via the TES firms that they 
engage (Int16. p248. Par142).  
A lot of people in our business today have, in fact some of my colleagues, have come 
through those ranks and sort of joined the business. So, I do think there is an element of 
in the good cases, it does provide a step into permanent employment, as a sort of first 
experience (Int16. p248. Par142-144). 
 
116 The final year of schooling in South Africa (year 12). 




However, a legal participant who acts for TES workers, firmly disagreed with the idea that TES 
firms found long-term employment for their employees. This participant believed that there was 
a demand for employment in South Africa and this demand would exist whether the TES 
industry operated or not. Instead of employing individuals permanently, TES firms created an 
environment where TES clients preferred to employ TES workers to meet that demand. The 
participant argued that by providing TES staff, TES firms simply ensure that employers can 
easily dismiss workers, thereby making employment more perilous and reducing the demand for 
permanent employment (Int7. P116. Par64). 
The TES industry creates opportunities rather than employment, was the argument posed by 
another senior legal participant. This participant believed that if the temporary nature of a 
position fell away, the TES client would need to consider whether the position was permanent. If 
the TES employee was familiar with the work and understood the client’s system, that individual 
would inevitably be given preference. ‘Why wouldn’t I hire someone that has been working my 
systems and understands my systems for X amount of time?’ (Int31. p509. Par20). The 
participant further explained that the commercial contract between the TES and the TES client 
would not prevent the TES employee being employed permanently by the client, as there was 
usually a ‘conversion’ clause built into a TES service level agreement.118 The conversion clause 
usually converted the fees payable by the client to the TES firm.119 If the TES client hired the 
TES employee permanently, the client was required to pay a recruitment fee to the TES firm. 
Interestingly, the participant stated that this fee would inevitably be significantly lower than the 
fee payable if the TES client approached a recruitment company to recruit an employee for that 
position, creating an incentive for firms to hire TES employees permanently (Int31. pp509-510. 
Par22-26).  
 
118 Compared to the provisions of the Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (No. 181) and the Private 
Employment Agencies Recommendation, 1997 (No. 188), the norm that requires that workers should not be 
prohibited from being employed directly by the client has not been specifically included in South African legislation 
(Aletter and van Eck, 2016). 
119 Secondary data, being two examples of TES employment contracts were provided by an attorney participant who 
had acted for the TES employees (Int33. Vol 2. Pp.40-41. Par172-186). The contracts were from two different TES 
firms and the employees’ names had been removed for purposes of confidentiality. Both contracts stipulated that the 
TES employee was to immediately notify the TES firm if they were approached by the client to work for the client. 
If the TES employee failed to notify the TES firm, both contracts made provision for the TES worker to pay an 
amount to the TES firm. One contract mentioned an amount equal to one month’s remuneration for the TES 
employee, and the other stated that this amount would be the ‘usual placement fee’ to the TES firm. Neither contract 
specified the terms of the ‘transfer’ if proper notification was received.  
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However, a legal participant who was an acting Labour Court judge, described a legal matter 
within his personal experience, where the TES firm contractually prohibited the permanent 
employment of the TES employee by the client. This participant argued that such a clause would 
be tantamount to a restraint of trade agreement. In this matter, the TES client undertook not to 
directly employ anybody who was engaged through the TES firm (Int33. Vol 2. p40. Par172). 
However, the TES workers in this matter did not proceed legally against the TES firm as the 
participant stated that they were too afraid to litigate.   
6.4. Access to training, social insurance and retirement benefits 
6.4.1. Access to training 
There were polarised responses amongst the participants regarding the training of TES workers. 
A union participant explained that TES workers often did not have access to the training that was 
offered to permanent, full-time employees (Int26.p429. Par.20). However, one TES client 
participant stated that there were TES firms who acted professionally and were ‘specialised’ in 
providing TES services. These firms provided medical aid, provident fund, training, induction, 
uniforms, and ‘permanent employment status’ within the TES firm. According to this participant 
these firms were ‘doing it the right way’. However, the participant acknowledged that these firms 
were in the minority within the TES industry (Int16.p241. Par.52-54).  
In South Africa, companies may claim back a part of their training expenditure according to the 
Skills Development Levies Act 1999 (No. 9), as amended. A legal participant believed that from a 
skills levies perspective, the TES industry was the largest contributor in South Africa.120 Which, 
according to this participant, meant that TES workers were being trained and developed by TES 
firms and that the negativity surrounding this aspect was merely ‘rhetoric’ (Int31.p508. Par.14). 
This participant argued that temporary employment service providers were historically the 
greatest contributor to employment in South Africa as they provide young workers with 
experience and training which allows them to access future employment (Int31.p513. Par.56). 
According to a senior TES firm employee, there was a need to keep the currency of their skills 
up to date with labour market requirements. This participant believed that TES employees’ 
access to skills development is significantly addressed as it was a TES firm’s function to ensure 
 
120 This information was supported by secondary information provided by a TES employee participant, namely a 
Confederation of Associations in the Private Employment Sector (CAPES) ‘Temporary Employment Services 
Stakeholders Pocketbook 2008’.   
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that they have a ‘talent pipeline’. As a result, both the payment of the levy and the access to 
skills development was critical (Int5.p71. Par.82). 
In addition to the skills levy, the senior TES firm employee mentioned above, outlined the TES 
industries’ role in the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI). The ETI is the package of tax incentives 
that Treasury of South Africa introduced which encouraged business to employ young people. It 
is a wage subsidy that employers receive for employing people under the age of twenty-nine, 
earning below the Threshold Amount, for a two-year period and encourages the employment of 
first-time employees. According to this participant, a high number of labour broking employees 
were ETI beneficiaries. The participant explained that the ETI encourages TES firms to take first 
time employees, very often through temporary employment services, in order to access skills 
(Int5.p71. Par.82).  
6.4.2. Access to social insurance schemes 
Although the right to social security and assistance is constitutionally mandated, there remains 
no comprehensive social security system (Cohen and Moodley, 2012). South Africa has 
contributory social insurance, whereby employers and employees contribute to a scheme to 
protect employees against contingencies which may interrupt their income-earning capacity due 
to ageing, sickness, disability, death, loss of employment and due to the birth of a child (Patel, 
2013). South Africa therefore takes a risk-based approach to social protection and compensates 
beneficiaries for lost income because of exposure to these contingencies (Kaseke, 2010). The 
impact of South Africa’s social insurance schemes is limited in that only two broad principal 
risks are covered, namely unemployment and employment injury (Kaseke, 2010). In addition, 
there is a significant gap in social provision as those that are not formally employed121 do not 
have access to occupational benefits (Ibid, 2013). These schemes are authorised by legislation 
and oversight is provided by statutory institutions that also regulate the feasibility of different 
schemes operated by financial and insurance industries (Ibid, 2013).There are two122 social 
insurance schemes in South Africa that are employment based, namely the Unemployment 
 
121 Those outside of formal employment are informal sector employees, independent contractors, the self-employed 
and unemployed (Patel, 2013). 
122 The third scheme, the Road Accident Fund, is not employment-based and is financed out of an obligatory fuel 
levy. It provides protection against the risk of road accidents (Kaseke, 2010). 
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Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Fund 
(Kaseke, 2010).  
The Unemployment Insurance scheme is provided under the terms of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act 2001 (No. 63 of 2001) (UIA), that provides protection to workers against the risk 
of temporary unemployment caused by termination of employment, maternity, illness and 
adoption (Kaseke, 2010). Contributions come from both the employee and employer and these 
are paid into the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). Employees and employers contribute one 
percent of the employee’s monthly earnings and, if the employee has accumulated enough 
credits, benefits are paid on a sliding scale for 34 weeks (Patel, 2013). Approximately 45 percent 
of the labour force is covered by the scheme (Patel, 2005). Those outside of formal employment 
namely, informal sector employees, independent contractors, the self-employed and unemployed 
are not included in the coverage (Patel, 2013). The fund has become more sustainable as higher 
income earners now contribute, but the current scheme does not provide adequate income 
protection for higher income earners (Ibid, 2013).   
The UIA applies to all employees, but not to those who work less than 24 hours a month for an 
employer; learners; public servants; foreigners working on contract; workers who get a monthly 
state pension; or workers who only earn commission. Unemployment benefits are only available 
to employees who have involuntarily lost their jobs. For example, if their employers are 
insolvent; the termination of the contributor’s contract of employment by the employer of that 
contributor or the ending of a fixed term contract; or if they are dismissed (Section 16 of the 
UIA). Benefits can be calculated on a daily, weekly or monthly rate (Section 13).  
These schemes are normally attached to formal employment123, and hence an increasing number 
of people are largely excluded. Also, the better paid typically secure the largest share of the 
benefits (Pauw et al, 2007). Importantly, the way benefits are calculated may adversely affect 
TES employees who work erratically. Section 13(2) stipulates that if the contributor’s 
remuneration fluctuates significantly from period to period, the calculation must be based on the 
average remuneration of that contributor over the previous six months. A contributor’s 
entitlement to benefits in terms of this Section 13 accrues at a rate of one day’s benefit for every 
 
123 Those outside of formal employment are informal sector employees, independent contractors, the self-employed 
and unemployed (Patel, 2013). 
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completed six days of employment as a contributor subject to a maximum accrual of 238 days 
benefit in the four-year period immediately preceding the date of application for benefits 
(Section 13(3) of the UIA). As benefits are calculated on completed days of employment, and in 
terms of an average remuneration over a six-month period for those whose employment 
fluctuates, the TES employee may receive significantly less than an employee who works 
permanently over the same period.  
In terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 1993 (No.130) covers 
employees for injuries and diseases at work. Although, once again, those outside formal 
employment are excluded from claiming benefits (Patel, 2013). The Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Fund is funded out of employers’ contributions, which vary 
from employer to employer depending on the risks inherent in their businesses (Kaseke, 2010). 
This Act specifically includes a ‘labour broker’ employee in its definition of ‘employee’ in 
section 1(xix)(c) ‘…and includes a person provided by a labour broker against payment to a 
client for the rendering of a service or the performance of work, and for which service or work 
such person is paid by the labour broker’. 
6.4.3. Access to retirement benefits 
Part of the debate regarding social security in South Africa revolves around the question of 
whether housing, transport, education and other forms of income support provisions should be 
included in the social security framework (Olivier, 2000). Government appears to be of the view 
that for South African purposes, social security includes both public and private measures, 
inclusive of private savings (Olivier, 2000).  
South Africa is unique in the way its pensions are administered as it has no compulsory or 
national pension fund scheme. However, the provision of healthcare and retirement benefits is 
piecemeal and is largely limited to employees in permanent employment (Cohen and Moodley, 
2012). Unlike the majority of countries, most South African retirement funds are privately 
administered and funded (deVere Acuma, undated).124 Under the current system, a large portion 
of employed workers do not have retirement provision due to this absence of a mandatory 
contributory system. Employers are not required by law to enrol their employees in retirement 
funds but, due to generous tax incentives, at least 50 per cent of formal sector employers do enrol 
 
124 The Government does provide retirement schemes for its own employees. 
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(Hunter, 2018). In 2008 there was 11701 retirement funds with 10.8 million members according 
to the Registrar for Pension Funds (Oxford Policy Management Africa, 2011).  
Most occupational retirement funds are funded by contributions made by both employers and 
employees. Some are funded only by employers and others only by employees (Hunter, 2018). 
Financial services providers, trade unions and bargaining councils125 may establish umbrella 
funds under the LRA 1995 or by the Minister of Labour in terms of sectoral determinations 
issued in terms of the BCEA (Ibid, 2018). In some unionised workplaces collective agreements 
have been concluded between employers and unions in terms of which union employees are 
required to belong to a multi-employer or ‘umbrella’ fund established by the unions. Non-
unionised employees may be allowed to belong to either union funds or other occupational 
retirement funds identified for the purpose by their employers ((Hunter, 2018).  
Budlender (2013) points out that the Confederation of Associations in the Private Employment 
Sector (CAPES) introduced several initiatives for TES workers. In 2009 CAPES developed the 
CAPES Provident Fund. TES workers who were not covered by bargaining council retirement 
funds were offered the option of joining this fund, which preserved their savings over periods 
during which they were unemployed. CAPES and its affiliates did not however contribute to the 
fund on behalf of workers but offered the opportunity of membership. At that time, Budlender 
(2013) recorded that the fund had in excess of 4,000 members. The fund experienced challenges 
however, in that it was not designed for workers who were employed intermittently as it required 
regular monthly deductions from earnings. 
Important for TES purposes, is that an employer may exclude certain employees from 
participation in its retirement plan but must ensure that the fund’s rules exclude all employees 
within the relevant category from membership of the fund (Hunter, 2018). The category may not 
be determined on a basis that unfairly discriminates on prohibited grounds (for example, race or 
gender). The rules of a fund may provide that an employee must have worked for a participating 
employer for a specified period before he or she will be eligible for membership of the fund 
(Ibid, 2018).  
 
 
125 A director of a confederation in the employment sector mentioned that sixty percent of the TES employees are 
either covered by a collective agreement or bargaining council agreement (Int30.p498. Par.20). 
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6.4.4. TES employees’ access to social insurance and retirement benefits 
Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) believe that social protection afforded to employees in non-
standard employment is inferior to that afforded to formal employees. This owing to the insecure 
nature of the employment and the lack of the social security arrangements associated with this 
type of employment, such as medical schemes and retirement provisions. This belief was 
supported by a participant from the ILO. The participant stated that historically, TES employees 
could have been employed by a TES firm for as long as 20 years without ever being employed 
permanently and were not receiving these benefits, therefore saving costs for the employer 
(Int17.p255. Par.20). The participant believed that social security remained a current dilemma for 
TES employees and organised labour because of the mobility of the TES worker. The challenge 
was to ensure TES employees retained their benefits when they changed employers, rather than 
accessing them126 and starting a new (Int17.p256. Par.32).   
So, that is linked very much to the very debate that’s going on in the country on social 
security reform. And ensuring that people do not lose access to their contributions127 if they 
move from one employer to the other. And that means there must be […] a national 
scheme which can then make it possible for people to contribute even though they came 
from one employer to the other. I think that is at the heart of the conversation and there is 
an ongoing policy debate now at NEDLAC for social security reform.’ (Int17.p256. 
Par.34-36). 
A senior employee of a large TES firm discussed these potential changes to social security and 
pointed out that organised labour had not supported the changes largely due to their members 
desire to retain the right to access their retirement contributions when they leave their employ. 128 
In the past year there was a desire in the country to make social protection more 
formalised, in other words, compulsory. And, of course, Government wanted to do this 
because they wanted to make sure that all workers contribute, so that they didn't fall back 
 
126 Until recently, South African law did not require the preservation of retirement savings on change of employment 
and most employees ‘cashed in’ those savings in such circumstances. This ‘leakage’ results in wholly insufficient 
provision for retirement. The Minister of Finance sought to address this by publishing regulations that will require 
preservation by default (Hunter, 2018). Media resources reveal that new default regulations to the Pension Funds 
Act were implemented from 1 March 2019. When a member leaves employment before retirement, the fund must 
automatically preserve the member’s benefit in the fund and convert the member to a ‘paid-up’ member. The benefit 
will only be paid out to the member or transferred to another fund selected by the member when the fund has been 
specifically instructed to do so by the member  The member can still choose to receive payment of their benefit - or 
‘access’ their benefits as mentioned by this participant (Businesstech, 2019). However, many funds are not ready to 
implement new regulations under the Act and have applied for exemptions (Brown, 2019). 
127 It was assumed that the participant was referring to pension or provident fund contributions that the employer, or 
the employee and employer jointly contribute to throughout the course of employment. 
128 See footnote 25 above for a further discussion on what it means to ‘access’ pension fund money. 
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on a government responsibility when they were unemployed or retired (Int5.p72. Par.90). 
But the trade unions are remarkably distrustful of pension funds so there was a huge 
amount of resistance for this and it was pended for a further year as was the principle of 
preservation of provident funds. And I really think this comes through a desire for 
workers, particularly low-income workers wanting to have access to their money 
(Int5.p72. Par.90-92).  
This participant explained how their large TES firm dealt with their TES employees in terms of 
social insurance and pension benefits. What is interesting about this account is how the firm has 
dealt with the mobility of TES employees. 
From a benefit perspective in this country, both medical aid and your retirement fund are 
voluntary, but what we did do was make sure that temp workers or labour broking 
employees, if they are not covered under the bargaining council, that they have access to 
similar benefits to a permanent worker, and they would be able to have mobility in terms 
of moving from their workplace. So, there are central funds and we made it quite flexible 
in terms of an alignment to contribute, not contribute when they not working, etcetera. So 
that it actually accommodating the requirements that are needed from temporary work 
(Int5.p72. Par.88). I think a fairly unique set up, from a legislative perspective.129  
A legal participant mentioned that the amendments to the employment legislation, more 
specifically the deeming provisions and the parity provisions, aim to improve the benefits that 
the TES employee receives. However, the changes referred to are only after the three-month 
period when the TES employee is deemed to be the employee of the TES client.  
That is also one of the purposes behind the amendment to ensure that employees who are 
provided through a labour broker are on the whole not treated less favourably than 
permanent employees of the client. In monetary terms they would therefore need to be 
compensated in respect of the benefit fund that permanent employees would be members 
of so that they can make their own arrangement. Or, you know, get the labour brokers to 
offer those kinds of benefits to the employees. And, in that way I think that the legislation 
aims to up the level of remuneration and benefits enjoyed by this category of employee 
(Int3.p20. Par.100). 
However, referring to paragraph 5.5.3. of this thesis, in terms of General Industries Workers 
Union of South Africa obo Mgedezi and Others v Swissport SA (Pty) Ltd and Others130 (the 
GIWUSA v Swissport matter), we now know that access to these benefits may not be as simple as 
this participant anticipated during 2017 when the interviews were conducted. 
 
129 The 2018 annual report of this group states that all employees including temporary employees are entitled to core 
benefits, including a funeral plan; debt counselling; healthcare and retirement funding. However, the 
retirement/provident fund is only compulsory for all permanent employees.  
130 Case no. WECT 18794 on 18 March 2019. 
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From the above, it appears that in terms of access to social insurance and pension benefits the 
TES employee in South Africa is a partial insider. Although they have access to certain 
minimum statutory rights in terms of the UIA, these are contributory and accrue on completed 
days of employment in a four-year period,131 which may be far less than a permanent, full-time 
employee. In terms of pension and medical benefits, which are not compulsory and do not 
include a national pension fund scheme, TES employees are reliant on employer, union or 
bargaining council plans. These plans may specifically exclude certain types of workers and may 
provide for a minimum employment period before being able to join the plan. TES employees 
may therefore be excluded on both counts. Some TES firms do provide these benefits, but this 
appears to be in the minority. In the event that TES employees work for a client for longer than 
three months, they will become the employee of the client and the parity provisions may apply in 
terms of these benefits, but may not be the same as those provided to the permanent 
employees,132making them partial insiders in terms of their employment with the client. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter dealt with three contextual issues relating to the TES employee. 
Firstly, the lack of statistical information regarding the TES sector made it difficult to study 
trends within the sector. One TES firm participant explained that they compile their own 
statistics ‘through some assumptions’.133 The reason for the lack of statistical material relating to 
this sector was largely because Stats SA did not differentiate between different types of work and 
trends could therefore not be isolated. The hope was that this situation would change as soon as 
the ESA came into operation as this Act would require compulsory licensing for TES firms, 
which would result in more accurate statistics.  
Secondly, whether individuals working for TES firms were considered ‘employees’ or ‘workers’ 
and if their status as ‘employee’ or ‘worker’ made a material difference, was discussed. Whereas 
in the UK there is a distinction between a ‘worker’ and an ‘employee’, in South Africa the same 
distinction is not made. The word ‘worker’ is not defined in the LRA 1995, but ‘employee’ is 
defined in section 213. However, the TES employment relationship is not covered by section 213 
 
131 Section 13 of the UIA: that benefits accrue at a rate of one day’s benefit for every completed six days of 
employment as a contributor subject to a maximum accrual of 238 days benefit in the four-year period immediately 
preceding the date of application for benefits. 
132 See par. 5.5.3. for further discussion on the parity provisions and the access to benefits. 
133 (Int5.p89. Par.318). 
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but rather in section 198 of the LRA 1995. In chapter 9 of the LRA 1995 entitled ‘Regulation of 
non-standard employment and general provisions’, section 198(2) states that: ‘for the purposes of 
this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or provided to a client by a temporary 
employment service is the employee of that temporary employment service, and the temporary 
employment service is that person’s employer’. [emphasis added]. In the Assign Constitutional 
Court matter 134 Dlodlo AJ in his majority judgement stated that once the employee provides a 
service to the TES’s client, they automatically become the TES’s employee. Furthermore, 
nothing turned on the difference between the word ‘deemed’ and ‘is’ in section 198(2) and that 
the difference should not cause controversy. He was of the belief that both sections create a 
statutory employment relationship which does not depend on the way the word ‘deemed’ is 
interpreted135  
Thirdly, the negative effect of the high unemployment rate in South Africa (27.5 percent in the 
third quarter of 2018) was examined. Unemployment together with an over-supply of unskilled 
workers in the labour market, created an environment of general desperation to find work. This 
in turn affected collective labour’s approach to TES employee matters as they felt that collective 
action was too risky and that each matter had to be dealt with on a case by case basis. The reason 
being that employees were afraid that they would lose their employment if they ‘complained’ 
and tried to enforce their rights. Individuals would rather accept low wages and abusive 
conditions than be unemployed. This environment of fear created a scenario where ‘fly-by-night’ 
TES firms were in a position of power and enforced low wages and poor working conditions on 
their employees who were willing to accept these conditions as an alternative to unemployment. 
The second part of the of the chapter dealt with access to work. Firstly, the access to work 
through networks was explored. This access appeared to have three different contexts, through 
the ‘fly-by-night’ TES firms that employed people from a pool of desperate individuals; through 
expanded networks where TES firms employed the unemployed from a wider group; and internal 
TES firm networks where workers remained ‘on the books’ of the TES firms. The latter group 
created partial insiders of an internal network who accessed work at the expense of other 
unemployed people. Secondly, the chapter discussed the concept of ‘flexicurity’, more 
 
134 Case CCT 194/17. 
135 At Case CCT 194/17, paragraph 50 of the judgement. 
212 
 
specifically the belief that greater flexibility of labour supply supported transitions into 
employment. The notion of employment security and job security were discussed by the 
participants in the context of decent work, and conflicting views emerged. Some participants 
believed that the employment security as opposed to job security was higher for TES workers 
especially during volatile economic times. There was a belief that it was easier to find 
employment as a TES worker as TES firms invested in their training and created opportunities 
for further employment, which was not the case for those trying to access employment through 
their own means. However, some participants believed that job security was still a necessity and 
was lacking in the TES industry. A lack of job security deprived people of the ability to make 
commitments and made life extremely precarious for especially unskilled and semi-skilled 
people. One participant argued that it was TES employees’ lack of decent wages and benefits 
that made them attractive to employers and allowed them to access employment through TES 
work. Thirdly, the idea that TES work was a steppingstone into permanent employment was 
explored. Some TES firm participants believed that it was a successful means of accessing 
permanent employment and examples were provided. However, one opposing view came from a 
legal participant who acted for TES workers. This participant believed that there was a demand 
for employment in South Africa and this demand would exist whether the TES industry operated 
or not and that TES work allowed clients to employ TES workers instead of meeting this 
demand, thus creating fewer permanent positions. Interestingly, a legal participant explained that 
commercial arrangements between the TES and the TES client usually allowed for the TES 
employee to be hired permanently by the client for a lower recruitment fee, which created an 
incentive for hiring TES employees permanently.  
The third part of the chapter deals with the TES employee’s access to social security and 
retirement benefits. Once again, the TES employee in South Africa can be described as a partial 
insider in terms of their access to social security. Although TES employees have access to certain 
minimum statutory rights, these are contributory and accrue on completed days of employment. 
In terms of pension and medical benefits, which are not compulsory and do not include a 
national pension fund scheme, these plans may specifically exclude certain types of workers and 
may provide for a minimum employment period before being able to join the plan, with 
potentially negative consequences for TES employees. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE TES FIRM 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter will outline the principal findings relating to temporary employment services (TES) 
work from the TES firm perspective. It consists of two main sections. The first section deals with 
the nature of the TES industry in South Africa, commencing with the first part that deliberates 
relevant terminology, including colloquial terms used for TES firms. The second part sets out the 
growth and importance of temporary agency work, including recent estimates of the size of the 
industry. Thirdly, the negative rhetoric that is used to describe the industry, together with the 
idea that ‘labour is not a commodity’ is discussed.  
The second section contains a discussion of four themes that emerged from the interviews. The 
first theme was how TES work had changed and how this affected the participating TES firms. 
The second theme concerned the range of different ‘staffing solutions’ or ‘outsourcing’ services 
offered to TES clients and the reasons these arrangements were considered by clients. The third 
theme involved the consolidation of the TES industry and whether the participants believed that 
the change in legislation had confined the TES industry to the larger, more formal operators. The 
final theme dealt with a renewed focus on higher earning TES workers and the reasons for this 
focus.  
7.2. The nature of the TES industry  
7.2.1. Terminology 
The term ‘labour broker’ is used in South Africa to refer to what are more commonly referred to 
as labour hire firms or temporary employment agencies.  Although the statutory terminology was 
changed to ‘temporary employment services’ (TES) in 1995, the term ‘labour broker’ has 
remained and is often used with a scornful meaning in public discourse (Benjamin, 2013). The 
negative connotations surrounding this term were discussed by a participant from a large 
auditing firm in Johannesburg: 
These days companies that are labour brokers don’t like to be called labour brokers, you 
know they are service providers. They also shy away from the name labour broker 
because of the negative connotation. There is one company that I visited that said hell no! 
We are not a labour broker, we are an employment company that provides the right skills, 
to the right client, whenever they want to, you know whenever they need it. So, it is just 
dressed up differently. So as long as you don’t use the name, you may not have the 
negative connotations associated to it. So, if companies that are labour brokers don’t want 
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to be called labour brokers, then it shows me that there is a perception that the concept of 
labour broker is not invited, is not good. But you can dress a sheep up or cow up in wool 
and call it a sheep, but it is still a cow [chuckle] (Int1. p9. Par64-66). 
For the purposes of this thesis ‘temporary employment services’ (TES) will be used for the South 
African context, and ‘temporary employment agencies’ for the international context.  
The TES industry in South Africa is diverse, ranging from well-established TES companies that 
abide by statutory rules and regulations and provide certain benefits for the workers, to low end, 
more informal operations associated with the abuse of workers, referred to by many as the 
'bakkie brigade' (Int22.pp364-365. Par.20). Table 17 sets out the different categories of TES 
firms in South Africa. 
Table 17: Types of TES firms in South Africa 
Category of firm Features  
Large scale, established firms Firms ranging from multinationals or regional firms, usually 
publicly listed. Many have been established for decades. 
General practice is to operate within labour legislation. 
 
Subsidiary firms and Black 
Economic Empowerment 
(BEE)136 partnerships/fronts 
of large established 
companies 
Large firms often establish subsidiary companies or 
partnerships. This allows them to focus on a range of different 
market segments. This is also done to obtain business which 
requires BEE credentials. Subsidiary companies often practice 
more flexibility than their parent companies in adhering to 
labour legislation. Likely to be registered with the Department 
of Labour. 
 
Independent agencies Usually private companies, ranging from well-established 
organisations with a national footprint to small start-up 
operations with a single office. These are often entrepreneur 
driven, sometimes assisted by having Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) credentials. Sometimes almost entirely 
dependent on a single client. Likely to be registered with the 
Department of Labour.137 
 
‘Bakkie brigade’ & informal 
recruiters 
Small scale labour brokers using a bakkie (a small truck) to 
transport workers and usually without any business premises. 
They often act as gang masters responsible for payment and 
generally take a percentage of the pay. They draw on personal 
networks, sometimes extending into neighboring countries, to 
 
136 Please see paragraph 8.2.3. for further discussions regarding BEE. 
137 See paragraph 6.2.1. for a further discussion on the registration of TESs. 
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recruit. Mostly not registered with the Department of Labour. 
 
Source: information provided by participant interview 3. 
7.2.2. The growth and importance of temporary agency work 
The TES sector138 is the single highest creator of jobs in the South African economy and 
contributed around nine percent to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, which is significant in 
the context of South Africa’s low levels of economic growth (Bhorat, Cassim and Yu, 2017). 
South Africa has exceptionally high levels of youth unemployment, reaching 36 percent in 2014 
and the TES sector disproportionately employs more young people than the national economy or 
other sectors (Bhorat, Cassim and Yu, 2017). TES employment has contributed R256 157 
million to GDP in 2013 (representing 9 percent of total GDP), which was greater than that of 
Agriculture (2.1 percent), Utilities (2.7 percent) and Construction (3.5 percent) in 2013 (Bhorat, 
Cassim and Yu, 2017).   
Most participants interviewed expressed general views on the growth of the TES industry.  
However, there was a reluctance from TES company participants to offer specifics. Through 
further prompting and discussion, senior members of staff or owners/CEOs of three large TES 
companies did provide some opinions regarding the size and general trends in the industry. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there was consensus amongst participants regarding the lack of 
reliable statistics for the TES industry. A senior member of staff of a confederation for the South 
African staffing industry, agreed that the industry was ‘a difficult thing to measure because there 
isn’t a singular … industry that gets reported … because there is no one place to report.’ 
(Int30.pp498-499. Par.22). The exact number of TES workers in South Africa is therefore not 
known. Table 18 provides recent estimates proffered by certain writers and research units about 
the number of TES workers in South Africa. These statistics lack precision, and some do not 
distinguish between TES work and other forms of atypical work. However, collectively, they do 





138 Bhorat, Cassim and Yu (2014) refer to the TES ‘sector’ 
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Table 18: Recent estimates provided in terms of the number of TES workers in South Africa  
Source  Details of the TES industry provided 
 
Bhorat and van der 
Westhuizen (2010) 
 
Estimate that in 2007, the number of TES workers in South 
Africa was about 600 000. The Confederation of Associations 
in Private Employment Sector (CAPES) estimate that the 
number is 850 000.  
 
Scully (2015) 42 percent of South Africa’s employed labour force can be 
identified as precarious in one way or another. 
 
Bezuidenhout et al (2017) Draws his data from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) data 
and estimates that there are 3.3 million casual, outsourced and 
limited-duration contract workers out of a total working 
population of 15 million. 
 
Benjamin (2012) Reported that the National Association of Bargaining 
Councils (NABC) had estimated that there were 780 000 TES 
workers in the private sector in 2010.  
 
COSATU (2012)  Three million was the estimate of COSATU’s research unit, 
NALEDI in 2012. This research unit further reported in 2012 
that the National Association of Bargaining Councils (NABC) 
had estimated that there were 979, 539 TES workers in South 
Africa. 
 
Bhorat, Cassim and Yu 
(2016) 
Found that the TES employment increased from 0.2 million in 
1995 to 0.97 million in 2014, accounting for 6.4 percent of 
total employment. 
 
Source: researcher’s own summary 
The online information provided by TES companies is similarly vague. Table 19 sets out 
information obtained from the interviews, together with annual reports online, for four TES 
companies. The total number of temporary or contract workers placed daily in only four 
companies total 117,304 workers, which provides some sense of the size of the industry. A 
participant from an international staffing company estimated that there is a total of 900 000 
temporary workers placed on a daily basis in South Africa (Int10. P141. Par18). Another TES 
company participant indicated that their company had approximately 4 to 5 million individuals 




Table 19: Four TES companies in South Africa: Employee and contractor numbers 
Company No of Permanent 
staff 
 
No of Contractor/ 
Temporary staff 




118 32 304 32304 
Company B140 
 
230 permanent & 100 
contractors that fulfil 
a support function for 
the business  
 Not available 7500 to 10 000  
Company C141 
 





 Not available Not available 15 000 
Source: researcher’s own summary 
A participant who spent many years working for a large union was of the opinion that the TES 
industry was not only flourishing but had become the standard form of employment in South 
Africa, a ‘dominant form of labour, this is not just like an aberration you know …’ (Int9. p134-
135. Par54). However, participants from a government institution, an international TES firm and 
the ILO disagreed with the notion that the TES industry had become ‘standard’ employment and 
that it remains just one of the offerings that exist in the South African employment market 
(Int10. p149. Par92; Int12.p175. Par.102; Int22.p378. Par.188). These participants believed that 
the permanently employed were a far larger group than the TES workers in South Africa. 
Interestingly, both the union participant (Int12.p175. Par.102) and government institution 
participant (Int22.p378. Par.188) estimated the number of TES workers in South Africa to be 
close to 1.5 million workers. All three acknowledged that the TES industry plays a significant 
role in the labour market (Int12.p175. Par.102) although the importance and size of the industry 




139 Company A, information was obtained from its integrated annual report 2016. 
140 Company B, information obtained from the CEO during the interview process. 
141 Company C, information was obtained from the integrated annual report 2017 and through the interview process. 
142 Company D, information obtained from the CEO during the interview process. 
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7.2.3. The reputation and negative rhetoric: ‘They believe that we are selling 
people like goods’ 
‘Labour is not a commodity’ is a familiar maxim that forms part of the 1919 ILO Constitution 
and the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration (Evju, 2013).143 O'Higgins (1997) contends that the 
principle that 'labour is not a commodity' represents one of the most fundamental principles of 
international labour law. However, Theron (2005,p.624) argues that despite the ILO being 
resolutely opposed to labour being treated as a commodity, during 1997 in a ‘historic volte face’, 
ILO Convention 181  acknowledged the existence of agencies that provided 'services consisting 
of employing workers with a view to making them available to a third party’- precisely offering 
labour as a commodity.144 In line with Theron’s observations, Marin (2013) believes that 
precarious forms of employment, used as a strategy, look very much like treating labour as a 
commodity. As such, precarious forms of work ‘dismantle’ labour legislation and relegate it to 
‘just a museum piece that sits prettily in its glass case while, in practice, forms of work are being 
accepted to which it applies as little as possible’ Marin (2013, p.162). Chang (2008) however 
explains that there is an intrinsic contradiction in labour law as on the one hand it is a commodity 
but on the other it deals with human beings that cannot truly be subjected to the rule of the 
market.145 In line with Theron (2005) and Marin (2013), a participant who is the head of human 
resources at a large retailer and a TES client, argues that the essence of what TES firms do is sell 
labour as a commodity, which leaves TES employees vulnerable to mistreatment (Int16.p239. 
Par.34). 
So, their commodity is labour. So, you must expect that they are going to be cutting 
corners to make money out of what their trade is. And I think that by doing that, that has 
got an impact ultimately on what and how they deal with the employees. I think that leads 
in many cases to ill-treatment or poor treatment and not the standards of what a full-time 
employee or permanent employee might receive (Int16.p240. Par.36-40).  
However, some TES firm respondents believed the industry had been unfairly tainted by the idea 
that they sell labour as a commodity. A chief executive officer of a large TES firm thought that 
there was a lack of understanding of how the TES business operated, perpetuated by two 
 
143 See paragraph 9.2.4. for further discussion on labour as a commodity. 
144 Art 1(b) of the Private Employment Agencies Convention, Convention 181 of 1997. 
145 Chang (2008) argues that there are two poles of labour law. The first pole defines labour as exchangeable and 
buyable private property, and the second, as a quasi-commodity that is attached to a human body and soul and 
therefore cannot be completely subjected to the rule of the market. Labour law reform swings in between those two 
aspects of the law. 
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misconceptions (Int15. P230. Par134). Firstly, organised labour did not understand the necessity 
for the industry, nor the need for flexibility (Int15. p230. Par135). Secondly, the idea that they 
were ‘selling people like goods’ had originated from the fact that TES firms charge their clients a 
fee in addition to the cost for each TES worker (rate of pay and benefits). The participant 
explained that what the unions failed to appreciate was that TES firms had offices and 
recruitment centres to run, their own staff to pay and general overheads ‘like any other business’. 
They had to train and develop people and ensure that they were in line with changing legislation. 
In addition, TES firms needed to deal with their clients’ operational requirements. This 
participant provided an example of these requirements (Int15. pp230-231. Par137). 
I have two hundred people at a particular centre in [a location in the Johannesburg area], 
they come off shift at 02h00 in the morning. There is no public transport available at all 
in that area. How do I get those people home safely? How do I make sure they get to their 
homes which could be all over the place? It cost me R400 000146 a month, to give you an 
idea, because you’ve got to have transport to support that particular client. Where does 
that money come from? So that is why you have this ‘they see us selling people like 
goods’ as opposed to, we are providing a service, funny enough. The people themselves, 
plus to the client and we've obviously got to survive. It is a three-way relationship’ 
(Int15. p231. Par139-143).  
In order to remedy the negative reputation that the industry had acquired, this participant 
believed that disseminating the correct information was important: ‘you've got to be very honest 
in terms of information that you have, you've got to spread it, you've got to educate, you 
absolutely have to do that’. In support of this view, this participant relayed a situation where they 
were asked to explain the wage structure for the TES industry during a nationally important 
presentation. 
A couple of years ago, when I was doing the [name of the presentation] for the industry 
regarding this concept of minimum wages etcetera, etcetera. And [details of the person 
asking the question] said to me yes, but you charge a hundred rand an hour and you pay 
thirty rand and you pocket seventy. I said excuse me sir, I don’t. I said in actual fact, we 
pay seventy rand an hour all-inclusive and yes, we pocket thirty, we are entitled to do so 
… So, in other words, all they are looking at is a rate of pay. Let's say the rate of pay is 
fifty rand for arguments sake, they see what the charge rate is a hundred rand because 
they happened to see an invoice lying on one of the client’s desks. …This is one of the 
reasons why I print on our payslip x amount rate of pay for whatever they’ve done, and to 
date for this week you've earned x amount for your annual leave, x amount for your 
 
146 £21,240 on 24 January 2020. 
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bonus, x amount for whatever the Provident Fund was etcetera, etcetera (Int15. Pp145-
232. Par147). 
In addition, the negative rhetoric concerning the TES industry in South Africa was of concern to 
some participants. A senior employment lawyer at a Johannesburg law firm stated that the entire 
industry was often unfairly ‘painted with the same brush’. This participant believed that only a 
small portion of the industry (the bakkie brigade) worked ‘under the radar’, and that the 
remainder of the industry was compliant. ‘So, the whole rhetoric and language around, you 
know, labour brokers and ‘bakkie brigade’, that they are slave drivers and stuff, often is just that, 
rhetoric’ (Int31. pp507-508. Par8). As pointed out by a director of an employer’s confederation, 
negative emotive rhetoric about the TES industry was very difficult to counter.  
The slave trader, human trafficker, exploitative, you know that narrative that tends to 
dominate from a trade union point of view is quite difficult to counter with rational, sane 
logic. So, we do what we can to try and show particularly around the diverse forms of 
employment (Int30.p497. Par.14). 
7.3.  Four themes relating to the South African TES industry 
7.3.1. The changing nature of TES work 
Some senior TES employee participants had noticed a change in the type of TES employee and 
the services required from TES clients over the last decade. Interestingly, a general decrease in 
the need for untrained TES employees in certain areas had been noticed by some TES firm 
participants. One TES firm employee mentioned that ‘first level environments’ such as logistics, 
call centres and bank tellers, were completely disappearing and being replaced by self-service 
and automation, leading to job losses in these areas (Int5.pp74-75. Par.120). This observation 
was supported by another large TES firm participant, who explained that client behaviour and 
growth in the TES industry varied for different categories of TES workers. Table 20 sets out the 
names of the different categories of TES employees (as provided by this participant) and the 

















collar’ workers.  
 
This category 
includes a wide 
range of workers, 
from general 
workers through 
to engineers.  
There was not much change in customer/client 
behaviour noticed in this category by the participant. 
 
This category was described as the ‘life’ of the 
business and experienced the ‘bulk placement’ of 
temporary employees.   
 
Approximately 60 000 temporary workers in this 
category were placed daily in South Africa (Int3. p30. 
Par16). Most of these placements were longer term, 
‘recurring annuity income type contracts’ (Int3. p30. 
Par18). 
 
The blue-collar category was a mature market and had 
grown by approximately 5 to 6 percent a year since the 











as bank tellers 
and call centre 
agents  
A noticeable decline in use of this category (Int3. p31. 
Par24). 
 
There was a change in the utilisation and headcount of 
this category of workers. The primary change was 
from longer term assignments, to more contingency 
work and project based, shorter term assignments. This 
trend was partly attributed to an increase in the 
automation of work. Businesses that required repetitive 
work, such as call centre agents and bank tellers, were 
most affected by technology. 148   
 
A further reason for the decline in use of this category 
was attributed to the amendments of the legislation 
post 2015. Clients who utilised support services were 
traditionally entities such as insurance companies, 
financial services and the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sectors. These 
 
147 The description of the categories such as ‘blue-collar’ or ‘white collar’ workers were provided by the participant.  
148 During March 2019 the South Africa media reported that about 1 200 jobs would potentially be lost after 
Standard Bank South Africa announced that it will be closing 91 of its 630 branches by end of June 2019. According 
to the bank, it was ‘realigning its retail and business banking delivery model amid a rapid adoption of digital 
banking products and services’ (Dewa, 2019). 
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clients were highly regulated, required skilled 
employees and were risk averse. As a result, they 
preferred permanent employees to the potential risks 
associated with using TES employees for longer 















There was substantial demand and growth in this 
category. 
 
The growth in this area was driven by a skills 
deficiency or skills gap in project management and the 
IT sector (Int3. p30. Par12).  
 
Source: from the interview with participant (interview 3). 
In line with the above trends, a TES client participant explained how their needs had changed in 
terms of TES requirements and that skilled TES employees were more in demand:  
Our experience is starting to shift, because as you start moving into bigger and better and 
more effective technology. So … it becomes more in your interest actually, to have 
someone who is trained properly, who is more permanent, who knows the technology, 
and who operates at the best level instead of five different guys going through the same 
place every week … Things like scanning and coding and pricing, and how you store 
logistically … so the technology and the attitude and the competence to manage that stuff 
becomes more important (Int16. p250. Par176-178).   
 
7.3.2. The range of staffing solutions offered to clients 
Ward (2002) suggests that since experiencing rapid growth during the 1990’s, staffing agencies 
have promoted themselves as specialist business services, with an expanded human resource 
management role in partnership with the client organisation (Ward, 2002). ‘Temporary' or 
`flexible staffing' has been replaced by `staffing solutions' that reflect the remaking of the 
product offered by temporary staffing agencies (Ward, 2002). These expanded services may 
 
149 See chapter 3 for a further discussion regarding the 2015 amendments. The participant mentions the risk attached 
to TES employees as opposed to permanent employees. It is assumed that the participant is referring to the 
‘deeming’ provision in the 2015 amendments. The TES employee becomes the employee of the client after a period 
of three months. At the time of the interviews, there was uncertainty about who the employer would be after the 
three-month period, i.e. whether it would be the TES firm and the TES client jointly, or only the TES client. 
223 
 
include a full range of human resources services often referred to as human resources or human 
capital services (Bartkiw, 2014). Other services and terminology include ‘project management’, 
‘outsourcing’ 'complete staffing solutions', ‘recruitment process outsourcing’, ‘master vendor’, 
‘neutral vendor’, and ‘managed service provider’ (MSP) - all terms given to different 
arrangements for placing workers (Ward, 2002).  
Sanders et al (2007) studied these different outsourcing activities in order to understand the 
growing lexicon of terminology. Based on in-depth interviews with 19 senior executives 
experienced in outsourcing and a synthesis of available research, Sanders et al (2007) formulated 
a framework clarifying the broad spectrum of outsourcing arrangements. They suggest that 
‘outsourcing’ is an umbrella term that includes a range of sourcing options that are external to 
the firm and involve choosing a third party or an outside supplier to perform a task, function, or 
process, in order to incur business-level benefits.150 In terms of the types or categories of 
outsourcing arrangements, Sanders et al (2007) found that the degree of responsibility assigned 
to a supplier, and associated relinquishing of control by the client, is the primary differentiating 
characteristic between them. In the present study TES firm participants largely used the umbrella 
terminology of ‘outsourcing’, some specifically referred to managed service providers (MSP). 
Sanders et al (2007) defines ‘managed services’ as a service where the supplier designs, 
implements and manages an ‘end-to-end solution of a complete function’, for example a client’s 
transportation system. The supplier is responsible for all aspects of the function, including 
equipment, facilities, staffing, software, implementation, management and ongoing improvement 
(Sanders et al, 2007, p.7).151 A participant who is the managing director of a large international 
employment services group indicated that their firm had worked with the MSP model in South 
Africa152 and outlined their understanding of this model. 
 
150 Freytag et al (2012) define outsourcing as ‘the operation of shifting a transaction previously governed internally 
to an external supplier through a long-term contract and involving the transfer to the vendor.’ 
151 In order to understand the practical difference between outsourcing and MSP, the website of a consulting group 
that provides these services was viewed. The Network Consulting Group defines itself as ‘a premier provider of 
business-level telecommunications and IT solutions and consulting services’. Their explanation is that an MSP 
provides individuals who can offer specialised services, in multiple environments, who manage certain aspects of 
the client’s business. In comparison, traditional outsourcing provides a cost-effective business function but not the 
consultative function or expertise that an MSP provides (Network Consulting Group, 2016). 
152 Another participating, large TES firm’s annual report (2017) confirmed that their business model creates value by 
leveraging elements within the organisation to build a sustainable organisation and create value for their 
224 
 
It is a Managed Service Provider (MSP) where we have one company that is managing 
all the providers, the suppliers for temporary workers, and then the client itself only deals 
with one person. So, there is one company that is managing all these individuals for the 
client. But the client has only one point of contact, being the MSP managing company 
(Int10. p146. Par66).153 
According to Ward (2002), how TES firms offer specialist business services is largely influenced 
by the legal framework governing the TES industry. This idea was mostly supported by TES 
firm participants who indicated that outsourcing and MSP arrangements had been considered by 
their clients in response to changes in legislation. More specifically, in terms of the amended 
section 198A(3)(b(i) of the LRA 1995, a TES employee earning under the Threshold Amount154, 
who is placed at a client and is not employed for any other reason outlined in section 198A(1), is 
deemed to be the employee of the client after three months. In addition, there is a duty on the 
client to remunerate these TES employees on the same or similar level as its own permanent staff 
who perform the same or similar work (referred to in this thesis as the ‘parity provisions’). The 
parity provisions attract additional costs and potential equal pay and treatment disputes for the 
client (Pienaar and Jamieson, 2018). A partner at a large law firm in Johannesburg had noticed 
that the parity provisions had caused a change in the ‘value propositions’ offered by TES firms 
as it was no longer possible to offer a client a cheaper labour force immune from litigation - 
which was possible before the amendments.155 
So, the difficulty for the labour broker is the terms and conditions not less favourable. So, I 
can't provide you with (a) a discounted value proposition (b) I can't take away the fear of  
litigation (Int25.p418. Par.148). 
Pienaar and Jamieson (2018) suggest an alternative relationship to the traditional TES model, 
based on the MSP model. The starting point to their model is the LRA 1995 provision that 
specifically excludes the independent contractor relationship from the extended liability of the 
 
stakeholders. This is achieved by their four service lines, one of which is the ‘outcomes’ service line that includes 
MSP and functional outsourcing.  
153 Another participating TES firm’s annual report for 2017, defined managed services as a contingent workforce or 
supplier that is managed from one point of control, by the TES firm, that ‘handles this from end to end and even on-
site’. 
154 R205 433.80 gross pay per annum (£10 867 on 22 January 2020). 
155 During March 2019 Workforce Holdings reported its revenue for the year ending 31 December 2018. The media 
reported that ‘Workforce said its core businesses operated under uncertainty stemming from the interpretation of 
section 198A of the Labour Relations Act, better known as the "deeming provision", which the group said led to 
cautiousness in the use of certain of its services’ (SIA, 2019). 
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‘parity provisions’. 156 They suggest an MSP model that provides a specialised outsourced 
service to an independent contractor (Pienaar and Jamieson, 2018). More specifically, the client 
firm contracts with a service provider who takes over the responsibility for all the company's 
service delivery functions, which might include operational or functional areas, cleaning services 
and the like. The expert MSP then sub-contracts all the required services to provide a range of 
services to the client. This they say, increases the productivity, sales and efficiency of the 
company in typical non-core activities (Pienaar and Jamieson, 2018). Some participants 
mentioned that they had noticed the increase in the MSP products offered to clients. It was not 
clear from the information provided whether the structure of the MSP models offered followed 
the same structure as that suggested by Pienaar and Jamieson (2018). What was suggested was 
that they were offered as a direct consequence of the new amendments and, according to a senior 
legal participant at a large Johannesburg law firm, as a means of circumventing negative client 
consequences.  
Those amendments came into effect in 2014, and in practise what we've noticed is that 
since then there definitely has been a move amongst companies that traditionally were 
just providing labour broking services to … providing more a managed service type of 
product … so instead of just supplying labour to their clients a lot of the old traditional 
labour brokers are now trying to provide an outsourced service because of the increased 
regulation and the consequences for their clients of just getting labour from these 
companies. So, they now try and say rather than just giving you people, we'll give you a 
fully managed service so that those individuals won't be considered to be labour broking 
employees, and the amendments won't apply to them (Int4. pp54-55. Par.2-6). 
An interesting initiative was outlined by a senior employee of a prominent TES firm. Their TES 
firm had pre-empted the changes to the legislation and had, as part of a ‘co-design collaboration’ 
with their large clients, developed sophisticated software to assess their clients’ changing needs. 
This software allowed them to analyse their clients’ permanent staff in comparable jobs, to the 
temporary workers that were placed by their firm, from a payroll and benefits perspective (Int3. 
 
156 According to the South African Revenue Services (SARS, 2019), an independent contractor is ‘a colloquial term 
for a small-time sub-contractor. An independent contractor is merely another word for ‘entrepreneur’, or perhaps, 
‘employer’ (or potential employer). The word ‘independent’ in the concept ‘independent contractor’ refers to 
independence from the employer’s organisation, as well as from the employer’s control’ (SARS, 2019, p.23). 
Section 198 of the LRA 1995, as amended reads: ‘In this section, temporary employment service‖ means any person 
who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client or other persons - (a) who perform work for the client; and (b) 
who are remunerated by the temporary employment service. (2) For the purposes of this Act, a person whose 
services have been procured for or provided to a client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that 
temporary employment service, and the temporary employment service is that person’s employer. (3) Despite 
subsections (1) and (2), a person who is an independent contractor is not an employee of a temporary employment 
service, nor is the temporary employment service the employer of that person’ [emphasis added]. 
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p37-38. Par96-100). As a direct result of this exercise, they changed their ‘value proposition’ to 
their clients away from simply offering a ‘brokering’ service, to offering ‘fully outsourced 
independent contracting’ services.  
 
As part of our business strategy over the last three four years we made a very conscious 
decision to look at our current revenue from labour broking and to migrate that across the 
fence through full independent contracting arrangements. So instead of just supplying the 
cleaner we've now got a fully-fledged cleaning business, instead of just you know 
providing pickers, packers and fork lifters to the warehouse, we actually now run the 
warehouses …So, we've transitioned what was originally a temporary employment labour 
broker relationship where the client was enjoined to all these issues after three months, 
we've now successfully transitioned that (Int3. p37-38. Par100-106). 
 
In accordance with the need for these specialised services, another senior TES employee 
confirmed that their large TES firm was increasing their ‘workforce management’ services to 
clients. The idea was that their firm managed a ‘functional area’ for the client, for example, the 
client’s logistics or canteen. These functional areas were run ‘end to end’ by the TES firm, with 
the workers reporting into the workforce management company or the TES firm (Int5.p74. 
Par.114-116). Similarly, a participant from a large international employment services group 
explained that their firm had opted for the ‘outsourcing model’, subsequent to the Labour Appeal 
Court decision in the Assign matter. What was interesting about this participant’s explanation of 
the outsourcing model, was that there was essentially no change to what had been offered in 
terms of TES - they were now simply offering an alternate model that remained legally 
compliant. 
So, I'll invoice your business for a hundred thousand rand a month as an example for 
managing the debt collection department. … So, we are providing them with a service, so 
we can bring in people or take off people as we need, as long as we are still actually 
going to bring the service. There is no difference really, it is just a different way of 
structuring agreements. Because if the contract comes to an end, you know, the 
outsourcing contract comes to an end, the client no longer requires the services, then we 
still need to obviously retrench the individuals and the client still, you know becomes 
liable for that cost as well. So, it's just a different model to make sure that we are still 
operating within the realms of the law. So, yes, outsourcing is an option to go for as long 
as you can identify a specific function that’s being outsourced, what that function is, and 




Hoque et al (2008, p. 391) explore the nature and consequences of new contractual relationships 
in the agency worker market in the UK’s National Health Service. They researched how these 
contractual relationships impact on direct costs and how they add value by improving the quality 
of placement matching. The reasons employers were opting for ‘collaborative contractual 
relationships’ were because of reduced costs,157 increased quality of placement matching, and the 
benefit of dealing with only one supplier (Hoque et al, 2008). However, the study found that 
these benefits were at the expense of relationship building and had potential negative 
consequences for the agency workers (Hoque et al, 2008). A subsequent study conducted by 
Hoque et al (2011) that involved ‘vendor managed services’ (VMS) in English social services, 
revealed that VMS did deliver cost savings but resulted in less effective placement matching, 
rising line manager workloads and concerns about service quality. 
Concern about the negative consequences of these ‘staffing solutions’ for TES workers, was 
raised by a human rights lawyer participant. This participant stated that these ‘very complicated 
schemes’ entailed different entities that did not consider themselves to be TES firms, but for all 
practical purposes, performed the functions of a TES firm. This participant went so far as to label 
these ‘schemes’ as ‘perverse’ as their aim was to ensure that they circumvented the provisions of 
the labour legislation that protect TES employees (Int7. pp116-117. Par68).158 The participant 
argued that these ‘nefarious agreements’ were concluded to prevent workers from interacting 
properly with their employers and made the employer party difficult to identify (Int7. p117. 
Par70-74). An employer that was difficult to identify led to complications for employees who 
wished to exercise or enforce their legal rights.  
However, the schemes mentioned by the above participant were anticipated by the legislature as 
the amended LRA 1995 contains section 200B. This section provides that: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act and any other employment law, 'employer' includes one or 
more persons who carry on associated or related activity or business by or through an 
employer if the intent or effect of their doing so is or has been to directly or indirectly 
defeat the purposes of this Act or any other employment law. 
 
157 Costs were reduced because of prices being agreed in advance, volume discounts and reduced transaction costs. 
158 During March 2019,  the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) went on strike at a South 
African steel company ArcelorMittal, mainly over a dispute involving TES or ‘labour brokers’. According to press 
reviews, ArcelorMittal was of the opinion that the workers in question were not employed by a TES firm but by 
‘service providers.’ The union’s view regarding these ‘service providers’ reflects this participant’s view (Ntsabo, 
2019; Faku, 2019). 
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(2)  If more than one person is held to be the employer of an employee in terms of subsection 
(1), those persons are jointly and severally liable for any failure to comply with the 
obligations of the employer in terms of this Act or any other employment law. 
During 2019, the LAC scrutinised the application of section 200B in Masoga and Another v Pick 
n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd and Others.159The summarised facts were that Pick ‘n Pay Retailers 
(Pty) Ltd (PNP) operated in-store bakeries to produce baked goods at some of their stores. As 
part of an empowerment initiative, PNP used these bakeries to train previously disadvantaged 
persons to operate self-standing bakeries, capable of operating independently of PNP. As part of 
this initiative, PNP contracted with Assist Bakery 115 CC (AB) for the acquisition and mixing of 
baking ingredients that would then be supplied to the store. The Appellants were employed by 
AB as bakery assistants and they picked ingredients from stores and delivered them to AB’s 
workplace, where AB’s other employees would mix the ingredients. They were employed by AB 
on 12 month fixed-term contracts. The appellants’ contracts commenced on 1 March 2015 and 
were due to terminate on 1 March 2016. On 17 November 2015, the appellants referred a dispute 
to the CCMA in which they cited PNP and AB as the ‘other party’ with whom they were in 
dispute. In their referral form, the appellants characterised their dispute as one in terms of section 
198A of the LRA. Their view was that AB was a TES and that they had been placed by AB to 
work in a PNP store. Further, in terms of section 198A, they had become permanent employees 
of PNP. The relief sought by the appellants was to be deemed permanent employees of PNP, and 
for PNP to pay them the same salary as its permanent employees (Dube, 2019) 
At the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Commissioner 
found that, based on the various contracts regulating the relationship between PNP and AB, a 
close association had been established and section 200B of the LRA 1995 applied. Thus, PNP 
and AB were joint or co-employees of the appellants. The Labour Court (LC) held that the 
invocation, by the Commissioner, of section 200B was misguided and an irregularity. On this 
basis, the LC reviewed and set aside the award (Sibika, 2019). On appeal, the LAC held that 
there was no credible averment that PNP and AB engaged in subterfuge by utilising an 
empowerment scheme for deceitful purposes. More particularly, that PNP was using the scheme 
and AB as a sham to avoid its legal obligations toward its employees. It was consistent with the 
workings of a genuine employment scheme that AB carried on business in PNP’s premises and 
 
159 (JA14/2018) [2019] ZALAC 59 (12 September 2019). 
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that PNP supplied AB with equipment and tools. The LAC upheld the LC’s judgment (Sibika, 
2019). 
The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) ruled on the scope and effect of this section and held that:  
The effect of section 200B, while crucial, is merely to fix or extend the liability that 
would ordinarily be that of the employer, as per the traditional tests, to another or others, 
who carry on as an associated or related activity or business by or through an employer. 
They are regarded as employers for the purposes of liability. But it is only if they are in 
an associated or related business with the employer which is intended to defeat, or has the 
effect of defeating, the purposes of the LRA or any other employment law, either directly 
or indirectly, that they would be treated as the employer. The purpose for this is clear 
from section 200B(2). They are regarded or treated as such for the purposes of liability - 
they are held jointly and severally liable for a failure to comply with the obligations of an 
employer in terms of the LRA or any other employment law. In other words, section 
200B(1) defines “employer” for a very specific purpose and that purpose is found in 
section 200B(1) read with section 200B(2). The section cannot be utilised generally for 
making persons or entities the employer(s) of others. 
Section 200B therefore seeks to stop complex contractual and other schemes used by true 
employers to avoid their obligations under the labour legislation. Because of the scope of section 
200B, it could be used to scrutinise a wide range of employment relationships or arrangements 
for the purposes of liability, provided that a case for such scrutiny has been made, and it is done 
fairly (Dube, 2019). 
In the matter of CHEP South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Shardlow N.O and others,160 (the CHEP matter), 
Contracta-Force Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd (C-Force) rendered pallet refurbishment services 
to CHEP South Africa. The C-Force workers referred a dispute to the CCMA in which they 
wished to enforce the rights contained in section 198A(3)(b) and (5) of the LRA.161 CHEP 
argued that it had outsourced re-conditioning services to C-Force and paid for the refurbished 
product per item. According to CHEP, C-Force was therefore an independent contractor and not 
a TES. The relationship between CHEP and C-Force was regulated by a two written Service-
level Agreements (SLA). The SLA provided that CHEP appoint C-Force as a service provider to 
render conditioning services at the CHEP plant in Jet Park. In addition, the agreement stipulated 
that the relationship between CHEP and C-Force was one of client and independent contractor 
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and C-Force warranted that it is not a broker, employee or personal service provider. The 
question that the Commissioner had to determine was if C-Force rendered a TES to CHEP. If 
this was the case, the employees would be given rights in terms of the deeming provision. The 
Commissioner concluded that the relationship between CHEP and C-Force was determined by 
the factual relationship between these two parties and that the 201 workers were employed by C-
Force as it was acting as a TES provider. Therefore, CHEP was deemed to be the employer for 
the purposes of the Labour Relations Act (Goldberg and Wilkinson, 2019; Vermaas, 2019).  
On review, the Labour Court concluded that section 198A(1) of the LRA 1995 defined a TES. 
The critical elements of the definition are the provision of other persons, to provide work for the 
client, while being remunerated by the TES, and the persons are provided by the TES for reward. 
Applying this to the facts, the court found that C-Force was not acting as a TES and the award 
was set aside. The SLA specifically provided for the delivery of a specified product, namely the 
refurbished pallets and C-Force was therefore not providing CHEP with ‘other employees’ or 
that it placed workers with CHEP. C-Force provided a product and not individual labour to 
CHEP and the relationship therefore fell outside of section 198 of the LRA 1995. In addition, C-
Force was not receiving a reward or fee for providing employees to CHEP. C-Force as a service 
provider was receiving an agreed price for a specified product which is remarkably different to a 
TES which receives a fee for every employee that it places with the client. The Court found that 
on a proper interpretation of sections 198(1), (2) and (3) of the LRA, C-Force was not a TES as 
defined. This finding placed the workers outside the scope of the deeming provisions. The 
CCMA decision was reversed and set aside, and C-Force was found to be an independent 
contractor and not a TES. 
It is interesting to compare the UK provisions regarding ‘master vendor’ or ‘neutral vendor’ 
arrangements. The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 guidance document stipulates that: 
Sometimes the supply of agency workers is managed on behalf of a hirer by a master 
vendor or neutral vendor that may or may not engage and supply workers directly or 
indirectly. These arrangements exist where a hirer appoints one agency (the master 
vendor) to manage its recruitment process, using other recruitment agencies as necessary 
(“second tier” suppliers) or appoints a management company (neutral vendor) which 
normally does not supply any workers directly but manages the overall recruitment 
process and supplies temporary agency workers through others. Master or neutral vendors 
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fall within the legal definition of TWA in view of their involvement in the supply of 
individuals and/or their role in forwarding payments to such individuals. 
The individual is therefore not prevented from being an agency worker under the regulations 
because they work through an intermediary body, an umbrella company who finds work for the 
agency worker or is managed on behalf of a hirer by a master vendor arrangement. These UK 
Regulations would have resulted in a very different result for the workers in the CHEP matter if 
the same facts had been heard in the UK. 
7.3.3. Consolidation of the TES industry  
Bhorat, Cassim and Yu (2016) state that public discourse suggests that the TES industry is 
dominated by large firms, but they believe TES industry is split into two distinct types of firms: a 
few large corporate players, and a number of small and medium-sized firms with 20 to 60 full-
time staff members (Ibid, 2016). Prior to the 2015 amendments, the African Professional Staffing 
Organisation (APSO) and Career Junction carried out a survey in 2010 with a sample of 197 
recruitment companies from across South Africa. The data collected by APSO suggest that 66.5 
percent of recruitment companies have fewer than ten employees (Ibid, 2016). Further, of those 
surveyed, 90 percent of recruitment companies have fewer than 50 employees and 86 percent 
have up to 25 employees.  Bhorat, Cassim and Yu (2016) argue that the bulk of the TES industry 
is made up of small and medium enterprises. 
The effect of the new legislation on the structuring of the TES industry was an important 
consideration for some participants. The type of TES firms that provide temporary employment 
services and whether, through regulation, the industry was confined to the larger more formal 
operators, was a question raised by a senior government employee participant. The participant 
questioned whether the smaller TES operators were finding it more difficult to keep a foothold in 
the sector since the new amendments came into force (Int22.p371. Par.90). In this regard, a 
senior employee of a staffing confederation noticed that the changes to legislation had caused 
consolidation of the TES industry, as smaller TES firms were not able to navigate the complex 
legal requirements.162 Some ‘small players’, particularly those where temporary employment 
 
162 On March 2019, it was reported in the South African press that The World Economic Forum ranks South Africa 
number 137 out of 137 countries in the latest World Competitiveness Report. The report states that South Africa has 
the worst labour-employer relations in the world. A contributing factor to this poor ranking is how complex South 
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services were just a part of their service offering and not their primary business, no longer 
offered these services. The participant believed this trend was occasioned by the complicated 
compliance requirements, cash flow issues, legislative requirements, and the complexities of 
managing the industrial relations.   
We have seen consolidation, where you know some of the bigger players have obviously 
absorbed business from some of the smaller ones. They have economies of scale in terms of 
being able to still operate at relatively small margins, whilst delivering all the infrastructure, 
compliant systems, people, processes that gives the client or end users, what’s the right word, 
not satisfaction, comfort maybe, in ensuring that even if there is joint and several liability, 
their risk is smaller you know because policies and procedures should be followed. So that if 
somebody is terminated in terms of a contract, it is done correctly according to the law 
(Int30.p495. Par.6). 
This trend was confirmed by a senior employee of a large TES firm, who had noticed a 
difference in the TES industry post the 2015 amendments. 
What we saw there Ronelle, is the smaller to medium size labour brokers literally lost 
half of their headcount, you know, so for every hundred people a small to medium size 
labour broker had placed with their clients 50 people were removed from their headcount, 
you know…So, the irony is that labour in terms of trade unions and government, they 
thought that if they bring more draconian laws into place more of the temporary workers 
employed by labour brokers would be permanently employed by clients. Cut out the 
labour broker, but in fact the exact opposite happened where you just saw a decimation of 
the labour broking industry in the small medium size space (Int3. p33. Par44-46). 
Interestingly, the decrease in the small-medium sized firms in the TES industry was perceived as 
a positive consequence of the new legislation, not only by the participants who were employed 
by larger TES firms, but by some legal and union participants. This was largely due to the 
smaller firms being viewed as non-compliant, abusive and responsible for the negative image of 
the South African TES industry. In comparison, the larger TES firms were perceived as 
compliant with both national and international norms and regulations. As a union participant 
pointed out:  
Your large companies supplying this service, they are complying with the basic 
principles of the ILO. I think they are doing it also in the spirit of our legislation. But then 
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your smaller ones, the ones that they almost set up overnight, they are not complying 
with this legislation they try to get away as long as possible (Int12. p168. Par48). 
A partner and senior employment attorney at a large Johannesburg firm believed that the new 
legislation would be a ‘shot in the arm’ for TES firms as they would no longer have to argue a 
case with their clients for the fair and legal treatment of their employees as this was now 
entrenched in law (Vol 2: Int32.p24. Par.264).  
So, I don’t need to get into that. So, those that would want to use my services for any 
other reason except what's in the law. I need to obviously you know, step off and I would 
step off, knowing that no other competitor would step in there because they would be 
noncompliant (Vol 2: Int32.p24. Par.266). 
In addition, all competitors in the industry would be required to comply (Vol 2: Int32.p24. 
Par.266). Consequently, the smaller bakkie brigades who lowered the ‘entrance bar’ in the 
industry, would be ‘flushed out.’ 
So, non-compliant TES's will be out of the picture, and then we'll have everyone 
complying. And already steps are afoot in terms of ensuring that we've got our own 
standards, and our own terms, as well as our code of conduct163 in that regard. And also, 
this will then dissuade user enterprises who are ever ready to use noncompliant partners 
in crime because it could be an offense to do so (Vol 2: Int32.p24. Par.268). 
Although the participants’ observations suggested a consolidation of the TES industry, with a 
decrease in smaller TES firms post the 2015 amendments to the legislation, these observations 
were presented without support from additional or secondary documentation. No other evidence 
was available in relation to smaller TES firms, especially the bakkie brigades. Smaller TES firms 
were invited to present their views, via e-mail invitation and follow-up phone calls, but were not 
willing to participate and further research is necessary on this trend. 
 
7.3.4. A focus on higher earning TES employees  
There was consensus amongst some participants that the TES industry would ‘restructure’ to 
include a renewed focus on employees that earned above the Threshold Amount. As set out in 
chapter 5, the Constitutional Court considered the recent amendments to section 198 of the LRA 
(1995) in the Assign matter. The court ruled that temporary employees who earn less than the 
Threshold Amount, and who are contracted through a TES to a client, will be deemed to be 
 
163 The Confederation of Associations in Private Employment Sector (CAPES) has a code of conduct called ‘Code 
of Professional Conduct for Labour Recruitment’ (CAPES, undated). 
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employees of the client after a period of three months. Thereafter, the temporary employees must 
be treated ‘on the whole not less favourably’ than permanent employees of the client performing 
the same or similar work. other permanent employees. However, temporary employees earning 
above the Threshold Amount may conclude contracts for longer periods of temporary 
employment (Read and Hanif, 2018). Therefore, not all temporary employees are affected in the 
same manner by the amendments and the subsequent ruling in the Assign matter. A managing 
director of a large international employment services group set out their understanding of the law 
in this regard.   
Those earning above the Threshold Amount are not affected by the amendment. There is still 
that requirement for people over the Threshold Amount. So, if anyone's earning over the 
Threshold Amount, this is not impacted by law. It is only for your blue-collar general 
workers that are earning below the threshold that would be impacted …So not all of our 
business would be impacted by that (Int10.p145. Par.46). 
Two participants believed that employees who earned above the Threshold Amount in some 
cases preferred to work for TES firms. One participant, a director of a government department, 
thought that these individuals favoured the flexible hours that came with working on a contract 
basis rather than ‘mainstream’ employment (Int19.p291. Par.52-54). The second participant, a 
partner in a top Johannesburg law firm, emphasised the fact that these employees were still able 
to provide their services unaffected by the amendments to the legislation.  
Labour broking itself wasn’t banned and employees earning above the threshold, you know, 
are very much still able to give their service as a labour broking employee. And we see it in 
companies like you know Ericsson, Vodacom, MTN, those kinds of companies, where they 
develop software and even in the engineering space you know like the contract engineering 
sector. The employees are very highly qualified and give their services to these entities 
through labour brokers and once those projects are done, they would move onto the next 
client. So, there is also you know employees who particularly like that arrangement you 
know, they don’t want to be employed permanently by a particular entity, they want the 
diversity of moving across clients. So, for them, that is very useful. I mean I don’t think that 
there has been any decline in the use of labour brokers for those industries or in those 
circumstances (Int2.p16. Par.46-52). 
An acting labour court judge predicted that in response to the amendments to legislation, and in 
order to survive, the TES industry would undergo significant restructuring. This participant 
predicted that this restructuring would include a focus on higher earning TES employees who 
earned above the Threshold Amount. 
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I think the industry will restructure itself and focus on higher earning employees who fall 
outside the deeming provisions of the LRA. So, I think you will see TES's place more 
emphasis on specialised skills, the IT industry for instance where people earn above the 
threshold, such provisions aren't applicable to them. But I think the … security guards, 
cleaners, that sort of thing, I think is going to be very, very difficult for them to survive in 
their current form (Int23.p389. Par.67). 
The intention to position their business to areas that require employees who earn above the 
Threshold Amount, was confirmed by a managing director of an employment services group. 
This participant believed that the higher earning workers ensured greater profits and required less 
‘hands-on’ management. 
It is a lot less work with a lot higher margin. So, as an example, if you placed ten 
accountants at a client it's not that you have to be managing the ten accountants, they are 
there to do a job they get paid on an hourly basis, so there is not a lot of manual 
management of the team that has to happen. And the gross profit you'd make on ten 
accountants, as opposed to if you’ve got a client who wants a hundred and fifty general 
workers, you generally have to be on site, you need to be managing. And remember 
because it is low level workers, high volume and the GP's [gross profits]164 are normally 
a helluva lot lower. So, you know there is always the opportunity to make money on the 
lower threshold individuals. Its high volume, but it is hard work and less GP. So, you 
know from a [company name] point of view, we also like to, we do have blue collars, we 
do. We got one branch in particular that focuses purely on blue collar. But it's also, we'd 
like to be growing, that is more of our focus, is to grow that business that’s above the 
threshold because there is so much more profit that can be made, with less hands-on 
involvement, if that makes sense’ (Int10.p146. Par.60-62). 
An interesting observation was made by two senior legal participants, who both believed that 
TES work was better suited for highly trained individuals who earned above the Threshold 
Amount. A partner at a large Johannesburg law firm had noticed that TES employees who earn 
above the Threshold Amount did not suffer the same abuses as those earning below the 
Threshold Amount as the nature of the relationship was different. The participant stated that it 
was unlikely to see ‘those kinds of high-level employees on indefinite labour broking contracts, 
it is mostly on fixed term contracts related to the needs of that client’ (Int2.p17. Par.62).165 A 
director at a different Johannesburg law firm argued that TES work should be limited to highly 
skilled workers, who work for short periods of time as the power base was different. Highly 
 
164 A company’s profit from selling goods or services before costs not directly related to producing them, for 
example interest payments and tax, are subtracted (Cambridge Dictionary). 
165 The participant was speaking about their experience in the legal profession rather than referring to any statistical 




skilled workers were in demand and this allowed them to ‘call the shots’ with the TES employers 
(Int33. Vol 2. p31. Par28). 
If you have a highly skilled worker who is in demand, it allows for that flexibility. They 
won't be tied into the single employment relationship with one employer. They can then 
sit at home and work from their laptop, service employers, various individuals around the 
country, not be tied to a single employer. Or, if they work for one employer but there is 
an alternate for somewhere else, then it is very easy for them to be shifted around and 
moved around. It is not intended for blue collar work (Int33. Vol 2. p30. Par22).  
 
7.4. Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter dealt firstly with the nature of the TES industry in South Africa 
and considered relevant TES industry terminology, including the use of the colloquial term 
‘labour broker’, with its negative connotations. The categories of TES firms range from large 
scale, established companies that include multinationals and publicly listed companies, to 
‘bakkie brigades’ and informal recruiters that have been likened to ‘gangmasters.’ According to 
the participants, there are differences in how these types of firms operate in the South African 
TES industry, with the larger firms being described as compliant and the bakkie brigades and 
informal recruiters held responsible for the abuse and resultant negative image of the industry.  
Secondly, the growth and importance of the TES industry was discussed. An accurate assessment 
of the size of the TES industry in South Africa is difficult to obtain. Participants’ estimates were 
that there could be as many as 1.5 million TES workers in South Africa (Int12.p175. Par.102; 
Int22.p378. Par.188).  However, participants acknowledged that reliable statistics were not 
readily available and that TES firms use their own numbers and assumptions to estimate the size 
of the industry (Int5.p89. Par.318). From the information obtained from the interviews, together 
with annual reports online, it was estimated that only four TES companies placed 117,304 
workers daily in South Africa. One TES company participant indicated that their company had 
approximately four to five million individuals on their TES ‘database’ during September 2017, 
which was a surprisingly large number (Int15.p219. Par.16). However, no details were offered 
about the ‘database’ and how often these individuals worked.  
Thirdly, the reputation and negative rhetoric that was used to describe the industry, together with 
the idea of labour as a commodity, was discussed by the participants. Although one TES client 
participant believed that TES firms sell labour as a commodity (Int16.p239. Par.34), other TES 
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firm participants disagreed with this sentiment. They believed that the industry had been unfairly 
tainted by negative rhetoric which stems from a lack of understanding of how the TES business 
is run. The misconception that they were ‘selling people like goods’ derived from the fact that 
TES firms charge the client a fee in addition to the fee charged for each worker. The participants 
pointed out that they had offices and recruitment centres to run, their own staff to pay and 
general overheads ‘like any other business’. In addition, they were responsible for the 
operational requirements of their clients such as night-time transport for their employees. In 
order to remedy the negative reputation that the industry had acquired, one TES firm participant 
believed that disseminating the correct information was important. A director of an employer’s 
confederation, however pointed out that the negative emotive rhetoric about the TES industry 
was very difficult to counter (Int30.p497. Par.14).  
The second section outlined four themes that emerged from the interviews. The first theme was 
the changing nature of TES work. The participants pointed out the changes in client requirements 
over recent years and the reasons for these changes. There had been a notable decrease in the 
need for untrained or unskilled TES workers, as well as workers in ‘first level environments’ 
such as the logistics, call centres and bank tellers (Int5.pp74-75. Par.120). One explanation 
offered for this finding was that changes in technology had necessitated the employment of 
trained, permanent staff who had the competence to manage new technology (Int16. p250. 
Par176-178). The noticeable decline in ‘support services’ that included individuals such as bank 
tellers and call centre agents, was explained by one participant: clients who utilised support 
services were traditionally entities such as insurance companies, financial services and the 
information and communications technology (ICT) sector. The TES firm participant believed 
that it was the uncertainty in the TES legal environment, and the fact that they required skilled 
employees, that caused these clients to prefer permanent employees as opposed to TES workers. 
(Int3. p31. Par22). This participant had however noticed growth in the need for professional 
service, which was largely driven by a skills deficiency in project management and the IT sectors 
(Int3. p30. Par12).  
The second theme concerned the range of different ‘staffing solutions’ or ‘outsourcing’ services 
offered to TES clients and the reasons that firms and clients considered these arrangements. 
Some TES firm participants indicated that outsourcing and MSP arrangements had been 
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considered by their clients in response to changes in legislation. The deeming and parity 
provisions of the amended section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA 1995 were of particular concern. 
The amendments to legislation had made it difficult for TES firms to provide TES employees 
without the ‘fear of litigation’ (Int25.p418. Par.148). One employment lawyer participant 
believed that ‘managed service arrangements’ provided temporary workers to clients in a form 
that would ensure that the workers would not be considered TES employees and the amendments 
would therefore not apply to them (Int4. pp54-55. Par.2-6). Another TES firm participant argued 
that there was no practical difference between outsourced or managed services arrangements and 
TES work, as they could still add or remove workers to suit the client’s flexibility requirements 
(Int10.p143-144. Par.39-40). The only difference, according to this participant, was a change in 
the legal structure of the agreements between the firm and the client. One human rights attorney 
criticised the rationale for outsourcing arrangements and called them ‘nefarious agreements’ that 
were designed to circumvent the provisions of the labour legislation that protect TES employees 
(Int7. pp116-117. Par68).   
The third theme involved the consolidation of the TES industry. Some participants believed that 
the change in legislation had confined the industry to the larger, more formal operators as the 
smaller TES firms were not able to navigate the complex legal requirements. Larger firms were 
perceived to be able to operate at relatively small margins whilst delivering compliant systems, 
people and processes that protected the client from potential risk (Int30.p495. Par.6). An 
interesting finding was that the decrease in the small-medium sized firms in the TES industry 
was perceived as a positive consequence of the new legislation. The smaller firms were generally 
viewed as non-compliant, abusive and responsible for the negative image of the South African 
TES industry. However, no secondary evidence was presented for this consolidation trend and it 
was based on the participants’ views and perceptions. 
The final theme concerned a renewed focus on higher earning TES workers who earned above 
the Threshold Amount. The recent amendments to legislation applied largely to employees 
earning below the Threshold Amount and therefore the ‘deeming provision’ and ‘parity 
provisions’ did not apply to those earning above this amount. Some participants believed that 
higher earning TES employees preferred to offer their services on a flexible basis, with the 
ability or freedom to move across clients. One managing director of an employment services 
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group thought that higher earning workers ensured greater profits for TES firms and required less 
‘hands-on’ management. In addition, a legal participant argued that TES work was far better 
suited to higher paid, highly skilled workers, who work for short periods of time as the power 
base was different. These workers were in demand and this allowed them to ‘call the shots’ with 






















CHAPTER 8: THE TES CLIENT  
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlined the findings in relation to TES work from a TES client perspective. It 
focused on the reasons that motivate TES clients to use TES firms and employees. Overall, there 
was a desire to manage costs and externalise risk. Six key reasons or themes for their use 
emerged from the interviews. The first theme dealt with the desire to obtain labour free from 
union involvement. The second theme looked at the broader topic of how TES employees avoid 
the obligations and risks associated with the employer relationship by utilising TES firms. 
Thirdly, how using TES firms affect clients’ obligations in terms of the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) legislation. Utilising TES services from specialist providers to achieve 
economies of scale and specialisation in providing services, was the fourth theme. The fifth 
theme, the desire for greater workforce flexibility, was a key theme that emerged from the data 
and remained a key motivator for the use of TES employees. Finally, the sixth theme looked at 
the clients’ ongoing desire to externalise their legal, industrial relations (IR) and human 
resources management (HRM) functions by utilising TES firms. 
8.2. Managing costs and externalising risk 
Coe et al (2010) divides the literature that explains the drivers that motivate client firms to use 
temporary staffing agencies, into three main groups. The first reason is a ‘just-in-time’ strategy 
designed to deliver numerical flexibility (Coe et al, 2010). This literature argues that firms make 
decisions about which jobs to outsource and which to retain based on complexity, skills required 
and level of firm knowledge needed for the job (Mangum et al, 1985; Purcell et al. 2004; Coe et 
al, 2010). The second is the reduction of labour costs as, on average, temporary agency workers 
are paid less than permanent members of staff (Coe et al, 2010). However, once the temporary 
employment agency has charged its ‘mark-up’ fee it often does not actually result in a cheaper 
wage bill for the client firm (Forde 2001; Kalleberg 2000; Segal and Sullivan 1997; Coe et al, 
2010). The third reason is the aim to reduce the fixed costs of labour hiring and recruitment. 
Outsourcing certain functions such as advertising and interviewing allows the client firm to limit 
non-core competencies (Coe et al, 2010).  
Bartkiw (2014) similarly provides a range of explanations for the use of temporary agency 
workers. There are those employers who wish to ‘avoid’ the effects of labour legislation, others 
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have more ‘legitimate’ purposes (Bartkiw, 2014). Whatever the rationale behind employing staff 
through a TES employer, Bartkiw (2014) argues that if the labour policy or social protection is 
undermined by the triangular employment relationship, it is prima facie (at first view) a problem 
The reasons for the use of TES companies in South Africa remains complex. Alford (2015) 
conducted semi-structured interviews with farming units at thirteen commercial fruit farms 
located in Ceres, Western Cape in South Africa and ascertained that there were different 
opinions regarding the use of temporary employment agencies. Some fruit producers employed 
casual workers directly to retain control over legal and contractual arrangements for farmworkers 
and offset any risks of malpractice (Alford, 2015). Others employed labour contractors to source 
casual workers over seasonal periods and to offset the administrative burden associated with 
recruiting and transporting large numbers of workers over a short time (Alford, 2015).  
As part of this thesis, participants were asked for their views on why TES services were engaged 
in South Africa. Their responses largely support Alford’s (2015) findings set out above and 
could be placed in both the ‘avoidance’ and ‘legitimate’ categories outlined by Bartkiw (2014). 
8.2.1. To obtain labour free from union involvement  
Some TES companies and their clients are accused of collaborating to engage in strategies to 
provide cheap labour, free from union involvement and negatively perceived employer 
obligations (Forrest, 2015). Forrest (2015) studied recruitment regimes in the mining industry in 
the Rustenburg area in South Africa and suggests that ‘without a supply of cheap labour mines 
cannot realise the profits they envisage after paying wage and production costs’ (Forrest, 2015, 
p.509). TES companies know that discouraging union membership is key to sustaining low 
wages so that they can offer competitive rates and secure their own profits (Forrest, 2015, p.516).  
The contract at the point of recruitment thus once again, as with the migrant labour 
system pre-1980, is the whip that allows the employer to forego responsibilities for the 
long-term reproduction of its labour force (Forrest, 2015, p.516). 
In the present study, the idea that TES clients used TES firms to circumvent unions and other 
employer responsibilities, was supported by some participants. One participant who worked for a 
voluntary organisation attributed the growth in the TES industry to the collapse of the union 
movement and the refusal to organise TES workers. The belief was that the lack of union 
involvement provided employers with more control, which translated into cheaper forms of 
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labour. This participant believed employers were engaging TES workers to ensure ‘a labour-free 
shop, a union-free shop’ (Int9. P134. Par52). This participant had worked in the union movement 
for many years and believed that the South African labour movement that had garnered world-
wide admiration and respect in the eighties and early nineties, had now regressed.    
A union participant believed that union involvement and strength was sector specific. For 
example, in sectors such as retail, catering and fast food, where much of the work was 
outsourced or casualised, trade unions were weak. As a result, there would be no need to hire 
TES workers to avoid unionisation in these sectors (Int21.pp350-351. Par.102). However, in the 
public sector, especially in teaching, where anti-union sentiments were rife, clients engaged TES 
firms to avoid unionisation (Int21.p351. Par.104).  
Participants from large TES companies were asked to express their opinions about whether 
clients engage TES staff to deliberately avoid unionisation, and the responses were mixed. Some 
appeared reluctant to answer the question and linked client preference of non-unionisation to 
other factors such as performance, pay threshold and the size of the client. One such TES 
company participant believed that unionisation and a lack of performance were connected and 
that clients hired TES workers as they performed better because they wanted to be permanently 
employed. The participant believed that unions were a negative influence on performance. 
The clients, who did take on a whole bunch of temporary people permanently are bitterly 
regretting it. What happens is your temporary members of staff, and I'm speaking 
generally okay, want permanent employment so they perform. But the moment they 
become permanent employees, then they get influenced by all the other workers around 
them, by whatever trade union happens to be in place, and then … you don’t get the same 
performance that you had initially (Int15. p230. Par129-133). 
Another TES company participant disagreed with the notion that companies deliberately try to 
avoid unionisation by hiring TES workers. This participant believed that there were many 
temporary workers who do belong to unions and that the level of unionisation depended on how 
much the TES worker was paid, and whether they fell below or above the BCEA’s Threshold 
Amount. If the TES employee hired was above the threshold, then they were unlikely to be a 
member of a union (Int10. p150. Par102). A third TES company participant stated that trade 
unions cost their clients time and money, and were often obstructive, which resulted in their 
preference for TES workers.  
243 
 
Now if they engage the TES, … they avoid this rigorous thing of consulting on 
something that is there. You know, where you get trade unions coming to say, but why 
you retrench us, not us, why do you do this? Why do you choose this person and not this 
other person? And often times, those discussions are just marred by obstruction … and 
user enterprises, for them to remain contracted, they need to act with speed on certain 
things as well … Who are you going to bill for the extra three months, you know, of 
consulting when there is no production? (Vol 2: Int32.p9. Par.76). 
This participant also believed that smaller employers simply did not have the skills or the 
experience to deal with unions. 
It is one of the considerations, the guys will say you know what, I've got problems, I 
cannot deal with trade unions. I'm not trained to do that, I'm an engineer … I don’t have 
time to see to the trade unions and meetings that are endless. … Can I get you to come 
here as a TES, and amongst others take care of my industrial relations? So yes, I think 
negative people would say to avoid trade unions, but people will say not necessarily to 
avoid, but to give it to people who specialise in that field. … I must comply with the 
laws, but I don’t have the capacity, nor the need, nor the desire, nor the appetite for it 
(Vol 2: Int32.p19. Par.202). 
Speaking in context of union avoidance, the above participant acknowledged that there were 
clients that did not wish to comply with legislation and in these instances, the TES would have to 
decide about their future involvement. However, there were always unscrupulous bakkie brigade 
TES firms who would accept the work and encourage employers not to comply.  
You still have others to be honest. You still have those others you know, that don’t want 
to comply, and therefore there is this thing. But it is up to you as a TES whether you want 
to get it. … but you still get your bakkie brigades who are encouraging employers not to 
comply, which is unfortunate (Vol 2: Int32.p19. Par.208-210). 
 
8.2.2. To avoid the obligations and risks associated with the employer 
relationship 
Von Broembsen, (2012) studied the role of intermediaries in facilitating participation in markets 
by poor producers. She drew on 23 semi-structured interviews with intermediaries in the craft 
and agribusiness sectors. Interviews were conducted with non-profit organisations, businesses 
and senior managers or directors of two South African retail giants, namely Pick ’n Pay and 
Woolworths. One surprise finding of the study was the use of temporary employment agency 
contracts, as opposed to fixed term contracts (Von Broembsen, 2012). Given the flexibility that 
fixed term contracts offered producers, it was surprising that at least two of the sites studied still 
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resorted to labour brokers (Von Broembsen, 2012). This was the case even though the wages of 
the brokers’ workers were 20 to 25 percent higher than that of directly appointed workers. The 
reasons provided for still engaging TES workers despite the extra cost, was that the TES 
company offered team supervision, professionalism and had an ‘obligation’ towards the client 
(Von Broembsen, 2012, p.24).  
Similarly, the participants in the present study were asked why they chose to engage TES 
employees rather than conclude fixed term contracts with individuals. The question was asked in 
the context of the similarities in the benefits to the employer - both the fixed term contract and 
the TES contract offered flexibility and short-term employment. This question was posed 
primarily to labour attorney participants, as they are best suited to advise clients on the most 
appropriate employment relationship to suit specific client needs. One labour attorney participant 
confirmed that clients used TES companies to avoid the risk of being the employer. 
If they went via a labour broker, they could say, well, we are not the employer, the labour 
broker is the employer and if you want to pursue any sort of unfair dismissal claim or 
unfair labour practise claims, you have to look to your labour broker that is your 
employer. So, I think primarily it was to avoid the employment relationship and to avoid 
the risk of any claims associated with that sort of a relationship’ (Int4. p61. Par60). 
However, the participant acknowledged that the 2015 legislative amendments had specifically 
targeted this avoidance behaviour and made it more difficult to escape the liabilities associated 
with the employment relationship, such as unfair dismissal claims (Int4. p61. Par62).166  
It almost means that it isn't worth going via a labour broker unless you have a really 
proper justifiable business reason for doing it, because the work is really of a temporary 
or defined nature. And you don’t want the administrative hassle of, you know, bringing 
these people onto your books, and increasing your headcount, and potentially having to 
provide them with certain benefits. But you can't really get away with trying to go via the 
labour broker to avoid an employment relationship anymore, in light of these 
amendments (Int4. p61. Par64). 
However, another attorney participant stated that clients were still willing to risk the ‘gamble’ of 
a TES service rather than concluding a fixed term contract, despite the 2015 legislative 
amendments.  
So, well look if you want to gamble a little bit, if you do a TES you only become the 
deemed employer. So, with a fixed term contractor you still have additional 
 
166 See par. 5.4. for further discussion on joint and several liability between the client and the TES firm. 
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administrative burdens such as payroll, disciplining employees, clocking issues, and so 
on and so forth. So, that you can outsource for your TES employee. But if you employ 
them on fixed term basis, then you are going to take on that administrative burden 
(Int28.p467. Par.138). 
A large, established TES company participant confirmed that clients choose TES employees 
rather than fixed-term contract employees, to avoid employee-related costs and the perceived 
liabilities associated with the termination of employment at the end of the contract period.  
If you ramp up and employ, and unfortunately … whilst you talk of engagement you need 
to talk of the end game, which is de-mobilisation … Now if you engage them on a fixed 
term contract … They need to have the HR setup that would accommodate five thousand 
employees … that comes with a cost … So, it makes it prohibitive (Vol 2: Int32.p9. 
Par.70-72). 
8.2.3. To meet the requirements of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
legislation 
One participant, a senior tax expert at a top auditing firm in South Africa, outlined how using 
TES employees affects clients’ Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), or as it is technically 
known, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) obligations.  B-BBEE is a 
growth strategy targeting inequality in the South African economy (Brand South Africa, 2013). 
South Africa's first democratic government had a mandate to redress the inequalities of the past 
in all spheres, political, social and economic (DTI, 2014). In 2003, in the light of this mandate, 
the B-BBEE Strategy was published as a forerunner to the B-BBEE Act 2003 (No. 53 of 2003). 
The primary objective of this Act was to advance economic transformation and enhance the 
economic participation of black people in the South African economy (DTI, 2014). The Act 
provided a legislative framework for the promotion of BEE, empowering the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to issue Codes of Good Practice, publish Transformation Charters and 
establishment a B-BBEE Advisory Council (DTI, 2014). Members of the B-BBEE Advisory 
Council were appointed during 2009, as contemplated in Section 6(1)(c) and (d) of the Act (DTI, 
2014). The B-BBEE Advisory Council provides guidance and monitoring of the state of B-
BBEE performance in the economy and makes policy recommendations to address challenges in 
the implementation of this transformation policy (DTI, 2014). The B-BBEE Codes of Good 
Practice were introduced during 2007, as an implementation framework for B-BBEE policy and 
legislation (DTI, 2014). This framework measures the level of compliance of an entity under the 
pillars of ownership, management control, employment equity, enterprise development, skills 
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development, preferential procurement and socio-economic development (Ernst & Young, 
2012). The B-BBEE Act has resulted in all businesses being required to be assessed in terms of 
the B-BBEE compliance levels to remain competitive (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
A director-level tax expert participant explained how this legislation works in practice: 
Black Economic Employment is a move, or a look at if you want to call empowering, 
employing, retaining individuals who fall within the definition of black within the South 
African context. What would happen here is you are looking particularly at black 
employees and black ownership, so the rating scores … would be dependent on the 
amount of individuals that you have who may be regarded as black, previously 
disadvantaged individuals; who have either ownership or are in the employment of the 
company. Also affected by things like who you are procuring services from. So, if you 
are procuring services from a very good BEE rated company then the amount that you 
could claim as a deduction as well as your rating from a BEE perspective, will improve. 
… You will succeed as a business in South Africa if your BEE rating is high. And, in 
fact, you often can't get business from the government unless your BEE rating is good 
(Int1. pp4-5. Par16-24). 
According to the above participant, white employees of a company who hold senior positions, 
may leave the employ of the company with a severance package. The reason for this would be to 
avoid them being part of the employee population which would affect the BEE scores of the 
company. They are then contracted back to the company via a TES company. The participant 
provided the following example of this scheme:  
Let's say I resign from a company and I then contract with a labour broker the company 
still wants me back, they require my services. They would go to the labour broker and say 
please employ this person we will pay you five percent of the remuneration as a fee… 
And the nature of the BEE now changes because in the past you were an employee 
rendering a service, but now what’s happening is that you are being provided by a service 
provider to deliver on something. So, the nature of the BEE effectively has changed, and 
it benefits then the company. And it benefits the individual because the individual can 
still get his money, still gets the same benefits that he got whilst in the employ of the 
company. And the company then also gets to retain the services of the individual at a 
cost, of let's say five percent. And all of that is obviously deductible from a tax 
perspective, as it is in the production of income (Int1. p5. Par26-30). 
The participant strongly disapproved of companies that participate in these arrangements as they 
could be viewed as ‘fronting’. ‘Fronting’ means a deliberate circumvention or attempted 
circumvention of the B-BBEE Act and the Codes (DTI, 2014). It involves the reliance on data or 
claims of compliance based on misrepresentations of facts, either by the party claiming 
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compliance, or by any other person (DTI, 2014). This participant believed that despite the risk of 
hefty fines attached to fronting, it still occurred ‘it is something that is being picked up by the 
government, but the fact is that a lot of people still do it, a lot of companies still do it (Int1. p6. 
Par34).    
As set out in table 13, TES firms often establish subsidiary companies or partnerships that allow 
them to focus on a range of different market segments.167 For example, to obtain business which 
requires BEE credentials. These companies are often referred to as ‘BEE labour brokers’ and in 
some instances would even be owned by the government (Int20.p321. Par.52-56). The wide-
scale involvement in BEE ‘schemes’ using BBE labour brokers was explained by a legal 
participant. In this participant’s experience, BEE schemes were commonplace, often involved the 
government, and were mostly concluded at the expense of the TES worker (Int20.p321. Par.52). 
A lot of labour brokering companies are owned and controlled by government, and a lot 
of labour brokering companies are in fact BEE schemes… a lot of government functions 
have been outsourced to BEE labour broker firms. So, for instance, street cleaning in 
[name of municipal area], which is a municipal function, has been outsourced to a BEE 
labour broker and the workers who perform these municipal services are paid a third of 
what they would get if they were municipal employees … Many government functions, 
including health and other types of government functions that are being outsourced to 
BEE labour broker firms with a huge saving, obviously to the municipality, and the 
profits to the labour brokering firm. And all of this is being done at the expense of the 
workers (Int20.p321. Par.52-56). 
8.2.4. Economies of scale optimisation 
Large firms and modern enterprises are characterised by newer technology, efficient production, 
economies of scale, and effective management of physical, financial, and human resources 
through specialised departments, all working toward higher profits in a competitive environment 
(Fox and Kaul, 2017; ILO, 2015; Lucas, 2017). The public sector is also tapping into the 
expertise of the private sector where they have proven, larger and established footprints, which 
enables them to be more efficient and cost effective (USAID, 2010). In contrast to the 
 
167 An example of this could be found in the South African Post Office (SAPO). At the time when SAPO engaged 
TES companies to provide TES workers, the only real requirement imposed within SAPO when contracting for 
labour was that the TES be BEE compliant. In response, Kelly established at least two BEE companies, Marula 
Staffing24 and Workforce Management25 as fronts to compete for what was a lucrative market. These organisations 
joined a plethora of other companies that provided labour to SAPO (Dixon, 2015, p.11). However, this is no longer 
the situation as Dixon (2015) details the account of the ‘Mabarete’s strike’ of 2011 /2012 that amounted to SAPO 
negotiating the end of labour broking. 
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries where agency 
employment is prohibited in the public sector (ILO 2009; Zhang et al, 2015), the South African 
public sector engages TES workers. As one participant from a large TES company pointed out, 
the South African government remained one of the largest users of TES services. However, 
pressure from trade unions have forced the government to consider insourcing168 workers from 
TES services who work for universities. This strategy has proved to be financially problematic, 
as pointed out by a large TES company participant:  
There is apparently some debate and discussion in the public arena because the 
universities are saying they actually can't afford to bring them [TES workers] on board, 
because of course one of the reasons for using us [the TES company] is the economies of 
scale in terms of how we actually manage workforces, I mean it is what we do best 
(Int5.p80. Par.189). 
As the above participant acknowledged, the contracting for services from specialist providers is a 
way to achieve economies of scale and specialisation in providing services (Ghani and Kharas, 
2009). With respect to external contracting, economic theories of firm size demonstrate that the 
relevant cost considerations may often be finely balanced (Collins, 1990).  In many instances the 
additional cost of subcontracting work engendered by the contractor’s profit margin can be more 
than offset by the lower management costs of the core firm and the efficiency of the 
subcontractor arising from lower overheads, better economies of scale, and hiring workers from 
a lower paid labour market (Collins, 1990). In this light, reasons for the growth of the TES 
industry are often explained in terms of neoclassical economic analysis, especially the ‘theory of 
the firm’ (Knight, 1921; Bartkiw, 2014). Storrie (2002) provides a succinct explanation of when 
a firm will procure labour services in the market: 
A firm will procure services in the market when the inputs are standardised (in this case, 
labour services); there are several competing suppliers (in this case, temporary work 
agencies); economies of scale exist in these supply firms that are too significant to be 
duplicated by the buyer (the user firm); economies of scope exist that would otherwise 
force the vertically integrated firm (the user firm) into unrelated business; and no specific 
investments on the part of either the buyer or seller (the user or the [temporary work 
agency]TWA) are involved. How suitable it may be to outsource the recruitment function 
will thus depend on the degree to which the above conditions are met in specific markets 
Storrie (2015, p.34). 
 
168 From the context of this participant’s response, ‘insourcing’ meant permanently employing the employees from 
the TES firm to work for the client. 
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In line with this thinking, a senior tax expert participant pointed out that in times of economic 
crises, businesses such as TES companies flourish as they can take on the employer 
responsibilities: 
As companies are under financial pressure and are rationalising their staff, or what you 
call rightsizing these days. It doesn’t mean that the associated responsibilities of these ex-
employees are gone, it is still there, which means that someone has to then take on this 
responsibility. So, it will be an external service provider, […], and that external service 
provider may be in the form of what may be called a labour broker (Int1. pp8-9. Par62). 
One participant from a confederation of business organisation, explained this as ‘[…] clients 
want to use a TES firm to avoid the hassle around employment. And I say the hassle it's the 
administrative burden (Int11. p153. Par18)’. This view was generally supported by the 
participants and examples were offered on how clients externalise their employer responsibilities 
to save costs and ‘hassle’. A senior tax expert participant mentioned that TES companies sell or 
‘tout’ their services on this basis: 
We are able to provide you with a person with the right skills for a fixed amount of time 
that is not just part of your books, you don’t need to worry about your HR issues, you 
don’t need to worry about payroll issues, all you need to be worried about is getting 
whatever it is that you need to have done (Int1. pp8-9. Par54-68). 
Similar views were expressed by a participant from an employers’ association: 
Ja, I mean it just makes life easier because you don’t have to go through the whole 
recruitment process of interviewing them and doing background checks. You don’t need 
to if you are an organisation that has a payroll, you don’t now need to load them onto the 
payroll and do all of the administrative tasks that come along with having to employ an 
employee (Int13.p185. Par.26). 
A strong theme that emerged from the data was that clients use TES companies to alleviate the 
administrative burden and costs of running the payroll. An attorney participant suggested that 
this was what the TES industry ‘is about’: 
I think it is about running the payroll, the cost of running the payroll. So, there are a 
whole range of combination of factors that people say, well, that’s why you outsource. 
Why don’t you run your own security guards? why don’t you run your own trucks? 
Because just it is too much hassle, there are more economies of scale dealing with a 
transporter a security company and, and, and - the same as outsource. […] there is no 
difference to the outsource model of logistics, or security, or cleaning than there is to 
250 
 
labour brokering. It is the same thought process; it is the same rationale (Int14. p209. 
Par82). 
The importance of ‘running the payroll’ was corroborated by other participants. An attorney 
participant stated that ‘all the labour broker does is act as the channel for their wages’ (Int33. Vol 
2. p31. Par28). Similarly, a TES company participant suggested that their ability to run the 
payroll lay at the heart of the TES industry’s appeal. 
You've got a client and he sees your appeal and remember this is how we operate, you 
provide the services and then you pay your employees. That’s me now, I pay my 
employees who are placed with your enterprise, and then I pay them every week. They 
are weekly paid employees, they are waged employed, I pay them every week. Come 
month end, I consolidate my bill I send you an invoice and now all of a sudden you are 
paying one consolidated invoice of two million for an example (Vol 2: Int32.p20. 
Par.218-220).  
Economies of scale optimisation is a primary concern for clients from the outset of the TES 
relationship, when commercial terms are negotiated. A participant from a large TES company 
advised that how they engage clients has changed in recent years. They mentioned that fifteen 
years ago, client presentations were made primarily to the clients’ human resources and 
production departments, and decisions were based on the strategic needs of the client. However, 
the participant currently presents to clients’ procurement and finance departments. The 
participant believes that this is an important change and affects the decisions that TES clients 
make. The participant believes that the TES companies have become ‘victims’ of the client’s 
desire to cut costs. 
Their decisions are within the scope of what they need to do, cutting costs, cutting 
corners, non-compliance as far as possible, that has been the issue. And the issue of 
commodification of labour in the way it is related to TES, we also are victims thereof, 
you know (Vol 2: Int32.p20. Par.218). 
The commodification of labour raised by this participant is an important consideration in the 
context of TES work.169 Coe et al, (2010, p.1057) points out that despite the categorisation as 
‘temporary’, many agency employees are in effect ‘perma-temps’, workers on uninterrupted 
placements. Agencies ‘sell’ the labour of the temporary employment agency worker to client 
firms, and make a profit, not by investment in capital or the means of production, but from 
extracting a portion of the workers’ wages (Parker, 1994; Vosko 2000; Coe et al, 2010). The 
 
169 See paragraph 7.2.3. for a further explanation of labour as a commodity. 
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commodification of labour was acknowledged by a participant who held a senior human 
resources position in a major retail industry in South Africa. The participant believed that the 
company they worked for was a ‘values-based organisation’ that engaged TES services. The 
participant was of the opinion that hiring TES workers was often at the expense of the 
company’s values, despite the cost efficiencies that they deliver. 
Our experience is starting to get to a point where the efficiencies of labour brokers are 
starting to compete with the values. So, if you are a values-based organisation, you start 
asking yourself the question: well can you actually say that if you are employing people 
on a strictly efficient basis, from a cost perspective. So, I think that incongruence is 
becoming more manifest (Int16. p249. Par156-160). 
 
This participant explained why they felt that the use of labour brokers was incongruent with the 
company’s values. They believed that TES workers who worked for their company on a regular 
basis, were in fact in jobs ‘that are there anyway’ (Int16.p238. Par.24) and that these were not 
temporary jobs that warranted TES services ‘and you need to treat them properly and do the right 
thing. […] there's almost like a values question’ (Int16.p238. Par.24). The participant’s 
suggestion was that the company either introduce a guaranteed number of hours to a set number 
of employees or offer employees permanent employment contracts. A further option would be to 
offer flexible employment contracts, such as fixed term employment agreements, to achieve the 
desired flexibility.  
 
8.2.5. The desire for greater workforce flexibility 
One of the dominant theoretical approaches used to explain the growth of temporary agency 
work have been demand side orientated, and focus on new institutional economic theories 
(Mitlacher, 2007b). This approach looks at employers’ needs for flexibility, cost savings and 
access to skills (Purcell et al, 2004). This method is based on assumptions of rational choice 
within assumed free labour markets (Purcell et al, 2004). Demand-side theory, in the form of 
transactional cost analysis (Williamson 1970, 1975), and human capital theory (Becker, 1964) 
have been combined, with insights from the resource-based view of strategy by Lepak and Snell 
(1999, 2002), to form a model of human resource architecture (Purcell et al, 2004).  
 
Employers, it is argued, have the fundamental choice: to externalise employment by 
using the market as the prime regulatory mechanism, hiring labour only when it is 
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needed, or to develop internal labour markets where the ‘hierarchy’ of values and 
bureaucratic rules provide controls and incentives. Employers, acting rationally, can 
differentiate between those jobs that should be done by their own employees and those 
for which there are advantages in allocating them to externally resourced staff, whether 
by subcontracting, outsourcing or using temporary labour (Purcell et al, 2004, p. 707).   
 
The utilisation of demand side economic theories to explain the growth in temporary agency 
work, is not surprising as the rationale for using temporary agency workers has much in common 
with downsizing and restructuring (Mitlacher, 2007). For example, the need to reduce labour 
costs, the need to introduce new technology, responding to changing markets. In all these 
instances, there is a demand for flexibility and the temporary employment agency worker 
provides a ‘flexible buffer’ that can be adjusted rapidly to changing demands (Abraham, 1988; 
Mitlacher, 2007).  
Participants were asked why they believed firms used TES services, and the need for flexibility 
emerged as a key theme from a range of different participants. Table 21 below sets out six 
participants’ views on why clients use TES services in relation to their flexibility requirements 
and many of the reasons are in line with the above literature, namely that they aid during difficult 
financial times and ensure that their organisations remain globally competitive. TES engagement 
also helps with the ‘peaks and valleys’ experienced in business and allows them to concentrate 
on their core functions. 













operation of the 
business. 
‘And the efficient operation of businesses is also a 
very important factor in South Africa you know that 
we are not a welfare state in the sense that private 
companies are necessarily required to carry 
employees when they actually don’t have work for 
them…But that talks to that need of flexibility’ 





than full time 
I think really the simple answer is that they provide 
a serious amount of flexibility that you don’t 
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client employment necessarily get out of your full-time employment 
base (Int16.p237. Par.18). 
 
Managing 




Remaining profitable ‘And we need to be sure that we can provide that 
flexibility for our clients. I think it is a huge part of 
our economy and that is why it is so important that 
whatever the labour legislation does, it doesn’t 
inhibit the flexibility of those clients, because they 
will not have the budget or the capacity to employ 
the people they need on a full-time basis and still be 






‘And that’s quite interesting you know if someone 
had done research in South Africa 2008/9/10, you 
would have seen that because the temporary 
employment service industry could switch off 
employment quite quickly. I think you would have 
seen a lot of businesses survive because of that cost 
reduction, quickly’ (Int14. pp206-207. Par60). 
 
Director of an 
employer’s 
association 
To remain globally 
competitive 
‘It is the belief that in today's global market, for a 
company to be globally competitive it needs to have 
at least a thirty-five percent flexibility in their 
workforce, to allow them to right size and take 
advantage of good and bad cycles in the economy’ 
(Int30.p496. Par.10). 
 
CEO of a 
large TES 
company 
The requirement for 
different staffing 
solutions during 
‘peaks and valleys’. 
‘I think companies use us for a lot of different 
reasons as I said to you, first of all, peaks and 
valleys in their business. I mean no company runs 
flat. No company in the whole world runs flat, I'm 




Allows companies to 
concentrate on their 
core functions 
‘The real reason for utilising temporary 
employment service is obviously to allow the 
business to focus on its core functions and what 
their business really is. Is to allow for the sort of 
temporary placements to allow for ebbs and flows 
in productivity’ (Int31. p508. Par12). 
 
Source: researcher’s own summary of interview data 
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However, the need for flexibility expressed by the above participants, comes at a cost for the 
workers involved.170 A TES client participant pointed out that TES workers are often employed 
under the guise of flexibility, where a permanent position exists, therefore perpetuating the 
casualisation of permanent jobs: 
But I think what's happened is that it's become an easy out to employ flexible labour 
where there are in fact permanent jobs. And if you look at places where labour brokers 
are actually providing labour, in many cases those people have been coming back to that 
same piece of work for many, many years, and that can't be – just from a values 
perspective – something is not right about that. It should be a job, absolutely it is a job. 
And you just not filling it the way you should be filling it (Int16.p243. Par.80-82). 
One union participant suggested that it was convenient for companies to place the need for 
flexibility above the needs of the TES worker. This participant claims that the TES worker 
ultimately pays for the cost of flexibility as it erodes job security. 
Basically, it is a way of enabling a company, rather than employing workers, to engage a 
company which will supply them with workers whenever they require them. And it is 
very convenient for the company because it gives them a great deal of flexibility which 
wouldn’t be possible if there was a strict enforcement of labour laws which protect 
workers’ rights to job security, and only to be dismissed if there is a good reason 
(Int21.p342. Par.4-6). 
A labour law attorney corroborated this view and stated that the need for flexibility was merely 
an excuse proffered by the client and that the real reason that TES workers are used was to 
reduce the costs associated with employer responsibilities such as fair dismissal procedures: 
The employer says we need the flexibility because the cost of dismissing a worker fairly, 
is too high…That’s their argument, but the flexibility for the employer really relates to 
the cost …And look frankly, I think that’s nonsense because our labour law is no more 
restricted than any other country … In terms of labour market flexibility, South Africa 
rates quite well internationally (Int33. Vol 2. p31. Par28-34). 
A participant from a dispute resolution organisation had similarly observed that TES clients 
engage TES workers to avoid fair dismissal processes: 
We have this flexibility which allowed us to compete internationally, so that if we get 
orders, we can say to people, listen no problem at the drop of a hat. I can effectively get 
 
170 Wright and Kaine (2015) identify some negative consequences of engaging TES workers: inferior wages and 
conditions, precarious employment arrangements, work intensification, work health and safety risks and minimal 
investment in employee development as commonly identified consequences and low morale amongst workers. In 
addition, conflicts often arise among workers at the lead firm who are forced to work alongside subcontractors out of 
fear that their own jobs and conditions are at risk. 
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people in to up my production that I deliver, and should that change, I don’t have to run 
through a lot of processes or/and, a very costly exercise to then sort of exit employees 
again (Int18.p266. Par.18). 
 
8.2.6. The desire to externalise the industrial relations, legal and human 
resources management (HRM) functions 
 
Tied into the need for flexibility mentioned above, temporary employment agency workers 
support client companies in the restructuring of their internal labour market, as firms shift parts 
of their recruitment functions to an external provider. Externalising these functions allows them 
to lower recruitment costs and dismissal costs (Mitlacher, 2007; Forde and Slater, 2005; Booth et 
al 2002). Baron and Kreps (1999) suggest principles to determine whether operations should be 
internally allocated or outsourced and suggest two main considerations. Firstly, the degree to 
which the task is strategically important for the firm, that is whether it is a core competence; and 
secondly, the degree to which the activity displays high technical or social interdependence with 
tasks done by regular employees (Baron and Kreps, 1999, p. 460). 
The need to externalise the human resources management (HRM) and industrial relations (IR) 
functions was mentioned as key reasons for using the services of TES firms by some 
participants. The key idea was that they simply did not have the know-how, time or resources to 
engage in these complex and technical areas. One participant, a labour lawyer, believed that 
especially smaller organisations choose to outsource the HRM and IR functions, as they simply 
could not justify the costs involved if these functions were performed internally. 
 
I don’t think people have got the human resources departments to run the employees. I 
think that is, the skill level is not there… The big labour brokers… [have] much better 
resources to run those cases at the CCMA if there is a dismissal, than me having a 
hundred people, because I can't really employ an IR specialist in respect of that 
cost…And the liability with a decent labour broker affectively means they can run the IR 
stuff. I mean [name of large broker] got a team of lawyers behind them that no other 
company in South Africa's got. So, they can run the IR properly…So, there are cases 
where it warrants it and it is proper you can't just do a scam it has got to be proper. And 
the other cases where it doesn’t warrant it (Int14. pp208-213. Par70-118). 
The CEO of a large TES company supported this view and stated that engaging a TES firm 
enabled organisations to focus on their core business while the TES ‘picks up the flack’. 
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There is a client concern, doesn’t want to, doesn’t have the time to focus on dealing with 
HR issues, disciplinary hearings investigation, all that sort of stuff… I've got to focus on 
my core business … therefore somebody else must just handle all these issues. And that’s 
pretty much what we do. So, we pick up the flack where all the things which companies 
out there either can't do or don’t want to do (Int15. p221. Par31). 
A director of an employer’s federation mentioned that managing ‘people on non-traditional 
structures’ is complex and that organisations utilise TES companies as they have the skill and 
know-how to deal with the legal and pay-roll requirements involved. 
Often companies directly don’t have the infrastructure or capability to manage people on 
non-traditional structures … I mean TES’s are running payrolls where you know one 
temp could work for three completely different industries in one week, with different 
bargaining council, terms and conditions and their payrolls have become sophisticated 
enough to be able to manage each of those shifts independently and to at the end of the 
week to produce one pay slip which is correctly compliant from a tax and payments point 
of view and to handle all of that (Int30.p497. Par.14). 
A participant from a large TES company similarly stated that the legal complexity required in the 
HRM and IR functions is one of the reasons why companies engage TES services. 
In our country, we have different sets of labour legislation which are quite tricky to deal 
with and very complex. And what companies do, is that they think ugh no, we can't 
handle this … I deal with seventeen different sets of labour legislation in this country. 
Basic Conditions, Bargaining Council, sector determinations, and so on. We have to 
know that intimately [chuckle] so that we know exactly what wages we have to pay. 
What sort of benefits we have to pay to the various individuals for whatever work they 
are particularly doing for a particular company, it is highly complex (Int15. Pp.220-221. 
Par25-29). 
An advocate and acting Labour Court judge participant agreed with the view that organisations 
utilise TES companies as they often do not have the necessary HRM and IR facilities. However, 
this participant believes that since the 2015 amendments to the legislation dealing with TES 
workers, these organisations will no longer be able to use TES companies for this purpose.  
No, I think there is a lot of merit in that, I think that is one of the facts that make a TES 
attractive. The point is this, they now will have to do these things, they don’t have any 
option anymore (Int23.p389. Par.66). 
The 2015 amendments to the labour legislation ensure that after a period of three months of 
working for a client, a TES employee earning below the Threshold Amount will be deemed to be 
the employee of the TES client. The above participant no doubt was referring to the fact that the 
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client would not be able to hire TES employees indefinitely as they did prior to 2015. Different 
liabilities may now arise after the three-month period171. However, the TES firm’s 
responsibilities remain clear for HR and IR functions for those TES employees over the 
Threshold Amount, and for those under the Threshold Amount who work for the client for a 
period less than three months. 
8.3. Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on the TES client and looked at seven reasons why they use TES workers 
and firms. Overall, there was a desire to manage costs and externalise risks, which is in line with 
the wider international literature (Mangum et al. 1985; Purcell et al, 2004; Coe et al, 2010). 
However, in South Africa the reasons for TES firm use remains complex (Alford, 2015) and 
often fall into both the ‘avoidance’ and ‘legitimate’ categories of use (Bartkiw, 2014).  
The desire to obtain labour free from union involvement was one reason outlined by the 
participants. More specifically, the participants supported the idea that TES companies were 
often used to circumvent unions and other employer responsibilities. However, this depended 
largely on the sector of the client firm. Unions were weak in some sectors such as the retail, 
catering and fast food industries, and strong in the public sector. The idea was that there would 
be no need to hire TES workers to avoid unionisation in sectors where unionisation was weak. 
Participants were asked to express their opinions about whether clients engage TES staff to 
deliberately avoid unionisation, and the responses were mixed. Some linked client preference of 
non-unionisation to factors such as performance, pay thresholds and the size of the client. Others 
believed that unionisation and a lack of performance were connected and that clients hired TES 
workers as they performed better because they wanted to be permanently employed. Other 
participants believed that smaller employers simply did not have the skills or the experience to 
deal with unions and engaged TES firms so that they could remain compliant. However, 
participants acknowledged that there were clients that simply did not want to comply with 
legislation and employed bakkie brigade TES firms to avoid union involvement. 
The next section looks at the broader topic of how TES employees avoid or circumvent the 
obligations and risks associated with the employer relationship by utilising TES firms. More 
specifically, it discussed the reasons why TES clients would choose TES firm employees as 
 
171 See table 12 for a discussion of these liabilities. 
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opposed to fixed term contract employees as both offer flexibility and short-term employment. 
Participants provided a range of different opinions about why clients hire TES employees. For 
example, to avoid employer associated risks, although the 2015 legislation amendments have 
targeted this type of avoidance. Another reason was that employing TES firms alleviated the 
administration ‘hassle’ attached to the payroll, discipline and time-keeping issues of fixed term 
or permanent staff. Some employers simply wished to avoid the employee-related costs 
associated with permanent or fixed-term contract employees, for example redundancy costs and 
the human resources investment needed to remain compliant.   
Participants outlined strategies adopted by clients using labour TES services to circumvent the 
requirements of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), or Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE). For example, they may provide severance packages to senior white 
staff to leave the organisation to avoid them being part of the employee population which would 
affect the BEE scores. Thereafter, they would hire them back through a TES firm, at a cost, 
which was tax deductible. These arrangements could be viewed as ‘fronting’ which is illegal in 
South Africa. However, according to a tax expert participant, these ‘fronting’ schemes remain 
popular. In addition, participants mentioned BEE ‘schemes’ where government functions were 
outsourced to government-owned TES firms. These BEE TES firms saved the local 
municipalities large amounts of money as they provided TES employees who performed 
municipal services and were paid a third of what they would get if they were municipal 
employees. The TES firms were earning fees and the municipalities were saving costs, all at the 
expense of the TES employees who should be permanently employed by the municipalities. 
Clients utilising TES services to achieve economies of scale and specialisation, was examined in 
the next section. Clients were externalising their employer responsibilities to save costs. The 
externalisation of payroll responsibilities was important as some participants believed that 
running the payroll was the TES firm’s primary purpose, a simple ‘channel for wages’. In 
addition, economies of scale optimisation influenced the way in which the TES firm engaged the 
client from the outset. In the past, TES firms would initially meet with the human resources and 
production departments to assess their TES employee needs. However, this had changed, and 
they now met with the procurement and finance departments which was indicative of what the 
client prioritised - cutting costs. An interesting point was raised by a TES client participant who 
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expressed concern about the commodification of labour when employees were employed on a 
strictly efficient basis. This participant explained that TES workers were often hired at the 
expense of the company’s values, despite the cost efficiencies they offer, as the company used 
TES employees for existing positions at the company. 
The next section looked at the desire for greater workforce flexibility as a key reason for using 
TES employees. Participants discussed the reasons why they believed flexibility was important 
to the TES client. These included the efficient operation of the business; greater flexibility than 
hiring full-time employees; remaining profitable; providing assistance during difficult financial 
times, ensuring their organisations remain globally competitive; helping with the ‘peaks and 
valleys’ experienced in business and allowing them to concentrate on their core functions. 
However, this flexibility came at a cost for TES employees. For example, it led to the 
casualisation of permanent jobs, cased the erosion of job security, and provided a means for the 
client to avoid their duties and responsibilities in dismissal processes. 
The final section of the chapter dealt with the clients’ ongoing desire to externalise their legal, 
industrial relations (IR) and human resources management (HRM) functions by utilising TES 
firms. The key idea was that they simply did not have the know-how, time or resources to engage 
in these complex and technical areas. These areas included the fair dismissal of employees, 
effective industrial relations, and navigation of complicated laws. The HR infrastructure needed 
to run complicated payrolls and shift patterns were also mentioned. In general, these participants 










CHAPTER 9: TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO TES WORK 
9.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline South African trade union responses to the temporary 
employment services (TES) industry. The chapter has three main sections. Firstly, the South 
African union legislative structure is summarised, and the TES industry’s impact on the principle 
of majoritarianism is discussed. Secondly, the South African unions’ responses to TES work are 
set out in relation to Heery’s (2004) framework for British unions’ responses to agency work. 
The third contains a more detailed account of the challenges faced by unions in representing the 
interests of TES employees, set out under six sub-headings each depicting a theme that emerged 
from the interviews. Importantly, these data do not allow for general conclusions to be drawn 
about how unions respond to the TES industry in South Africa. Rather, the aim was to use the 
interviews with participants to illustrate ways in which unions may approach TES employees and 
the difficulties they may encounter in doing so.  
9.2. The legislative framework and majoritarianism 
Labour unions are pivotal to the collective bargaining system in South Africa (OECD, 2010). 
Due to the history of collective bargaining in South Africa, unions have a broad mandate and 
objectives, including matters of economic justice, fair working conditions, standardisation of 
wages, addressing inequalities, and raising wages and social benefits (Moll, 1996; Godfrey et al, 
2007; OECD, 2010). The abuse of trade unions under apartheid led to a unique entrenchment of 
labour rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (No. 108 of 1996) (the 
Constitution) (Kruger and Tshoose, 2013). Section 23(5) of the Constitution gives all employees 
the right to belong to a trade union. One of the most significant changes in the Labour Relations 
Act (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA 1995) was that it provided for legislated organisational rights (Kruger 
and Tshoose, 2013). In addition, in order to achieve industrial peace, the LRA 1995 made a 
policy choice to discard the previous duty to bargain in favour of a system of voluntary collective 
bargaining, preferably at sectoral level, underpinned by the principle of majoritarianism (Leppan, 
2016). Table 22 below provides a summary of how trade unions and employers’ organisations 
operate within the collective bargaining system in South Africa - their registration, membership, 




Table 22: South African unions’ legislative structure 
Trade Unions Details 
Definition An association of employees whose principal purpose is to 
regulate relations between employees and employers, including 
any employers’ organisation (Section 213 of the LRA 1995) 
 
Registration • Trade unions may exist and function without registration 
• Organisational and other LRA 1995 rights are restricted to 
registered unions. 
• Registered unions may become members of bargaining 
councils, establish statutory councils, enter into binding 
collective agreements, conclude agency and shop- 
agreements, establish workplace forums and consult on 
redundancies. 
• No level of representation required for registration. 
• Registration indemnifies union officials and representatives 
against personal liability. 
 
Membership • Right to join a union is part of the general right to freedom 
of association. 
• Racially exclusive unions may not be registered 
• Union membership is only open to employees as defined by 
the LRA 1995. 
• All employees irrespective of seniority have a right to join a 
union.  
 
Closed-shop agreements • Allowed in terms of Section 26 of the LRA 1995. 
• All employees to whom closed-shop agreements are 
extended are required to be members of the union party. 
• Only union members may be employed by the employer 
parties. 
• The union parties must be registered, have a majority in the 
workplace or sector, and two-thirds of the employees must 
have voted,172 and that there is no provision in the 
agreement requiring membership of the union parties before 
employment commences.173 
• The employer party may dismiss employees who cease to 
 
172 Section 26(3) of the LRA states: A closed shop agreement is binding only if - (a) a ballot has been held of the 
employees to be covered by the agreement; (b) two thirds of the employees who voted have voted in favour of the 
agreement. Section 26 (4) states: despite subsection (3)(b), a closed shop agreement contemplated in subsection 
(2)(b) may be concluded between a registered trade union and a registered employers’ organisation in respect of a 
sector and area to become binding in every workplace in which - (a) a ballot has been held of the employees to be 
covered by the agreement; and (b) two thirds of the employees who voted have voted in favour of the agreement. 
173 Section 26(2)(a) therefore only permits ‘post-entry’ closed shops, where union membership is a term of a contract 
of employment, not a condition of its making. The counterpart is ‘pre-entry’ closed shop where no one can apply for 
a job unless they are a member of the union party (Grogan, 2017). 
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be union members. 
 
Agency-shop agreements • Allowed in terms of Section 25 of the LRA 1995. 
• An agency174 shop agreement is a collective agreement that 
allows the employer to deduct an agreed fee from the wages 
of non-union employees, that is paid into a special fund 
administered by the union.175 
• The fee may be deducted without the employees’ consent 
• The union must be registered, enjoy a majority in the 
workplace or sector, and the amount cannot be more than 
the membership fee. 
• The money is used to advance the socio-economic interests 
of all employees. 
 
Collective agreements • Collective agreements are legally binding on all future 
union members and those that cease to be members. 
• The union’s authority to conclude agreements flows from 
the principle of ‘majoritarianism’. 
• Unions don’t need a specific mandate each time they act on 
behalf of their members. 
 
Thresholds • ‘Sufficiently representative’ is not defined in the LRA 
1995. 
• The term applies to employees in the workplace as a whole, 
not a part or a bargaining unit. 
• The CCMA decides on what is sufficiently representative. 
 
Rights • Unions need to be ‘sufficiently’ representative to acquire 
access, payment of union dues and leave for shop stewards. 
• They need a majority of members at the workplace to 
acquire the election of shop stewards and the disclosure of 
information. 
 
Representatives • In a workplace of more than 10 employees, trade unions 
may elect representatives.  
• The number of representatives depends on the size of the 
workplace. 
 
Source: adapted from Grogan, 2017, pp. 346-365. 
 
174 The term ‘agency’ in this context does not relate to temporary agency workers and refers to a type of collective 
agreement that requires employers to deduct a fee from the wages of non-union workers to ensure that they do not 
benefit from the union’s bargaining efforts without contributing towards these efforts. In other words, an agreed 
agency fee is deducted from the non-union workers’ pay. 
175 Section 25(4)(b) states that ‘conscientious objectors’ (workers who refuse to belong to a union on the grounds of 
conscience) may request that their fees are paid to a fund administered by the Department of Labour. 
263 
 
As can be seen from Table 22 above, the principle of majoritarianism is important in the South 
African union context. Majority trade unions are entitled to appoint representatives and have the 
right to disclosure of information by the employer to enable the trade union representative to 
effectively perform their duties (Kruger and Tshoose, 2013). In addition, the incentives for 
majoritarianism in the LRA1995 include the right to enter into a collective agreement setting 
thresholds of representivity for the granting of access, stop-order and trade union leave rights to 
minority unions176, the right to conclude agency shop and closed shop agreements, the right to 
apply for the establishment of a workplace forum and the right to conclude collective agreements 
which will bind employees who are not members of the union or unions party to the agreement 
(Kruger and Tshoose, 2013).  
In the South African context, pluralism is a term used in the predecessor of the LRA 1995 to 
describe a system of collective bargaining that contrasts with the majoritarian model and grants 
recognition to more than one trade union, provided they are sufficiently represented (Du Toit et 
al, 2003; Kruger and Tshoose, 2013). The pluralist approach presumes that with different trade 
unions representing different interests, power will be distributed fairly (Bendix, 2001; Kruger 
and Tshoose, 2013). The model of majoritarianism, on the other hand, bestows a degree of 
primacy on unions with majority membership (at least 50 percent plus one) in a workplace 
(Kruger and Tshoose, 2013). Baskin and Satgar (1997, p12) note that  
The LRA is profoundly majoritarian. Unions with majority support get distinct 
advantages. Small, minority and craft-based unions are disadvantaged. The message for 
unions is clear...grow or stagnate.  
The impact of the new legislation pertaining to TES employees discussed in chapter 5 may affect 
trade union majority rights. An employment lawyer participant explained that the new legislation 
that allowed TES employees to become permanent employees of the TES client after a period of 
three months, impacts on union representivity (Int24.p403. Par.72). Potentially, unions could 
access majority rights, or they could forfeit these rights based on the number of TES employees 
 
176 Section 18(1)of the LRA states: (1) An employer and a registered trade union whose members are a majority of 
the employees employed by that employer in a workplace, or the parties to a bargaining council, may conclude a 
collective agreement establishing a threshold of representativeness required in respect of one or more organisational 
rights such as access, deductions of subscriptions or levies and leave for trade union activities. Section 18(2) states 
that a collective agreement concluded in terms of subsection (1) is not binding unless the thresholds of 
representativeness in the collective agreement are applied equally to any registered trade union seeking any of the 
organisational rights referred to in that subsection. 
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that became permanent employees after the three-month period. The participant stated that the 
percentages of employees that they organise is crucial to the rights that a union may access, such 
as recognition rights (Int24.p403. Par.74).  However, the participant acknowledged that it may 
prove risky for unions to have an entirely different labour pool after a three-month period, 
especially considering the rivalry between unions in South Africa (Int24.p404. Par.78-80).  
On the other hand, an acting Labour Court judge participant believed that the single employment 
relationship with the client after a period of three months as envisaged by section 198 of the 
LRA, has brought certainty for unions. It allows unions to organise TES employees working 
‘under one roof’, meaning TES employees can now be counted and organised together with the 
permanent employees (Int23.p387. Par.48). ‘I think the single employer interpretation is going to 
increase and improve the collective bargaining muscle of the unions’ (Int23.p387. Par.50). The 
participant anticipated that one of the positive consequences of the recent legislation 
amendments, was that increased union involvement may in turn lead to additional regulation and 
better policing which may decrease exploitation of TES employees (Int23.p391. Par.94). The 
participant further believed that trade unions should be the custodians of the fight against 
exploitation of TES workers and that it should not be left entirely to the inspectorate (Int23.p391. 
Par.92). 
Importantly, there has been interesting developments in the protection of TES worker collective 
rights. The LRAA now allows trade unions representing the employees of temporary 
employment agencies to exercise their organisational rights not only at the workplace of the 
agency, but also at the user firm’s workplace (Benjamin, 2013, pp.12-15; ILO, 2016). In 
addition, an arbitration award establishing organisational rights may be made binding on the TES 
firm and the TES client (Benjamin, 2013). Moreover, workers employed by agencies who 
participate in a legally protected strike action are entitled to picket at the user firm’s premises 
(ILO, 2016). 
A senior TES employee pointed out that these additional organisational rights have created 
complexities for both the client and the TES firm to navigate: 
And now you've got to involve the client and say what should the protocols be in that 
regard you know in terms of time off for union representatives. You know obviously the 
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TES, the labour broker, needs to protect its margins. So, now the question is who pays for 
the ten to twelve days that the trade union representative goes on these conferences and 
what have you? So, it is a very, very complex environment. And then … the trade union 
wants to engage in agreeing a collective agreement that regulates annual wage negotiations 
and stuff like that. You know, so you are just compounding the complexities as you move 
up the value chain around organisational rights collective bargaining (Int3.p36. Par.82-84). 
9.3. Union responses to the TES industry 
Heery (2004) famously analysed the reaction of British unions to agency work. As part of his 
study, Heery (2004) mapped union response to employment agencies and gauged union success 
either in blocking their growth or in establishing meaningful contact based on collective 
bargaining and joint consultation. He identified four main responses to agency work namely, 
exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement. These four responses, together with an 
explanation of each are set out in table 23 below. 
Table 23: Heery’s British union responses to agency work 
Response Details of the response 
Exclusion Unions reject the legitimacy of both agency suppliers and agency 
workers and seek to drive them from the labour market. 
 
Engagement Acceptance of both and an attempt to represent agency workers 
through a negotiated accommodation with agency suppliers. 
 
Replacement The inclusion of agency workers combined with a rejection of 
agency suppliers, and an attempt to replace them with a more 
acceptable labour market intermediary. 
 
Regulation Unions do not seek to represent agency workers but rather strive 
to regulate their terms and conditions through engagement with 
agency suppliers in order to protect their core membership from 
undercutting. 
 
Intermediate position Standing midway between two of the pure types. 
 
Source: Heery (2004, p.437) 
There was consensus amongst some participants that a uniquely acrimonious relationship existed 
between organised labour and the South African TES industry. These participants offered 
different reasons and opinions for this trend. A senior executive at a large TES firm blamed an 
extreme divergence of opinion between organised labour and organised business for the 
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acrimony (Int5. P76. Par138). The participant explained that the ‘anti-labour broking’ sentiments 
expressed by the union movement gained momentum approximately fifteen years ago, when it 
was indicated that the TES industry employed over a million workers (Int5. P77. Par144). This 
number was widely published by the media and communicated by the industry.177 This 
participant acknowledged that the present negative sentiment attached to the TES industry was 
also due to the industry’s practices in the past. TES workers were used as cheap labour, without 
the basic rights they currently enjoy (Int5. P77. Par152).178 Although historically the compliant 
TES firms differentiated themselves from the non-compliant firms, little was done to regulate the 
industry (Int5. p78. Par158).  
According to a senior employee of an employers’ association, one of the reasons for the 
adversarial relationship between organised labour and the TES industry, is the strength of the 
‘voice’ of organised labour. The argument is that the tripartite system179 that exists between the 
South African Communist Party (SACP), the African National Congress (ANC) and 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), allowed COSATU to have a much 
stronger voice regarding TES issues than most trade unions have internationally and importantly, 
that their representation should allow (Int30.p503. Par.50).  
So, I think it’s a system which has some inherent flaws in it, which creates an adversarial-
type face, where we kind of have to be against each other instead of working with each 
other. And that I think … makes bigger challenges of things, than if we actually just sat 
down and talked about them, we might be able to find win-wins. (Int30.pp503-504. 
Par.52). 
Similarly, a senior member of a prominent union agreed that the relationship between organised 
labour and organised business in the TES industry was not only acrimonious but highly litigious. 
This participant stated that this had not been the envisaged relationship at the advent of 
democracy when the 1995 legislation was promulgated.  
 
177 This participant shed light on what appeared to be a reluctance from the TES firm participants to provide detailed 
statistical information regarding the industry, especially in relation to the size of the industry. For further discussion 
on the paucity of statistical information, see paragraph 6.2.1. 
178 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion regarding the history of TES work in South Africa. 
179 When political organisations were unbanned, in the early 1990s, the ANC, SACP, and COSATU agreed to work 
together as an alliance - known as the tripartite alliance (Bhorat et al, 2014). This implicit and explicit political 
contract has held its political position since the ANC was democratically elected into power in 1994 (Ibid, 2014). 
The Alliance is centred around short, medium to long terms goals of the National Democratic Revolution - the 
establishment of a democratic and non-racial South Africa, economic transformation and continued process of 
political and economic democratisation (COSATU, undated). 
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You know that old saying, be careful what you wish for? We wished for a Labour 
Relations Act which gave us the right to organise trade unions without government 
interference. We wished for an Act which would stop people from being dismissed ... we 
wanted an Act that would stop people selling the business simply to get rid of workers 
and then starting off somewhere else. We wished for all those things, but we didn’t really 
know, it was sort of heady days of freedom and of liberation ... It says everything about 
how disputes began to be resolved. Not through workers power and workers saying we 
are not having this we are going on strike, we are going to protest ... we suddenly had 
courts intervening. The law being interpreted in ways that had never been the idea of the 
original draft of the '95 Act’ (Int26.p442. Par.162-164). (Union participant).  
Trying to explain the extent of legal intervention in South Africa is difficult. However, a 
quotation from the Commission for Conciliation. Mediation and Arbitration’s (CCMA)180 then 
Director in the CCMA’s Annual Report 2012/13 provides a sense of this intervention and offers 
a possible explanation: 
We have seen a further case load rise this year, from 649 to 679 every working day, a six 
percent increase without an increase in the number of commissioners.…This increased 
caseload could be interpreted as there being serious malaise in our society, with such a 
high level of conflict in the workplace. The work on which we tend to focus is that of 
dispute resolution and yet, if we had placed more emphasis on dispute prevention and 
management, perhaps there would be less need for resolution. Conversely, cases continue 
to be brought to us in seemingly ever-increasing numbers … (CCMA Annual Report, 
2012/13, p.8) 
In line with Heery’s (2004) exclusion response by unions to agency work, a strong theme that 
emerged from the data was a call by unions for a total ban of the TES industry. A senior 
employee of a confederation of businesses observed that the union movement had run a 
comprehensive and systematic campaign against the TES industry. 181 The participant felt that 
the goal of the campaign was for society to regard the industry as exploitative. As a result, clients 
of TES firms avoided hiring TES employees as they did not want to be associated with the 
 
180 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is an independent, juristic body that helps 
to resolve disputes and offers advice and training on labour relations, with jurisdiction in all the provinces. It is 
mainly state-funded and has on its governing body representatives from government, business and labour, each with 
three representatives. The main function of the CCMA is to try to resolve disputes through conciliation. If 
conciliation fails, the CCMA may resolve the dispute through arbitration (Department of Labour, 2007). 
181 During 1997 that the Report of the September Commission on ‘The Future of the Unions’ was tabled at 
COSATU’s Congress. The report argued that labour market flexibility, as a key characteristic of globalisation, 
generates increased differentiation and fragmentation of the organised working class. The report stated that labour 
market flexibility results in an increase in non-standard forms of employment and workers who are vulnerable and 
difficult to organise. By 1999, COSATU took a bold step and called for a total ban of TES work or ‘labour broking’ 
but without success. Since then the issue of representing and organising non-standard workers remained point of 
contention for organised labour (LRS, 2014). This ongoing campaign against labour brokers is well documented in 
the South African press. 
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negativity surrounding the industry (Int11. p154. Par22-26). A union participant regarded this 
campaign as successful as it had highlighted the plight of TES workers and placed pressure on 
the government to change the laws for TES work. However, a senior employee at an employer 
confederation believed that unions use the TES industry as a rallying tool to poach members 
from each other, usually correlating with election time (Int30.p502. Par.47).  
More in line with Heery’s (2004) engagement and regulation strategies, a senior member of staff 
from a union federation disagreed with the call to ban TES work and regarded the campaign as 
unsuccessful. This participant itemised several alternate union strategies to protect and represent 
TES workers, such as raising TES worker issues during sector related negotiations and 
investigating and questioning working conditions during their site visits. These strategies may 
include requesting access to details concerning wages, benefits, period of employment and 
reasons for their employment. The rationale behind this strategy was that TES workers were 
frequently afraid to report illegalities to their union or to the Department of Labour inspectors as 
they fear that their contracts will be terminated (Int12. p168. Par50). Union visits to TES worker 
premises was therefore vital to ascertain first-hand whether they were being treated in line with 
their legal rights.  In addition, according to this participant, TES employees were often unskilled 
or semi-skilled and in some cases illiterate. They were frequently unaware of their rights and 
required union officials to provide awareness of the provisions of legislation to ensure that they 
are treated fairly. 
Many a time, some of these people are not literate people they are not aware of legislation the 
things they are entitled to and they need therefore somebody to tell them and we see that as the 
role of the trade unions such as [name of union]. We will go into the workplace we will look at 
the people that’s employed and we will look at their status. We are entitled to ask those 
questions and then we will make sure that they receive a fair dispensation. (Int12. p169. 
Par52). 
9.4. Union strategies of inclusion and exclusion 
In general, non-standard employees pose a challenge for traditional actors of industrial relations 
because of the difficulties in defining, aggregating, ‘voicing’ and representing interests of a 
heterogeneous workforce (Czarzasty, 2017, p. 111). While a strategy of exclusion is a common 
response, unions cannot afford to ignore non-standard forms of employment as this is a growing 
segment of the labour force (Czarzasty, 2017). As discussed in the literature review, theories of 
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union revitalisation argue that unions increasingly seek to recruit atypical workers and bargain 
on their behalf. This they do as a result of an increasingly hostile environment for labour and to 
regain their bargaining power (Benassi and Doriatti, 2014). Goldthorpe (1984) believes that both 
inclusion and exclusion are viable strategies for unions to maintain their labour market power. 
However, Benassi and Doriatti (2014) argue that little research exists on the conditions under 
which unions choose one or the other of these options and that their decision ultimately depends 
on how they define their boundaries and constituencies. Benassi and Doriatti (2014, p.2) argue 
that  
The inclusion of peripheral workers into unions depends on the changing perception of 
potential alignment of interests between the union and its core members, on the one hand, 
and either management or peripheral employees, on the other. 
 
Interestingly, in South Africa, research conducted by Naidoo and Frye (2005, p.197)182 found 
that as far back as 2000, the National Congress of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU)  identified the recruitment and organising of informal sector and atypical workers as 
‘a major and necessary challenge’. At that time, a COSATU resolution committed each 
COSATU affiliate to develop a strategy for recruitment of informal and atypical workers. The 
resolution called for the release of adequate resources for the campaign and identified four key 
strategies. Firstly, they were to organise a range of types of workers in the informal economy but 
target certain categories first. Secondly, they were to address gender dynamics of the informal 
economy. Thirdly, creative organising strategies were to be developed for informal workers 
whose work situation was too different to fit into existing categories of informal work. Finally, 
they were to recognise the voice of informal workers by not attempting to speak on their behalf. 
These historical efforts reflect a strategy of inclusion of atypical workers as far back as 2000. 
In the current study, participants focused much of their responses on the difficulties that unions 
face when attempting to include TES employees. The reasons for these difficulties varied. Some 
participants believed that due to the internal structure of unions, and especially in situations 
where agency shop agreements183 prevail, unions have little interest in TES employees, and they 
 
182 Naidoo being the Director of the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI). 
183 In terms of Section 25 of the LRA 1995, an agency shop agreement allows the employer to deduct an agreed fee 
from the wages of non-union employees, that is paid into a special fund administered by the union party. The fee 
may be deducted without the employees’ consent (Grogan, 2017). See table 1 above for further details. 
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are excluded from being represented. A detailed account of their responses is set out under six 
headings that depict the themes that emerged from the interviews. 
9.4.1. TES employees fear reprisals from employers if they join a union 
A legal participant, who is an acting labour court judge, acknowledged the insecurity of TES 
workers in the workplace.  He observed that they are afraid to join trade unions making them 
difficult to recruit (Int33. Vol 2. p30. Par16). This view was supported by a senior member of a 
union who stated that the reason that TES employees were not unionised was not because unions 
fail to include them and fight for their rights, but because they do fight for their rights. The 
participant explained that union representatives ask questions about TES employees’ 
remuneration and benefits at meetings held with the employers. If it transpires that there has been 
abuse, unions will ensure that the situation is corrected. As a result, unionised TES employees 
stand a good chance of losing their employment as they are perceived as ‘troublemakers’ (Int12. 
p173-174. Par90). ‘If you were looking for a stick in the dark, you'll find it … there will be a 
problem in his work, and then he will be charged, and eventually they will get rid of the so-called 
problem’ (Int12. p174. Par92-94). 
The idea that TES workers fear reprisals from their employers if they join a union, was one of 
the outcomes of a project embarked on by a large union and large TES firm. This was an 
experimental project mentioned by a participant who is a senior union employee.184 The purpose 
of the initiative was for the union to ascertain how to improve representation and inclusion of 
TES workers. In addition, the project aimed to alter negative perceptions of unions in the TES 
industry (Int12. p179. Par137). After the most recent amendments to the labour legislation, an 
employer’s association group randomly selected five hundred people who were then employed 
with TES firms within their group (Int12. p178. Par126-130). The employer’s association 
subsidised the union membership fees for these five hundred185 individuals for a period of six 
months. These individuals were placed on the membership list of a large, well established union 
(Int12. p178. Par132). The union met with these individuals on a regular basis to provide union 
services to them ‘as normal members.’ In addition, the union had monthly feedback meetings 
 
 
184 The project was also mentioned by an employer’s association participant. 




with the employer’s association. At these feedback sessions, complaints and concerns were 
raised and experiences shared. Mutual concerns were resolved, and the union was perceived as a 
positive influence, working together with the employer for the benefit of the employees (Int12. 
pp178-179. Par134).  
Problems arose after the initial six-month period when TES employees were required to pay the 
full union membership fee. A large number resigned from the union. The employees advised that 
while the employer subsidised their union membership, they ‘were protected’ but when the fees 
were their own responsibility, that protection ceased (Int12. pp177-178. Par122). The 
employees’ fears were relayed to the employer party and assurances were provided to the 
employees, but they still left the union (Int12. p179. Par136).  
However, an employer’s association participant expressed a different view as to why TES 
employees did not retain their union membership after the project came to an end. This 
participant believed that unions need to recreate their value proposition as younger workers no 
longer require union representation as they are willing to express their own opinions and 
represent themselves (Int30. P504. Par54). 
9.4.2. Unions rely on a traditional ‘job for life’ model and do not cater for a 
changing world of work 
The concept of a ‘job for life’ being an outdated concept in a changing world of work, was a 
prominent theme that emerged from the interviews. Some participants believed unions relied 
heavily on a traditional model of employment, being full-time and permanent. In line with this 
theme, an employment lawyer participant believed that the unions were finding it difficult to 
include TES employees as the world of work was changing. Accordingly, the ‘average eighteen 
to twenty-two-year-old’ is not interested in belonging to a trade union or having a ‘job for life’.  
They say, listen here, I don’t need protection if this job doesn’t work out. I'm going to 
leave in any case, I'm not looking at a job for life. They realised that that promise for a 
job for life is a load of rubbish. And no one can promise you that. So, the youth are 
prepared to be mobile, they are not scared of going to another country taking a part time 
job, doing a bit of a jobbing here, doing a bit of jobbing there (Int14.p204. Par.40). 
This employment lawyer participant believed that unions needed to change their focus and 
approach to include and retain membership. Accordingly, unions needed to become more 
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‘electronic, much more act driven, much more benefit type driven. Like the Discovery Medical 
Aid186, … it is not about the medical aid anymore it is about the vitality and the discounts’ 
(Int14.p204. Par.42). A CEO of a large TES firm corroborated this view and stated that unions 
have a ‘very conservative approach to employment’ as young people have a desire for 
technology and information, they do not want to be in the same job for twenty years ‘They want 
to be in a job maybe for six months a year, two years maybe and then move on’ (Int15. pp224-
225. Par75). A senior employee at an employer confederation pointed out that this concept of ‘a 
job for life’, is one of the most difficult concepts to challenge. ‘I think our strategy in South 
Africa is still very industrial orientated. This idea of a very labour intensive industry and people 
who have these permanent jobs … is very sort of old style’ (Int30.pp502-503. Par.48). 
Unions’ reliance on a traditional ‘old style’ model of work was also raised by a participant who 
for many years held senior positions in different government departments concerned with labour 
and employment issues. The participant perceived the union movement as distant from the ‘real 
issues’ concerning the TES industry and referred to the National Economic Development Labour 
Advisory Council (NEDLAC) negotiations prior to the latest legislation amendments as an 
example of this argument. According to the participant, organised labour negotiated a ‘perfectly 
good Rolls Royce solution’ for TES employees that they do not represent and have agreed on 
views that support an ‘old fashioned’ approach to work (Int19.p290. Par.46-50). 
It suits them if guys are employed in mainstream old-fashioned work. It fails to take into 
account the changing nature of work i.e. that people work different hours people don’t 
work in mainstream jobs anymore… taking into account the fourth industrial revolution 
of IT and stuff, the nature of work is changing. In fact, … lots of people actually do 
maybe want to contract (Int19.p291. Par.52-54). 
A link between this ‘mainstream, old-fashioned’ model of work and union fees was made by a 
senior attorney participant, who argued that unions exclude TES workers as they cannot be relied 
on to pay their membership fees. This participant outlined their understanding of how unions 
perceive TES employees: 
 
186 Discovery Medical Aid (private medical insurance) in South Africa has a ‘Vitality’ programme that they define 
as ‘the world’s leading science-based behavioural-change programme that encourages and rewards you for living 
healthier, driving well and banking well’. These rewards may include half-price movies, flight savings, cash back on 
groceries, fuel savings and the like (Discovery, 2019). 
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I cannot really count on that membership because they might, if they are not permanent, 
they don’t pay subscriptions all the time. And in the end, it is all about the money 
(Int29.p489. Par.148). 
Another participant believed it was not the inability of union members to pay fees that was 
prohibitive, but that joining a union was not in line with TES employees’ values. This senior 
executive at a large TES firm suggested that trade unions' value propositions were outdated, as 
young TES employees were more concerned about disposable income than political issues. The 
participant explained that the average age of a union member in South Africa is in the upper 
forties and that eighty percent of the people placed by TES firms were young.  
So, the youth of today as you know are radically different, they couldn’t give a rat’s arse 
about even the political issues necessarily, you know they want a mobile phone, and 
smart phone, and they want apps, and they want disposable income. So, I think that 
unions are totally mismatched with the sort of people that we place (Int3. p43. Par164).  
The idea that unions were focusing or ‘targeting’ TES employees using the wrong strategies was 
supported by another senior member of staff of a large TES firm. Unions’ modus operandi and 
organising strategies were ‘out of touch and out of date with the realities of the current world of 
work’ (Vol 2: Int32.p17. Par.182). This participant believed that an increasing number of 
employees were opting to be employed by TES firms. For example, it afforded them increased 
mobility and improved their chances of finding further employment. The TES firm’s role was to 
seek employment opportunities and ensure the employee remains in employment for longer - an 
important factor considering the high unemployment rate187 in South Africa (Vol 2: Int32.p17. 
Par.182).  
A changing world of work and increased mobility has created further problems for organised 
labour, according to a participant who works for an employer’s association. According to this 
participant ‘knowledge economy workers’ are not catered for under the traditional services 
offered by unions. These workers command a salary based on their skills, the market and other 
factors and consequently do not require the mass negotiation skills offered by organised labour. 
In addition, the trade union environment in South Africa is sector specific and TES employees 
are often mobile and flexible, as pointed out by the previous participant. For example, a TES 
worker may work a day in a logistics company, a manufacturer the next and a hotel the third, 
covering three different sectors in a week. As a result, the employee would need to belong to a 
 
187 The unemployment rate for Q1:2018 was 26.7 percent (Stats SA, 2018) 
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different sector specific trade union for each of those days and this is not a viable option 
(Int30.pp504-505. Par.58).  
Moreover, South African unions have traditionally organised certain categories of employees, 
such as mineworkers, construction employees and hospitality employees.188 However, TES 
employees are engaged in different types of work and do not have a clear position in the labour 
market (Int21.p346. Par.52). A participant who has spent many years working for unions in 
senior positions, pointed out that that it would be impossible to have a different union for every 
different workplace that engages TES workers ‘it just isn't feasible to be able to organise like 
that. You have to have a membership across at least a sector’ (Int21.p348. Par.72). Despite these 
difficulties, the participant understood that unions should ‘stop just recruiting workers who 
traditionally have been recruited’ and focus on employees who ‘are maybe not technically 
workers in the traditional sense, but frankly suffer many of the same problems’ (Int21.p347. 
Par.58-60).  
‘Dualisation’ has been described as the division between workers who have stable jobs, a regular 
salary and decent working conditions and those precarious workers who occupy unstable and 
poorly protected jobs (Kalleberg, 2011; Manky, 2018). In the ‘traditional’ industries such as 
mining, favoured by unions, these differences are particularly stark (Manky, 2018). In this 
context, an interesting link between the reluctance of TES workers to join unions and the unions’ 
focus on certain traditional categories of full-time employees, was provided by a participant who 
is a director of an international organisation (Int17.p258. Par.52). TES employees are reluctant to 
join unions as unionisation is associated with traditional, fulltime employment at a mine or 
factory, and there is a negative perception of TES workers amongst these ‘traditional’ 
employees. According to this participant, these negative sentiments stem from their belief that 
TES workers are used to undermine both the benefit and the negotiating power of organised 
labour. When members of a union go on strike, the non-unionised temporary workers continue to 
perform their work functions, which raises the ire of organised labour (Int17.p258. Par.54). 
 
188 In a 1997 COSATU document that assesses the changing nature of the labour market in South Africa, COSATU 
committed itself to the strategic objective of organising ‘vulnerable sectors.’ The construction industry, farming, 
parts of retail and catering, domestic sectors, contract cleaning and security services were characterised as 
vulnerable. They were sectors in which the labour process, working conditions and production cycle combined to 
make it difficult to build stable organisations or maintain membership (COSATU, 1997). 
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Consequently, unions will need to ‘reimagine their business model’ to recruit not only their 
traditional full-time paid employees, but temporary workers (Int17.pp258-259. Par.58). 
Bargaining councils offer a further deterrent for unionisation of TES employees, according to a 
participant who is the owner of a TES firm. If TES employees enter a workplace governed by a 
bargaining council agreement, that forum dictates the terms and conditions of employment and 
there is therefore little need for trade union intervention (Vol 2: Int32.p17. Par.184). In addition, 
if TES employees are embroiled in a workplace dispute, they can approach a dispute resolution 
centre under the auspices of the bargaining council and they are entitled to represent themselves, 
if they so wish. 
In changing the way that unions traditionally attempt to include TES employees, a senior 
member of a prominent union suggests that unions may consider offering additional benefits to 
union membership. Some larger unions have offered benefits such as medical aid and insurance. 
However, this participant believed that only larger unions have the resources to run ‘benefit 
unions.’ The participant acknowledged that these benefits do attract members, but most unions 
do not have the additional resources required (Int26.p443. Par.171-172). For unions who do not 
have the required resources, this participant offered further advice, ‘so, you have to prove 
yourself in action’ (Int26.p443. Par.174).  
First of all, you have to get to all these people, you need dedicated organisers who will go 
out there, and who actually engage with workers. And that often is going to the factory at 
05h00 in the morning, being there at 23h00 at night, you know when the next shift comes 
out. It means proving that you got a … good deal, not just on wages, but on holidays, 
medical aid, provident fund... They are interested in you know, the long-term interest in 
them and their families (Int26.pp443-444. Par.178-180). 
9.4.3. Union fees and agency shop agreements 
Union membership fees as a deterrent for TES employees joining unions was discussed with a 
few of the participants. Once a union has been officially recognised by the Department of 
Labour, the union can apply for the employer to deduct union subscriptions directly from the 
employee’s wages.189 Unless the employer has good reason not to deduct the money, they are 
legally obliged to do so. Traditionally, union fees are one percent of the employee’s salary. A 
 
189 Section 13(1) of the LRA states that any employee who is a member of a representative trade union may 




union participant explained that all workers were likely to raise issues of affordability, with no 
noticeable distinction between vulnerable workers and other workers (Int26.pp444-445. Par.182-
190). Interestingly, this participant mentioned that higher paid employees were more likely to 
object to paying the fees as they perceived the one percent of their salaries as a substantial 
amount. Another participant who had spent many years working for unions in senior positions, 
believed that union fees were a deterrent to recruiting non-standard employees.   
A lot of these workers are so poor that there's no way they could join anyway, and it is 
not good having a union which the workers are not financially organisationally 
committed to. You can't be organised from an office (Int21.p347. Par.60). 
This view was supported by a senior executive at a large TES firm, who argued that unions fail 
to include TES employees, as these employees prefer disposable income and do not want to 
spend one percent of their income per month on trade union membership. Due to the South 
African economic situation, TES employees would rather spend it on transport, food or airtime 
(Int3. p43. Par166).  
Apart from the actual membership fees payable, participants also mentioned agency shop 
agreements as a deterrent to unionisation amongst TES employees. A senior government 
department participant warned that if trade unions wished to operate in the temporary 
employment sector, they would have to carefully reconsider agency shop agreements. This 
participant believed that unions should not impose the high costs of membership and the benefits 
of collective bargaining on the lower income workers. Consequently, unions would need 
innovative ways of dealing with their fees without excluding the temporary employment sector 
(Int22.p374. Par.124). This participant went so far as to suggest that the reason why TES 
employees are moving away from the traditional union membership, and towards non-profit 
organisations and other associations, was the cost of union membership and the agency shop 
contribution (Int22.p374. Par.130). This view was supported by a participant who had spent 
many years working for the union movement in South Africa. The participant believed that 
unions have no need or desire to re-orientate themselves and as a result exclude TES workers 
because of agency shop agreements. 
That movement is in terminal decline. I mean, if you know these organisations, then you 
know it is impossible to see who in those organisations will take the trouble to re-
orientate them. Why should they? They earn huge salaries, they got all kinds of benefits, 
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the money pours in through the agency shop agreements that they have, especially the 
public-sector ones, and the state is the biggest users of these precarious forms of labour. 
The public-sector unions have these agreements with the state - agency shop agreements. 
They get millions a month they don’t have to organise. The organisers sit there with big 
salaries, they’ve got cars which are subsidised, they have you know, their whatever, their 
laptop computers and their cell phones and why should they bother… I worked in the 
organisation for a long time, so I'm not saying this as an outsider you know [chuckle] 
(Int9.p136-137. Par.76-82). 
Another union participant focused on the difficulties experienced by unions in collecting the 
membership fees from TES employees. As mentioned above, once a union is recognised by the 
Department of Labour, the employer is obliged to deduct union subscriptions directly from the 
employee’s wages. However, this participant explained that employers try to circumvent these 
responsibilities in relation to TES workers. This participant suggested that the problem may be 
avoided if unions resort to collecting union membership fees directly from the employees and not 
through the company. The participant pointed out that this was not a new concept for unions in 
South Africa. During the apartheid years, union organisers had to physically stand at the gate of 
the workplace to collect fees from the employees as they left the promises on a Friday after 
work. ‘So, we have to find a way of getting back to that early tradition, while of course not 
stopping the pressure on employers to deduct money’ (Int21.p354. Par.146). 
9.4.4. Trade Unions’ internal affairs and lack of resources  
An interesting study conducted by Paret (2018) drew on interviews with COSATU officials and 
workers in 2013. The study examined how union activists understood their relationship to the 
unemployed and local protests within residential areas.190 Paret (2018) stateed that according to 
official statistics at the time, trade union members accounted for 30.7 percent of employees (this 
number excludes employers, own account workers, and unpaid workers in household 
businesses), and about 17 percent of the entire South African labour force (including the 
unemployed and the aforementioned groups of excluded workers). Union members therefore 
represent a shrinking proportion of the labour force in South Africa (Paret, 2018). A legal 
participant in this study observed a decline in general union membership in South Africa from 
about 50 percent in the 1990's, to approximately 23.5 percent currently (Int20.p323. Par.74). This 
 
190  This study revealed support for union involvement in extra-workplace struggles and the results showed that 
South Africa’s social movement unionism remains strong. Paret (2018) found that some union activists felt the need 
to discipline, educate or speak for the unemployed and that this ‘paternalistic’ view may become an obstacle to 
broad working-class solidarity in South Africa. 
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decline in union membership was also mentioned by a senior mediator and arbitrator. Referrals 
received from unions representing their members were less than 40 percent of their overall 
referrals and could be as low as 30 percent. The participant believed that this was due to union 
density dropping over the last decade in all sectors of the economy (Int18.p273. Par.94). The 
participant believes that decreased union membership, results in decreased fees payed to unions. 
This in turn creates a situation where unions are forced to ‘rationalise’ themselves and question 
themselves on how to remain relevant and retain even their current membership (Int18.p274. 
Par.100). Under these generally difficult circumstances, unionising the TES industry poses many 
additional challenges. The participant stated that in attempting to recruit union members trade 
union officials are met with many logistical and resource problems. For instance, a province in 
South Africa could be an area of 360 x 360 kilometres and there would be approximately six 
union officials working in that vast area. Under these circumstances, with different employers 
throughout the region, it has been near impossible for unions to access TES employees scattered 
throughout these large areas (Int18.p274. Par.102). In addition to the sheer size of the region that 
each union organiser needs to contend with, the ‘intangible body’ of TES employees causes 
additional hardships for the unions. This point was raised by a participant who is the head of 
human resources at a large retail company, and a TES client. 
It is very hard for unions to actually organise and get membership and have a voice in that. 
And so, it becomes a sort of intangible body for them to create a membership base in, and 
therefore they have an issue with it (Int16. p242. Par66). 
Further logistical difficulties experienced in unionising TES employees were mentioned by a 
legal participant who acts on behalf of union clients. As mentioned in paragraph 9.4.2., unions 
traditionally want workers to have long term employment, at a single workplace, to facilitate stop 
orders and the establishment of local regional offices (Int20.p323. Par.76). Generally, unions 
require stability in order to form leadership structures at the local level. The participant pointed 
out that when workers are itinerant and very precarious, it is not possible for them to establish 
stable structures, resulting in union breakdown. The participant believes that because of the 
breakdown in the union structure, unions exclude TES employees ‘unions either won't let them 
join, or don’t assist them’ (Int20.p326. Par.102) and are reluctant to fight for their rights 
(Int20.p323. Par.78). This participant argues that because the union membership has shrunk, 
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union organisers are consequently under resourced, overworked, underpaid and out of their depth 
‘they just don’t know what's going on’ (Int20.pp326-327. Par.108). 
In addition to declining membership, the decrease in resources and tricky logistical issues, the 
internal ‘politics’ of South African unions are a further deterrent to the unionisation of TES 
workers.191 An employment attorney participant, who often acts on behalf of unions, explained 
that unions have experienced internal upheaval resulting in a change in their leadership, 
orientation and focus; ‘there is a crisis in this sphere of the unions, that the unions themselves 
have readily spoken about’ (Int7. P114. Par40). This participant believes that the internal 
changes and ‘crises’ that unions face has affected their ability to involve themselves with TES 
issues. As a result, unions have not done enough to bring the legislative amendments that assist 
TES workers into full force (Int7. P114. Par40). An owner of a TES firm supported this view and 
believes that unions are increasingly perceived as being ‘more political than addressing the bread 
and butter issues of workers in the workplace’, in other words being increasingly more involved 
in the external political arena (Vol 2: Int32.p18. Par.190). According to this participant, until 
trade unions start to change their trajectory and their outlook, there will be an increase in 
employees leaving the trade union fold (Vol 2: Int32.p18. Par.196). One union participant 
warned that unions are not just ineffective but corrupt, with leaders ‘embezzling members 
money. So obviously you can see why workers wouldn’t want to join a union like that’ 
(Int21.p348. Par.70). 
9.4.5. ‘Flexible networks’ and new ways of organising 
Overcoming tough economic circumstances, limited resources and the need to reach non-
standard employees, are difficulties experienced by unions in many countries. According to 
Czarzasty (2017), non-standard workers are not ‘natural clientele’ for trade unions. This 
heterogeneous workforce lacks stability and socio-economic security and requires ‘different 
institutional arrangements to facilitate their interests: not stable structures but flexible networks’ 
(Czarzasty, 2017, p114). For example, Lithuanian trade unions battle limited human and 
financial resources, and market related problems such as low minimum wages, low living 
 
191   By ‘politics’ it is believed that the participant was referring to the recent upheavals in the general union 
movement in South Africa. SAFTU was three years in the making. In 2014, COSATU expelled NUMSA, its largest 
and most radical affiliate, after the metalworkers’ union withdrew its electoral support for the ANC, COSATU’s 
alliance partner. The next year, the trade federation dismissed its general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, who became 
SAFTU’s first general secretary (Luckett and Munshi, 2017). 
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standards, a low incentive to work and scarcity of skills due to high emigration rates (Blažiene 
and Gruževskis, 2017). Despite these limitations, trade unions have survived the economic 
downturn by co-operating with foreign trade unions, employers, civil society and international 
organisations (Blažiene and Gruževskis, 2017). These trade unions consider non-government 
organisations (NGOs) as partners in the pursuit of their political objectives to reach the youth 
and attract new members to their ranks. Similarly, Bernaciak and Kahancová (2017) point out 
that in developing countries, unions often cooperate with social movements and NGOs on rule 
enforcement and social justice issues (Moody 1997; Waterman 2001).  
As far back as 2006, the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) in 
their The state of COSATU: phase one report, stated that if COSATU wished to expand its 
organisation in the non-core employees it should consider innovative social movement strategies 
for organising externalised workers, such as ‘mobilising them on a community-wide basis’ rather 
than trying to establish shop steward structures and negotiating relations with each sweatshop 
employer. They furthermore recommended that COSATU ‘build alliances with community 
organisations and social movements to strengthen efforts to organise in the non-core zone’ 
(NALEDI, 2006, 16). In addition, NALEDI (2006, p.16) suggested that COSATU should 
establish alliances with organisations that do have appropriate structures and organising practices 
and assist them with resources and joint campaigns. Where such organisations did not exist, they 
recommended that COSATU facilitate or support the establishment of such organisations. 
Years later, Bonner and Spooner (2011) similarly emphasised the importance of relationship 
building to increase visibility, influence and institutional power. They examined organising 
labour in the informal economy, more specifically relationships between informal workers’ 
organisations, trade unions and NGOs. They conclude that a flexible, multi-faceted approach to 
organising is required. In South Africa, Barchiesi and Kenny (2008) come to a similar conclusion 
Due to high unemployment, the proliferation of contingent occupations, and growing 
labour market fragmentation, many intellectuals and trade unionists argue that unions are 
at risk of being marginalised unless they rebuild alliances with activists and social 
movements articulating the struggles of non-union workers, the unemployed, and 
marginalised communities (Barchiesi and Kenny, 2008). 
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In the present study, participants from the employer, union and client perspective mentioned that 
TES workers in South Africa were moving away from joining unions and experimenting with 
‘new ways of organising’ (Int9. pp129-130. Par6). From the interviews, a strong impression was 
left that TES workers were organising themselves with the help of non-profit, voluntary 
organisations, or simply forming ‘self-sorted committees’ or associations (Int16. p242. Par72) as 
an alternative and not in partnership with existing unions.  A participant who spent many years 
working for the union movement explained that TES employees are beginning to organise 
themselves in this fashion as a result of the traditional union movement failing to include TES 
workers (Int9. pp129-130. Par6). However, this participant stressed that this ‘new way of 
organising’ is still in its experimental phase and covers new terrain for all involved; ‘the old way 
of organising is not working, but the new way has not yet emerged very clearly’ (Int9. p130. 
Par6). The participant stated that TES workers have responded ‘magnificently’ to the idea of 
organising themselves and their quest is to exercise their rights under section 198A of the LRA 
1995 (Int9. p131. Par18). TES workers are quite determined to set up workers committees and 
workers’ councils, outside of the traditional union structures (Int9. pp131-132. Par26).  The 
participant has noticed that not only are there no unions involved in most cases, but where unions 
are involved, the TES workers are hostile towards them (Int9. p132. Par32).  
There is I mean like Simba Chips we've got Heineken we've got Proctor & Gamble you 
know the big companies like that, Nestle, then on the other hand there are big national 
companies like Pick 'n Pay, Shoprite, you know Barloworld, Luxor Paint, companies like 
that, where workers have organised themselves into these various committees, and have 
entered into negotiations with their employers, and the employers have been obliged to 
respond because the workers have organised (Int9. p132. Par32).192  
The prevalence of these non-profit organisations and associations was stressed by an 
employment law attorney participant who works for a large firm. This participant had dealt with 
non-profit organisations rather than unions in all matters relating to TES referrals. 
 
Whenever we see TES's especially large referrals coming up for a declaration from the 
CCMA of a deemed employer.…I haven't had one yet where they [a non-profit 
organisation] haven't been involved. But I haven't actually dealt with a union. I've dealt 
 
192 Secondary data in the form of newspaper reports and an online petition 
https://awethu.amandla.mobi/petitions/tell-heineken-to-stop-abusing-labour-broker-workers-in-south-africa, mention 
the relationship between TES workers and some of the companies mentioned by this participant. See (Smit, 2017; 
Smit, 2018; Brandt, 2018). 
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with a number of TES matters and not once have I dealt with a union (Int28.p468. 
Par.152-156). 
 
The idea that TES employees were opting for alternatives to unions was corroborated by a senior 
human resources employee at a large retailer, who is also a client in the TES industry. This 
participant stated that apart from the traditional unions, or groups organised by non-profit 
organisation and self-sorted committees, there are ‘associations’ of TES employees emerging. 
The participant described these associations as small clusters of independent groups that claim to 
represent labour broker employees and who have become quite effective in certain places. ‘So, 
Shoprite I think about a year or two ago, it got a significant strike at its Midrand distribution 
centre and that was through an organisation that was unheard of until the day the workers 
downed tools’ (Int16. p242. Par72). The participant believes that these associations are as a 
result of the changes to the legislation as they are using the new legislation as a vehicle to 




Generally, participants viewed unions as key actors in the TES environment, partly due to their 
historical importance in the South African labour market. However, there was a marked view of 
despondency amongst participants regarding the union movement’s attempts at recruiting, 
assisting and representing TES workers. This, according to the participants, is in stark contrast to 
the traditionally active role in pursuing employee rights under difficult circumstances during the 
apartheid years. Several of the participants acknowledged the real difficulties faced by the union 
movement because of decreasing membership and resources, logistical hindrances and the 
sector-orientated collective bargaining arena. However, the participants also placed the blame on 
the union movement’s outdated support of a ‘job for life’ concept that fails to consider the needs 
of young TES employees and ‘knowledge economy workers’. Some participants urge union 
officials to return to ‘old fashioned’ principles of organising, which entail working hard and 
taking an interest in their member’s lives. In addition, according to a few participants, the union 
 
193 Secondary data in the form of a news article supports this statement. The article mentions that outsourced 
Shoprite workers organised under the #OutsourcingMustFall movement went on strike to protest against poor pay 
and their employment through labour brokers at Shoprite’s (a large retailer) largest distribution centre in the 
Gauteng province (Reporter, 2016). 
283 
 
movement should re-think their fee-structures and agency shop agreements to attract TES 
employees. The experimental project mentioned by one participant, where 500 employees’ 
membership fees were paid by a TES firm that was committed to improving the TES union-
employer relationship, had a positive outcome for the those who participated. The participants 
involved encouraged an alternative to the traditionally highly acrimonious relationship between 
unions and the TES industry.  
TES workers organising themselves with the help of non-profit, voluntary organisations, or 
forming ‘self-sorted committees’ or associations as an alternative and not in partnership with 
existing unions, pose a challenge for the trade union movement. In other jurisdictions, these 
organisations have successfully worked in partnership with unions to assist non-standard 
employees. One participant suggested that this was a new way of organising in South Africa and 
















CHAPTER 10: ANALYSIS 
The chapter contains two sections. The first will summarise the main findings in relation to the 
research questions. This section includes the current perspectives of TES workers, clients and 
firms. It furthermore looks at the historical and legal context for TES work in South Africa, as 
well as union responses. Following this the second section will discuss how the findings relate to 
the theories, concepts and debates in the literature review.   
 
Section 1: summary of the findings in relation to the research questions 
 
10.1. What is the current position and perspectives of the temporary agency 
worker, firm and client in South Africa? 
10.1.1.  The temporary employment agency worker  
In order to ascertain the position of the temporary agency worker or temporary employment 
services (TES) worker as they are known in South Africa, the starting point would be to establish 
their employment status. In the UK there is a distinction between ‘worker’ and an ‘employee’ 
where a ‘worker’ is a wider category than ‘employee’. All UK employees are workers, but an 
employee has extra employment rights and responsibilities that don’t apply to workers who 
aren’t employees.  in South Africa the same distinction is not made. The word ‘worker’ is not 
defined in the LRA 1995, but ‘employee’ is defined in section 213.194 However, the usual TES 
employment relationship is not covered by section 213 but rather in section 198 of the LRA 
1995. In chapter 9 of the LRA 1995 entitled ‘Regulation of non-standard employment and 
general provisions’, section 198(2) states that: ‘for the purposes of this Act, a person whose 
services have been procured for or provided to a client by a temporary employment service is the 
employee of that temporary employment service, and the temporary employment service is that 
person’s employer’. In the Assign Constitutional Court matter 195 Dlodlo AJ in his majority 
judgement stated that once the employee provides a service to the TES’s client, they 
automatically become the TES’s employee. Dlodlo AJ however clarified at paragraph 56 of the 
judgment, that ‘sitting on the books of a TES does not make you an employee’. Section 198(2) 
 
194 Section 213 reads: ‘any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the 
State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in any manner 
assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer’. 
195 Case CCT 194/17. 
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clearly states that the individual’s services are to be ‘procured for or provided to a client by a 
temporary employment service’. The employment status of the TES worker is important as the 
employment statutes, together with their rights and remedies, do not apply unless the person is an 
employee. As a result, there would be periods where TES workers fall within the reach of the 
employment statutes and the benefits that they hold, and periods where none of the employment 
statutes apply. The negative consequences of the periods of unemployment cannot be 
underestimated.  
One such negative consequence is the TES worker’s right to access medical and pension 
benefits. South Africa has a contributory social insurance system that protects against certain 
contingencies. TES employees have access to the social security minimum rights, but they are 
prejudiced by the fact that contributions accrue on completed days of employment and average 
days of remuneration over a six-month period. Pension and medical benefits are not compulsory 
and TES employees rely on employer, union and bargaining council schemes. These plans may 
exclude certain categories of employees and may provide for a minimum employment period 
before joining. TES employees are therefore likely to receive inferior benefits in terms of these 
provisions.  
In addition to receiving inferior benefits compared to those who are permanently employed, TES 
workers face the reality of long periods of unemployment. The consequences of the high 
unemployment rate (27.6 percent in the first quarter of 2019)196 together with an over-supply of 
unskilled workers, was a strong theme that emerged from the interviews. The participants 
commented on the negative consequences of this economic environment on the TES employee. 
These include a general desperation to find work, and limited options available for those looking 
for employment. It also affects union representation as there is a need to adopt a cautious 
approach to negotiations due to the fear that their members may lose their jobs. Linked to this 
approach is an overall acceptance of low wages, a reluctance to bargain for better conditions and 
a tolerance of an environment of exploitation.  
The reality is that a large component of people in South Africa struggle to access the labour 
market. According to some participants, the access to TES work appears to have three different 
routes. Firstly, through ‘fly-by-night’ TES firms who employ desperate individuals who have no 
 
196 QLFS Q1:2019 Stats SA 
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alternatives and who will accept exploitative conditions. Secondly, through expanded networks 
where TES firms employ the unemployed from a wider group of unemployed individuals. 
Thirdly, individuals are employed from a contained, internal network of workers that are ‘on the 
books’ of the TES firms. 
Due to the dire economic context for South African TES workers, some participants believed 
that TES employees had a greater need for employment security than job security. The idea was 
that the TES industry provided security of employment through upskilling and training, thereby 
increasing their employability. However, long-term security regardless of the format of the 
employment contract, could not be guaranteed. ‘Decent work’ that entailed job security, that in 
turn allowed long-term plans and commitments, was lacking. In this light, a range of different 
views were expressed as to whether TES work was a steppingstone to permanent employment. 
Some TES firms and one client participant believed that TES work did provide access to 
permanent employment. Secondary documentation supported this view as the written contractual 
arrangements between TES firms and TES employees allowed and encouraged permanent 
employment. Alternate views were that TES work provided opportunities rather than 
employment, and that the supply of TES workers encouraged employers to fill permanent 
positions with TES workers therefore discouraging full-time employment. Overall, the 
employment risks that TES employees face, such as the lack of long-term security, made them 
attractive to employers who took advantage of their precarious situation. 
Recent amendments to the employment legislation pertaining to the TES industry has gone a 
long way to protect the TES employee by the introduction of a three month limit for employing 
TES workers before they will be deemed permanent employees of the client and be subject to 
parity provisions that require them to be treated ‘on the whole not less favourably ’ than 
permanent employees of the client. Despite an active legislature, specific legislation dealing with 
the TES employees and a strong legal system in South Africa, some participants believed that 
TES workers still experience inferior working conditions. Due to the high unemployment in 
South Africa, there is a wide belief that ‘a bad job is better than no job’ and TES workers are not 
only willing to work for lower wages and benefits, they are also reluctant to allow unions to 




10.1.2.  The temporary employment agency firm  
Although specific information regarding the size of the South African TES industry remained 
difficult to ascertain, participants agreed that the TES industry is important and growing. TES 
firm participants from large, prominent firms provided useful information about the industry. 
These participants estimated that the total number of temporary or contract workers placed daily 
in only four firms was 117,304 individuals, with approximately 900 000 temporary workers 
placed daily at clients throughout South Africa.  Some participants believed that there were as 
many as 1.5 million TES workers in South Africa at the time the interviews were conducted. 
A large TES firm participant had noticed trends in the demand for different categories of TES 
workers post the 2015 legislation amendments. These trends included the ‘traditional blue-collar 
workers’ category (e.g. general workers through to engineers) experiencing a growth of five to 
six percent. The growth was attributed to this category being a mature market for this TES firm, 
with workers placed daily at clients. Most of these placements were longer term, ‘recurring 
annuity income type’ contracts.  The ‘white collar workers’ category (e.g. bank tellers and call 
centres) had experienced a noticeable decline in demand at this firm. The primary change in this 
category, was from longer term assignments to more contingency work and project based, 
shorter term assignments. The decline in this category was partly attributed to an increase in 
automation, and partly because these clients preferred permanent employees to the potential risks 
associated with employing TES employees for longer periods post the amendments. Professional 
services (e.g. IT professionals, java programmers, systems analysts and developers) saw 
substantial growth in demand. The growth in this area was driven by a skills deficiency or skills 
gap in project management and the IT sector.  
A further trend noticed by some participants was that TES firms increasingly offered a range of 
different staffing solutions to clients. The deeming provision, (section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA 
1995)197 was of concern to TES firm participants as it was no longer possible to offer clients TES 
employees without the fear of litigation. Outsourcing and managed service arrangements were an 
alternate offering to traditional TES services in the light of these changes in legislation. One 
option was the managed service provider (MSP) model. Pienaar and Jamieson (2018) suggest an 
 
197 According to this section, a TES employee earning under the Threshold Amount, who is placed at a client and is 




MSP model that provides a specialised outsourced service to an independent contractor. More 
specifically, the client firm contracts with a service provider who takes over the responsibility for 
all the company's service delivery functions, which might include operational or functional areas, 
cleaning services and the like. The expert MSP then sub-contracts all the required services to 
provide a range of services to the client. This they say, increases the productivity, sales and 
efficiency of the company in typical non-core activities. Some participants mentioned that they 
had noticed the increase in the MSP products offered to clients. It was not clear from the 
information provided whether the structure of the MSP models offered followed the same 
structure as that suggested by Pienaar and Jamieson (2018). Some participants saw it as no 
different to the TES model, just an alternate way to restructure the commercial agreement. 
Others saw these arrangements as ‘complicated schemes’ used to circumvent employee rights.198  
Some participants believed that the TES industry was consolidating as a result of the 2015 
legislation amendments, with the larger firms ‘absorbing’ the medium and smaller sized TES 
firms. The reasons for this trend was that larger firms were able to operate on smaller margins, 
had superior infrastructure, with compliant systems, and correctly trained people to navigate an 
increasingly complex legal landscape. This was generally perceived as a positive trend as the 
smaller firms were considered abusive to their workers and non-compliant. 
TES firms were also increasing their focus on higher-earning TES employees. Some participants 
believed that the focus on TES employees who earn above the Threshold Amount was due to the 
changes in legislation that came into effect in 2015 (e.g. the deeming and parity provisions). 
Participants explained that these higher earners favoured the flexible hours and diversity of TES 
work. They were often home based, working on laptops and TES work catered for this mode of 
work. A high demand existed for their skills as they required less management and TES firms 
made more money from their services (the gross profits ‘GPs’ were higher). Overall, they were 
unlikely to suffer abuse from the client as the power base of the employment relationship was in 
their favour as they were in demand. Critically, the new legislation that came into force in 2015, 
generally only applied to those who earned under the Threshold Amount. 
 
198 Section 7.3.2. discusses section 200B of the LRA 1995. This section deals with joint and several liability of the 
employer in the instance of more than one employer. 
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A strong theme that emerged from the data was the concern raised by the TES firm participants 
about the negative reputation of the TES industry. These concerns included the industry being 
accused of treating employees as commodities. Participant views were however divided 
regarding these negative perceptions. Some participants believed that firms cut corners to save 
costs which led to ill-treatment of employees, rightly earning the industry its reputation.  Others 
believed that the industry was tainted by negative rhetoric and a lack of understanding of how the 
business operated in terms of its overheads and operational costs. These participants believed 
that negativity was perpetuated by two misconceptions. Firstly, a lack of understanding for the 
necessity for flexibility and secondly, a lack of appreciation for how TES business was 
conducted. TES firms had offices and recruitment centres to run, their own staff to pay and 
general overheads ‘like any other business’. They had to train and develop people and ensure that 
they were in line with changing legislation. In addition, TES firms needed to deal with their 
clients’ operational requirements. As a result of these costs, TES firms charge their clients a fee 
in addition to the cost for each TES worker (rate of pay and benefits). TES firm participants 
believed that regardless of any positives that may flow from the TES industry, negative rhetoric 
was hard to counter as it was historically entrenched. However, there was consensus amongst all 
participants interviewed that the ‘bakkie brigade’ were validly criticised for ‘slave driver’ 
practices. 
10.1.3.  The temporary employment agency client 
The reasons why clients use TES firms in South Africa is complex. The desire to circumvent 
union involvement was mentioned by some participants. Some believed that possible union 
avoidance tactics by the clients depended largely on the sector of the client firm. In this regard, 
there was no need to hire TES workers to avoid unionisation in sectors where unionisation was 
weak. Some linked client preference of non-unionisation to factors such as the performance of 
TES workers and the size of the client. In terms of performance, it was argued that TES workers 
performed better because they wanted to be permanently employed. Others believed that smaller 
employers did not have the legal know-how to deal with unions and engaged TES firms to 
remain compliant. Some clients, however, simply did not want to comply with legislation and 
employed bakkie brigade TES firms to avoid union involvement, although some participants 
mentioned that these smaller TES firms were declining in influence. 
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TES employees and fixed term contract employees both offer flexibility and short-term 
employment. The reasons why TES clients chose TES firm employees rather than fixed term 
contract employees, was discussed. Some participants believed TES employees were chosen to 
avoid employer associated risks, or to alleviate the administration ‘hassle’. For example, payroll, 
disciplinary issues and time keeping problems were associated with fixed term or permanent 
staff. Some wished to avoid the employee-related costs, for example redundancy costs and the 
human resources investment needed to remain compliant.   
Participants outlined strategies adopted by TES clients to circumvent the requirements of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation, or Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-
BBEE). For example, they paid severance packages to senior white staff to leave the organisation 
to avoid them being part of the employee population which would affect the BEE scores. 
Thereafter, they hired the same employees back through a TES firm. A senior tax expert 
participant explained that the client company was then able to retain their services at a cost to the 
employer. The costs of the TES service were deductible from a tax perspective, as these costs 
were incurred in the production of income. These arrangements were considered ‘fronting’199 
which is illegal but according to the tax expert participant, remain popular. TES firms were also 
popular in the public sector. For example, local municipalities saved large amounts of money 
hiring TES employees to perform municipal services at a third of the cost of permanent 
employees. These costs were saved at the expense of the TES employees who should have been 
permanently employed by the municipality.  
Clients externalising their employer responsibilities to save costs was a strong theme that 
emerged from the data. The externalisation of payroll responsibilities was popular, with some 
participants believing that running the client’s payroll and being a simple channel for wages, was 
the TES firm’s primary purpose. In addition, economies of scale optimisation influenced the 
initial engagement of the client. In the past, TES firms would initially meet with the human 
resources and production departments to assess their TES needs. However, they now met with 
the procurement and finance departments which was indicative of the fact that clients prioritised 
cost cutting. One TES client participant expressed concern that TES workers were often hired at 
 
199 ‘Fronting’ means a deliberate circumvention or attempted circumvention of the B-BBEE Act and the Codes. It 
involves the reliance on data or claims of compliance based on misrepresentations of facts, either by the party 
claiming compliance, or by any other person (DTI, 2014). 
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the expense of the company’s values, despite the cost efficiencies they offer, as the company 
used TES employees for existing, permanent positions at the company. The interplay between 
economic forces and the TES industry ensures that the TES client still exerts commercial control 
over the TES firm by undercutting prices and treating employees as commodities. Due to dire 
economic conditions and exceptionally high unemployment, TES clients were able to manipulate 
the relationship to achieve the cheapest rate possible and to find loopholes in legislation to 
benefit their organisations at the expense of the TES worker.  
Greater workforce flexibility emerged as a key reason for using TES employees. Participants 
discussed the reasons why flexibility was important to the TES client. These included the 
efficient operation of the business, remaining profitable during difficult financial times, and 
ensuring global competitiveness. Using TES firms assisted with the ‘peaks and valleys’ 
experienced in business and allowed them to concentrate on their core functions. Clients were 
also able to externalise their legal, industrial relations (IR) and human resources management 
(HRM) functions by using TES firms. This was important as clients often did not have the know-
how, time or resources to engage in areas such as dismissal processes and IR. They also lacked 
the legal expertise and HR infrastructure to navigate the payroll for temporary employees, 
especially if there were shift patterns involved. In general, these participants perceived TES 
firms as having the necessary skills to deal with these complex issues. From a negative 
perspective, participants believed that this desire for flexibility led to the casualisation of 
permanent jobs and the erosion of job security for these workers.  
10.2. What is the regulatory framework for temporary agency work in South 
Africa and the response of key groups to this framework? 
In considering the legal framework for temporary agency workers in South Africa, this thesis 
focused on two important employment statutes namely, The Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 
of 1995) (LRA 1995), and The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 (No. 75 of 1997) 
(BCEA). Recent amendments to these statutes were promulgated during 2015. Section 198 of the 
LRA 1995, that deals with temporary agency or TES work, was of interest to the participants and 
therefore discussed in some depth. In particular, the ‘deeming provision’, Section 198A(3)(b)(i) 
of the LRA 1995 concerns the identity of the employer party and Section 198A(5) of the LRA 
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1995 contains the principles of non-discrimination relevant to the TES relationship, termed the 
‘parity provision’ in this thesis. 
Participants’ views regarding the meaning of the deeming provision varied as the interviews 
were conducted prior to the Constitutional Court (CC) judgement in the Assign matter.  The CC 
in a landmark ruling on 26 July 2018, subsequently ruled that the language in section 198A of 
the LRA1995 was clear and that the TES client was the sole employer of the TES employee after 
a period of three months. Opinions expressed concerning this three-month period ranged from 
participants who believed that three months was far too short, to participants who were of the 
view that there should be no waiting period for the provisions of Section 198 to take effect. 
These participants felt that any waiting period allowed a loophole for employers to abuse TES 
employees.  
With regard to the parity provision, the amended Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995 provides that 
TES employees employed for more than three months must not be treated less favourably than 
an employee employed on a permanent basis who performs the same or similar work, unless 
there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. Most participants acknowledged that there 
had been a need for a change in this area of the law as TES employees were historically more 
likely to receive inferior pay and benefits than permanently employed employees of the TES 
client. However, concern was expressed that if the new parity provisions were suddenly 
implemented, the increased costs may lead to job losses and redundancies in the TES industry. 
One of the important aspects of Section 198A(5) of the LRA (referred to as the ‘parity 
provision’) is the interpretation of the words ‘must be treated on the whole not less favourably’ 
in respect of TES employees being deemed to be employees of the TES client. Section 198D of 
the LRA 1995 stipulates that the following factors may be taken into account in determining 
whether justifiable reasons exist for treating TES employees differently: seniority, experience or 
length of service; merit; the quality or quantity of work performed; and any other criteria of a 
similar nature. These equal pay provisions do not require TES workers to prove that they are 
paid less as a result of the employer discriminating against them unfairly. Instead, the employer 
bears the onus of proving that the differential treatment is based on a justifiable reason and such 
reason is not unfairly discriminatory. Participants believed that the unclear wording of the parity 
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provision would give rise to interpretation issues in the future and focussed their criticisms on 
the unclear wording of the section. 
Some participants believed that in the past firms used TESs to avoid labour law provisions and 
that the law concerning TESs provided the opportunity to achieve this goal. Tightening the 
regulations for the TES industry in South Africa had provided more protection for the TES 
employees, but that more effective enforcement and increased resources were needed. A legal 
practitioner participant stated that they were sceptical about the enforcement challenges ever 
improving and believed that the solution rested on self-compliance. A self-regulatory model had 
been proposed by some employer parties at the time that the 2015 amendments were debated. A 
director at a government department participant explained that although a self-regulatory model 
had not been introduced, it was ‘not mutually exclusive’ with the regulatory framework that was 
implemented. Despite the self-regulatory model being rejected, the participant thought that there 
was still a general commitment to regulation within the industry and its associations. 
10.3. How is temporary agency work influenced by trade union responses?  
The legislative framework for unions in South Africa includes the entrenchment of labour rights 
in the Constitution and legislated organisational rights. In order to achieve industrial peace, the 
LRA 1995 adopted a policy of voluntary collective bargaining, at sectoral level, underpinned by 
the principle of majoritarianism. Under the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014, trade unions 
representing the employees of temporary employment agencies are now able to exercise their 
organisational rights not only at the workplace of the agency, but also at the user firm’s 
workplace (ILO, 2016). Moreover, workers employed by agencies who participate in a legally 
protected strike action are entitled to picket at the user firm’s premises (ILO, 2016). Taking into 
consideration the importance and incentives of majoritarianism in the LRA 1995, participants 
discussed how the new changes to the legislation may affect trade unions. Potentially, unions 
may access or forfeit their majority rights based on the number of TES employees that become 
permanent employees after the three-month period and thereafter either choose to become union 
members or reject union membership. This may be risky for unions bearing in mind the 
importance of retaining their majority status. However, the single employer relationship with the 
client after the three-month period may also bring certainty for unions, allowing them to organise 
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all employees ‘under one roof’. This in turn may increase their bargaining muscle, leading to 
additional regulation, better enforcement and decreased exploitation. 
A few participants acknowledged that an acrimonious and litigious relationship existed between 
organised labour and the South African TES industry. From a TES firm perspective, this was 
described as an ‘anti-labour broking’ campaign against TES work. This sentiment was attributed 
to the growth in the TES industry approximately fifteen years ago and the resultant media 
attention. In addition, the historical exploitation of TES workers, and a largely non-compliant 
industry, attributed to this negative sentiment. An employer’s association participant believed 
that the tripartite system that existed in South Africa allowed COSATU to have a much stronger 
voice regarding TES issues than most trade unions have internationally, and that the current level 
of their representation should allow. As a result of this troublesome relationship between 
organised labour and the TES industry, there is largely an exclusion response by unions in 
relation to agency work (Heery, 2004). Unions have embarked on a systematic and 
comprehensive campaign to ban TES work. A union participant attributed the legislation 
amendments to the success of this campaign, but not all participants viewed the campaign as 
positive. For example, an employer confederation participant stated that the campaign against 
TES firms was simply a rallying tool used by unions to poach members from each other during 
election times. More in line with Heery’s (2004) engagement and regulation strategies, one union 
has instead opted for raising TES worker issues at sector related negotiations. In doing so, they 
have successfully bargained for ‘inspection-like’ rights at work premises to prevent TES 
employee victimisation and provide awareness of legal rights.  
Participants focused much of their responses on the difficulties that unions face when attempting 
to include and recruit TES employees. The reasons for these difficulties varied. Some 
participants believed that due to the internal structures of the unions, and especially in situations 
where agency shop agreements prevail, unions have little interest in TES employees, and they 
are excluded from being represented. Other participants acknowledged the insecurities faced by 
TES employees even in circumstances where unions attempt to include them. Once unionised, 
they were often labelled as ‘troublemakers’ and dismissed, making them afraid to join unions. 
Union strategies of inclusion of TES workers were largely criticised by the participants. These 
strategies centred around an outdated ‘job for life’ concept that South African unions preferred. 
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This concept was perceived as obsolete in a changing wold of work, where the average TES 
employee was young compared to the average union member. According to this argument, 
young employees were not interested in a job for life and preferred the flexibility of TES work. 
One employment lawyer participant believed that it would be more appropriate for unions to 
focus on a ‘benefits type driven’ approach to retain members. Another TES firm participant 
believed the focus should be on technology and information.  
A link between this ‘mainstream, old-fashioned’ model of work and union fees was made by a 
senior attorney participant, who argued that unions exclude TES workers as they cannot be relied 
on to pay their membership fees. Unions faced a further difficulty attempting to include 
‘knowledge economy workers’, who according to an employer’s association participant, 
command a salary based on their skills, the market and other factors and consequently do not 
require the mass negotiation skills offered by organised labour. A few participants mentioned 
that the sector specific South African union environment posed practical issues for unions as it 
was impossible to have a different union for every different workplace that engages TES 
workers.  
In line with dualisation theories, a participant who is a director of an international organisation 
pointed out that there was a negative perception of TES workers amongst ‘traditional’ employees 
who believe that TES workers are used to undermine both the benefit and the negotiating power 
of organised labour. This comment was made in relation to non-unionised, temporary workers 
continuing to perform their work functions during a strike.  
Union membership fees as a deterrent to unionisation, was an area of questioning that offered 
contradictory responses from participants. One union official suggested that all workers were 
likely to raise issues of affordability, with no noticeable distinction between vulnerable workers 
and other workers. However, the same participant mentioned that higher paid members were 
more likely to consider the one percent of salary, which is the customary union membership fee 
in South Africa, as substantial and therefore they were more likely to object to paying it.  Other 
participants stated that union fees were a deterrent for TES workers as they were ‘so poor that 
there's no way they could join anyway’ and would prefer to spend their money on necessities. 
One union participant pointed out that unions experience problems collecting union membership 
fees from TES workers as employers simply do not deduct the required membership fees. One of 
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the surprising findings was the participants’ strong criticism of agency shop agreements.200 
According to some participants, agency shop agreements impose the costs of membership and 
the benefits of collective bargaining on lower income workers. Agency shop agreements were 
also blamed for the lack of desire by union officials to engage TES workers as ‘the money pours 
in through the agency shop agreements’ and there was therefore no need to work hard to increase 
their membership.  
Union internal conflict and politics, together with a lack of resources added to the difficulties that 
unions face in organising and representing TES workers. Declining union membership and the 
resultant decrease in membership fees has forced unions to rationalise their resources to retain 
their existing membership. In addition to their decreasing finances, unions faced logistical 
problems with each union organiser having a large area to cover as they were understaffed. 
These issues made organising ‘traditional’ employees difficult, let alone the ‘intangible body’ of 
TES employees. In addition, a legal participant pointed out that when workers are itinerant and 
very precarious, it is not possible to establish stable structures, resulting in union breakdown. 
Unions require stability in order to form leadership structures at the local level. In addition to 
stretched resources, unions have experienced internal upheaval resulting in a change in their 
leadership, orientation and focus which has resulted in ‘a crisis’ that has affected their ability to 
involve themselves with TES issues. One participant blamed the union movement for being 
‘more political than addressing the bread and butter issues of workers in the workplace’, 
including those of TES workers. A union participant went so far as to state that union leaders 
were corrupt and ‘embezzling members money’ which makes unionisation unattractive to TES 
workers (Int21.p348. Par.70). 
An experimental project mentioned by one participant, where 500 employees’ membership fees 
were paid by a TES firm that was committed to meeting with employers to improve union-
employer relationships in the TES environment, had a positive outcome for the TES workers 
participating in the project. This positive outcome encouraged an alternative to the traditionally 
highly acrimonious relationship between unions and the TES industry.  
 
200 In terms of Section 25 of the LRA 1995, an agency shop agreement allows the employer to deduct an agreed fee 
from the wages of non-union employees, that is paid into a special fund administered by the union party. The fee 
may be deducted without the employees’ consent (Grogan, 2017). 
297 
 
A few participants mentioned that TES workers were experimenting with ‘new ways of 
organising’. They were organising themselves with the help of non-profit, voluntary 
organisations, or simply forming ‘self-sorted committees’ or associations (Int16. p242. Par72). 
This was done as an alternative to and not in partnership with existing unions, as the traditional 
union movement was perceived as failing to assist TES workers. However, this ‘new way’ of 
organising was still in its experimental phase and covered new terrain for all involved.  
Section 2: How the findings relate to the main concepts and debates in the literature review 
10.4. The complex contractual arrangements between agencies and user firms.  
The internationalisation and fragmentation of business activity and ownership has greatly 
increased product and financial market competition, while weakening the bargaining power of 
traditionally organised labour. This has driven changes in how business contractually engages its 
workforce (Wright et al 2019). The large, vertically structured, bureaucratic organisation of 
Fordism, has now been replaced by a network organisational form, where the traditional 
boundaries of organisations are blurred as organisations establish joint ventures, partnerships and 
subcontracting arrangements with a network of other small and large organisations (Grimshaw, 
2005). These arrangements have led to a ‘fissuring’ of the workplace through the proliferation of 
subcontracting ventures (Weil, 2014; Eichhorst et al, 2019). In this regard, client organisations 
are engaging agencies to meet all staff needs, often referred to as human resources or human 
capital services and may include HR activities, payroll management, training, and appraisals 
(Purcell and Purcell 1998; Purcell et al. 2005; Hoque et al, 2008, p.391; Bartkiw, 2014). Other 
services may include ‘project management’, ‘outsourcing’ 'complete staffing solutions' and 
‘managed service provider’ (MSP) agreements - all terms given to different measures for placing 
workers (Ward, 2003). 
Similar trends were confirmed by the participants in the current study, with some participants 
mentioning the umbrella term ‘outsourcing’, or more specifically, the MSP model. Interestingly, 
according to some participants, in South Africa these options are considered in response to 
changes in legislation. The idea was that the provision of ‘a fully managed service’ model would 
not be considered a TES in terms of legislation (Int4. pp54-55. Par.2-6). The LRA 1995 
specifically excludes the independent contractor relationship from the extended liability of the 
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parity provisions. Section 198(3) of the LRA 1995, as amended, provides that ‘a person who is 
an independent contractor is not an employee of a temporary employment service, nor is the 
temporary employment service the employer of that person’. The MSP, or other similar model 
may therefore be designed in such a manner as to provide a specialised outsourced service by an 
independent contractor (Pienaar and Jamieson, 2018). The expert MSP then in-turn may sub-
contract various services to be provided to the client.  
In this regard, the current study revealed interesting collaborations between large TES firms and 
their larger clients. A senior employee of a prominent TES firm outlined an initiative where their 
firm had pre-empted the changes to the employment legislation that affected the TES industry 
and had developed sophisticated software to assess their clients’ changing needs. This software 
allowed them to analyse their clients’ permanent staff in comparable jobs, to the temporary 
workers that were placed by their firm, from a payroll and benefits perspective. As a direct result 
of this exercise, they changed their ‘value proposition’ to their clients away from simply offering 
a ‘brokering’ service, to offering ‘fully outsourced independent contracting’ services.  
The literature points to some potential benefits for employers as a result of these collaborations 
between clients and temporary employment agencies. These may include a more engaged model 
with a broader range of attributes than price and reduced purchase costs. There may also be 
greater information-sharing, joint learning and problem solving (Hoque et al (2008); Grimshaw 
et al, 2005). The MSP model also purportedly increases the productivity, sales and efficiency of 
the TES client in typical non-core activities (Pienaar and Jamieson, 2018). 
However, in this study, a human rights lawyer participant believed that these collaborative 
‘schemes’ were put in place simply to circumvent the provisions of the labour legislation that 
protect TES employees (Int7. pp116-117. Par68). The participant argued that these complex 
arrangements made the employer party difficult to identify and their rights difficult to enforce. In 
contrast to this view, a senior employment lawyer participant argued that it was not easy to 
circumvent the law as the outsourcing arrangement would need to be genuine. The commercial 
agreement between the TES client and the TES firm would be scrutinised and if it transpired that 
the TES firm merely supplied ‘bodies’, it would be a simple TES contract. If it was found that 
the commercial agreement stipulated that the client relinquished control of a certain 
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function/department, then it may be considered an outsourcing agreement (Int25.p421. Par.181-
188).  
This later view is supported by an important recent amendment to the LRA, 1995, namely 
section 200B. This section deals with the joint and several liability to comply with the 
obligations of the employer when more than one person is held to be the employer of an 
employee. In Masoga and Another v Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd and Others,201 (the Masoga 
matter) the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) ruled on the scope and effect of section 200B of the 
LRA 1995. While it contemplates that a single person may be the employer, it does not provide 
criteria for determining what makes that one person the employer. The section provides for joint 
liability in a situation where that one person is a party to a simulated arrangement or sham, the 
true intent or effect of which is to defeat the purposes of the LRA, or any other employment law, 
and there is a failure by that person to comply with the obligations of an employer (Dube, 2019). 
If this is the case, any other person or entity which is complicit in this scheme is treated as an 
employer for the purposes of liability. The other person or entity is jointly and severally liable in 
terms of section 200B together with anyone else held to be an employer and in respect of the 
employer’s obligations under the LRA or any other employment law. (Dube, 2019). The net 
result of section 200B and the ruling in the Masoga matter is that it would be legally risky for 
clients and TES agencies to engage in ‘simulated arrangements’ or ‘shams’ to avoid the 
provisions of section 198 of the LRA.  
While section 200B deals with a situation where TES agencies are involved in a sham or 
simulated arrangement, there are however many instances where there is no sham or subterfuge 
and the ‘outsourcing’ or independent contracting arrangement is constructed in terms of 
prevailing legislation. However, in these instances the potential TES employees may still not be 
afforded parity rights as they do not fall within the provisions of section 198. These 
arrangements would therefore be attractive to employers seeking to employ temporary staff. 
In the matter of CHEP South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Shardlow N.O and others,202 (the CHEP matter), 
the relationship between CHEP and Contracta-Force Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd (C-Force) 
 
201 (JA14/2018) [2019] ZALAC 59 (12 September 2019). 
202 [2019] JOL 40990 (LC). 
300 
 
was regulated by a two written Service-level Agreements (SLA). The CCMA Commissioner 
concluded that the relationship between CHEP and C-Force was determined by the factual 
relationship between these two parties and that the 201 workers were employed by C-Force as it 
was acting as a TES provider. Therefore, CHEP was deemed to be the employer for the purposes 
of the Labour Relations Act (Goldberg and Wilkinson, 2019; Vermaas, 2019). On review, 
however, the Labour Court concluded that C-Force was not acting as a TES and the award was 
set aside. The court found that C-Force provided a product and not individual labour to CHEP 
and the relationship therefore fell outside of section 198 of the LRA 1995. This finding placed 
the workers outside the scope of the deeming provisions. The CCMA decision was reversed and 
set aside, and C-Force was found to be an independent contractor and not a TES.  
In comparison, in the UK, ‘master vendor’ or ‘neutral vendor’ arrangements are treated 
differently to those in South Africa. The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 guidance document 
stipulates that an individual is not prevented from being an agency worker under the regulations 
because they work through an intermediary body, an umbrella company who finds work for the 
agency worker or is managed on behalf of a hirer by a master vendor arrangement. These UK 
Regulations would have resulted in a very different result for the workers in the CHEP matter if 
the same facts had been heard in the UK. The recent court decision thus points to a weakness in 
the South African legislation from a worker perspective. 
10.5. The human capital perspective: accessing the labour market 
Given the high unemployment rate in South Africa, an important theme that emerged from the 
interviews is how individuals access work. 203 The human capital theory is important in the South 
African context as it predicts that individuals with higher human capital have higher earnings and 
higher probability of finding employment (World Development Report, 2007). One of the main 
international concerns about temporary agency work, is the lack of investment in human capital 
as both TES firms and clients face disincentives to invest in TES workers (CIETT, 2000). From a 
client perspective, the temporary agency workers are only at the client firm for a limited period, 
are usually employed by the agency and the skills required for agency work are not necessarily 
firm-specific. From a TES firm perspective, the inclination to resign may be high as the agency 
 
203 The South African unemployment rate was 27.6 percent in the first quarter of 2019 (Mkentane, 2019). 
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worker may be poached on assignment at the user firm. As a result, firms are reluctant to finance 
non-firm specific human capital as they may not be able to reap the return on their investment if 
the worker leaves their employment (Storrie, 2002). These realities are reflected in a 2010 
European Working Conditions Survey that reported that only 26 per cent of temporary agency 
workers received training, compared with 39 per cent of workers on an indefinite contract (ILO, 
2016, p.207).  
 
In this study, there were polarised responses amongst the participants regarding the training of 
TES workers. Union participants believed that TES workers often did not have access to the same 
training as permanent employees, whereas a TES client believed that TES firms did offer training 
but these firms were in the minority.204TES company participants disagreed with these sentiments 
and were adamant that they trained their employees and mentioned the skills levy as proof. In 
South Africa, companies may claim back a part of their training expenditure according to the 
Skills Development Levies Act 1999 (No. 9). A legal participant believed that from a skills levies 
perspective, the TES industry was the greatest contributor in South Africa and that the negativity 
surrounding this aspect was merely rhetoric.205 According to a senior TES firm employee, TES 
employees’ access to skills development was significantly addressed as it was a TES firm’s 
function to ensure that they have a talent pipeline. As a result, both the payment of the levy and 
the access to skills development was critical.206 In addition to the skills levy, a high number of 
TES employees were Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) beneficiaries.207 The ETI encourages TES 
firms to take first time employees, very often through temporary employment services, in order to 
access skills. 208 
However, a more contextually rooted analysis of the human capital perspective is important. In 
the global south and southern Africa where there is high unemployment and an uneven 
geographical distribution of employment, the positive aspects of temporary agency work as a 
 
204 (Int16.p241. Par.52-54). 
205 (Int31.p508. Par.14). 
206 (Int5.p71. Par.82). 
207 The ETI is the package of tax incentives that Treasury of South Africa introduced which encouraged business to 
employ young people. It is a wage subsidy that employers receive for employing people under the age of twenty-
nine, earning below the Threshold Amount, for a two-year period and encourages the employment of first-time 
employees. 
208 (Int5.p71. Par.82). 
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route to work experience and skills is important. High levels of unemployment, coupled with 
rural areas that lack development, result in young people struggling to find jobs (Branson et al 
2019). In addition, youth from disadvantaged backgrounds do not have networks to introduce 
them to potential employers (Dieltiens, 2015). The ILO has suggested that agency work can be 
vital for less skilled workers who lack the informal networks and contacts that were often 
necessary to gain permanent employment (ILO, 2011).  
 
The present study revealed that access to employment (whether it be temporary employment or 
permanent employment) via TES firms in South Africa appeared to have three different contexts. 
Firstly, individuals may be employed through ‘fly-by-night’ TES firms that employ those who 
were desperate and consequently take any opportunity of work. These fly-by-night TES firms 
often paid inferior salaries and benefits. Secondly, there were expanded networks where reputable 
TES firms employ the unemployed from a wider group of those looking for work. In this regard, 
South African studies have found that employment agencies are of assistance to people with 
limited attachment to the labour market and limited access to employed individuals who can help 
them find a job (Lam et al 2008; Bernstein, 2012). For example, a senior TES firm participant 
mentioned that their firm had taken on 80 000 youth and previously unemployed workers over a 
period of two years, and had ‘converted’ their temporary employment into permanent 
employment.209 Thirdly, TES firms utilise or offer employment to individuals who are ‘on their 
books’ forming an internal network of TES workers.210 Those TES workers who access 
employment through this ‘internal network’ system of the TES firm, may partly be seen as 
insiders in particular in comparison to the unemployed who cannot get a foothold in the labour 
market.  
 
In relation to this third context, the refinement of the segmentation or dualisation theory is called 
for as the South African TES industry in some cases seems to create employment for some 
unemployed individuals who become partial insiders of an internal network. They dominate TES 
employment opportunities at the expense of other unemployed people who fail to get any 
 
209 (Int3. P44. Par174-176). 
210 Dlodlo AJ clarified at paragraph 56 of the Assign judgment, that ‘sitting on the books of a TES does not make 
you an employee’. Section 198(2) clearly states that the individual’s services are to be ‘procured for or provided to a 
client by a temporary employment service’. 
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foothold in the labour market or are forced to join ‘fly-by-night’ operators. As argued by one 
participant, ‘if you are working with a very specified pool of employees, you know, then it 
doesn’t really help the problems we face in the labour market’ (Int22.p380. Par.206).   
 
10.6.  Segmentation and dualisation 
Considering the above discussion on the refinement of the segmentation or dualisation theory, a 
key interest of this research has been the disadvantages experienced by TES workers compared to 
permanent or standard workers in South Africa. This theme ties into the general debate about the 
existence of an insider-outside divide in contemporary labour markets (Lindbeck and Snower, 
2001), of labour market dualism (Emmenegger et al., 2012), an overall polarisation of the labour 
force (Kalleberg, 2013), and an emergence of a social class of precarious workers (Standing, 
2011; Bertolini, 2018). The literature points to many degrees of being an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ 
and the distinction between them was made along a variety of employment-related divides, such 
as good jobs and bad jobs, unionised and non-unionised. These differences also translate into 
social differences (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002), and poorer skill acquisition for temporary 
employees (Booth et al., 2002), which may result in a temporary job trap due to the lack of 
opportunities (Choi, 2019, p.3) 
One such definition of ‘dualisation’ is the division between workers who have stable jobs, regular 
salary and decent working conditions, as opposed to precarious workers who occupy unstable and 
poorly protected jobs (Kalleberg, 2011; Manky, 2018). South Africa has a long, historically 
entrenched dualistic labour market as black workers were denied the opportunity to seek work of 
their choice and to live with their families where there was work (Kraak, 1993). Regulating this 
segmented labour market was a dualistic system of labour control. There were collective 
bargaining rights for non-African workers, and a system of despotic control and denial of trade 
union rights for black workers (Kenny and Webster, 1999). Even after apartheid was abolished, 
there were calls for an entrenched ‘two-tier’ labour market (SAF, 1996; Kenny and Webster, 
1999).211 These proposals called for two sets of rules, one for a high-wage, capital-intensive, low-
 
211 This ‘two-tier’ labour market was proposed by the South African Foundation (SAF) after 1994. The SAF was a 
powerful lobby group and think tank for big business. Fifty-three of South Africa’s top companies, certain foreign 
companies, and some South African state-owned companies were members of the SAF (Baskin 1996, pp. 7-8). This 
was an incredulous stance as South Africa had struggled long and hard to overthrow a two-tier society and a two-tier 
labour system (Standing et al, 1996, p. 12).  
304 
 
employment sector, and the other for a bourgeoning free-entry labour-intensive sector, with 
strong new investment (South African Foundation 1996; Kenny and Webster, 1999, p.218). 
These propositions reflected the highly flexible system of contract labour which was at the core 
of the apartheid regime’s migrant labour system (Kenny and Webster, 1999). Unsurprisingly, 
COSATU argued that this approach would erode labour standards and stressed that the flexibility 
trend was simply a re-emergence of the apartheid strategy to divide workers into those with and 
without rights, as was the case with migrant workers in the past and would be a recipe for 
perpetual instability in the labour market and the economy (COSATU, 1997). 
Research conducted by the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) 
during 2006, explored the extent of casualisation in the southern African region formal sector and 
its impact on workers and the economy. It was based on country studies in Lesotho, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Bodibe, 2006). The study found 
that there was an increase in casual employees filling positions that were permanent in nature. 
Behind employee vulnerability in the region was high levels of unemployment and accompanying 
poverty. Poverty had bred a dangerous work environment where many desperate job seekers in 
the labour force were willing to take any job for survival purposes rather than dignity. This posed 
a challenge for trade unions in their pursuit to protect and advance workers’ rights and foster 
decent work at that time (Bodibe, 2006). 
In present day South Africa, the ‘insider-outsider’ divide is still a stark reality as the labour 
market remains racially biased, and the socio-economic context is characterised by poverty and 
high unemployment (Senne and Nkomo, 2015). As a result, temporary and casual labour have 
been endemic features of the South African labour market (Van Eck, 2010; Senne and Nkomo, 
2015). In many respects this divide is not in relation to temporary agency employees versus 
permanent employees, but rather the employed versus the unemployed. Ultimately, employers 
have adapted by shifting to economic coercion and casualisation because of high unemployment 
(Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). This adaption perpetuates the divide between the employed 
and the unemployed, forcing individuals to accept ‘any job’ to cross this divide. This is evident in 
the minutes of a NEDLAC National Social Dialogue Institution meeting held during 2017 on the 
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future of work. 212 These minutes state that ‘a strong argument has been made that the immediate 
goal should be any job rather than a decent job if the high unemployment levels are to be lowered 
as targeted by the National Development Plan (NDP)’. Senne and Nkomo (2015) argue that while 
there had been a desire to change the exploitative labour regime in law, little has been done by the 
government to transform the reality in the workplace.  
Historically, transformation of the South African workplace has notably been driven through the 
union movement. However, organised labour has largely adopted an exclusionary response in 
relation to agency work (Heery, 2004). In line with dualisation theories, an ILO participant 
pointed out that there is a negative perception of TES workers amongst ‘traditional’ unionised 
employees who believe that TES workers are used to undermine both the benefit and the 
negotiating power of organised labour. TES employees are reluctant to join unions as 
unionisation is associated with traditional, fulltime employment at a mine or factory, and there is 
a negative perception of TES workers amongst these ‘traditional’ employees. When members of a 
union go on strike, the non-unionised temporary workers continue to perform their work 
functions, which raises the ire of organised labour and traditional union members.213 
Consequently, unions will need to ‘reimagine their business model’ to recruit not only their 
traditional full-time paid employees, but temporary workers in order to cross the many divides 
between these two categories of individuals. 
 
10.7. The regulatory environment governing South African temporary agency 
workers 
Although temporary agency work may yield benefits, it has been associated with substandard 
work, inferior pay and detrimental outcomes for workers because it inhabits a legal ‘grey zone’ 
(Forde et al., 2015, Stanford, 2017, p.385). As a result of the negative consequences associated 
with this type of work, there has been increased focus on three aspects of the regulatory 
environment affecting temporary agency workers. Firstly, the requirement that agency temps are 
treated equally comparable to directly employed workers in user firms (Forde and Slater, 2016). 
Secondly, the debate around joint and several liability between the temporary employment 
 
212 These minutes were provided by a participant during the interview process. 
213 (Int17.p258. Par.54). 
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agency and the client. Thirdly, the increase in regulatory avoidance in the temporary agency 
worker sector (Knox, 2018). 
10.7.1. Equal treatment of temporary agency workers  
The literature points towards a range of legal instruments that embed the principles of equal 
treatment and equal pay for workers in all forms of contractual arrangements. These include ILO 
standards and EU Directives, as well as the laws and collective agreements of individual 
countries (ILO, 2016). They provide that workers in non-standard employment should be 
guaranteed the same minimum labour standards and receive the same wages as comparable 
standard workers (ILO, 2016). For example, the ILO Recommendation 198 recommends that 
countries should adopt a national policy to ensure that employed workers, including those that are 
part of a multi-party relationship, should have the same standards applicable to all forms of 
contractual arrangements (Benjamin, 2013b). Similarly, the 2008 EU Directive on Temporary 
Agency Work was adopted to ensure the protection of temporary agency workers and to improve 
the quality of temporary agency work by ensuring that the principle of equal treatment is applied 
to temporary agency workers (Article 2). On a national level, many jurisdictions provide for 
principles of non-discrimination between non-standard workers and their standard counterparts 
for example, the Republic of Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom and in South Africa.  
 
Whether equal treatment principles are applied to temporary agency work from day one, or if 
there is a qualifying period before their application, is an important consideration.  For example, 
certain qualifying periods apply in both the UK and South Africa. The UK supports equal 
treatment for agency workers, although only after twelve weeks. There is a difference between 
day one rights and those that apply during a continuous assignment of twelve weeks or more 
(Forde and Slater, 2016). Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency went further than the UK declaration in stating that 
the non-discrimination principle applied from day one of an assignment, unless a qualifying 
period was agreed on at a national level by the social partners and/or tripartite bodies (McKay, 
2010). The UK social partners therefore negotiated a deal that fell short of that being pursued by 
most other social partner organisations in member states (McKay, 2010). 
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In South Africa, the LRA 1995 contains a similar time period of three months before any parity 
provisions may apply. Those working for a TES firm will be considered temporary employment 
services workers (performing a ‘temporary service’) for three months if certain conditions are 
met214 and will not be compared to any permanent employees for that period. Section 
198A(3)(b)(i), the ‘deeming’ provision, states that if a TES employee is not performing a 
‘temporary service’, the employee is ‘deemed to be the employee of the client’ and to be 
‘employed on an indefinite basis’ by the client.215 In this event, Section 198A(5) of the LRA 1995 
provides that these TES employees (employed for more than three months) must not be treated 
less favourably than an employee employed on a permanent basis by the client, who performs the 
same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. Section 198A(5) 
of the LRA 1995 stipulates: 
 
An employee deemed to be an employee of the client in terms of subsection (3)(b) must 
be treated on the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the 
same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. 
 
Clause 38 of the Memorandum of Objects of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012216 
provided the following examples of what would constitute treatment that is ‘on the whole not less 
favourably’ in terms of section 198A(5) of the LRA: ‘The same wages and benefits as the client's 
other employees who are performing the same or similar work’. Section 198D of the LRA 1995 
stipulates that the following factors may be considered when determining whether justifiable 
reasons exist for treating TES employees differently: seniority, experience or length of service; 
merit; the quality or quantity of work performed; and any other criteria of a similar nature.   
 
 
214 Section 198A of the LRA 1995 defines a ‘temporary service’ and restricts the employment of TES workers to 
employment for a period not exceeding three months, or as a substitute for a temporarily absent employee, or in a 
category of work which is considered to be a temporary service as determined by a collective agreement of a 
bargaining council or a sectoral determination, for a period of time. 
215 After much debate and protracted legal proceedings, as to whether the ‘deemed employer’ provision in section 
198A(5) of the LRA 1995, meant a ‘sole employer’ or ‘concurrent employer’, the Constitutional Court (CC) in 
Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others provided clarity. The TES client is the sole employer after three 
months, this means that the TES will not have any legal standing in the employment terms of TES employees‚ nor 
be involved any further in the equation with regards to the LRA 1995, after the three-month period has elapsed 
(Mahlakoana, 2018).  
216 This Memorandum does not speak to the Act in its final form and must be treated with caution - these 
sentiments were expressed by Dlodlo AJ about the Memorandum in paragraph 66, p. 23 of the Assign Services (Pty) 
Limited matter in the Constitutional Court, Case CCT 194/17) 
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Participants in the present study, from both the employer and labour movements, acknowledged 
that in the past TES employees were likely to experience unequal treatment and there was a 
general need for the legislation to provide further protection against such abuse.217However, 
participants criticised the lack of clarity of the wording of Section 198A(5) of the LRA and 
predicted that interpretation issues were going to arise in relation to the words ‘must be treated on 
the whole not less favourably’ in section 198A(5) of the LRA. Interestingly, the participants did 
not highlight the latitude employers seem to potentially have in justifying different treatment, for 
example the different employee qualifications and skills. This may be due to the changes to the 
legislation being relatively new when the interviews were conducted. This latitude provided for 
by the LRA 1995 is interesting when compared to similar provisions in the UK’s Agency 
Workers Regulations 2010 (AWR). 
 
In the UK, Regulation 5(1)(a) of the AWR states that an agency worker must be entitled to the 
same basic employment conditions that the worker would have been entitled to had they been 
recruited by the client without the intervention of the temporary work agency (Ebrahim, 2017). 
The AWR furthermore provides that regulation 5(1)(a) will be met if the worker receives the 
same relevant terms and conditions as the comparable employee of the client. Regulation 6(1)(a)-
(f) set out a detailed list of terms and conditions that will fall within the meaning of ‘relevant 
terms and conditions’ (Ebrahim, 2017). Unlike the South African legislation that broadly refer to 
a ‘on the whole not less favourable’ test, the UK provisions are far more prescriptive. 
 
Some insight into how the courts may treat the interpretation of the ‘on the whole less favourable’ 
provision was provided by the CCMA during March 2019, in GIWUSA obo Moedezi and Others 
v Swissport SA (Pty) Ltd and Others (the GIWUSA matter).218 In this matter, the CCMA held that 
the obligation to treat the deemed employees ‘on the whole no less favourably’ only arises in 
respect of employees doing the same or similar work. It is not a blanket comparison of the terms 
and condition of the entire workforce of the client (Ncume, 2019). This rather narrow 
interpretation of the words ‘on the whole not less favourably’ may open avenues to unscrupulous 
employers who will ensure that the positions filled by TES workers are deliberately ‘different’ in 
 
217 (Int2.p15. Par.32 [legal participant]; Int12.p166. Par.32 [union participant]). 
218 Case no. WECT 18794 on 18 March 2019. 
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order to avoid the risk of parity provisions applying in the future. 
 
Deliberate attempts to avoid equality provisions applying to temporary agency workers are of 
concern in both in the UK and in South Africa. The UK AWR contains ‘anti avoidance’ 
provisions designed to prevent assignments that are put in place to intentionally circumvent the 
equality provisions of the AWR. However, the agency worker must have completed at least two 
assignments or two roles (in substantively different roles which break the qualifying period) with 
the same hirer or connected hirers within the same group, in order for the anti-avoidance 
provisions to become relevant. These provisions could be utilised if the agency moves a worker 
to a new assignment every eleven weeks in order to avoid the equality provisions that become 
effective after twelve weeks of employment. However, certain specified factors must be present 
that would indicate that a pattern of assignments was structured with the intention to deprive the 
worker of equal treatment rights (The Agency Workers Regulations: Guidance, 2010). 
 
The South African legislature dealt with a TES client avoiding the provisions of the section 
198A(3)(b) (the deeming provisions), by the addition of subsection 198A (4). This subsection 
states that: 
The termination by the temporary employment services of an employee’s service with a 
client, whether at the instance of the temporary employment service or the client, for the 
purpose of avoiding the operation of subsection (3)(b) or because the employee exercised 
a right in terms of this Act, is a dismissal. 
 
 If a TES or a client terminates an employee’s assignment to avoid the operation of section 
198A(3)(b), that termination would be considered a dismissal and the usual remedies available 
through the LRA 1995 would apply. Unlike in the UK, there is no requirement for there to be two 
or more ‘assignments’ in order to prove that the employer attempted to avoid the equality 
provisions and the worker may access the remedies under the LRA 1995 even on a single unfair 
‘dismissal’. 
Possible inequalities that may exist for temporary agency workers may also be diminished 
through the provision of collective rights. For example, in Italy the law explicitly provides that 
agency workers can exercise collective rights vis-à-vis both the agency and the user firm, limited 
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to the duration of their assignment in terms of the user firm (LIO, 2016). Similarly, the amended 
LRA 1995 now allows trade unions representing the employees of temporary employment 
agencies to exercise their organisational rights not only at the workplace of the agency, but also at 
the user firm’s workplace (Benjamin, 2013, pp.12-15; ILO, 2016). In addition, an arbitration 
award establishing organisational rights may be made binding on the temporary employment 
agency and the temporary employment agency client (Benjamin, 2013). Moreover, workers 
employed by agencies who participate in a legally protected strike action are entitled to picket at 
the user firm’s premises (ILO, 2016). The idea is that by allowing these workers to bargain with 
all relevant parties, alongside permanent employees of the principal or user firms, may be an 
effective approach for ensuring equal treatment (ILO, 2016). In the UK, agency workers have a 
statutory right for their union to be recognised where the majority of agency workers support it. 
However, a union will need to seek statutory recognition with the agency, rather than the hirer 
(TUC, 2011). 
10.7.2. Joint and several liability within the TES relationship 
A further way of counteracting the inequities or negative legal consequences affecting temporary 
agency work, is through allocating employer responsibilities within the triangular employment 
relationship. Ascertaining the organisation responsible for complying with regulations and 
liabilities applicable to the triangular employment relationship, may however be problematic 
(Kalleberg, 2000). Debates regarding these issues often include discussions of joint employer or 
co-employment (Kalleberg, 2000; ILO, 2016). Joint and several liability is a common labour law 
technique for ascribing employment related responsibilities to organisations involved in a 
common enterprise (Fudge, 2006; ILO, 2016). This measure is often found in the regulation of 
temporary agency work, particularly in relation to wages and social security entitlements (ILO, 
2016). For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), joint and several liability is an accepted 
method in tort law for ascribing responsibility to separate entities engaged in a common 
enterprise (Fudge, 2006). Similarly, joint liability rules between the TES client and the TES firm 
are found in the US, Argentina, France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Namibia, Ontario (Canada) 
and South Africa (ILO, 2016). 
In the past, South African legislation tended towards express allocations of employment law 
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obligations to a single employer in both the 1956 and the 1995 LRA. This is no longer the case as 
the new section 200B(2)219 of the amended LRA1995 now explicitly recognises that there may be 
more than one employer for the purposes of liability.  In Masoga and Another v Pick n Pay 
Retailers (Pty) Ltd and Others,220 section 200B of the LRA 1995 was scrutinised by the LAC. 
The LAC ruled that the effect of section 200B is to fix or extend the liability that would 
ordinarily be that of the employer, as per the traditional tests, to another or others, who carry on 
as an associated or related activity or business by or through an employer. The purpose for this is 
clear from section 200B(2) where they are regarded or treated as such for the purposes of liability 
- they are held jointly and severally liable for a failure to comply with the obligations of an 
employer in terms of the LRA or any other employment law. In other words, section 200B(1) 
defines ‘employer’ for a very specific purpose and that purpose is found in section 200B(1) read 
with section 200B(2). The section cannot be utilised generally for making persons or entities the 
employer(s) of others. Section 200B therefore seeks to stop complex contractual and other 
schemes used by true employers to avoid their obligations under the labour legislation. Because 
of the scope of section 200B, it could be used to scrutinise a wide range of employment 
relationships or arrangements for the purposes of liability, provided that a case for such scrutiny 
has been made, and it is done fairly (Dube, 2019). 
Additional protection is provided to TES employees who earn below the earnings threshold of 
R205 433,30 per annum, and who have been placed with the TES client for longer than three 
months. This protection was achieved by the introduction of an extended joint and several 
liability of the client and the TES in terms of s198(4A) of the LRA 1995.221 These provisions 
expose the client to claims of unfair dismissal and the like, by employees of the TES (Pienaar and 
 
219 Section 200B(1)-(2) reads: ‘(1)  For the purposes of this Act and any other employment law, ‘employer‘ includes 
one or more persons who carry on associated or related activity or business by or through an employer if the intent 
or effect of their doing so is or has been to directly or indirectly defeat the purposes of this Act or any other 
employment law. (2) If more than one person is held to be the employer of an employee in terms of subsection (1), 
those persons are jointly and severally liable for any failure to comply with the obligations of an employer in terms 
of this Act or any other employment law’. 
220 (JA14/2018) [2019] ZALAC 59 (12 September 2019). 
221 Section 1984A of the LRA 1995 reads: ‘If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly and severally 
liable in terms of section 198(4) or is deemed to be the employer of an employee in terms of section 198A(3)(b) :- 
(a)  the employee may institute proceedings against either the temporary employment service or the client or both 
the temporary employment service and the client; (b)  a labour inspector acting in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act may secure and enforce compliance against the temporary employment service or the client as if it 
were the employer, or both; and (c)  any order or award made against a temporary employment service or client in 
terms of this subsection may be enforced against either’. 
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Naidoo, 2017). Section 198(4) of the LRA 1995 effectively create ‘a substantive and statutory 
form of joint and several liability -  which does not equate to joint or dual employment but rather 
creates a statutory accessory liability for the client in the circumstances set out in the section - 
where the TES carries principle liability as employer in terms of the LRA’ (Dlodlo AJ, 
2018).222In other words, section 198(4) and (4A) stipulate specific areas of liability for the TES 
firm pre- and post-deeming, as opposed to the general liability applicable in terms of section 
200B223. Importantly, the TES firm’s liability only lasts for the duration of its contractual 
relationship with the client, and while it continues to remunerate the worker (Dlodlo AJ, 
paragraph 64). Subsection 198(4A) was introduced to provide recourse directly against the client 
for contraventions in terms of section 198(4) without first having to institute proceedings against 
the TES (as was the pre-amendment case).  
Therefore, the contractual relationship between the client and the TES can be terminated when 
section 198A(3)(b) is triggered, with the client directly remunerating the placed employee. If this 
happens, the TES will cease to be a TES in terms of section 198(1) as it no longer ‘remunerates’ 
the worker and will fall out of the relationship entirely (Dlodlo AJ, paragraph 64). The 
contractual relationship between the client and the placed employee does not come into existence 
through negotiated agreement or through the normal recruitment processes used by the client. 
Instead, the employee automatically becomes employed by the client and he or she must be 
treated on the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the same or 
similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment (Le Roux and Alcock, 
2019). 
Comparatively, in the UK, hirers are solely responsible for agency workers’ rights to equal 
treatment on collective facilities or their right to receive information about vacancies. 
Employment tribunals can find that either the hirer or the agency is liable for breaches of equal 
treatment rights to pay, holidays or working time, depending on who is responsible for the failure 
to provide equal treatment (TUC, 2011). The Agency Workers Regulations 2010: Guidance 
specifically excludes the possibility of joint and several liability for the TES worker, however the 
 
222 CCT194/17 (26 July 2018). 




AWR allows for either the hirer of the TWA to be named or joined to a claim: 
In a Tribunal claim, where the responsibility or a breach of Regulations is not clear, or has 
not been conceded, as between TWA and hirer, the agency worker may claim against both 
the TWA and the hirer at the outset. This does not mean that a Tribunal can be asked to 
find that there is ‘joint and several liability' for breaches. The Regulations ensure that any 
party in the chain of relationships (i.e. a hirer or a TWA) can be named at the outset or 
joined to a claim and be liable to the extent that the Tribunal finds they are to blame for 
the infringement (The Agency Workers Regulations 2010: Guidance, p.46). 
10.7.3. Regulatory avoidance in the temporary agency worker sector 
Knox (2018) defines regulatory avoidance as overt avoidance or breaches of specific regulations, 
or the exploitation of loopholes and shortcomings. Internationally, regulatory avoidance in the 
temporary work agency industry has expanded and intensified, normalising exploitation and 
increasing the negative outcomes of precarious work (Knox, 2018). Some suggest that the growth 
of temporary agency work may be linked to those employers who wish to avoid the effects of 
labour legislation (Bartkiw, 2014). In South Africa, the lack of protections in labour legislation 
for TES workers has in the past provided the motive for firms to use them (Bezuidenhout et al 
2004; Benjamin, 2005; Cohen, 2008; Theron, 2008; Benjamin, 2013; Benjamin, 2016a). South 
African law historically designated the temporary employment agency as the employer, reducing 
the risk for the client (Theron, 2008). It was difficult for the TES employees to prove dismissal 
and employers had the freedom to manage the relationship as they saw fit, leaving these workers 
vulnerable (Botes, 2015).  
The amendments contained in the LRAA were designed to discourage the use of TES workers on 
a long-term basis to avoid the costs of the employment of permanent employees (Le Roux, 2015). 
The obligation imposed if clients make use of these workers in circumstances that fall outside the 
definition of a temporary service, consists of two parts. Firstly, that the TES worker assigned to 
the client is ‘deemed’ to be the indefinite employee of the client for the purposes of the LRA 
1995 (van Eck, 2013). Secondly, the client must treat the ‘deemed’ employee ‘on the whole not 
less favourably’ than an ordinary employee who performs the same or similar work, unless there 
is a justifiable reason for not doing so (Le Roux, 2015). Despite these legal reforms, a legal 
participant in the present study still perceived the entire purpose of the industry as a mechanism 
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of avoiding the employment relationship. The participant believed that TES firms acted as 
subsidiary entities that distanced employers from their workers, allowing them a mechanism to 
disengage (Int7.p111. Par.16).  
 
Regulatory avoidance was a strong theme that emerged from the data, across all aspects of the 
TES relationship, with several examples provided. One legal participant stated that TES 
employers circumvent the provisions of the LRA 1995 by simply rotating employees from one 
employer to another so that they do not work for more than three months for the same TES 
client.224 However, this tactic may prove unsuccessful as the current section 198A(4) provides 
that the termination by a TES of an employee’s service with a client, whether at the instance of 
the temporary employment service or the client, for the purpose of avoiding the operation of 
subsection section (3)(b), is considered a dismissal. However, nothing prevents the TES and 
client from routinely rotating employees after a short period of time in order to avoid the 
provisions of section 198A(4) of the LRA 1995. This type of rotation would be difficult to detect 
as falling foul of section 198A(4) even though the intention would be to circumvent its 
provisions. 
 
Another legal participant pointed out that the use of outsourcing was a popular way of avoiding 
the parity provisions of section 198 of the LRA (Int20.pp329-330. Par.148). The participant 
explained that if workers were moved from a TES model into an outsourcing arrangement, the 
TES client would be able to employ TES workers on different terms and conditions after three 
months as there would be no comparison employees at the client premises (all the employees in 
that category would be outsourced). The reason for this would be that nobody in the client’s 
operation would be performing that job post the outsourced arrangement (Int20.p330. Par.148). 
This participant’s views were supported by the GIWUSA matter discussed above. However, the 
new section 200B of the LRA 1995 seeks to stop complex contractual and other schemes used by 
true employers to avoid their obligations under the labour legislation. Because of the scope of 
section 200B, it could be used to scrutinise a wide range of employment relationships or 
arrangements for the purposes of liability, provided that a case for such scrutiny has been made, 
and it is done fairly (Dube, 2019). 
 




Further examples of employer strategies for avoiding regulations, obligations and liabilities by 
employing TES employees, were outlined by the participants. These include employers using 
TES workers to avoid unionisation in sectors that had a strong union presence such as the public 
sector (Int9. P134. Par52; Int21.pp350-351. Par.102-104). Another involved TES clients 
engaging TES workers to avoid fair dismissal processes, using the need for flexibility as the 
rationale (Int18.p266. Par.18). A further strategy involved circumventing BEE requirements by 
recruiting white people through a TES in order to avoid them being part of the employee 
population which would affect the BEE scores (Int1. p5. Par26-30). 
 
10.8. Comparative capitalism debate 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) theory (Hall and Soskice, 2001) categorised and described 
economies based on the comparison of Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), characterised by 
arm’s length interaction among market actors, and Coordinated Market Economies (CME) where 
informal networks and collaborative arrangements accompany market relations (Kiran, 2018). A 
third type, called ‘Mixed Market Economies’ (MMEs) was later added, combining features of 
CMEs and LMEs (Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Witt et al, 2018).  
Due to their ‘mixed’ character, MMEs tend to be characterised by organisational fragmentation 
and the greater role of the state as a regulator (Molina and Rhodes, 2007). While unions and 
employers in MMEs often have stronger organisational structures than in LMEs, they are 
generally weaker than in CMEs. There are strong incentives to invest in political power and 
mutually supportive relations between political parties and trade unions are common (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2007). State regulation tends to perpetuate long-term inefficiencies because of collective 
action problems and actors that tend to pursue their independently defined interests (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2007). MMEs are therefore often considered a hybrid, unproductive form of capitalism 
that are unlikely to obtain the same level of economic performance as LMEs and CMEs. These 
characteristics often play out in a labour market characterised by dual flexibility that allows 
protection for the core labour force and encourages precarity for those in the periphery (Nattrass 
and Seeking, 2010).  
The findings from this thesis suggest that South Africa continues to fall between two stools, 
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combining the elements of CMEs and LMEs, thus showing MME characteristics. On the one 
hand increasing employment regulations such as the legislation and court decisions regarding 
TES employees; on the other hand, facilitating more market-based relationships such as those 
described in this thesis where activities are externalised or outsourced. In support of this trend, a 
senior TES firm employee pointed out that if all independent contractors, labour brokers and 
‘smaller atypical types of work arrangements’ such as freelancers were added together, they 
estimated that three to four million of South Africa’s thirteen million economically active work-
force would be considered ‘atypical’. According to this participant, this could amount to an 
approximate thirty percent atypical rate of employment in the labour market in South Africa 
(Int.3. pp.45. Par.188).  
Conversely, some participants believed that the South African labour market was over-regulated 
from a global perspective. This they believed has contributed to slow economic growth and 
widespread capital flight (Int.5. p91-92. Par.35).225 Participants noted that this ‘global mobility’ 
was a concern, especially in the financial services and motor manufacturing sectors. Firms simply 
did not wish to operate within the rigid conditions imposed by the new legislation for TES 
employees and went off-shore (Int.5. pp.67. Par.38). Participants had also noticed an increase in 
market-based relationships as a reaction to this perceived rigidity, with TES firms increasingly 
offering outsourced services to those clients who traditionally utilised TES employees (Int.4. 
Par.6. p.64). With the result that these ‘outsourced’ employees fall outside the ambit of the TES 
legislation. Whether through temporary agency work or outsourced arrangements, an increasing 
number of regular workers are being replaced with non-regular workers, undermining the job 
protection and working conditions of all employees.  
As with the VoC framework the business system theory (BST), more specifically the extension of 
this work by Wood and Frynas (2006) to segmented business systems, is of value in providing 
theoretical insights on South African employment. Underlying dualism is a key characteristic of 
the segmented business system (Wood and Frynas, 2006, Wood et al, 2012, Bischoff and Wood, 
2018, Darwish et al 2020). Often large organisations show alignment with formal employment 
relations, and smaller organisations disregard these regulations (Darwish et al 2020). These laws 
 
225 According to Ashman, Fine and Newman (2011), 20 percent of GDP has left South Africa since 1994. 
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or formal rules that are ignored or bent, reflect both limitations in the state and civil society 
(Wood and Frynas, 2006). A lack of labour law enforcement enables an arbitrary and 
authoritarian management style, weak communication, and a tendency to rely on low-cost, 
unskilled labour (Wood et al, 2018; Darwish et al 2020). If unions are present, they are likely to 
be weak because of high unemployment (Wood et al, 2018). Recruitment occurs through 
informal networks and results in informal employment, with far-reaching flexibility in terms of 
leave and rewards (Darwish et al 2020). These abovementioned strategies may result in low 
productivity, poor quality control and a ‘sweat-shop’ mentality – all made possible by a limited 
capacity to enforce labour laws (Kamoche, 2011; Wood and Frynas, 2006; Bischoff and Wood, 
2018).  
Generally, South Africa adheres to the segmented business framework mentioned above. There is 
both a growing informal sector and a developed financial system (Dibben, 2007). Whilst core 
employees enjoy strong and enforced protection from one of the most progressive bodies of 
labour legislation in the world, unions battle to deal with widescale job losses and to make 
themselves relevant to those in atypical employment (Brewster and Wood, 2007).226 In addition to 
high levels of unemployment, the South African labour market is characterised by a growing 
peripheral workforce that holds part-time, temporary or casual jobs that are often precarious, lack 
benefits and offer low wages (Dibben, 2007). True to the segmented business system, the South 
African labour market has many forms of non-permanent employment, such as temporary 
employment agency work, and there is a tendency to rely on this low-cost labour.  
In line with the underlying dualism of the segmented business system theory, participants spoke 
of the vast differences between large and small TES firms. Large firms conduct their business in 
accordance with the laws and regulations, whereas the smaller ‘bakkie brigade’ firms flouted the 
law. Whether in large or small firms, TES employees in theory enjoy the protection of current 
legislation, but in practice the circumstances of their employment make the enforcement of rights 
difficult.  They often receive no medical aid, pension or provident fund benefits and are 
dependent upon statutory employment standards for basic working conditions.  
To counter these insecurities, there has been radical intervention by government in the form of the 
 
226 The difficulties faced by unions in representing TES workers due to widespread unemployment was a strong 
theme outlined in chapter nine of this thesis. 
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latest amendments to the TES legal framework. These new amendments have provided 
sophisticated legal rights and obligations which include joint and several liability between the 
TES firm and client, parity of treatment between TES employees and those employed 
permanently by the TES client, and provisions whereby TES workers are deemed the employee 
of the client after three months. Yet, in line with the segmented business framework, exploitation 
persists due to a high unemployment and over-supply of unskilled workers, a lack of enforcement 
of the law coupled with weakened trade unions.  
Although legislation has taken major steps towards the regulation of temporary agency work with 
the introduction of these new amendments to section 198 of the LRA 1995, not all atypical 
workers have received protection. Temporary workers are still required to fit the definition of 
‘employee’ and not be independent contractors to receive the protection of legislation and the 
statutory benefits that flow from this protection. As set out in chapter six of this thesis, those 
defined as independent contractors fall outside of the scope of the LRA 1995. The traditional 
reading of the word ‘employee’ has restricted the scope and protection that the LRA 1995 offers 
to people who are contracted to provide work under a contract of service (i.e. a contract of work 
and not just ‘employment’) (Clarke, 2004). Participants have pointed out that this has led to a 
scenario where TES firms creatively arrange contractual agreements to take advantage of this 
loophole. A wider interpretation of the word ‘employee’ that campaigners have argued for, would 
include workers who provide personal services for another, whatever the form of contract 
(Clarke, 2004). 
Whatever their shortfall, the recent amendments to the legislation pertaining to TES work does 
begin to address the extreme inequalities that workers have inherited in this sector due to the 
apartheid regime. Given the experiences of deregulation in other countries and the national and 
international pressure from business to increase competitiveness and flexibility, the new 
legislation pertaining to TES workers has tried to balance protection of TES employees with 
flexibility. Enormous challenges have faced South Africa since independence and even a partial 
transformation of the labour market since 1994 has been a significant achievement (Clarke, 
2004). However, the legacy of apartheid market policies, rising unemployment, combined with 
poor enforcement of legislation, has caused non-standard employment to flourish (Clarke, 2004). 






This chapter was divided into two sections, the first dealt with a summary of the findings vis-à-vis 
the research questions, and the second set out how the findings related to the key points from the 
analysis. 
 
The first subsection of section one dealt with the perspectives of the temporary agency worker, 
firm and client, and key findings were highlighted for each of these parties. Firstly, in relation to 
the temporary agency worker, the South African TES workers’ status as an employee was 
contemplated as this status is vital for the access to any employee rights in terms of South African 
legislation. Secondly, their access to medical, pension and other benefits and how these compare 
to permanently employed individuals was discussed. The negative consequences of the 
exceptionally high unemployment rate in South Africa and how this affects the TES worker was 
looked at. Ultimately, despite specific legislation dealing with the TES employees and a strong 
legal system in South Africa, TES workers still experience inferior working conditions.   
 
For the temporary employment agency firm, interesting information was provided by the 
participants on the estimated size of the industry, with an overall estimate of 1.5 million TES 
workers in the South African labour market. Some important post-amendment TES industry 
trends were outlined, with a noticeable increase in demand for professional, higher earning TES 
workers. Also, a wider range of staffing solutions were being offered to clients, such as 
outsourced services or the managed service provider (MSP) models. These offerings were seen by 
some as an alternate way to restructure the commercial agreement, and by others as ‘complicated 
schemes’ used to circumvent employee rights. The consolidation of the industry with larger firms 
‘absorbing’ the smaller TES firms was mentioned by participants. Of concern to TES firm 
participants was the negative rhetoric and reputation of the TES industry in South Africa, which 
they advised was based on misconceptions.  
 
Participants provided their views on the reasons why clients use TES firms. These included the 
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desire to circumvent union involvement, or to obtain the legal know-how to deal with unions. 
Avoiding employer associated risks, costs and administration ‘hassles’, with the need to 
externalise their payroll responsibilities was of importance to clients. Participants stressed that the 
priority for the TES client was cost cutting. To this end, TES workers were often hired for 
existing, permanent positions at the company instead of employing individuals on a permanent 
basis, thereby exacerbating externalisation of employment. Overall, the client exerted commercial 
control within the TES relationship, undercutting prices and treating employees as commodities. 
In addition, the legitimate need for workforce flexibility was a large driver for TES work. These 
flexibility needs included the efficient operation of the business, remaining profitable during 
difficult financial times, and ensuring global competitiveness. However, some participants 
pointed out that the benefits associated with flexibility reside with only a handful of well-
qualified, high-status and affluent TES workers and encourages the growth of precarious 
employment contracts and relations among those who struggle to access the labour market. 
 
The second subsection dealt with the newly amended regulatory framework for TES workers in 
South Africa, with a focus on section 198 of the LRA 1995. In particular, the ‘deeming 
provision’, section 198A(3)(b)(i) that includes the identity of the employer party, and section 
198A(5) that contains the principles of non-discrimination, termed the ‘parity provision’ in this 
thesis. In addition, the subsection considers the all-important Constitutional Court (CC) Assign 
matter that clarified the employer party in the TES relationship - the TES client being the sole 
employer of the TES employee after a period of three months. 
 
The third subsection considers how temporary agency work is influenced by trade union 
responses. Ultimately, unions played a key role in campaigning for change in the TES industry.  
However, due to their historical reliance on agency shop agreements, the perceived corruption 
within union ranks, and the required union fees for workers who are poor and trying to make ends 
meet, unionisation of TES workers has been largely unsuccessful. The data revealed that TES 
workers preferred to organise themselves into self-sorted committees or associations as an 
alternative to and not in partnership with existing unions. However, this trend was still in its 
experimental phase. Importantly, recent legislation amendments allow trade unions representing 





The second section of the chapter considered how the findings relate to main concepts and 
debates in the literature and reflects on seven important themes, each dealt with under a separate 
sub-section. Firstly, the complex contractual arrangements between agencies and user firms are 
discussed, and thereafter, the human capital perspective in relation to TES work. The penultimate 
subsection deals with the important theories of segmentation and dualisation in the context of 
South African TES work. The final subsection considers the regulatory environment governing 
temporary agency workers. This final subsection contains three parts, the first deals with the 
equal treatment of temporary agency workers; the second takes a deeper look into the complex 


















CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
11.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the suggested contribution of the research, highlight its 
limitations and make some suggestions as to how this project might be built on by future 
research efforts.  
11.2. Contribution of the research 
11.2.1. Empirical contribution 
Flexibilisation and dualisation of employment have been recurring themes in the literature in 
recent years. Yet there is an absence of empirical research on the latest trends in temporary 
agency work. This is particularly the case in countries from the global south. This research 
provides illuminating evidence in this regard. It has found that trends identified in wealthy 
nations of the west such as the growth in subcontracting or managed service provider (MSP) 
arrangements, are also present in countries such as South Africa. This can perhaps be attributed 
to South Africa’s unique context of a sophisticated legal regime coexisting alongside a weak 
economy. 
While the literature is dominated by pessimistic perspectives regarding the negative 
consequences of global trends of flexibilisation and employment degradation, research on the 
potential for the state and other actors to exercise agency and regulate the use of labour market 
flexibility is of the utmost importance. Research of this nature is, on the one hand, particularly 
crucial, and on the other hand, particularly lacking, in sub-Saharan Africa. Against this context, 
this thesis makes a notable contribution. It provides in-depth case study analysis of both current 
strategies of TES firms and of experts’ views regarding the current and likely impact of 
legislative interventions aimed at regulating temporary agency work. 
The legal provisions in South Africa can be seen as more radical or powerful than those 
introduced elsewhere. For example, the deeming and joint and several liability provisions, in 
comparison to the UK where these are absent. Whereas the parity or equality provisions are 
comparable to those found in the UK. However, the latitude South African employers seem to 
potentially have in justifying different treatment, for example the different employee 
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qualifications and skills, is far wider than the prescriptive provisions found in Regulation 6(1) of 
the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 (AWR) in the UK.  
The important question lies in the extent of actual labour market change effected or realised, and 
crucial here are institutions and resources dedicated to labour market enforcement. The South 
African case demonstrates that while the legislative changes have had some significant influence 
on TES firm and client practice, a dominant perception was that the potential impact would be 
limited due to the under resourced nature of labour market enforcement in South Africa.   
The extensive literature review undertaken did not identify holistic case study research similar to 
that undertaken in the current study, drawing on high quality interview data addressing 
temporary employment from the perspective of the various interested parties post the 2015 
amendments to the legislation framework affecting TES workers. This has enabled a holistic 
assessment of trends and the likely impact of regulatory measures.  
11.2.2. Theoretical contribution 
The South African case is arguably particularly interesting as an example of a country from the 
global south, which while economically weak, has introduced some radical legislative provisions 
regulating the use of temporary agency work in the form of the deeming and parity provisions. 
This represents an example of government or social movement agency pushing back against the 
dominant trends towards flexibility. The South African case may be seen as comparable to 
attempts by populist leaders in other developing countries to introduce social market principles. 
For example, Bolivia under Morales, where social movements united in their opposition to the 
neoliberal principles, engaged in constant actions that included road blockades, strikes, and 
multisectoral mobilisations (Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010). Equally in Venezuela, the Bolivarian 
revolution of Hugo Chavez represented a popular rejection of an externally imposed political 
economy of liberalisation (Riggirozzi, 2010). Argentina’s political and economic collapse in 
2001 was emblematic evidence of the failure of neo-liberal governance, captured in the slogan of 
the demonstrations ‘Que se vayan todos’ (‘out with all of them’). This slogan expressed the 




In terms of the general debates about the existence of an insider-outside divide in contemporary 
labour markets (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002), of labour market dualism (Emmenegger et al., 
2012) and an overall polarisation of the labour force (Kalleberg, 2013), this thesis offers a 
refinement of the segmentation or dualisation theory. In many respects the ‘insider-outsider’ 
divide in South Africa is not in relation to temporary agency employees versus permanent 
employees, but rather the employed versus the unemployed. TES firms utilise or offer 
employment to individuals who are ‘on their books’, forming an internal network of TES 
workers. Those TES workers who access employment through this ‘internal network’ system of 
the TES firm, may partly be seen as insiders in particular in comparison to the unemployed who 
cannot get a foothold in the labour market. Therefore, the South African TES industry, in some 
cases, seems to create employment for some unemployed individuals who become partial 
insiders of an internal network.  
South Africa is a useful case country study due to its particularly difficult economic and social 
conditions set out in chapters 2 and 3, making it an ideal case in which to study the regulation of 
temporary employment agencies and the effect of such regulation. In this regard, the thesis adds 
to the debates on two important themes or developments in the temporary employment agency 
literature. Firstly, equal treatment of temporary agency workers and secondly, joint and several 
liability within the triangular employment relationship. These debates are important in the South 
African context post the promulgation of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2014 (No. 6 of 
2014) (LRAA), that came into effect on 1 January 2015. The new section 198 of the LRA 1995 
adds further protection to lower earning TES workers against possible abuse of temporary 
appointments by employers. Essentially, the amendments to this section restrict the employment 
of TES workers to employment for a period not exceeding three months, or as a substitute for a 
temporarily absent employee, or in a category of work which is considered to be a temporary 
service as determined by a collective agreement of a bargaining council or a sectoral 
determination, for a period of time. In any other situation the employee would be considered an 
employee of the client and not the temporary employment service. The interviews were 
conducted from June 2017 to February 2018, shortly after the amendments and a critical time in 
the legislative history of TES employment regulation.   
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Importantly, the study contributes to debates regarding regulatory avoidance and how it is 
constructed and played out in the South African national context (Knox, 2018). On the one hand, 
temporary employment agency firm participants pointed out the benefits of temporary 
employment agency work. For the client this includes increased flexibility and access to 
specialised industrial relations, legal, management and human resources functions. For the 
temporary employment agency worker, increased employment security and a stepping-stone into 
permanent employment. However, evidence pointing towards these benefits stemmed primarily 
from the TES firm participants themselves and some secondary documentation. In contrast, data 
related to regulatory avoidance and its negative effects were far more extensive and stemmed 
from a broader range of parties. This was especially true for smaller, ‘bakkie brigade’ temporary 
employment agency firms. Perhaps most importantly, these findings underscore the absence of 
appropriate responses to address problems. The lack of response can be attributed to decreased 
unionisation in general and particularly within the TES industry, and an understaffed and 
overstretched inspectorate that did not inspire confidence with any of the participants.  
Like in other countries trade unions in South Africa are struggling for legitimacy facing many 
challenges from the flexibilisation and fragmentation of employment, employer opposition and 
changing attitudes of young workers towards union membership. They also face acute resource, 
logistical and operational challenges in attempting to organise the TES sector. At the same time, 
South African trade unions have been successful in promoting the regulation of TES work. Due 
to the tripartite system that exists in South Africa, the important legislative changes were 
introduced primarily due to union influence and lobbying. In addition, and relatedly, unions have 
influenced public opinion, which in turn legitimised the legislative changes introduced.  
Finally, this study contributes to understanding the debates around the South African variety of 
capitalism and provides valuable theoretical insights on the interaction between global trends in 
work and employment and the particular features of the South African context. Ideal types of 
national systems cast light on why specific types of firm do better at different times and in 
different places, and how national level governance systems, and dominant clusters of relations 
between firms, may promote certain common practices (Lane and Wood, 2009).  
In terms of the VoC theoretical framework, South Africa contains elements of LMEs and CMEs 
but does not approximate an ideal CME nor LME (Nattrass, 2014). Macroeconomic, trade and 
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investment policies are economically liberal, but while it is relatively easy to retrench workers 
for economic reasons, labour legislation is protective in other respects, raising costs to employers 
(Bhorat and van der Westhuizen 2009; Nattrass, 2014). The small size of the domestic market 
together with the extreme income and wealth inequality, makes for unattractive foreign direct 
investment (Padayachee, 2013; Nölke and Claar, 2013). Compared to the other middle-income 
and developing countries, South Africa has a relatively high coverage of collective bargaining 
and involvement of trade unions and business in government policy (Nattrass, 2014). The state 
has strong regulatory capacity, particularly regarding tax and labour legislation, yet the 
enforcement of this regulation is weak. In addition, there are high unemployment rates and no 
significant informal sector (Nattrass, 2014).  
The rapid expansion of atypical and precarious work, legal loopholes, weak monitoring and 
enforcement, all provide employers with greater flexibility. South African TES employment 
trends are characterised by both regulating/coordinating and deregulating/liberalising tendencies 
- which is becoming more dominant in South Africa is difficult to conclude. However, the trends 
towards flexibility arguably reflects the continued and growing dominance of neo-liberal ideas 
and principles. Employers seem to have ‘won’ the flexibility battle, with the labour market 
remaining very flexible for most of them (Clarke, 2004). Despite labour’s victories with the new 
amendments, these reforms are unlikely to reverse the deeper trends that have dominated the 
evolution of the segmented, post-apartheid South African labour market. 
11.2.3. Methodological contribution 
The research comprised a constructive research approach through a single holistic case study, 
using qualitative research methods including document analysis, interviews with experts and 
secondary data. The holistic case study with embedded units enabled a thorough exploration of 
TES working in South Africa, while considering the influence of the TES worker, client and 
agency (Baxter and Jack, 2008). This holistic approach provided the ability to look at different 
sub-units (the TES client, worker, firm and unions) that were situated within a larger case (South 
African TES working) and considered the interrelationships within the phenomenon of TES 
work within the South African context (Yin, 2003). The literature did not reveal any research 
that has focused on TES work in South Africa from four different perspectives, namely the TES 
worker, firm, client and union, within the newly amended legislative framework. In addition, the 
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use of expert interviews greatly aided the data collection and analysis process. Senior legal, 
union and business professionals were interviewed as participants in order to ascertain the impact 
of the historical, political, regulatory, and economic trends in South African TES work. Further 
research in this area would benefit from the strategies adopted for this thesis.  
11.3. Limitations of the research 
The research would have benefitted from interviews with temporary agency workers. As 
documented in chapter five, no agency workers were interviewed, however the alternative 
approach taken was to speak to experts and this was arguably a strong methodology in this case 
in that the difficulties experienced by TES workers are well documented. What is less 
documented however is the strategy, response and views of key players such as TES firms and 
clients and the legal practitioners regarding industry trends.  
 
TES firm participants were reluctant to provide information or documentation regarding the size 
of their firms or how many TES employees they engage. This reluctance stems from a 
historically negative view of TES firms in South Africa and a belief that this negativity relates to 
their size and growth within the labour market. Participants were therefore guarded when pressed 
for specifics relating to statistical or contractual information. Similarly, legal participants were 
unable to divulge details relating to their clients and could only provide general information or 
views. Consequently, a lack of specific statistical and contractual information necessitated a 
reliance on secondary information that could be found in the public domain such as annual 
reports, legal judgements and local media reports. However, although specific information on 
numbers employed and contractual relations were not provided, quite precise estimates of TES 
worker numbers were provided on specific TES firms. These estimates combined with other 
secondary data enabled a good sense to be obtained regarding the scale of the industry.   
 
As a result of this lack of quantitative information provided, the thesis was primarily qualitative 
in nature. While the high quality and triangulated nature of the qualitative data obtained means 
that the findings and analysis outlined are robust, greater use could have been made of 
quantitative data, most notably in the form of figures on the size of TES firms, their growth over 




Related to the above, a limitation in certain sections of the thesis is that participant observations 
are in some instances presented without support from additional or secondary documentation. 
For example, the participants perceptions of consolidation in the TES industry or that the ‘bakkie 
brigade’ has declined in incidence. Participants did not provide any secondary documentation 
and no other evidence is available especially in relation to smaller TES firms. Smaller TES firms 
were invited to present their views, via e-mail invitation and follow-up phone calls, but were not 
willing to participate and further research would be useful on these issues. 
 
The actual number of interviews conducted differed from the what was originally intended as no 
TES employees were interviewed, which resulted in far fewer interviews. The reasons why these 
interviews did not take place is set out in chapter 4. Even though only 34 interviews were 
conducted with participants in the TES industry, the general analysis and conclusions were valid. 
The input from experts such as lawyers and trade union representatives who have access to, and 
speak on behalf of, a much wider client or constituency base provided a much broader 
understanding of the TES industry than just the 34 individuals. In addition, the strategy of 
triangulating via secondary data and from a number of different sources (the TES firm, worker, 
client and union representatives),  means that this research avoids a possible limitation or 
weakness of case study research, namely that conclusions are drawn on the basis of one or a 
small number of pieces of information or organisational perspectives that do not reflect the 
complete or 'true' picture of the situation or issue being examined (Yin 2003, pp. 97-101).  
Despite the limitations of this study the methods used produced data sufficient to address the 
research questions. However, as any exploratory study it provides an initial overview of the 
issues of temporary agency working in South Africa. Further research is needed in order to 
complement, broaden and also challenge the findings presented in this thesis. 
11.4. Suggestions for future research 
The regulatory framework differs in each country as it reflects legal traditions, national character 
of trade unions and employers’ associations and historical differences in the balance of power 
(Cousins, 1999). This research touched on the comparisons between the UK and South African 
temporary employment agency regulatory framework, but the focus was on the South African 
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case. There would be great potential in undertaking further research comparing the UK and the 
South African temporary employment agency environments. For example, the South African 
legislation dealing with equal pay of atypical employees that came into effect during 2015 and 
the lessons that can be learnt from the UK’s equal pay provisions. Although a brief UK-South 
African comparison has been made by Ebrahim (2017), an in-depth analysis of the comparative 
consequences of these provisions for TES employees, firms and clients would be useful. In 
addition, broader comparative research into how economic trends, pressures and initiatives to 
regulate precarious work both in South Africa and the UK could be conducted. 
In line with the above, due to peculiar histories, legacies, boundaries, legal frameworks, and the 
nature of collective action, precarious work has different characteristics in different national 
settings. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency of research to consider the economic 
development of the west (Kalleberg and Hewison, 2012). As pointed out in chapter three, in the 
global south, work has occurred under unstable conditions, with little legal regulation and little 
expectation of long-term continuity (Mosoetsa et al, 2016). A great part of the active population 
has never performed work that corresponds with the ‘conventional’ or ‘standard’ employment 
model (Tekle, 2010). Research that investigates disadvantages among TES workers from a 
south-south comparative is lacking. For example, a comparison between South Africa and 
Venezuela or Bolivia would be of interest. There is also a need for north-south comparison 
between the institutional settings that affect temporary agency work, specifically relating to the 
working conditions and experiences for TES workers, efforts by governments and unions to 
promote principles and policies such as the ILO’s decent work, and how these have had impact 
or been limited and why. In addition, research into the impact of regulatory reform and union 
efforts in countries in the global south, as compared to those in the global north, would be 
beneficial. 
Finally, further South African domestic-focused research could be undertaken. This research was 
conducted primarily during 2017, when the legal framework for TES workers was newly 
amended. There was uncertainty about the meaning of the sections pertaining to TES workers 
and their long-term consequences. A clearer picture regarding the potential benefits of these 
changes for TES workers could be obtained. In this regard, interviews with TES workers would 
be ideal. This research could include insight into how the issues and challenges raised in this 
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research have been addressed and whether the amended framework has, over time, improved 
TES worker experiences. In addition, a more in-depth analysis of how migration status, ethnicity, 
gender, geographical location, educational attainment, political ideology and age influence 
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 1 13 June 2017 Johannesburg 
 
 
Auditing firm: one of the top five 
auditing companies 
Partner  
 2 27 June 2017 Johannesburg 
 
Law firm: one of the top five law firms 
in South Africa 
Partner - Employment Law 
 3 30 June 2017 Johannesburg Large employment services group, 
including temporary employment 
services.  
Head of Department 
 4 4 July 2017 Johannesburg Law firm: one of the top five law firms 
in South Africa 
Director - Employment Law 
Department 
5 11 July 2017 Johannesburg Employment services group, including 
temporary employment services.  
Executive, HR 
 6 13 July 2017 Johannesburg Law firm: one of the top five law firms 
in South Africa 
Senior Associate - Employment 
Law  
 7 20 July 2017 Johannesburg Law firm in Johannesburg Senior attorney for the strategic 
litigation unit 
 8 1 August 2017 Johannesburg Large national trade union in South 
Africa.  
General Secretary 
9 3 August 2017 Johannesburg A registered, non-profit, voluntary 
organisation.  
Director 
 10 11 August 
2017 
Johannesburg International employment services 
group, including temporary employment 
services. One of the largest in South 
Africa 
Managing Director 
11 17 August 
2017 
Johannesburg Confederation of business organisations.  Senior director level 
12 24 August 
2017 
Johannesburg Large trade union in South Africa. Specialist Division Manager 
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13 1 September 
2017 
Johannesburg An industry association in South Africa Director 
14 7 September 
2017 
Johannesburg A labour law, Human Resources and 
Industrial Relations consultancy.  
Chief Executive officer (CEO) 
15 12 Sept 2017 Johannesburg Large TES firm in South Africa. CEO 
 16 19 Sep 2017 Cape Town One of the largest retailers in South 
Africa (top 4).  
Head of HR 




18 6 October 
2017 
Port Elizabeth A dispute resolution body. Senior operations employee 
 19 13 Oct 2017 Johannesburg Many years of experience working for 
relevant government departments. 
Director level 
20 17 Oct 2017 Cape Town Cape Town Bar Advocate at the Cape Town Bar 
21 20 Oct 2017 Johannesburg A trade union federation in South Africa.  Spokesperson  
 
 
22 22 October 
2017 
Pretoria A South African Government department Director 
23 23 October 
2017 
Johannesburg Johannesburg Bar 
Labour Court  
Advocate of the Johannesburg Bar 
Acting judge of the Labour Court 
 24 23 October 
2017 
Pretoria An attorneys’ firm specialising in South 


















26 26 Oct 2017 Johannesburg Large trade union in South Africa  Head of Legal  




28 3 Nov 2017 Johannesburg Law firm: one of the top five law firms 
in South Africa 
Associate (Attorney) 




Acting Judge of the Labour Court 
 
30 21 Nov 2017 Johannesburg Staffing Confederation  Director 
 
 
31 11 Jan 2018 Johannesburg A labour law, Human Resources and 




32 19 Jan 2018 Johannesburg A staffing solutions business, including 
temporary employment services  
COO 
33 14 & 15 Feb 
2018  
Johannesburg Large law firm known for their expertise 
in labour law 
Director 










PhD interview invitation (for participants other than union participants)  
 
I am studying for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Business and Law at 
Kingston University London. I have read your online profile and I believe that you would add 
considerable value to my thesis on labour brokers in South Africa. 
 
The main unit of analysis of the research is temporary agency or labour broker working in South 
Africa. More specifically, the research aims to evaluate the character, impact, regulatory 
framework and social/institutional context of temporary agency working in South Africa. One of 
the primary objectives is to find out how temporary agency working in South Africa is 
influenced by the interplay between the pressures of the economy (the driving trends); the norms 
of the ILO (decent work); the local actors and their institutional structures (trade unions and 
employer organisations). I have attached a letter of recommendation from my supervisors that 
provides further details of the study. 
   
Would it be possible to conduct a telephonic interview with you for approximately 20-30 
minutes, at a time and date that suits you, on either a Tuesday, Thursday or Friday? The 
following are the types of questions that I would like to ask but essentially, I would like to know 
what is of interest to you regarding labour brokering in South Africa. 
 
1. What would you say are the key trends in use of labour brokers? 
2. What are the general perceptions of labour brokering and how are these changing?  
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3. What would you say is the impact of the legal framework and government policies on 
labour brokering? 
4. Do you believe there is a place for labour brokers in the South African labour market? 
5. What are your thoughts about labour brokers and the ILO concept of ‘decent work’? 
6. I am also particularly interested in information about the differences in labour 
brokering in different sectors and occupational groups. 
 
As it is part of an academic thesis, you and your firm may remain anonymous and I will send you 
a confidentiality undertaking prior to the interview.  
 






Researcher’s contact details:  
Phone: XXXX 
Email: XXXXX 
Deans’ contact details: 
Email:   R.Tuninga@kingston.ac.uk 
Phone: 0044 (0) 208 417 5228 











PhD interview invitation (union participants)  
 
By way of introduction, I am studying for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of 
Business and Law at Kingston University London. A previous interview participant 
recommended you as they believed that you would add considerable value to my thesis on labour 
brokers in South Africa. 
 
In order to provide a brief summary of my research, the main unit of analysis is labour broker 
working in South Africa. More specifically, the research aims to evaluate the character, impact, 
regulatory framework and social/institutional context of labour broker working in South 
Africa. One of the primary objectives is to find out how labour broker working in South Africa is 
influenced by the interplay between the pressures of the economy (the driving trends); the norms 
of the ILO (decent work); the local actors and their institutional structures (trade unions and 
employer organisations). In this regard, I have attached a letter of recommendation from my 
supervisors that provides further details of the study. 
   
Would it be possible to conduct a telephonic interview with you for approximately 20-30 
minutes, at a time and date that suits you, on either a Tuesday, Thursday or Friday? The 
following are the types of questions that I would like to ask but essentially, I would like to know 
what is of interest to you regarding labour brokering in South Africa. 
 
1. What would you say are the key trends in use of labour brokers? 
2. What are the general perceptions of labour brokering and are these changing?  
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3. What are your thoughts about the Government’s policies on labour brokering and 
what are the key causes or influences of these policies? 
4. What are your thoughts about the labour movement’s response to these policies? 
5. Do you see union policies concerning labour broker workers changing in the future, 
and if so how? 
6. What are your thoughts about labour brokers and the ILO concept of ‘decent work’? 
7. I am also particularly interested in information about the differences in labour 
brokering in different sectors and occupational groups. 
 
As it is part of an academic thesis, you and the union may remain anonymous and I will send you 
a confidentiality undertaking prior to the interview.  
 






Researcher’s contact details:  
Phone: XXXXX  
Email: XXXXXX 
Deans’ contact details: 
Email:   R.Tuninga@kingston.ac.uk 
Phone: 0044 (0) 208 417 5228 





Appendix 3: Written consent to participate in a research study 
 
 
WRITTEN CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Statement by (name of participant) 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet/letter of invitation for this study. 
I have been informed of the purpose of taking part. 
 
Title of Study: Temporary employment services work in South Africa 
 
• I understand what my involvement will entail and any questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
• I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can withdraw at any time 
without prejudice. 
 
• I understand that all information obtained will be confidential. 
 
• I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published and stored before and after 
the examination process, provided that I cannot be identified as a subject. 
 
• Contact information has been provided should I (a) wish to seek further information from the 
investigator at any time for purposes of clarification (b) wish to make a complaint. 
 
 
      Participant’s Signature---------------------------       Date ---------------------------------- 
 
Statement by Ronelle Barreto (researcher) 
 
• I have explained this project and the implications of participation without bias and I believe that 
the consent is informed and that the participant understands the implications of participation. 
 
Ronelle Barreto (researcher) 
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Appendix 4: Contents page for the Framework Document  
SOUTH AFRICAN TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK:  FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT 
Contents 
A. The growth and importance of temporary agency work 
B. The nature of temporary agency work in South Africa 
a. Why organisations engage agency workers 
i. To avoid unionised staff 
ii. To avoid the risks associated with being the employer 
iii. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
iv. Saving on administration costs - economies of scale 
v. Seasonal or fluctuating work demands 
vi. Lack of human resources functions and know-how 
vii. The complexity surrounding organisational rights, tax laws and 
bargaining council provisions 
viii. To keep company employee head-counts down 
b. Why individuals work for temporary employment agencies 
i. After retirement 
ii. Income tax rules 
iii. Flexibility 
iv. A steppingstone to permanent employment 
v. Lack of skills required to access jobs 
vi. To gain experience and skills 
c. Why labour brokers run TES businesses 
C. The controversy surrounding temporary agency work 
a. Historical controversy 
b. Political controversy 
c. The controversy surrounding how labour brokers are structured and 
conduct business 
d. The controversy relating to the workers’ experience of the TES relationship 
e. The controversy surrounding the casualisation of permanent jobs 
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D. The context of temporary agency work 
a. The unemployment context 
b. The context of the lack of social security 
c. The context of a youth based industry 
d. The South African demographic context 
e. The context of the tax structure 
f. The context of a minimum wage 
E. The ILO framework for temporary agency workers 
a. General ILO context 
b. The ILO Convention 181 
c. The ILO concept of ‘Decent Work’ 
d. The Decent Work Country Program (DWCP) 
e. The ILO and the future of work 
F. The national legal framework for temporary agency workers 
a. The historical legislation governing temporary agency work 
b. Protection of employees earning below the threshold of R205 433.30 per 
annum 
c. Protection of employees earning above the threshold of R205 433.30 per 
annum 
d. Where does the employment relationship reside within the triangular 
arrangement? 
e. The ‘deeming’ provisions 
f. ‘Equal treatment’ provisions 
g. Organisational rights provisions 
h. Provisions regarding the registration of labour brokers 
G. Problems with the interpretation and implementation of the amendments 
a. General difficulties with the implementation and interpretation of the law 
b. Section 197 - transfer of a business as a going concern 
c. Section 189 - ‘retrenchments’ or redundancies 
d. Difficulties with dismissal disputes 
H. Problems with the enforcement of legislation 
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I. Responses to the new legislative amendments 
1. The history of the drafting of the new amendments 
2. The nature of litigation after the amendments 
3. The response of temporary employment agencies or ‘labour brokers’ to the 
new amendments 
4. The response of clients of the temporary employment agencies, to the new 
amendments 
5. The response of temporary employment agency workers to the new 
amendments 
J. The exploitation of temporary agency workers 
a. Historical exploitation 
b. Current exploitation, fear and abuse 
K. The union response to temporary agency work 
a. Historical union responses 
b. Current union responses 
c. Alternatives to unionisation 
L. Supply chain management and the temporary agency worker 
M. Bargaining councils, collective and sectoral agreements 















Appendix 5: Extract of the Framework Document 
A. The growth and importance of temporary agency work 
However, if we look at why is it that labour brokers continue to flourish it is largely because part 
of the workforce is made up of individuals who may not be able to be directly employed by a 
company (Int1.p2. par2). 
You know the Labour Relations Act was amended and the amended version was promulgated in 
January 2015 (Int3. P29. Par2). And subsequent to that there has been a number of changes but 
some of the changes are very sector specific, so you know I don’t know if you want to maybe 
differentiate between what we would call industrial services (Int3. p29. Par4). In our industry 
certainly from the [Company name] point of view we've got industrial services which places 
your traditional blue-collar workers, anything from a general worker through to potentially an 
engineer. Then we have what we call support services which is your white-collar temporary 
employment services or temporary work agency. And that would be your bank tellers your call 
centre agents and the like (Int3. pp29-30. Par8). And then the third and final classification that 
we use is what we call professional services. And professional services relate to your IT on 
practice you know your java programmers your systems analysts your developers etc. (Int3. p30. 
Par10).  
[paragraphs deleted] 
RB: Okay has the [deleted] noticed particular trends in the industry? (Int17.p255. Par.25). The 
industry has continued to increase the number of people it takes on (Int17.p255. Par.26). So, it 
has – I don’t have the empirical figures – but it definitely is a much it started probably at the 
[00:07:13] of the labour market, but it is now one of the key players in the market for sure. That 
continues to be contested, unfortunately is also true, (Int17.pp255-256. Par.28). And that the 
industry itself is striving to move towards better regulation. And I have gone to meetings and 
discussed with some of the representatives of the industry particularly on how the industry can 
provide a better image and a cleaner image of itself. The reality is that it is now a key factor in 
the labour market (Int17.p256. Par.30). RB: And at these meetings what has been discussed in 
terms of that image and how to improve it? (Int17.p256. Par.31). If they had to fit with the issue 
of the triangular relationship, how to handle it. Because you can't improve the image unless you 
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deal with the substantive issues, the difficult issues particularly for organised labour on the table 
(Int17.p256. Par.32). 
The labour broker industry I think it is quite a substantive, well I won't call it a job creator, there 
is a debate about whether or not it creates jobs, or you know what the status is. But it's been a 
substantive industry in the labour market in South Africa for some time, and to a certain degree 
they had been seen as institutions that affectively supply cheap labour. Now that is not my view, 
but that is the general impression a lot of times from society […] (Int18.p265. Par.12). 
[deleted paragraphs] 
Yes, look I think we've seen an enormous growth in the industry from roundabout 2000 roughly 
and it does play I think a significant role in the labour market. I think since the amendments were 
introduced to Section 198 in 2015, it is a little bit unclear how the industry will be developing 
into the future. So, I think we are in a bit of a transition period and it is a bit difficult to know 
exactly what the future holds, but it is still a big significant industry. And what the amendments 
did in 2015 was not to really undermine the operation of the industry, but more to regulate its 
way of operating. And the real effects of that we'll have to see in time what impact that has on 
the industry (Int22.p364. Par.18). RB: So, you would say that there is a place for the industry in 
the labour market? (Int22.p364. Par.19). I do think so, I think that what is important to recognise 
is, that the industry is quite a diverse one, there are a number of well-established temporary 
employment service companies that do follow the regulatory model that's in place in law, do 
provide certain benefits for the employees that they place. But I'm afraid the industry combines 
very sort of low end, more informal operations, where there have been a significant number of 
abuses associated with labour brokering and temporary placement. And that's really where I 
think as government, we have been aiming the policy to have maximum affect to try and regulate 










Appendix 6: Kingston University application form for ethical review (RE4) for research 




APPLICATION FORM FOR ETHICAL REVIEW RE4 












If yes, please specify the name of the group/cohort and note who will be responsible for ethical oversight 
of projects in this area (the block release holder); this will usually be the module leader, supervisor or 




Project title:  
Temporary agency working in South Africa 
Name of the lead applicant: 
Name (Title / first name / surname): Mrs. Ronelle Barreto 
Position held: PhD student 
Department/School/Faculty:  Kingston University Business School 
Telephone: DELETED 
Email address: DELETED 
 
Name of co-applicants: 
PLEASE REFER TO THE RE4 GUIDANCE NOTES AND 




Name (Title / first name / surname):  
Position held:  
Department/School/Faculty:   
Telephone:  
Email address:  
 
Name (Title / first name / surname):  
Position held:  
Department/School/Faculty:   
Telephone:  
Email address:  
 
Name (Title / first name / surname):  
Position held:  
Department/School/Faculty:   
Telephone:  
Email address:  
 
Is the project: 
 
Student research Yes  
X 
No  
 KU Staff research Yes  
 
No  






If it is STUDENT research: 
Course title  




Dr. Enda Hannon 
 
SECTION B (Complete this section if another ethics committee has already granted approval for the 
project. Otherwise, proceed to Section C)   
 
Committee that granted approval  
 
Date of approval  
 
 
Please attach evidence that the project has been fully approved (usually an approval letter). The original 
application should be retained on file in the Faculty for inspection where necessary. The Faculty Research 
Ethics Committee (FREC) may require further information or clarification from you and you should not 
embark on the project until you receive notification from the FREC that recognition of the approval has 






SECTION C Provide a brief project description (max. 150 words). This should be written for a lay 
audience 
The proposed research aims to combine data from different sources, with the main unit of 
analysis being temporary agency working in South Africa. More specifically, the proposed 
research aims to evaluate temporary agency working in South Africa as a whole, in order to 
obtain the best possible understanding of the character, impact, regulatory framework and 
social/institutional context of temporary agency working in South Africa. In this regard, 
internal comparison across sectors, and in different geographical locations, may facilitate 
deeper understanding of agency working in South Africa. 
The objective of the proposed research is to answer the following questions: 
4. What is the current position in terms of the experiences of the agency worker in South 
Africa? 
5. What is the regulatory framework for temporary agency working in South Africa? 
6. How is agency working in South Africa influenced by the prevailing social institutional 
context? 
7. How is agency working in South Africa influenced by the norms and practices of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO)? 
8. How is agency working in South Africa influenced by the interplay between the 
pressures of the economy (the driving trends); the norms of the ILO (decent work); the 




Estimate duration of the project (months) 48 months 
 
State the source of funding  
Kingston University PhD studentship 
 
 
 Yes  No X 
400 
 
Is it collaborative research? 
 





















Briefly describe the procedures to be used which involve human participants  
It is anticipated that temporary agency workers and other key informants will be interviewed. These 
interviews will be guided conversations, facilitated by a checklist of topics and questions to be 
covered. The specific application of this approach will differ according to the type and purpose of 
the interview. As a result, the interviews will not be restricted by ascribing too many predetermined 
categories to the interview schedule. The aim will be to draw out a range of relevant themes, 
including unexpected ones. The researcher will use in-depth, semi-structured interviews which are 
common in qualitative research. The in-depth nature of the interviews lies in the intention of the 
interviewer to uncover details of the interviewee’s experience. It is anticipated that the interviews 
will be on a one-to-one basis. 
 
 
Summarise the data sources to be used in the project 
 
Temporary agency workers, key informants and experts in the field will be interviewed. The 
interviews will, where possible, be recorded and transcribed. The researcher will take hand written 
notes during the interviews. Documents may also be used for contextual information about events 
that cannot be directly observed, or to question information from other sources. It is difficult to 
anticipate at this stage what documents will be accessible to the researcher. However, the following 
are examples of some of the documents that may be relevant and available: pro forma terms and 
conditions of engagement, any union documentation, contractual documents and other documents 
that may provide information regarding any benefits that they may receive, may be of interest. News 
clippings and other articles appearing in mass media or in community newspapers may also provide 
a source of information for the case study. 
 
 
Storage, access and disposal of data 
Describe what research data will be stored, where, for what period of time, the measures that will be put 
in place to ensure security of the data, who will have access to the data, and the method and timing of 




Interviews with participants will be recorded and the audio files together with the transcripts of the 
interviews will be stored. It is anticipated that the raw data will be stored until after the examination 
process as the examiners may need to have access to the data. The following data protection 
principles will be followed: 
• Personal information such as names and contact information will be stored separately from 
the research data such as audio recordings and transcripts. This will be achieved by giving 
the participants a serial number and a pseudonym which will be assigned for the research. 
• The electronic files or any documents linking serial numbers and pseudonyms to participants 
will be kept in a separate location from the research data. 
• The paper documents and electronic files will be stored in a lockable cabinet or on pass-word 
protected electronic device. Only the members of the research team or the examiners, will 
have access to these documents. 
• If data is shared with others, such as supervisors or examiners, these will be securely 
transferred. Pseudonyms will be used from the outset when emailing data.  
Consent will be obtained from the participants to store the data, concurrently with their consent to 
participate in the research. At the end of the interview, once they have knowledge of what the data 
entails, they will be verbally requested to agree that the data can be stored. This revised, verbal 
consent will form part of the interview material and will be recorded and transcribed. 
 
 
Risk Assessment Questionnaire:  Does the proposed research involve any of the following?   
  YES NO 
0. The use of human biological material? 
 
 X 










2. People with an intellectual or mental impairment, temporary or permanent?  
 
X 
3. People highly dependent on medical care, e.g., emergency care, intensive care, neonatal intensive 
care, terminally ill, or unconscious?   
 X 
4. Prisoners, illegal immigrants or financially destitute?  
 
X 
5. Women who are known to be pregnant? 
 
 X 
6. Will people from a specific ethnic, cultural or indigenous group be targeted in the proposed research, 
or is there potential that they may be targeted? 
 X 
7. Assisted reproductive technology?  
 
X 
8. Human genetic research? 
 
 X 
9. Epidemiology research? 
 
 X 
10. Stem cell research? 
 
 X 
11. Use of environmentally toxic chemicals?  
 
X 
12. Use of ionizing radiation? 
 
 X 
13. Ingestion of potentially harmful or harmful dose of foods, fluids or drugs?  
 
X 
14. Contravention of social/cultural boundaries? 
 
 X 
15. Involves use of data without prior consent? 
 
 X 




17. Compromising professional boundaries between participants and researchers?  
 
X 
18. Deception of participants, concealment or covert observation? 
 
 X 
19. Will this research significantly affect the health* outcomes or health services of subjects or 
communities?  
 X 
20. Is there a significant risk of enduring physical and/or psychological harm/distress to participants?  
 
X 
21. Does your research raise any issues of personal safety for you or other researchers involved? 
(especially if taking place outside working hours or off KU premises) 
 X 
22. Will the research be conducted without written informed consent being obtained from the 
participants except where tacit consent is given by completing a questionnaire? 
 X 
23. Will financial/in kind payments (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be 
offered to participants? (Indicate in the proposal how much and on what basis) 
 X 
24. Is there a potential danger to participants in case of accidental unauthorised access to data?  
 
X 




SECTION D (To be signed by all applicants) 
Declaration to be signed by the applicant(s) and the supervisor (in the case of a student): 
 
• I confirm that the research will be undertaken in accordance with the Kingston University Guidance 
and procedures for undertaking research involving human participants. 
 
• I will undertake to report formally to the relevant Faculty Research Ethics Committee for continuing 
review approval where required. 
 
• I shall ensure that any changes in approved research protocols or membership of the research team are 




• I shall ensure that the research study complies with the law and University policy on Health and 
Safety. 
 
• I confirm that the research study is compliant with the requirements of the Disclosure and Barring 
Service where applicable. 
 
• I am satisfied that the research study is compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998, and that 
necessary arrangements have been, or will be made with regard to the storage and processing of 
participants’ personal information and generally, to ensure confidentiality of such data supplied and 
generated in the course of the research.  
(Further advice may be sought from the Data Protection Officer, University Secretary’s Office) 
 
• I shall ensure that the research is undertaken in accordance with the University’s Single Equality 
Scheme. 
 
• I will ensure that all adverse or unforeseen problems arising from the research project are reported 
immediately to the Chair of the relevant Faculty Research Ethics Committee.  
 
• I will undertake to provide notification when the study is complete and if it fails to start or is 
abandoned; 
 
• (For supervisors, if the applicant is a student) I have met and advised the student on the ethical 
aspects of the study design, and am satisfied that it complies with the current professional (where 
relevant), departmental and University guidelines. I accept responsibility for the conduct of this 
research and the maintenance of any consent documents as required by this Committee. 
 
• I understand that failure to provide accurate information can invalidate ethical approval. 
 
Is this an application for fast-track ethical approval? 
(Fast track is only available for projects either pre-approved by another ethics committee, or where you have 
























If this is a block release application and/or you have answered YES to any of the questions in the Risk 
Assessment, you must complete a full application for ethical approval and provide the information outlined 
in the checklist below. Your project proposal should show that there are adequate controls in place to 
address the issues raised in your Risk Assessment.  
If you have answered NO to all of the questions in the Risk Assessment you may submit the form to your 
Faculty Ethics Administrator as a fast-track application. You must append your participant information 
sheet. The Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC) may require further information or clarification 
from you and you should not embark on the project until you receive notification from your Faculty that 
recognition of the approval has been granted. 
CHECKLIST (Where a full application for ethical approval is required) 
Please complete the checklist and attach it to your full application for ethical approval: 
Before submitting this application, please check 
that you have done the following: (N/A = not applicable) 
Applicant Committee use only 
Yes No N/A Yes No N/A 
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All questions have been answered X 
All applicants have signed the application form X 
The research proposal is attached X 
Informed Consent Form is attached X 
Participant Information Sheets are attached X 
All letters, advertisements, posters or other recruitment material to be 
used are attached 
X 
All surveys, questionnaires, interview/focus group schedules, data 
sheets, etc, to be used in collecting data are attached 
X 
Reference list attached, where applicable X 
